HUMAN VALUES IN INTERCULTURAL SPACE

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JAGIELLONIAN CULTURAL STUDIES

Edited by Renata Czekalska, Agnieszka Kuczkiewicz-Fraś, Leszek Korporowicz

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JAGIELLONIAN CULTURAL STUDIES

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FROM THE EDITORS

In the global system of relationships and mutual links as well as international cooperation, the representatives of almost all cultures observe the growing importance of communication. The need to cooperate does not limit, but rather reveals the importance of distinct identity and cultural heritage as well as the ability to create the future with respect for the original values of human communities, even while undertaking the activities of innovative nature.

Inspired by the above described notions, and the idea presented by an eminent Indian scholar, Professor Suresh Sharma, whose concept of Word and Image creates a transcultural space for academic discussion, we present a volume of essays by a group of scholars united within the framework of the Jagiellonian Cultural Studies which refers to multicultural and centuries-old tradition of dialogue and fruitful co-existence between different nations, originating in the medieval Poland, as well as the allied neighbouring countries. The inspirational concept of Word and Image – in which the project of Jagiellonian Cultural Studies, with its stress on intercultural in-depth understanding could be written in – allowed us to bring together the two projects under the heading of this publication.

The articles are divided into two parts: Word and Image in Intercultural Space and Human Values in Intercultural Space. The volume opens with two programmatic texts, by Bogdan Szlachta and Leszek Korporowicz. The former article discusses political and legal issues related to the problem of cultural rights in a modern multicultural society, whereas the latter – proposes a creation of an integrated theory of intercultural space, in the context of the contemporary universe of symbolic culture.

The relationship between word and image in the context of intercultural space triggered the reflexions of six Authors: Rahul Peter Das, Andrzej Dudek, Tomasz Gacek, Beata Kłocek di Biasio, Bohdan Michalski, and Paweł Siwiec. The spectrum of themes discussed in this part includes literature; translation; Western religious painting; Orthodox iconography; semantic aspects of expressing values in languages belonging to
different civilisations; language as a value; the myth of Europe in art; and the question of European identity.

The Authors of the articles gathered in the second part of the volume – Marcin Brocki, Leon Dyczewski, Łukasz Gacek, Sylwia Jaskuła, Hubert Królikowski, Józef Łucyszyn CM, Tadeusz Paleczny, Dorota Rudnicka-Kassem, Magaret J. Secombe, and Tobiasz Targosz – dedicated their contributions to axiological dimensions of “East” and “West.” The issues confronted encompass cultural relativism; translating cultures; the triad of values fundamental for the development of modern society, such as: human dignity, justice, and solidarity; the principles of Confucianism cultivated in Chinese diaspora; the concept of Carl von Clausewitz’s military strategy in relationship to the ancient Chinese ideas of Sun Tzu; contemporary information culture and society; the approach of the Christian state towards pagans and Paweł Włodkowic’s definition and recognition of the level of dialogue, understanding and compromise; processes of transferring the cultural elements between different racial, ethnic and religious groups; the issue of multi-ethnic relations in Western Europe with special focus on the question of Muslim nowadays identity; the concept of core values in intercultural space defined by Jerzy Smolicki; and modernisation of a traditional society during the colonial period (on the example of Burma).

The Contributors of the volume address the complex connection between both the axiological and pragmatic levels of human life, thinking, and comprehension – indicating the natural craving to combine the material and the spiritual. In this context, they also undertake the multifaceted issue of mutual interdependences between word and image, both of which not only signify meaning but also work as natural carries of human values. The articles gathered in this publication justify therefore that different cultures of the World are not only united by common values, but at the same time, they are also enriched by cultural diversity.
PROBLEMS OF CULTURAL RIGHTS

ABSTRACT When one reads the declaration of UNESCO from the early twenty-first century and wonders not so much on the phenomenon of coexistence of different cultures, but rather on the multicultural projects formulated in relation to the above, one relates the key questions to its origin and possible new solutions, first political and then legal. In political philosophy today developed in the so-called Western societies, these projects are linked to the reflection on their liberal and democratic foundations, especially on the issue of individual and group rights. Outlining these problems may be the introduction to the discussion of the key issues emerging in the reflection on the modern citizenship, as well as the expected legal order of multicultural societies.

Keywords: cultural rights, rights of minorities, multiculturalism, liberal culturalism, liberalism
The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity was adopted unanimously during the 31st Session of the General Conference of UNESCO on 2 November 2001. It preceded the adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions which took place a few years later, on 20 October 2005. The declaration of 2001, according to the website of the Polish UNESCO Committee stated that diversity is the common heritage of mankind, and that cultural diversity is a source of creativity and the essential element for the dynamic development of societies (Polski Komitet ds. UNESCO). The above statements do not give rise to serious debate, although they already indicate the assumptions about equality of all cultures which in their diversity constitute the “common heritage of mankind” and “a source of creativity and the essential element for the dynamic development of societies.” However, its further formulations arouse serious disputes, sometimes focusing on the very foundation of the language used today, especially in the so-called West, among the members of liberal democratic societies. The Declaration in fact states, moving the reflection from the level of facts describing the actually existing many and diverse cultures, sometimes carrying contradictory content or patterns of behavior, to the normative level, supplementing the previous one (and perhaps derived from it), which brings about problems carried by the so-called naturalist fallacy). At the second level, one says: “normative” (or “somewhat normative” as one speaks about rights in the subjective sense, rather than the law in the objective sense), meaning that “the protection of cultural diversity is an integral part of human rights and as such should be seen as an ethical imperative” (Polski Komitet ds. UNESCO).

1 In Article 1 of the Declaration (“Cultural diversity – common heritage of humanity”) one may read: “Culture takes diverse forms across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.” The next two articles (Art. 2: “From cultural diversity to pluralism of cultures” and Art. 3: “Cultural diversity as a factor in development”) state that “In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life. Policies endorsing integration and participation of all citizens are the guarantee of social consistency, viability of societies, civil society and peace. Cultural pluralism defined in this way is the political answer to the existence of cultural diversity. Cultural diversity widens the range of options open to everyone; it is one of the roots of development, understood not simply in terms of economic growth, but also as a means to achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence” (Powszechna Deklaracja: 2).

2 In the key article 4 of the above Declaration of 2001, key for the reflection of this work) (entitled “Human rights as guarantees of cultural diversity”) we find the following words, which bring us not only onto a political, but also a normative level: “The defence of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from respect for human dignity. It implies a commitment to human rights and fundamen-
It appears, then, that what we have in mind is not a legal obligation, but only an ethical imperative involving real cultural diversity, and not only a normative resolution of moral value, but the connection between the actual cultural diversity with juridical relation, when mention is made of the fact that “the protection of cultural diversity is an integral part of human rights.” It seems that it is expected to protect the actual diversity of culturally specific identities, probably of individuals and/or groups by assigning individuals and/or groups with the rights allowing the protection of their identity and preservation of their their diversity resulting from the diversity of their cultural contexts. Moreover, the website, when discussing the declaration, says that by “protecting individual freedoms, in particular the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples. No one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope.” In the last cited article, Article 5 of the Declaration entitled “Cultural rights as an enabling environment for cultural diversity” lone may find an important supplement to the normative level, as it says: Cultural rights are an integral part of human rights, which are universal, indivisible and interdependent. “The flourishing of creative diversity requires the full implementation of cultural rights as defined in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Articles 13 and 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. All persons have therefore the right to express themselves and to create and disseminate their work in the language of their choice, and particularly in their mother tongue; all persons are entitled to quality education and training that fully respect their cultural identity; and all persons have the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice and conduct their own cultural practices, subject to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Powszechna Deklaracja: 2-3).

3 Once, in the introduction to a collection of essays Szlachta 2012: 8-10 I wrote that “Popular knowledge’ tells us that ‘once’ the world was not as complicated as it is today, that it was more homogeneous, or at least that the Western world was more uniform. Without going into discussion about the intriguing question of the existence of such a world or its possible ‘essence,’ one usually assumes that there were times when reference was made to the nature of the human species or nature as rationality or reasonability (reason) common to all species, and the norms of natural law were creates basing on the above – the norms which the human mind could determine when it duly recognized nature as not shaped by itself, but contained in each person, perhaps introduced by God or developed in some other way or characteristic to it in some other way. The norms of natural law (as ‘once’ one spoke about about natural norms and rules rather than ‘innate possibilities’ and even natural rights of an individual) were to set fundamental normative context for the activity of any human legislator, no matter who it would be; the content of these standards was to somehow limit the legislative will of each body, and probably also every sovereign. When one uses ‘popular knowledge,’ one usually does not see the consequences of the nominalist or even nominalist-voluntarist revolution because knowledge today is enriched with information about the anatomy of animals or structure of chemical compounds, the rivers of South America or romantic poets rather than information on disputes which shaped the mind of the ‘Western man.’ This ‘once,’ however, remains within the boundaries of that knowledge, and we turn back to this knowledge when we read, for example, the statements of the current St. Peter, Benedict XVI, on the importance for the Western legal culture of a meeting between Stoic philosophers and Roman lawyers in the second century before Christ. This meeting twenty-two centuries ago helped shape the theoretical concept finding justification for the ‘measures of law’ not in God’s revelation, but in nature; the concept indicating indirectly that beyond the arbitrary will of each of the ‘sovereigns’ lies ‘the final measure’ of what they introduce as the content of law, as a set of norms supported by sanctions; that – in contrast – it lies next to or above this will, that it binds this will, because before the judgment of will one has to appeal to reason able to know something that is not dependent on the mind of the knower and is not shaped by it. The task of the mind is to learn, and that of the will to relate to what has been learned. We must know that what was to be known was nature
the diversity we protect the rights of minorities, endangered languages and the right to education and expression in the mother tongue,” clearly associating a real cultural diversity with the rights granted not to individuals, but rather to groups, including minority groups. The signatories to the Declaration not only noted that “an essential criterion for the protection of diversity is the protection of cultural heritage and active cultural policy guaranteeing universal access and dissemination of information on the cultural goods and creations and ensuring the free circulation of ideas,” but also advocated “international cooperation in order to create and support indigenous cultural industries capable of existence both at national and international level,” pointing finally “to the need for cooperation between the public and private sector for the effective protection and promotion of diversity” – briefly, giving consent, and even calling for the use of also public funds both for the “effective protection” and to “support diversity” actually existing in many societies, not only probably the liberal-democratic cultural diversity (Polski Komitet ds. UNESCO).

When we reflect not only on the sociological description of the well-known, “real” phenomenon of the coexistence of different cultures in today’s society, but rather responses to multicultural projects, key questions are asked about its origin and new political and legal solutions that it offers. In political philosophy, these projects are usually associated with reflection on the foundations of liberal societies and the question and that reason was to apply to it the standards to protect it, especially after the terrible experiences of the previous century, the century of Auschwitz, but also the age of critical discussion on tradition reiterated by Pope Benedict in the German Bundestag in September 2011.” This collection included articles about the problems associated with the search for justification for universally binding legal rather than moral normative order in the second half of the twentieth century – the century marked by the rule of positivist and normativist approach to law, and attempts to identify the causes of these problems, including the problems of explaining the transition from what is actually normative in the so-called liberal democracies, and remarks on problems related to the treatment of the individual as a citizen and a man at the same time (which is present today and in the case of refugees is reflected in trying to determine what “nationality” and “citizenship” are) finally, the proposals submitted today by those considered to be liberals and those called agonist or radical democrats. The reader can find there remarks of historical nature and reflections on the content of contemporary debates, and can perhaps ascertain that we “are still discussing the same issues, although we are talking about them now due to the increase in problems resulting from the increase of the ‘real’ multiculturalism and the attempts to translate them onto the lookout for new justifications for normative order. The meeting between natural-legal and positivist-normativist approaches occurs today in a new context, which leads some scholars not so much to introduce new descriptions of the phenomenon of multiculturalism, as to declare that this phenomenon finally removes the basis for the standards found in the nature of the species, common to all (not taking into account the diversity of ethno-cultural groups and individuals), and also leads to the astonishing attempt to weaken or even abolish the ‘territoriality of law,’ i.e. the validity of the legal system for all citizens living in a country, occupying its territory. The transition from ‘factuality’ to ‘normativity’ must now take into account a new element differentiating ‘factuality,’ and possibly differentiating ‘normativity’ as – to some extent at least – a reflection of the other.” Articles published then taken up the problem of representation, no doubt related to the increasing multiculturalism as a phenomenon examined by sociologists, but also connected with the philosophical and political concept, sometimes, on the normative plain, called multiculturalism.

This and the next few paragraphs follow the article “Introduction to the Liberal Project of Multiculturalism” included in the already cited collection of essays Szlachta 2012: 139-148.
of the so-called relations between individual rights and the rights (perhaps perceived only as norms) of groups to which individuals, being nationals of states including these groups, belong. Thus posed issue, requiring extensive discussion on the plain of the history of ideas (political thought), and also indicating individual positions formulated today by those with extreme and moderate approach to multiculturalism, feminist and communitarian environments critical towards this approach, would require an extremely elaborate text, which is still lacking in Polish literature of the subject. The author of the text, however, is not attempting to fill this gap, but rather focuses on critical comments on project considered most significant from a theoretical point of view and providing a point of reference for the apologists and critics of the ideology of multiculturalism. This project, developed by Will Kymlicka in his work on contemporary political philosophy (Kymlicka 2009: 397–452), is sometimes referred to as “liberal culturalism,” thus associated with the liberal tradition. Indeed, precisely in this tradition one may usually find the basis for the formulation of multicultural projects, understood as justifying respect for otherness and cultural diversity, “plurality of individuals” regardless not only of their gender, race or social class but also their cultural or ethnic group. Such a definition of this tradition leads to the issue of equal value of each individual, which can not be influenced by the above mentioned or other conditions that empirically determine differences between individuals. Basically the main point here is equal dignity (or “value”) of each of the individuals and – postulatively, or at least potentially postulatively – the same value of each individual life and its projects.

What becomes problematic already at this point is the question of determining the criteria to punish individuals for certain acts that are nothing more than a realization of a part of their own life project. This issue has been dealt with by political philosophy of politics since its very beginnings. Its creators have formulated different justifications for the existence of subjective and objective sovereignty, even in modern times associated with only legislative sovereignty. In the tradition of liberal thought this subject also is raised, generally leading to a thesis about the need to adopt a justification which takes as a starting point the will of the individual to submit to the sovereignty in order to obtain protection for individual rights and freedoms etc., including – which sometimes is especially emphasized – external security. Apart from an undoubtedly engaging discussion on the countercultural approach and even abandoning the selected topic as too broad, one may only state that looking for justification for the possibility (right) to punish for certain actions of individuals by somehow justified and understood sovereignty, guides us towards the relationship between a strictly individualist approach (with individual as to be the ultimate source of sovereignty as such), and situating the individual not before or against any groups, but within them. Limiting the liberal tradition identified by the ideologues of multiculturalism (referred to by Kymlicka) to strictly individualist approach problematizes the treatment of citizens of a multicultural state at the same time as an individual (which, according to this tradition is consistent especially with justifying sovereignty, and with it the existence of any normative order [see in particular (to recommend a text available in Polish) Habermas 2005]) and as a member of a group other than the state, because identified as national or ethnic,
forming at least a minority in the given country (mainly immigrants, e.g. long settled in the territory and enjoying the citizenship of the country – this may well concern the Aborigines in Australia and the French-speaking Canadian citizens living in Quebec. In these countries the reflection on multiculturalism is particularly relevant and has been undertaken for a long time, and the name of the Canadian communitarian Charles Taylor is often mentioned among the main creators of this kind of reflection). The strictly individualist assumption leads to the open proclamation of the possible respect for each individual, but also – which is important here – to justifying the existence of a single normative order for all individuals regardless of their affiliation to any group belonging to the same state as other groups. The conclusion essential at this point is worth noting: the diversity of citizens on grounds of their group affiliation may not lead to a differentiation of citizens-individuals in their function to justify the generally applicable norms, binding all individuals in the same manner regardless of their eventual membership in the group.

The Liberal tradition has two faces, according to Kymlicka: on the one hand, it was used as justification for the redistribution policy, crucial in the work of building of welfare states, significantly weakening the differences between individuals seen by the Marxist tradition as belonging to different social classes; on the other hand, it is used for formulating the so-called policy of difference, emphasizing differences between individuals rather than removing them, as in today bygone policy of redistribution. The policy of acceptance or difference, close to the followers of the ideology of multiculturalism therefore rests on a different premise than the once effective redistributive policy; it does in fact – otherwise than the previous one – create differences between individuals. Although these differences are no longer “class” or “economic,” but “cultural,” however – let us emphasize this fact – the point is to differentiate individuals. The same tradition is therefore used to justify the pursuit of equality between individuals but also differences between them; this first goal is subordinated not only to the purely economic dimension, but also the legal or entitling one. The second option is not limited to the purely cultural dimension, but is also connected with the legal or entitling one. Kymlicka, in fact, sees no tension between the two pursuits present in the liberal tradition, and thus does not take into account the difficulties or inconsistencies within this very tradition. His “liberal culturalism” in fact leads us to claims which are unacceptable for one of the liberal pursuits specified above, for striving to achieve equal position of each individual and their rights in comparison with any other individual belonging to the same country with any other citizen subject to the same legal system.5 That claim

5 Sometimes this tension is perceived by the followers of the ideology of multiculturalism and leads them to seemingly paradoxical claims, such as the one of a British citizen of Indian descent Bhikhu Parekh, the author of the famous report adopted by Her Majesty’s Government, which demands discrimination (as differentiation of particular groups) and (also) refraining from all discrimination (as taking into account the positions of all the groups). Looking at this paradox in the words of a supporter of multiculturalism, and even reconstruction of the “traditional” way of thinking about Britishness as a phenomenon dominated by white British tradition one can see how far it departs from the absolute prohibition of discrimination for individuals, usually commonly associated with the liberal tradition (see also another article by the Author of this work Parekh 2006: 65-78).
can be made even more dramatic by giving it the following wording: if one of the liberal aspirations is to support equality before the law (i.e. uniformity of rights for each individual), the second aspiration contradicts this goal, and even acts against the very essence of previous efforts, leading us from the need to rethink the far-reaching transformation of the theory of citizenship varied in connection with differences between rights of individual citizens.

The tension thus observed in Kymlicka’s project is of paramount importance; it is not important that we associate it – as Kymlicka does – with the possible dissonance which is present in the liberal tradition. What is important are not the words or even the uniformity of positions in the history of political thought (it is enough to mention that within the liberal tradition several competing trends may be discerned, whose supporters refer to different categories and different constructs – for example, utilitarians and liberal rationalists, now called supporters of liberalism based on rights), but quite a fundamental issue: the ideologues of multiculturalism consciously deny the thesis of the possible assignment of powers exclusively to individuals undifferentiated from the point of view of the legal position. It is an extremely powerful statement, in fact, also Kymlicka takes it into account if in connection with it he introduces a distinction of external security and internal restrictions: on the one hand he aims to take into account the possible influence by other groups and/or multicultural state to a given group identified by its “cultural identity,” on the other hand to take into account the possible influence of the group on its members. External security measures, for the sake of their value, negate the possibility of limiting by other groups and/or multi-cultural state of the given group that identifies itself through its cultural identity; their nature is thus colloquially liberal: the “freedom” of the group is at stake, which can neither be denied nor even violated by external influences; the second element of the distinction is in fact of a similar value, as it is also “colloquially liberal,” since in this case it is required that the individual (this time not a group to which they belong) is not in its decisions or ways of life constrained from the outside, not so much by the state or another group, but by the group to which they belong. In this way, our claim on the contradiction between aspirations within liberalism is protested against at the level of liberal commonness, because it turns out that both the agreement to external security measures and opposition towards internal restrictions have liberal value. A “liberal culturalist” defending the autonomy and diversity of each group\(^6\) appears in this way at the same time as a defender of individuals as members of each of the groups. Thereby, however, he opens an unusual perspective, using liberalism to justify the need to take into account not only

\(^6\) This question is still valid, and in another context it was already posed in the text, regarding the possibility of justifying the existence of normative criteria for the operation of individual groups or making their own decisions built on their own cultural identity; in other words, on the possibility of its co-participation (as by each of the individuals justifying the existence of sovereignty and – subsequently – normative order justified by them general standards binding each individual in the same way regardless of the differences between them) in the work to justify sovereignty over the groups (and each of them separately), and thus justify the existence of standards binding each group in the same way.
“individual rights” but also “group rights,” prepares us to accept liberalism as a position acting against itself, against its own, so far dominant principle of equality of individuals before the law; prepares to us accept the thesis that it is dangerous for its main principle, and even “self-contradictory.”

This quite a fundamental problem from the point of view of a historian of political thought brings us to the issue which is much more serious from the perspective of anyone observing the development of discourse on multiculturalism and growth of the phenomenon itself. The fundamental problem concerns the prospects of being associated by some with the creation of each individual out of “shattered” group identities their own individual identity according to their own taste (perhaps strongly shaped by media content), leading in the final instance to the emergence of a world of identical people, in fact losing their differences in spite of reverse attempts, associated by others with the prospect of having to reformulate the previously existing legal systems in different countries (no longer national ones), or even to establish in their place conglomerates of legal systems derived from many different group identities. The major question in connection with the second option sounds very serious: can we then defend the existence of any normative point of reference common to all new legal systems: whether it will be a conglomerate of equals, and equally respected in a given territory normative projects, applicable only to the members of a given group, in the absence of even elementary norms of a common normative base, however, exceeding a set of only procedural standards, or will a certain amount of common standards be maintained, if only those belonging to criminal law, allowing to disqualify certain actions, which – although justified by reasons of cultural identity – will be considered as negating the generally applied pattern and will justify the punishment of their perpetrators? If the second solution is accepted, however, it will open the critical prospect from the point of view of proponents of multiculturalism; the prospect of having such rules in this set that would disqualify certain behaviours justified for the sake of the particular traditions of the community, for the particular interest of the identity group, and it will happen perhaps because of one/some (but not all) particular group identities/traditions. It seems that such a solution cannot be accepted by the proponents of multiculturalism. It is no longer a question of the so-called affirmative actions in favour of some minority disadvantaged socially or economically or even culturally – it is a much more serious problem requiring a different and a new approach. An approach not taken into account in the liberal culturalism of Kymlicka, which is conservative in expecting a slow change in present legal systems which are still based on the territorial principle; an approach that will perhaps characterise those who will radically reconsider the liberal tradition and recognize that the place of individuals justifying with their consent the existence of sovereignty, and thus a single normative order should be taken by other entities, this time – groups. These will be cultural and ethnic groups co-habiting with others on the same territory, formerly states, based on the uniform national concept, now with their own normative systems, congruent to the appearance of some common procedural norms and possibly also a material ones, including criminal law, but also certain (because given the right to do so), that at any time they can leave such a relationship of groups. But will states exist then or will they disappear based on
the “principle of territoriality”? And will opposition to the internal restrictions imposed by the group on its members be possible?

Such questions are particularly justified now. Delight in the multicolour diversity of contemporary liberal societies, sometimes increased by media campaigns and public resources (which the Declaration did not mention) should not obscure these questions. The point is not to limit tolerance for “otherness,” running xenophobic policies of closeness towards national and ethnic minorities that fuel opposition of the majority, most often concerned about, for example, competition in the labour market, towards newcomers from afar or settled for generations, heirs of a tradition and identity different than the majoritarian one tradition. The point is only to think about the theoretical consequences of projects formulated today, and associated with liberal tradition. The call to take up this kind of reflection is by all means justified as a call to carry out a kind of intellectual exercise towards the practical reality which subject to clear changes – it is enough to see the consequences of affirmative policies in the area specified herein. This exercise becomes easier when we take into account old approaches, as those formulated in the early fifteenth century (the so-called late Middle Ages, some centuries before the Enlightenment, which is so close to many) by the rector of the Kraków Academy, Paweł Włodkowic, and also new approaches found in the statements of representatives of other non-Western contemporary cultures, who do not know well (and perhaps do not know at all or do not accept) the liberal, essentially individualistic thinking of the main creators of Western multicultural projects, especially liberal culturalism. Looking from this perspective, the attempt to include in a volume devoted to cultural rights as rights of groups rather than individuals the approaches both present and past seems to be obvious, first because they let us trace the beginnings of justifications for group rights, and secondly – they reveal their conditioning in the expectations and demands formulated by those arriving in West, hoping to benefit from multicultural policies implemented there, after all, based on the concept of cultural rights accurately identified and described in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of 2001 and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression of 2005.

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INTERCULTURAL SPACE

ABSTRACT
Contemporary features of global, technological changes stimulate such processes as mobility of cultures, deterritorialization of space, multiplication of space, convergence and interaction, decentralization and disappearance of physical boundaries in communication and metamorphoses of space, especially of symbolic space which can repeatedly interchange its real and virtual dimension. That is why we shall form the basis for a proposal concerning the creation of an integrated theory of intercultural space which will combine the classical and the virtual understanding of cultural and intercultural space in the context of the contemporary universe of symbolic culture. Attributes of thus understood space have a relatively different and distinctive ontological status and they refer to different characteristics of space but in very intensive, mutual relations. In the proposed theory they are interlinked and their characteristics show a high degree of synergy between “objects,” “relations” and the “scope” of their attributes. Interactions of these attributes take place at various levels of reality; they change the character of attributes but maintain the general logic of mutual clarification and the explanatory power of the integrated theory of space where objects define relations, relations define objects and scope, and scope defines objects and relations.

Keywords: anthropology of space, intercultural space, symbolic culture, attributes of space, integrated theory of cultural space
Herodotus, widely considered the “Father of History,” as early as in the V century BC described the rich relations between local communities and cities of ancient Greece, Egypt and Asia Minor; therefore, he revealed the significance of the relationship that developed in the cultural space of these regions that was present in stories and intergenerational transmissions of their inhabitants. These relations always had a profound significance, so did the strength of identity of communities in small countries that laboriously created symbols of their distinctive status and transformed them into values and elements of the citizens’ dignity. Despite the multiplicity of these communities and the proximity of the areas recognized as their domain there was a fundamental, constant and clear policy that assigned them to a specific territory symbolically represented by a capital and surrounding towns.

As a result of different phases of civilizational development these communities began to expand not only by merging their own territories but also by conquering new territories that belonged to their dominions; as a consequence, they would impose their influence, traditions and cultural patterns, especially in the successive epochs of progress, technological discoveries, exploration of new routes and invention of new means of transport. Not only did they bring new forms of transporting goods and people, but they also introduced new ways of transmitting information, thus turning the cultural space into a subject of constant expansion and interaction, exchange, synergy and emergence of hybrid cultural constructs (Korporowicz 2009(a); Korporowicz 2009(b)). The essence of these changes (which began to advance rapidly during the Renaissance; later they developed through the series of industrial revolutions and presently through media) was the process of reciprocal content delivery and the creation of specific “spaces and channels of flow.” The borders of cultural spaces became imprecise and fluid, in addition these spaces began to lose their central disposal centres.

Some areas of contemporary cultural space overlap to such an extent that it is in fact difficult to identify distinct monocultural spaces. It is important to note however, that this phenomenon is not a simple increase of cultural diversity, i.e. a formation of a multicultural area in which each and every culture retains their status quo and simply a passive sense of tolerance is sufficient for its existence. As far as these overlaps are concerned, they cause far-reaching interactions and fuses of qualitatively new elements, and their numerous rearrangements change the character of individual components of a given culture, their function and meaning. For these reasons the analysis of intercultural space brings a great number of fundamental theoretical issues into the field of contemporary cultural studies; they impose a major redefinition and revaluation in terms of the classical categories of analysis (namely sociological, anthropological, ethnological) and methodological assumptions (Jaskuła 2011). They shall form the basis for a proposal concerning the creation of an integrated theory of intercultural space which will combine the classical and the virtual understanding of cultural and intercultural space in the context of globalization, cultural diversification and mediatisation of the contemporary universe of symbolic culture (Bokszański 2007).
DETERMINANTS OF RE-EVALUATIONS

Intensive interaction processes cause re-evaluations of their own dynamics which is never located in a static environment of a single or many cultures. What follows is the formation of intercultural space; it is not however, synonymous with multicultural space because of the dynamics and characteristics of the continuous evolution, but above all because of the constant willingness to accept mutual enrichment, completion, and also because of the dynamics of meetings between people, communities and cultures. In such space all factors of change acquire key importance; especially those which allow conscious change made through reflexive choices and compositions i.e. those which activate the personal and social self, subjectivity and self-agency of man. Therefore, intercultural space is an area of constant transgressions; hence it is a challenge not only in the sphere of praxis but also in the sphere of its conceptualization as it requires overcoming many cognitive and methodological schemas, as well as a development of a new kind of academic sensitivity. These challenges stimulate the creative potential of individuals and groups, especially when they relate to the creative exploration or alteration of identity or when they provoke its intentional and deliberate transformation.

This change is not an aim in itself; it involves an abundance of mental and social threats and it leads to multi-area crises. It is however important to note that they activate many features of human personality; they create new types of interpersonal, intergroup and interinstitutional relations; finally, they are much more than just a passive adaptation or a strategy of inculturation. In the current development of social and cultural studies the creative potential of intercultural space is significantly undervalued. The reason behind this is possibly the lack of any theory of intercultural space, but above all it is possibly due to the continual, unbreakable presence of still dominant, functional orientations in social sciences which are based on static, repetitive and adaptive dimensions of social reality (Krzyżanowski/ Urbańska 2010; Giddens 2003; Giddens 2002).

The above-mentioned characteristics of intercultural space gain more clarity and they present all their dynamic aspects in the rise of an entirely new, previously unknown virtual space. In fact, it results in the emergence of an equally new mode of existence, but also overall functioning of space in general, especially intercultural space, which further triggers its transgressive mental and social components embedded in the new technological realities with entirely objective micro– and macrostructural determinants. Their essence is the radically new quality of deterritorialization, which takes away the constitutive physical attributes of space which locate it in firmly established boundaries, changing it into a configuration of meanings where physical distances lose their importance in favour of semiotic “distances.” This prompts a radically contextual, hybrid and multi-dimensional understanding of space – especially symbolic space and information space with a high factor of relativity in defining its borders and the nature of its content. Therefore, as in the case of cultural space theory and space in general, the concept of intercultural space also requires a new theory of relativity.
The stimulating factor in both circumstances – i.e. in the development of the new type of space and in the reflection on its new characteristics – it is the increasing role of the “virtual” space which displaces traditional forms of existence and experience in the “real” space and reality. In fact, the construction of interconnected systems of meta-space is in a rapid and intense development; furthermore, these systems have a synergetic and often hybrid character in which all possible types of flows, transformations, translocations and functional dualities play a fundamental role. This poses a difficult and important question in contemporary cultural studies of new anthropology of space which will be able not only to analyse but also to design cultural, intercultural and communication competencies appropriate and effective in a given situation. In experiencing and functioning of cultural space, as well as in the relations of the discussed spaces, the connections between meanings have not so far surpassed the reality defined by its physical parameters (Poster 2006; Castells 2008; Castells 2013; van Dijk 2006). With the unprecedented progress in the sphere of information technologies this allows a radical process of the aforementioned deterritorialization, as well as a peculiar disembodiment of space, its products and contents of culture. Thus, the boundaries of cultural space not only broadened; in fact, this made it rather easy and effortless to cross them. They are full of “holes” or “gateways,” and, in equal measure, overlays and synergies that shift in the world of global information flow, and consequently of a new configuration of communities defined by their participation in the network society.

In the media civilization, the domination of a geographically and physically determined “place” ceases to be the determinant of space (including intercultural space) (Goban-Klas 2005). Instead, it is displaced by the relationship of exchange which defines the scope of the flow, and subsequently the relationship of the symbolic interaction seen as the appropriate “substance” to define boundaries and content of space.

Undoubtedly, the statement in the preceding paragraph does not mean that the traditional, physical space ceases to exist and loses its important cultural functions. However, the role it plays changes its character in the whole of the multidimensional, hybrid, flow and alternating cultural reality. Due to advanced liquidity and hybrid ontology of space, all skills (and needs) that activate the subjective attributes of self acquire profound significance which becomes the most important component of the new type of space; eventually, it also indirectly creates the dynamism of this space, but above all it becomes the main energy and creative force that forges human cultural identity (Lyotard 1997; Matsumoto/Juang 2007; Mikułowski-Pomorski 2007; Lash/Friedman 1992; Goldberg 1994). The nature of intercultural space ceases to be static, parametric and homogeneous; instead, it becomes dynamic, relational and ontologically diverse.

Paradoxically, intercultural space does not eliminate but rather “illuminates” different cultures; moreover, as a growing phenomenon of modernity it promotes or even enforces the ability to recognise the significance and values of specific components of each separate culture. In addition, it illustrates the processes of their interpenetration, configuration and creation, but it also stimulates the potential and competencies necessary for assigning human meaning to them.
Further analysis of different types of intercultural relations and, correspondingly, types of intercultural spaces requires the establishment of the key features that determine and characterize the process of their modern development; in fact, the first volume of the series Jagiellonian Cultural Studies entitled Mobility of Cultures was largely devoted to this topic (Politeja 2012). These features reflect global, technological and objective determinants of growth and development of intercultural space. They are:

- **mobility of cultures**, which reduces the importance of geographical, administrative and ethnic boundaries and enters the era of intense cultural transgressions that result in the nomadic nature of communities and communication spaces;
- **deterritorialization of space**, which is particularly intense in relation to virtual spaces; moreover, it breaks the conventional relationship of space, acting subject and its relation to the configuration of the elements of the environment;
- **multiplication of space**, which causes an uncontrolled increase in possibilities of reproduction, multiplication of quantity, range enlargement, increase in information diversity/cultural diversity;
- **convergence and interaction** – of physical, symbolic, virtual space and cultural patterns present there;
- **decentralization and disappearance** of the boundaries of cultural areas that define their central and peripheral points or the systematic shift in the area of network participation;
- **metamorphoses** of space, especially of symbolic space which can repeatedly interchange its real and virtual dimension, find its representations in various media with high transfer capabilities that “embed” the content in itself, transfer to various context, or develop parallel coexistence;
- **diversification of symbol-formation competencies** which extends not only the range of communication competencies of the members of old and new communities in the global network of interactions but it reveals to them new and diverse ranges of meaning i.e. purpose-oriented cultural meanings and values which are the result of a dynamic process of mutual interactions (Golka 2008; Hargie/Saunders/Dickson 1994).

**METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES**

All the above-mentioned processes imply a series of consequences in the treatment of the intercultural dialogue, of the cultural heritage of each individual community, but also of the approach towards the heritage of other cultures, by determining the scope and potential of intercultural space on its many levels (Urry 2009; Znaniecki 2001; Lash/Friedman 1992; Goldberg 1994; Nikitorowicz 2009). These processes have a great number of methodological implications that take into account the open and interactive character of space.

Firstly, more extensive connections and interactions between cultures provide a new overall context for their functioning. This context significantly broadens the under-
standing and interpretation of their individual elements. The broad area of references in the multi-layered image of cultural reality does not reduce the issue of identity and heritage; on the contrary – it exposes the issues of identity and heritage due to questions that arise in the process, which are largely a consequence of globalization and relocations in the new space of interaction typically associated with this phenomenon.

Processes of deterritorialisation, (i.e. the detachment of cultural content from the specific territory of its origin) occasionally do not result in success; their new locations met with a strong reaction in the form of reterritorialisation phenomena as exemplified by the aforementioned revival of exploration and experience of small homelands. Countering the negative consequences of cultural eradication has become the objective of many organizations and social movements. A similar tendency to strengthen the need of identity and to present a new reading of the heritage is found in response to postmodern de-compositions and re-compositions of traditional and, in specific environments, relatively stable cultural patterns. These actions lead to significant, newly rediscovered re-compositions and re-constructions which are extremely powerful within the multiplicity of regional cultures, but also ethnic movements, local communities, socio-cultural societies and educational programs. Fragmentation of structures and contents of culture, characteristic for the processes of globalization and relocations, is related to integration effort which manifests itself in the revival of the need for a sense of identity and expressing interest in consciously recognizable heritage.

Secondly, phenomena of re-composition and re-construction, together with rediscovering oneself in the polymorphic universe of culture require much more than the reproduction of patterns or expertise that allow their accurate identification. Crystallized and sufficiently intense dynamisms of development are undoubtedly needed; these dynamisms, at the level of personality, should be investigated in an open structure of self, motivation and human value; and at the super-individual level – in the type of awareness and social attitudes. They trigger the skills of design, perspective, transgressive, and, above all, subjective thinking. They are the reason behind the fact that in the multiplicity of available contents, patterns and their possible combinations, it is still possible to find something else than just chaos, confusion, disintegration and dispersion. This becomes one of the main goals of modern cultural science and intercultural relations studies that go beyond mere descriptions and classifications but rather aim at understanding their sources, problems of continuity and change (LUHMANN 1997). These dynamisms blend with the interactive nature of intercultural space; consequently, it ceases to be a static panorama of inert objects and in the cultural sense it creates these elements, moderates them and continually maintains their active state.

Thirdly, the extended field of social interactions, choices and transformations leads to a new perspective on the developmental significance of cultural interactions and thus intercultural space becomes the matrix of creative reception and processing of heritage, together with the ways of communicating it in the world of border crossing, content relocation and a great necessity of identity. Intercultural space of this type has three unique characteristics:
a) it is transgressive; it goes beyond the designated boundaries, participation rules, conventions and patterns of coding;

b) it reveals the possibilities of learning new skills and promotes values that are little known or even new (Lustig/Koester 2006);

c) it leads to the empowerment of their participants, i.e. to the development of their own rule of self-determination which is significant in the relations with other members of the common space of interaction (Korporowicz 2008(a)).

The abovementioned attributes of the dynamically changing intercultural space require the formation of a relatively unified, integrated theory that would allow a synthetic approach to the real and virtual space and would explain the nature of the flows between them. The need for an integrated theory of space arises not only from the simultaneous, parallel existence of both the real and virtual space; in fact, it rather results from their continuous interlacing and complementing, and from the alternate character of the dominant. This phenomenon causes a build-up of a peculiar metamorphosis of numerous elements of each space which occasionally are part of the real world but they can equally easily become a reality of the virtual world. This happens, for instance, to many elements of each of the two spaces; they are the “meeting spots” where social interactions take place. They can take a completely material form such as cafes, classrooms or even supermarkets; at the same time, they often transfer to the virtual space in the form of social networking sites or online discussion groups. What remains as their only symbol is the electronic address in the “network.” The transformation of places that are understood in such manner indicates the necessity of a synthetic recognition of the communication space due to the cumulative nature of the process that is a result of the constant overlapping and complementing of the interaction space. An integrated theory of space should help to avoid learning limited ideas about the contemporary universe of symbolic culture which reinvented the two types of space and clearly gains even more from their synergy.

The creation of an integrated theory of both cultural and intercultural space must commence from the construction of its elementary version which can identify the fundamental components that exist in the completely “real” manner, and, at the same time, attributing to them an appropriate value and meanings at the higher level of the constructed model, generating the forming processes of symbolic culture and finishing at the level of the virtual space in which the weight of the physical component disappears in favour of the absolute dominance of the processes of axiosemiotics. Such theory should meet the diagnostic functions which are explanatory but also heuristic, and should inspire proper understanding and analysis of modern intercultural space in the whole of its various manifestations and synergies.

In order to obtain even a brief insight into the existence of the compounded space of contemporary media civilization that assumes a growing importance of the diffusion and interaction of cultures it is necessary to separate, at each of the discussed levels, three basic groups of its attributes that have a significant impact on the processes of mutual definition. These attributes have a relatively distinctive ontological status and they refer to different characteristics of space, thus they constitute analogical “components”
in the attempt to build this particular model of space. In the proposed theory they are interlinked and their characteristics show a high degree of synergy.

A) Objects

At the elementary level, they have the character of ordinary physical objects to which individuals attribute meanings; consequently, they form material correlates of culture. The elements that constitute the geographical space are specific objects of nature; the elements of social space, which provides physical objects with a great number of symbolic meanings, are formed from the urban space and architectural creations. They create a new type and level of space which illustrates the myriad ways of integrating it. Not only physical objects constitute objects of the virtual space but also those informative, symbolic components of space that are recognized as content. They are frequently the symbolic representations of physical objects. Objects of space can also include the aforementioned places of interaction which adequately show their dual nature and the alternating characteristics of their mode of existence; however, they fulfil similar functions with similar meanings and similar values, serving as the fundamental determinants of space (Smolicz 1999). These objects can be created from relatively autonomously understood cultures, the characteristics of which force the multi-level understanding of space due to the multi-level characterization of each individual culture.

B) Relations

They designate the inalienable attributes of space by defining the means of connections, impact and interpenetration of objects, channels of information flow and types of interactions. In terms of the physical sense of space they are parametrically definable distances but also the mutual location that even at this level can gain a great number of meaning; in addition, it can create and express this recognized meaning. In the virtual space relations become, in fact, merely informative and symbolic, they are systematically disembodied, thus transforming the space of semiotic and axiological (mental and emotional, cognitive and communicative) character. Of crucial significance is the fact that on the occasion of such transformation of relation they are the factor that cause the ontological status of objects to change; objects that are often the artefact of these relations and do not exist outside of them. In fact, the relations between individuals, groups and cultures create “meeting spots” (frequently in the virtual world) that are generated by interactions. In this manner intercultural space is formed. Completely new objects are constructed; they are the effect of the relations (including the experience and its content) which begin to create significant content of the interactive (in other words intercultural) space.

C) Scope

Every kind of reflection, analysis or description of space is not possible without defining its boundaries; however, these boundaries and their functions need to be de-
fined in various ways depending on the degree of “materialization” of the space. An integrated theory of cultural space should suggest a multiple approach to the particular problem of “boundaries,” and show their variations, changes, overlap but also their disappearance (Michael 2000). In the case of the virtual space which is delineated by network coverage the problem does not necessarily disappear but rather changes its form. Leaving aside the technological dimension of the “boundaries of coverage,” it is a limit to the abilities to use the network (i.e. information-communicative competence) which consequently establish many other boundaries that define, inter alia: the actual access to information, the access to the designated content, and lastly, the range of meanings and experiences that they create and the dynamism in the development of man but also of the community. The third group of attributes of intercultural space places limits on the actual sense of participation by offering the opportunity to update its resources. These resources form the objects that are contained in the space, the nature of the relations, and eventually the possible level of exploration of their content and of what they are able to communicate, generate and make the actual object of the cultural experience, provided that they are all “within reach” of our participation.

Similarly to the level of difficulty that arises when describing the symbolic objects of space beyond the “grammar” of their relations and types of interactions that create them, it is equally difficult to describe the third group of attributes of space in separation from the other two. The scope i.e. an attribute of availability in cultural and intercultural space is defined as an ability to understand its meanings and realistically achievable experiences. The attributes of “scope” or “coverage,” beyond their physical parameters which characterize the relations between equally physical objects of space, determine the skills of perception, decoding and experiencing the meaning of objects symbolically marked or only autonomous systems of meanings (Reklajtis/Wiśniewski/Zdanowski 2010). Physical objects may constitute a very significant media of meanings assigned to them; monuments and statues are a powerful expression of this phenomenon as they are spaces that are symbolically marked off as sacred areas. They permanently occupy the space of symbolic culture and they primarily function as symbolic meanings rather than physical objects of space. For these reasons, the transition from the physical to purely symbolic objects of space poses a great challenge but it also provides a justification for the integrated theory of cultural space, or even more importantly intercultural space, due to the gradational, gradual nature of the process of “disembodiment” of the parametrically understood space and the development of the process of symbolization in the vast and constantly increasing diversity.

In order to present the three groups of attributes that characterize the information, cultural and intercultural space on each of its many levels, it is possible to present them as shown in the figure below:
The above model determines the necessity of perception, characterization and analysis of mutually determinant groups of attributes of space; space that is created by objects and their relations followed by relatively autonomous relations that define the actual coverage, i.e. the scope of availability, understanding and evaluation of objects. In turn, these objects are the result of that access which completes the circle of mutual definition and mutual self-agency. It takes place on the physical, symbolic and virtual level, but also in the areas of their interpenetration and integration. The number of possible synergies, places of transition and fusions between the levels is practically unlimited and depends on the specific cultural contexts, or in the case of cultures, on the multiple techniques of intercultural translation. The example of such areas of synergy and the possible application of the proposed theory of space is the academic culture of every university. It has at its disposal a number of particular educational facilities located throughout the physical space of a university campus. They are characterized by specific relations that in turn define the various level of availability which, as a result, redefines these very objects. Similar attributes describe the symbolic reality of the university. The same educational facilities can constitute important elements of symbolic culture of the university; they can also be a valuable asset to its cultural capital determined by the system of relations, i.e. the cooperation and common achievements of individual units viewed as teams or departmental communities. In turn, these relations determine the scope and manner of understanding of communal actions and the mission of the university, the sense if its identity and the scope of its interaction with the environment (Dyczewski 2001). This fact may contribute to the creation of new objects not only in the form of buildings, but units and university structures. The operations undertaken in these facilities as an inherent part of the integrate space of academic culture can transfer into the space of virtual interactions and create separate areas of communications that are distant from the places of their initiation; moreover, they can repeatedly return to the space filled with physical, social and character correlates on the level of real academic communities. It often happens that these processes take place in the areas that exhibit a high degree of multiculturalism; therefore, they create their own space of
Intercultural interactions that take full advantage of all the possibilities of combining “places” and levels of communication.

All three groups of its attributes, along with the multiplicity of levels and areas of fusion of the already mentioned “channels of translation” are clearly visible on the example of the separate space. This broadens the cultural function of multicultural space and increases its importance as the place of interactions; moreover, it shows how modern transformations and manifestations of space can be understood in a relational and synergetic manner. Mutual definition of attributes of space can be presented in a simple diagram such as Figure 2:

Fig. 2. Axes that present mutual interaction of attributes of intercultural space

Interactions shown on the above diagram take place at various levels of reality; they change the character of attributes but maintain the general logic of mutual clarification and the explanatory power of the integrated theory of space. Although the diagram below presents three levels of intercultural space of human presence it is worth taking into account that this procedure is characterized by a high level of reduction and conventionality. In practice, but also in theory of its functioning it is possible to distinguish more levels that overlap and adjoin in a number of complex ways. The synergetic nature of modern space is expressed in numerous fuses of objects, relations and processes of interpretation across different levels. Objects of symbolic culture in various areas of national culture gain an increasing number of representations at the virtual space level by transferring intercultural relations to the world of information societies. In fact, they can return again to the reality of specific communities which is exemplified in the Arab Spring of 2013 when all the events on the streets and squares of many Arab cities immediately had their direct counterparts in the virtual reality, and later they would effectively move back to the world of network societies. Discussions, meetings, and general interactions that would independently take place in the virtual space at the same time provided people and political groups with new means of action and enabled the establishment of new facilities in the changing reality of Arab transformations. In fact, these processes spread across numerous countries and represented new phenomena of equally new intercultural space which had unknown characteristics of performance and development. Intercultural space, but of much smaller range, works in a similar manner in local and autonomous communities but also in ethnic organizations that encourage events in the integrated space of intercultural relations of contemporary network societies.

Taking into account the dynamics and the mutual defining process of the attributes of modern space it is better to determine the potential of intercultural space the objects of which become the communities of relations and exchange that have a communal
character of interactions. Accordingly, the relations create the actual content, and thus the objects of space, as well as the scope of their understanding and impact (therefore their cultural presence); in turn, the content generates the nature of these relations and, once more, various objects of space. The theory of space understood in this broad sense allows a relatively flexible definition of many phenomena that cover the reality, the virtual reality and many synergistic phenomena. They will increasingly occupy modern intercultural space that is built in a new, transgressive reality of transnational network societies.

**Fig. 3. Interactions of intercultural space levels**

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**OBJECTS AS INTERACTIONS AND INTERACTIONS AS OBJECTS**

During the earlier characterization of the three attributes of cultural space the author mentions their relational specificity, especially when it is understood in the axiosemiotic categories that cause the gradual “disembodiment” of objects of space and the “embodiment” of relations. An example of collective “objects of cultural space” and especially of communicative space are the network communities generated from symbolic relations of the virtual reality. They gain the same level of reality as any other community; they become an important component of social life, even though their activities generate a wide range of cultural relations. Cultural interactions – and among them, communication – are not present in a different and more truly existent “reality.” On
their own they constitute the true reality which determines human behaviours, shapes the characteristics of social system of particular institutions and the nature of human experiences; moreover, it makes people believe that life is not merely a subjective impression. Therefore, both objects and the relations between them define the reality and social objectivity of cultural and intercultural space, for which interactive elements deserve a careful and specialized analysis as they will be the subject of a number of efforts of an increasingly integrated management of intercultural space.

PARTICIPATION DETERMINED BY RELATIONSHIP AND RELATIONSHIP DETERMINED BY PARTICIPATION

Participation in intercultural space is determined by a wide range of experiences that are made available through relations of specific objects of culture (including symbolic objects) but also communities and institutions. In terms of the model proposed in this paper, all of them constitute objects of cultural space that also enter intercultural space which is particularly sensitive to any type of interaction. Closed borders, difficulties in the cultural, educational or even commercial exchange of information – in other words, the reduction of relations between objects of intercultural space always leads to a similar reduction in intercultural competence and it limits the access to the available content, values and culturally-producing experiences. However, this process also proceeds in the opposite direction resulting in the fact that none of the groups of attributes exists independently. The level of communication skills, both cultural and intercultural, and thus the level and advancement of participation in a specific area of culture stimulates many relations between specific objects of space, especially in the area of communication, but also in the sphere of attitudes and intercultural relations. Therefore, the degree of reception competence, experience and production of cultural goods is, on the one hand, created, but on the other it also creates – a specific character, intensity and purpose of the relationship between the objects of space. This feature of manoeuvrability is worth indicating not only in the perspective of anthropology, but also sociology, pedagogy and progressive psychology of intercultural space.

OBJECTS THAT “PLAN” THEIR RECEPTION AND RECEPTION THAT CREATES OBJECTS

In every cultural space almost all of its objects do not exist outside the power of perception, interpretation and understanding of meaning that they bear. In this sense, the sphere of culture (“cultural facts”; McCarthy 2001) differs from the sphere of nature (“nature facts”). The consequences of these differences constituted the foundation of F. Znaniecki’s project of humanistic sociology and C. Geertz’s symbolic anthropology that presently through the perspective of cultural sociology and aforementioned anthropology of space allow the understanding of its hybrid, disembodied, polymor-
phous and transformative character. Naturally, cultural objects do not exist without the ability to "receive" them, i.e. the actual availability of their meanings. As early as in the stage of their formation, the objects frequently design the rules that govern their perception; moreover, they impose specific requirements on the other participants that urge the art of interpretation and conscious perception. Many studies conducted as early as in the 1970s in the field of sociology of art, literature and theatre clearly showed how the abundance of factors attributable to the recipient, i.e. to his cultural competence, conditioned the actual access to the cultural content by specifying the "scope" (access) of their actual presence and correspondingly the boundaries of cultural and intercultural space.

The factors of social status and cultural competence that results from them define the scope of intercultural experience and once more they build the world of objects, their relations and a peculiar universe of cultural space with its intercultural artefacts (Łyszczak/Marcinkiewicz/Sokołowski 2014). In fact, it is the level of preparation for the reception of culture that creates the social boundaries of culture together with the "architecture" of objects both in the world of their physical correlates, and, above all, in the world of meanings and values that constitute an essential substance of the virtual space.

CONCLUSION

The topic of intercultural space represents one of the most visionary areas that integrate research from multiple disciplines, theories and discussions of an interdisciplinary character. In an era of globalisation, the very emergence of entirely new processes, qualities and forms of cultural interaction shifts the focus onto cultural transgressions, cultural stimulation of development potentials (of both individuals and communities), and the dynamics of identity transformations which reject passive mechanisms of reproduction and adaptation. Not without significance is the growing awareness of the risks and pathologies that have become part of the experience of transformation in which the extended space of interaction and cultural exchange requires a deeper understanding of fundamental personality traits and human spirituality. Therefore, the analysis of contemporary intercultural space reveals a huge range of human transgressions, possibilities of education and development, and the problem of subjectivity which gives all these processes a broader sense (although it is sometimes misplaced).

The objective of this paper was to indicate creative aspects of the conscious participation in intercultural space, but the paper was also an attempt to propose an integrated theory of space that would grasp the nature of all its possible variants without excluding the virtual space. Such a concept should be relatively simple and refer to the analogous principles of each of its variants; however, it needs to be open to qualitative and functional changes of successive levels of its complexity, possible synergies and transfers. The key to understanding modern space both within and outside specific cultures is its polymorphic, transgressive and transferable character. These features are
realized in all its areas in which the physical, axiosemiotic and virtual components intertwine. Intercultural space uses the abovementioned features and as a result the primary manifestations and conditions of intercultural space, i.e. reciprocity and exchange gain a new and more efficient infrastructure. Intercultural space becomes an active factor or often even a stimulator of cultural interactions in the most complex (and often new) forms.

Translated by Zuzanna Sławik

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RUMINATIONS ON LITERATURE IN A GLOBALISED CONTEXT

ABSTRACT A critical appraisal of the term and concept of “world/global literature,” examining *inter alia* the two opposing notions of particularity and commonality/universality associated with it, the issue of selection and who has the authority to select, and the problem of the language interface.

Keywords: world literature, global literature, translation, social constructs
Communication has taken many forms throughout history, and need not be constrained spatially or temporally, as exemplified, for instance, by paintings and monuments in the case of visual communication, or writing and oral recordings in the case of spoken communication. This has enabled humans to interact with and influence each other transcending the boundaries of space and time.

Written or, in the present age, recorded oral communication may take various forms, one of these being that which we today call literature. One can, I think, confidently assume that there is a general, or at least near to general, agreement that simply writing something does not constitute literature – there has to be something more involved. Unfortunately, what this exactly is, and what exactly is produced by these means to belong to the category of “literature,” is unclear even to disciplines studying literature as a categorical phenomenon, as a Wissenschaft. Indeed, the efforts to define “literature” are legion, and one may, with a dose of polemics, assert that no two seem to be alike. This is substantiated by the findings of Rainer Rosenberg, who, after a painstaking analysis of the historical usage of the term Literatur (“literature”) and its associations particularly, though not only, in Germany, concludes (Rosenberg 2003: 38f.)

daß es den Literaturbegriff gar nicht gab, vielmehr auch in der Literaturwissenschaft zu der fraglichen Zeit stets diverse Literaturbegriffe im Spiel waren. [...] Wenn sich anhand der Veröffentlichungen feststellen läßt, daß ein bestimmtes Paradigma zu einer bestimmten Zeit

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1 Forms of literature whose sole repository is the individual as a corporeal being are not in the focus of interest here. Literature in a recorded oral form is, however, subsumed under “written” in the following.

2 As Jean-Paul Sartre aptly put it (Sartre 1972: 32): “On n’est pas écrivain pour avoir choisi de dire certaines choses mais pour avoir choisi de les dire d’une certain façon” (“One is not a writer for having chosen to say certain things, but for having chosen to say them in a certain manner”).

3 Interestingly, such study is to be found mostly in non-English discourse; in fact, there is no real English equivalent for the German Literaturwissenschaft, with its equivalents in other European languages (e.g., Dutch literatuurwetenschap, Swedish litteraturvetenskap, Danish litteraturvidenskab, Polish literatururoznaństwo, Czech literární věda, Russian литературоведение etc.) (cf. also Hladnik 1995: 141f.) – it is not the same as comparative literature (Komparatistik in German). The particularly German phenomenological approach has found not only friends in parts of the world with other academic traditions; it has, for instance, been criticised by René Wellek as leading to “a discipline removed from contemporary literature and released from the task of discrimination and evaluation” (Wellek 1963: 35f.), i.e. for not indulging in “criticism” as in the Anglo-Saxon (English, particularly in the USA) and Romance (particularly French) sphere, in which linguistic environment comparative literature is most firmly embedded.

4 Even today, in German language discourse the ideal of a Wissenschaft remains largely that constituted at least since the eighteenth century: “If a field of study was to put itself (or keep itself) on the map – if it was to validate its claim to be a rigorous Wissenschaft with an autonomous jurisdiction – it had to constitute itself as a system. A system was a clearly bounded, self-contained whole; it had its distinctive methods and normative premises, from which it derived its own criteria for truth value and a certain internal coherence” (LaVopa 2001: 208f.). This is difficult to reproduce in discourse utilising another language, and it is thus quite understandable that the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) lists “Wissenschaft” as a loan word utilisable in English, explaining it as: “(The systematic pursuit of) knowledge; learning, scholarship; science.”
den Fachdiskurs beherrscht, dann ist damit noch nicht erwiesen, daß die Mehrheit der Fachvertreter diesem Paradigma gefolgt ist.  

As Terry Eagleton remarked: “What matters may not be where you come from, but how people treat you. If they decide that you are literature then it seems that you are, irrespective of what you thought you were” (EAGLETON 1997: 7f.). His resigned conclusion: “There is no ‘essence’ of literature whatsoever” (EAGLETON 1997: 8).

Instead of attempting to elucidate the prevailing disaccord by quoting – ultimately far from exhaustively – from a plethora of works devoted to the subject, I would like to draw attention to just one appropriate description, by Fotis Jannidis, which sums the matter up nicely (JANNIDIS 2003: 305):

Es gibt heute kaum noch etwas, über das Literaturwissenschaftler sich einig sind: Man weiß sich in einem allgemeinen Dissens über die Frage, was Literatur ist und welche Literatur von der Wissenschaft untersucht werden sollte.

In view of this situation, a description of “literature” which does not attempt to be an authoritative definition, but strives to succinctly give voice to the mentioned dissent, while leaving ample scope for interpretation in various directions, seems the best one may hope for. According to one such description (JANNIDIS/LAUER/WINKO 2009: 32)

[...] es scheint uns [...] phänomenadäquat und plausibel zu sein, den Begriff ›Literatur‹ als Ensemble von Gattungen zu konzipieren, die über eine Struktur der Familienähnlichkeit miteinander verbunden sind.

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5 “that the concept of literature did not in the least exist, rather, in the Literaturwissenschaft at the time in question, too, diverse concepts of literature were always involved. [...] If it can be established on the basis of the publications that a certain paradigm dominates the specialist discourse at some certain time, then by that it is still not proved that the majority of the specialists has followed this paradigm.”

6 “There is, today, hardly anything on which scholars of Literaturwissenschaft agree: one knows oneself to be in general dissent regarding the issue of what literature is and which literature should be examined by (the) science.” Note that, though Wissenschaft has here been translated as “science,” this is, all the more so as Latin scientia has undergone a marked semantic shift in modern English, of course no satisfactory equivalent for the German term (as also pointed out, e.g., by VERMEER 2007: 88f.).

7 DAMROSCHE 2003: 14 has attempted such a description: “Any global perspective on literature must acknowledge the tremendous variability in what has counted as literature from one place to another and from one era to another; in this sense, literature can best be defined pragmatically as whatever texts a given community of readers takes as literature.” This is, however, unsatisfactory, as it simply shifts the problem of defining literature from one plane to another, since to take something to be literature requires a conception of what constitutes literature to be already present. Cf. also the criticism of this description by PETTERSSON 2006: 28 note 56.

8 “[...] it seems to us [...] to be adequate to the phenomenon and plausible to conceive the term ‘literature’ as an ensemble of genres that are connected with each other by means of a structure of family resemblances.”
Matters are complicated by the fact that, as in the case of various other terms figuring prominently in public discourse, academic definitions of “literature” may not be in sync with, or not have any marked or discernible effect on, common everyday usage. And there are, in fact, various meanings which dictionaries list for this term, which might – as in the case of various other terms in common public discourse⁹ – make it difficult to determine exactly what any particular individual means when using “literature.” For it is clear that when we refer, for instance, to “literature in the twentieth century,” we use “literature” in a sense different from its usage in, e.g., “scientific literature” or “management literature.” But in the case of these latter too, the usage is different from that in, e.g., “English literature.” Anyone with a knowledge of modern English comprehends this difference immediately, even though this person, unless a trained semanticist, would probably feel quite ill at ease if asked to explain the difference, not only pertaining to these usages, but also to others which have not been mentioned here.

Now among the various definitions which the OED gives, the one seeming to be most relevant to our context is that of “literature” without a qualifying word before it: “written work valued for superior or lasting artistic merit.” This, of course, leaves much room for interpretation. Nevertheless, it also accords, ultimately, with the description of JANNIDIS/LAUBER/WINKO 2009: 32, quoted above.

Dealing with “literature in a globalised context,” which entails both public and academic discourse in which the various discussants do not necessarily, and probably overwhelmingly do not, first strive to reach an accord on the nature of what they are discussing, thus using an already intrinsically fuzzy term in various individual manners which might not be in accord with each other,¹⁰ we will have to settle upon some sort of working definition which allows incorporation of as much of this variegated discourse as possible, while making allowance for its inherent fuzziness. In this context, “literature” as defined above by the OED, namely “written work valued for superior or lasting artistic merit,” with “written” also including recorded oral works, seems to be the best take-off point; my – admittedly unproven – presumption is that most readers of these lines will be comfortable with this usage.¹¹

Having settled on what “literature” is, at least for the purposes of our considerations, let us now turn to the “globalised context.” As is known, not only individual works, but also whole genres of literature have over the centuries passed from language to language and culture to culture,¹² transporting influences back and forth, shaping and re-shaping

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⁹ WHITNEY 2010: 23 cites “Western,” and in this context draws attention to George Orwell’s remarks on terms such as “democracy,” “socialism,” “freedom,” “patriotic,” “realistic,” “justice” etc.

¹⁰ A good example in this context is PERKINS 1992, a comprehensive study on “literary history” which does not first specify what “literature” is, even though this seems relevant to the nature of individual literary histories, or genres of literary history.

¹¹ One could, at this point, also debate on what genres of works could be subsumed under “written work valued for superior or lasting artistic merit,” i.e., whether these should be fictional or semi-fictional works in prose or verse, or include other sorts of works too. But such a discussion here does not seem to serve any discernible purpose, and is hence dispensed with.

¹² I am aware that today “culture” is a contested term; cf., e.g. HANN 2007: 133: “Nehmen wir tapfer
ideas and values. An ideal means for a partnership of exchange of human values in intercultural space, one might say.

However, there is a difference between this sort of exchange and contemporary globalised exchange inasmuch as not only are the spatial dimensions involved much larger, but so also are the temporal dimensions involved. The enlargement has come about both through means of travel and – perhaps even more importantly – communication and storage (including storage retrieval) hitherto unavailable to mankind. “Globalisation” in the contemporary context thus refers to a new situation brought about not only, but to a major extent by heretofore unknown technologies, bringing with it not only opportunities, but also challenges hitherto unknown, at least in today’s dimensions. This accords opportunities to create literature which not only transcends certain individual cultural and/or linguistic areas, but is truly globe-spanning, with the potential – given the requisite infrastructure – of transporting its ideas to all humanity in a manner previously impossible.

Is that, however, the same as ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, which it has become common to refer to and debate about, despite doubts having been voiced as to the validity of these categories? In this connection, Daniel M. Dooghan, recurring to previous studies, points out (Dooghan 2011: 281):

All literature is world literature, or more appropriately, part of global literary production.

That is, of course, true inasmuch as literature produced on this globe or in this world cannot but be ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature. However, when the terms ‘global’ and ‘world’ are matters of debate in the context of literature, they are obviously so precisely because they are not taken to refer to the sum total of literary production the world over, even though this may be available to all in its entirety – which it is of course not.
As Dooghan points out elsewhere (Dooghan 2011: 6), whatever the entity which is the subject of debate here may actually be,

the world of world literature marks a boundary. Inherent to the term is not the expression of totality but its denial. Only certain texts constitute world literature.

Further (Dooghan 2011: 8):

The globe may be easily defined, but a global literature lacks the clarity of its geographic site. This term faces the same obstacles as does world literature.

Unfortunately, all that does not, ultimately, help us much in arriving at any conclusion regarding the contents of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature. It is, however, obvious that this is nothing primordial, self-creating or self-evident, but has to be something chosen to accord with certain parameters – in other words (as Terry Eagleton remarked on the “literary canon,” the unquestioned ‘great tradition’ of the ‘national literature’; Eagleton 1997: 10), that it

has to be recognized as a construct, fashioned by particular people for particular reasons at a certain time. There is no such thing as a literary work or tradition which is valuable in itself, regardless of what anyone might have said or come to say about it.

But if there are parameters involved, then these too certainly cannot be self-evident either, but have to be determined – and as such, they cannot but be dictated or influenced by the conditioning of certain environments. The whole thus boils down to influenced choices.

Since the debate on the nature of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature has mostly occupied itself with the issue of particularity19 – i.e. with the diverse literary products generated by various different groups, defined ethnically, linguistically, culturally or otherwise, and with how to juxtapose these within an overarching framework –, it centres, for the most part, upon which groups are to be represented, and through what means or products. In this, the major impulse today comes from debates predominantly in English, and informed heavily by developments in North America, especially the USA,20 triggered to a major extent by issues of adequate representation of

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19 Against this background it is understandable that Roberts/Nelson 2011: 61 refer to ‘world’ literature as being “recognized as the best means of allowing the comparative study of societies and cultures in a globalized world.”

20 This is unsurprising given the dominance of North Americans using English in relevant fora and discussions, which has effectively largely blended out other approaches. As César Domínguez provocatively asks in his presentation of the Slovak Dionýz Durišin’s systemic theory of world literature (seemingly unknown to the relevant North American discourse) while referring to remarks made by Franco Moretti, who has come up with his own systemic theory: “to whom does “we” refer in terms of a collective of researchers who supposedly lack a theory of world literature?” (Domínguez 2012(a): 100; see also particularly p. 105).
various groups mostly, though not only, domestic, and theoretically underpinned by very specific ideological and explanatory models, including many taken to have been evolved as such in France and French. This modern development — irrespective of the actual historical background of the concepts involved — probably explains why, even when the focus shifts from predominantly domestic considerations to more really global ones, the issue of particularity and adequate representation group-wise remains predominant.

Interestingly, though, one of the major tangible outcomes of the view of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature from the perspective of particularity has been not in the English language sphere, the debate in which has furnished it with most of its present parameters, but in that of German, as Peter Goßens details (Goszens 2011: 12):

Weltliteratur, das zeigen die meisten Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Begriff wie dem Konzept, ist fast gleichbedeutend mit dem kulturellen Erbe eines weltliterarischen Kanons, dessen Ausmaß sich individuell entwickelt. Seine umfangreichste Form hat dieser Kanon wohl in den 21.000 Einträgen von Kindlers Literatur-Lexikon gefunden, wobei die Auseinandersetzung mit diesem Kanon angesichts seiner extensiven Ausdifferenzierung zunehmend auch eine Art Spezialwissen wurde.

I was part of the project mentioned, as the editor responsible for literature in indigenous South Asian languages. However, my personal engagement was not seen by me as any statement of views on ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, but motivated primarily by the desire to ensure comprehensive representation of South Asian literatures in this mammoth enterprise. I remain thankful that this opportunity was accorded me.

Let us, however, return to the fundamental contemporary debate and especially the issue of particularity. As Dooghan 2011 presents a good, and critical, overview of this debate, there is no need to take up the matter anew in a more detailed form here. In

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21 I am using this neutral formulation as a means of steering clear of the controversy involving the actual basis, given the contention that (Lotringer/Cohen 2001: 1) “French theory” is an American invention, going back to at least the eighteenth century, and no doubt belongs to the continuity of American reception to all sorts of European imports, an ongoing process.

22 In this case a term widely used is “multicultural literature.” The motives behind it have been succinctly stated by Cai 1998: 322: “Multicultural literature embodies a dream of equity for the oppressed groups”; it “should eventually lead to changing their [i.e. the readers’] perspective on the Other,” and thus “cultivate pluralism.”

23 “World literature — most debates on the term, as on the concept, show this — is nearly synonymous with the cultural heritage of a world literary canon whose dimension develops individually. This canon has probably found its most extensive form in the 21,000 entries of Kindlers Literatur-Lexikon, in which context the engagement with this canon progressively also became, in view of its extensive differentiation, a sort of specialised knowledge.”

24 On this aspect of the lexicon see Arnold 2009: viii., also with regard to the culture-specificity of canons.

25 I would, however, like to expand on the criticism levelled (Dooghan 2011: 6, also 228) against the definition of ‘world’ literature by David Damrosch (referred to by Dooghan 2011: 266 as “at the
this discussion the irreconcilability of claiming or aiming for globality and emphasising particular entities is especially accentuated (DOOGHAN 2011: 267):

For all its flaws, the nation remains a viable analytical concept; nation-states still exist even if their identity is under assault from within. However, to posit the existence of a global conversation as world literature does, [...] while surreptitiously and reductively mediating that conversation through the nation promotes the worst essentialisms. Doubly so, because they are not recognized as such.

The above can be taken to pertain to other entities such as “ethnic group,” “region” or the like too.
The matter is explicited further (DOOGHAN 2011: 268f.):

As limiting and problematic as the designator “world” is, it does imply a certain transnational scope. Yet the invitation for students to link these worldly texts with geographical places is the explicit motivation for the inclusion of the maps. Rather than allowing the texts to stand on their own as “world” texts, or contextualizing them with their discursive influences and respondents, the anthologies always already subsume their constituent texts under a totalizing logic of geography.

But there is, it is pointed out, an alternative, namely (DOOGHAN 2011: 266):

All texts, by virtue of their being texts, can communicate something intelligible to the reader. The task of the editors, then, is to recover that kernel of ostensibly universal identity from a given text’s otherwise irreconcilable difference.

It is highly interesting that this idea – which might, perhaps, be seen as being in opposition to Dooghan’s own statement reproduced above in note 18 – is not pursued further. In fact, though DOOGHAN 2011 unsparingly criticises the existing predominant deliberations and developments with regard to ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, the parameters of this discourse, as formed by the idea of particularity, are not abandoned. Even the plea for “reorienting our focus in world literature from national representa-
tion to intertextual connection” (DOOGHAN 2011: 281), so as (in effect continuing and modernising Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s concept of a Weltliteratur26) “to take the mechanisms of global exchange as its object” (DOOGHAN 2011: 282), is not part of an alternative discourse with different parameters. The discourse remains heavily influenced by North American, and particularly US, notions and debates on a “literary canon.”27 And with regard to this, Šarká Bubíková (BUBÍKOVÁ 2004: 28) has pointed out that “America” (i.e. the USA) still needs to overcome its tendency to canonize works because of their ethnic origin instead of canonizing ethnic works because of their literary value.

In the last part of this quotation we have the nucleus of an alternative debate with different parameters, a debate which seemingly never became a constituent part of the predominant discourse in Europe or North America (particularly in the English language), maybe because the preoccupation with nationalisms and the resultant notion of national literatures got in the way.

This is not to say that there were no attempts to begin such an alternative debate in the regions mentioned. One such debate centres on the notion of ‘universal’ literature, which according to A. Owen Aldridge (ALDRIDGE 1986: 56), when not taken to refer to the sum total of all works in the world,

comprises all works that contain elements cosmopolitan enough to appeal to the average person in any literate culture.28

A discussion along such lines does not seem to have got off the ground, however, even though it “provides epistemological soundness and has far-reaching ontological consequences” (DOMÍNGUEZ 2012(b): 245).

But such a debate is or was found elsewhere, though along lines different from the above. I would here like to highlight one prominent example from another part of the globe and in a non-European language. I am referring, of course, to the ideas of Rabindranath Tagore (RABINDRANATH ṬHĀKUR). These are based on his philosophical vision within which he attempted to encompass all aspects of human endeavour including religion, science and art. On the latter he wrote in English (TAGORE 1931: 134f.):

26 It is impossible to do justice here to the huge mass of literature written on this seminal concept as explicated by Goethe (the term was first used, though in a different sense, by Christoph Martin Wieland; cf., e.g., KOCH 2005: 53, HINDERER 2004: 382). For a recent overview see, e.g., LAMPING 2010.

27 This is not surprising. As DAMROSCH 2003: 27 aptly puts it: “For any given observer, even a genuinely global perspective remains a perspective from somewhere.”

28 Cf. also ALDRIDGE 1986: 53: “From the perspective of content, universal literature may refer to any work that reflects attitudes, situations, or experiences that are felt or understood by human beings in all cultures.” There are, however, also theories seeking to shift the onus of the issue of universality, namely by requiring us as readers to adapt, and to develop the proper consciousness for coping with a work by “deterritorialising our reading practices” (DIXON 2012: 82).
Truth is the infinite pursued by metaphysics; fact is the infinite pursued by science, while reality is the definition of the infinite which relates truth to the person. Reality is human; it is what we are conscious of, by which we are affected, that which we express. When we are intensely aware of it, we are aware of ourselves and it gives us delight. We live in it, we always widen its limits. Our arts and literature represent this creative activity which is fundamental in man. But the mysterious fact about it is that though the individuals are separately seeking their expression, their success is never individualistic in character. Men must find and feel and represent in all their creative works Man the Eternal, the creator. Their civilization is a continual discovery of the transcendental humanity. [...] For Reality is the truth of Man, who belongs to all times, and any individualistic madness of men against Man cannot thrive for long. 29

This vision has also informed Tagore’s literary theory, in which he eschewed the idea of simple reproduction of the observable, as in the Bengali “Sāhityer bicāarak” (“The Judge of Literature”), 30 first published 31 in 1903, where he says (Ṭhākur 1974: 351f.): 32

sāhitya yāhā āmādigāke jānāite cāẏ tāhā sampurṇarūpe jānāẏ; arthā- sthāyike rakṣā kariyā, abāntar’ke bād diyā, chaotoke choṭo kariyā, baṅkhe baṅko kariyā, phāṅk’ke bharāṭ kariyā, āl’gāke janāt kariyā dār karāẏ, prakṛtir apakṣapāt prācuryer madhye man yāhā karite cāẏ sāhitya tāhāi karite thāke. man prakṛtir ār’śi nahe, sāhitya prakṛtir ār’śi nahe. man prākṛtik jinis’ke mānasik kariyā lay; sāhitya sei mānasik jinis’ke sāhityik kariyā tule. duẏer kāryapraṇālī prāẏ ek’i rakam. kebal duẏer madhye kāye t’ta biśeṣ kāraṇe taphāt ghatiẏāche. man yāhā gariyā tole tāhā nijer ābāsyaker janya, sāhitya yāhā gariyā tole tāhā sakaler ānaner janya. [...] man sādhāraṇata prakṛtir madhaya haite samgraha kare, sāhitya maner madhaya haite saṅcay kare. maner jinis’ke bāhire phalāiyā tulite gele biśeṣ’bāhe srjān śaktir ābāsyak hay. eirūpe prakṛti haite mane o man haite sāhitye yāhā pratipalita haiẏā uthe tāhā anukaraṇ haite bahudūr’battī. 33

29 Cf. in this context Ghose 2011: 55: “Both Rabindranath and Einstein claimed to be realists who believed in an omniscient universal ‘intelligence’ as the fundamental reality, a conception of reality that subsumes within it classical mind-independent realism in which ‘mind’ is a complex evolve of matter and hence matter-dependent. The difference between these claims lies in the different ways in which the universal reality and its relationship with the individual are viewed – Einstein clearly viewing the universal intelligent reality to be essentially different from the individual (this was his religiosity), and Rabindranath believing in a oneness of the two in spite of the apparent difference. He regarded the universal One to be ‘within as well as beyond’ the individual.”


31 With the title “Sāhityasamālocanā” (“Criticism of Literature”), which was subsequently changed.

32 The translations of this and the following Bengali passages adhere as closely as possible to the original wording and thus accept a certain ruggedness of the English reproduction, so as to minimise the risk of falsification.

33 “That which literature wishes to let us know, it lets [us] know fully; that is, it erects by preserving the constant, omitting the irrelevant, making the petty petty, making the great great, filling the gap, tightening the loose. Literature continues doing exactly that which the mind wishes to do in the midst
It is on this foundation that Tagore erected his edifice of *biśbasāhitya*, a term that can be translated both as “world literature” and as “global literature,” but also as “universal literature” or “literature for all.” This concept he elaborated upon in his essay of the same name, first published in 1907, in the course of which he equated *biśbasāhitya* with the English “comparative literature,” even though the two are very obviously, and were very obviously even then, not the same. He wrote (Ṭhākur 1974: 384f.):

of nature’s impartial abundance. The mind is not the mirror of nature, literature too is not the mirror of nature. The mind makes natural things to intellective ones; literature transforms those intellective things to literary ones. The method of operation of both is nearly the same. Only, differences have arisen between both due to some certain reasons. What the mind forms, that is for its own needs; what literature forms, that is for the joy of all. […] The mind usually gathers from amongst nature; literature collects from amongst the mind. If one sets out to bring things of the mind to fruition outside, creative power is particularly needed. What is, in this way, mirrored from nature in the mind and from the mind in literature, is far removed from emulation.”

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34 The pronunciation of this Bengali word is /ˈbiʃʃoʃahitto/. It is made up of the combination of two loanwords (*biśba* and *sāhitya*) from Sanskrit. Transposed into Sanskrit, Tagore’s term would be *viśvasāhitya*.


37 “If one sees literature through making it petty with regard to region, time and object, [then] one does not see it properly at all. If we understand this, [namely] that it is Universal Man himself who manifests himself in literature, then we get to see that within literature which is for us to see. Where in creating literature the writer has not become merely the means, there his writing has become spoilt. Where the writer has felt the sentiment of all humans in his thoughts, has revealed the pain of all humans in his writing, only there has his writing received its place in literature. Then indeed must one see literature in this manner, [namely] that Universal Man as a mason is erecting this temple; the writers, having come from various regions and various times, are working as his labourers. What the plan of the mansion is, that is not, forsooth, [lying] before any of us, but whichever bit turns out wrong, that bit is broken down again and again; every labourer, putting to work his innate capability, harmonising his own bit of composition with the whole, has to come to conformity with that invisible plan. In this indeed is his capability revealed, and precisely because of this no one pays him lowly wages like an ordinary labourer, [but] generally reveres him like a master [of his craft].”
And further (Ţhăkur 1974: 387):

As the earth is not my field and your field and his field, [as] knowing the earth thus is knowing it in an extremely unrefined manner, so literature is not my composition, your composition and his composition. We usually tend to see literature exactly thus, in an unrefined manner indeed. Granting ourselves freedom from that unrefined narrowness, we shall fix as [our] objective the seeing of Universal Man within biṣbaśāhitya, shall accept an entirety within the composition of each writer, and shall see within that entirety the connection of all humans’ efforts for expression... What has here been translated as “unrefined,” i.e. grāmya, literally means “rural.”

The above must be seen also in connection with Tagore’s differentiation, formulated most incisively in 1941, between satya and bāstab, which one may attempt to reproduce in English adequately as “truth” and “reality,” the latter being bound to the individual human situation, the former exceeding this.

The metaphysical aspects of these notions may possibly not appeal to all, but that is not the point. The point is that we have, here, an alternative model of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature which is not based on particularity, i.e. on encompassing diversities, but on the notion of commonality (or maybe: universality), of the search for what transcends the various diversities and seeks to “recover that kernel of ostensibly universal identity from a given text’s otherwise irreconcilable difference” (Dooghan 2011: 266, already quoted above). It is clearly based on a concept of what literature should be about that is very different from the particularity-based (Masoomi 2010: 108)

conviction that literature concretizes a kind of reality or truth about a given environment, a daily existence, a socio-cultural context, about given people, ordinary lives and transactions [...].

Even though Tagore’s ideas are well-known particularly in South Asia, and have been discussed, this alternative view does not seem to have gained many followers.
And yet it is interesting that, only a few years before Tagore put down his ideas in writing, another prominent personality from another part of the globe had voiced ideas pointing in a similar direction. It was Alfred Nobel who, in his will of 1895, stipulated that of the yearly interest from the fund he had set up there should be disbursed a sum among those who “hafva gjort menskligheten den största nytta” (“shall have conferred the greatest benefit to mankind”), with

en del den som inom litteraturen har producerat det utmärktaste i ideallisk riktning.

The line just quoted is translated by the Nobel Foundation as “one part to the person who shall have produced in the field of literature the most outstanding work in an ideal direction.” There has been a controversy, though, on the exact meaning of “ideallisk,” the result of which, as far as the Nobel Foundation is concerned, can be summed up in the words of Bengt Samuelsson, chairman of the board of directors of the Nobel Foundation, who in his 1997 opening address at the Nobel Prize award ceremony stated (Samuelsson 1997): 46

Sture Allén, permanent secretary of the Academy, recently analyzed the expression “ideallisk” in Nobel’s will from a philological standpoint. He also obtained the help of a forensic expert, because the word “ideallisk” is the result of a change that Nobel made in his handwritten will. The conclusion, based on the linguistic usage of that era, is that Nobel’s expression “i ideallisk riktning” means “in a direction toward an ideal” or “in an ideal-oriented direction.” The delineation of this ideal is determined, in turn, by the basic criterion that applies to all the Nobel Prizes: its benefit to mankind. According to Allén, the English translation of “ideallisk” should therefore be “ideal” and not “idealistic,” the term used in the first official translation of the will.

There seems to be no evidence which could let us assume that Tagore knew of Nobel’s ideas, or that the committee which awarded him the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913 knew of Tagore’s ideas reproduced above. But that is immaterial. What is relevant here is the alternative view of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature as something based on commonality (or universality) and not particularity.

What this entails has been set forth by Horace Engdahl of the Swedish Academy, which selects the awardees of the Nobel Prize for literature (Engdahl 2010: 42):

writing “the world history of literature” to “satisfy the interest in knowing what existed in earlier cultures that coincides with literature in the sense used about present conditions,” as that would “separate individual older works from the cultures to which they belong, and where they form natural parts of textual worlds very different from the modern western one, and thus be deeply unhistorical in important respects.” Cf. also Perkins 1992: 127.

45 The original Swedish text is from <www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/testamente.html>, the official English translation from <www.nobelprize.org/alfred_nobel/will/will-full.html> (both accessed on December 30, 2012).

46 Cited from the English translation of the address. I was unable to obtain the original Swedish version.
In his will, Nobel declared that it was his “express wish that in awarding the prizes no consideration whatsoever shall be given to the nationality of the candidates.” The prize is intended as an award for individual achievements and is not given to writers as representatives of nations or languages nor of any social, ethnic or gender group. There is nothing in the will about striving for a “just” distribution of the prize, whatever that could be. What was vital for Nobel was that the prize-winning author should have contributed to humanity’s improvement (“conferred the greatest benefit to mankind”), not that the prize should flatter any collective self-esteem.

According to Engdahl, “a great book, regardless of its language and background, belongs to the readers of all the world” (Engdahl 2010: 45), and the Nobel Prize for literature tries to ensure this (Engdahl 2010: 45) by looking at authors as individuals and not as representatives. This not only means being open to good candidates from every corner of the earth. It also means turning a deaf ear to the demands that the Academy should let itself be guided by good intentions rather than good judgment. It means playing down the whole issue of origin.

As in the case of ethnicity or nationalism in the selection of the Pope, some might question the claim that “the whole issue of origin” is in actual fact played down in the Nobel selection process. One may also doubt whether individual awardees indeed “have contributed to humanity’s improvement.” But that would not alter the principle behind the whole. As is quite evident, this view of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature is the direct antithesis of what seems to be the dominant discourse, based on particularities and identities, in this sphere. Thus, from the point of view of commonality (or universality), the fear expressed by Erich Auerbach that the ever further reduction of literary languages, maybe ultimately to only one, would at the same time be the ultimate realisation and the end of ‘world’ literature (Auerbach 1952: 39) – a view which obviously is based on the notion of particularity – makes no sense.

The issue of particularity as opposed to commonality/universality was taken up some years ago by an author of Bengali background famous for his literature in English, namely Amitav Ghosh. On the basis of observations made primarily, but not only, in Bengal (though without recourse to Tagore’s ideas), Ghosh discussed the differences these two approaches create in the character of narratives, and how their paradoxical juxtaposition allows certain novels to transcend the boundaries of space and time (Ghosh 1998). Taking his cue from Ghosh, Michael Mack concludes: “Literary representation depends on a shift away from that which is represented” (Mack 2014: 40; italics

Moreover, it is clear from this short overview that the issue here is not the understanding or misunderstanding of literature in individual languages, and the meaning this literature has for the specific populations involved. Criticising the Nobel Prize for literature for being awarded or not awarded in the light of such criteria (as, e.g., by Derks 1996) is thus beside the point. Similarly, it should also be clear from the above that genres as such, too, are no relevant criteria. Therefore, it serves no purpose to point out, for instance (as done by Suleiman 2005: 79), that writers of children’s literature have not been considered. 
in the original). This echoes Tagore’s contention that true literature needs to eschew “making it petty with regard to region, time and object” (see note 37 above).

At a deeper level, the two opposing views pertinent to literature “of all the world” (to use Engdahl’s words quoted above) also reflect the two opposing views informing much of global debate in various spheres today, namely that related to the primacy of the individual as opposed to that of the group. But this issue not being in the focus of our deliberations here, we shall not comment further upon it.

For, apart from whether the author functions as an individual as such or as the representative of a particular group, there is also another matter that crops up in this context. It is the well-known controversy based on the catchwords “elitist” and “democratic.” For whether one chooses a work based on its perceived benefit to humanity as such, or as representative for some particular grouping, it always (i.e., irrespective of which of the alternative basic premises mentioned above one adheres to) means that someone is doing the choosing, more often than not in the name of a multitude of other persons, but not necessarily legitimised by the consent of these – indeed, in most cases such consent would be impossible to come by.

One is reminded of the controversy centring on the French anti-globalist José Bové and his prominent anti-McDonald’s campaign, symbolised by the Roquefort cheese versus the Big Mac. Bové legitimised his stance by recurring to “good taste,” which prompted critics to ask why his taste should be taken to be more legitimate than the taste of those who prefer Big Macs. Transposed into our context, one could cite the example of the Harry Potter books, which have been seen as a shining example of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature – particularly (though not only) with reference to their global spread –, but also as junk hyped out of all proportion by an industry out to make a quick buck.

It is true that “reference to good taste certainly does not figure conventionally in radical social critique.” Nevertheless, even if not expressly acknowledged, in most discussions on ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature qualitative criteria of some sort clearly play a role, whether it be commonality or particularity that is regarded as predominantly relevant. And it is of course just such qualitative categories which serve to exclude certain forms or individual specimens of literature from being considered, even though they may be internationally highly popular.

This ultimately boils down to the issue of whose point of view is being asserted. Franz H. Bäuml has pointed out for mediaeval Europe (BÄUML 1980: 245):

> With the increase in vernacular literacy, moreover, the oligoliterate structure of medieval society, in which the ability to read and write and the possession of access to the written word were socially distinctive, was replaced by a proliferation of social distinctions based on the matter written or read.

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48 Cf. on this whole issue, e.g., BODNÁR 2003.
49 BODNÁR 2003: 139. Note that “good taste” is not used here as an analytical category, but rather as a referential one.
50 This was already pointed out above while discussing DOOGHAN 2011.
Jacques Pelletier opines in a more general vein (Pelletier 1986: 538):

Le discours sur la littérature n’est jamais innocent. Toujours il est effectué à partir d’un lieu bien précis et dans l’optique privilégiée par ce lieu.  

Consider, too, what Renate von Heydebrand and Simone Winko say (Heydebrand/Winko: 235):

We agree with the argument of Joachim Küpper [...], and also of Pierre Bourdieu [...], that the canonic stability of a small number of literary works cannot be explained primarily by their intrinsic properties; instead, one must look at their long-term usefulness for the historically evolving models by which social elites define their relationship to the world.

Jean-Paul Sartre is even more blunt by calling such hoeing to the line of a dominant group a characteristic not merely of discourse on literature, but of the writer himself, which must needs also pertain to what is written by the writer (Sartre 1972: 105):

“Ainsi l’écrivain est-il un parasite de « l’élite » dirigeante” (“Thus the writer is a parasite of the governing ‘elite.’”).

But even if we look at the matter of choosing not from the point of view of social groupings, but from some other perspective, such as that of expert knowledge, we cannot avoid the fact that we are here entering a sphere in which ultimately opinions are arrayed against opinions. This multifarious enterprise of defining what is or is not ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature has of late increasingly led to such literature being seen as consisting not of a canon, but as a process, or something similar. Though “process” or the like ostensibly refers to an entity or entities with fluid borders and content, the terminology used is a bit unfortunate in that it might lead to the action leading to the creation of such an entity or entities being taken to be meant by the term ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, which would lead to this term ultimately referring to something devoid of literature itself.

In any case, it is doubtful whether it will ever be possible to decide on objective criteria to determine what is or is not appropriate to be considered. Let us leave it at that,

51 “The discourse on literature is never innocent. It is always undertaken from quite specific a position and within a perspective privileged by this position.”

52 Cf. on this aspect, e.g., Arnold 2009: x, where we also find a negative evaluation, as far as the evaluation and filtering of literature is concerned, of the principles which have given rise to the Wikipedia.

53 Interesting in this context are the considerations of Bodmer 2009: 73f. on how this notion was utilised to underpin the vision, popular in Germany particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, of an intellectual elite of the best whose duty it was to manage world affairs.

54 Cf. in this regard the remarks of David Damrosch, elaborating (Damrosch 2003: 3) on Fritz Strich’s interpretation (first formalised in 1946, but going back to ideas expressed already in 1930; cf. Gossens 2003: 195f.) of Goethe’s ideas (Damrosch 2003: 5): “My claim is that world literature is not an infinite, ungraspable canon of works but rather a mode of circulation and of reading, a mode that is as applicable to individual works as to bodies of material, available for reading established classics and new discoveries alike” (similarly Damrosch 2003: 281).
and simply hold on to the fact that, whichever of the two opposing views on ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, based respectively on commonality and particularity, one may adhere to, choices of some sort have to be made to decide what can be deemed to be ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, however this may be defined.

But there is no gainsaying the fact that any relevant discussion has great difficulties in freeing itself from the conditionings and backgrounds of the various discussants, and from its and their positioning in time and space. What then transpires has been aptly described in a study devoted not to literature, but to the interpretation of the development of world history, which description is, however, relevant here too (BRYANT 2006: 404):

A grand interpretive battle is joined. The claims of partisans notwithstanding, victories here – in marked contrast to the natural sciences – are rarely total, and the new positions agreed to are seldom supersessional of the old. Continued factionalism is commonplace, but accommodations do also occur [...].

At this point one could be tempted to latch onto social studies discourses which attempt to classify the various, and often contradictory, trends and processes within “globalisation” on the basis of whether the local influences the global, or the global the local. Some have indeed attempted to discuss literature in a globalised context within the framework of terms such as “glocalisation” and “grobalisation,”55 “macro-localisation” and “micro-globalisation,”56 or the like, i.e., with the help of terms created, discussed and critiqued primarily in contexts having little to do with literature. We also have theses on the standardisation of differences in the cultural sphere.57 It may be debated whether such efforts to fit multifarious actual happenings into neat theoretical delimited boxes, and to label these, are really helpful, given that such efforts often tend to produce meta-discourses on the boxes and labels rather than on what these attempt to come to grips with. I leave this question to others to debate upon.58

My concern is different. There is a much more fundamental conceptual problem associated with such discourses, as with many such classificatory problems, namely that they tend – sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly – to base deliberations on the presumption of some sort of pure or pristine entities gradually altering their original state. Maybe this holds true for entities such as companies in the sphere of economics, but it is a problematic supposition in the field of culture. As Habibul Haque Khondker aptly puts it (KHONDKER 2005: 186):

55 Cf. on these, e.g., RITZER 2007, particularly Chapter 6.
56 Cf. on these, e.g., KHONDKER 2005: 186: “The problem of simultaneous globalisation of the local and the localisation of globality can be expressed as the twin processes of macro-localisation and micro-globalisation.”
57 See on this issue particularly SCHWINN 2006.
58 One particular issue I would like to draw attention to in this connection, though, is the issue of conscious blending out of the global on the local scale, as, for instance, shown by Xavier Mínguez López in his study of Catalan juvenile literature (LÓPEZ 2011). I am sure that similar examples can be garnered from various other parts of the globe.
One of the consequences of globalisation is that it opens up doubts about the originality and authenticity of cultures. If one takes a long-term view of globalisation, “locality” or “local” itself is a consequence of globalisation. There are hardly any sites or cultures that can be seen as isolated or unconnected from the global processes.

In the words of John Pizer (Pizer 2006: 119):

Of course, the notion of isolated, pristine regional cultures is itself somewhat of a chimera. Worldwide migratory patterns dating back to the beginnings of human life have guaranteed that few civilizations existed in complete isolation. Prior to the current age of globalization, political imperialism tended to eviscerate the unique character of many areas.

This is just a small sampling of similar statements by various researchers. Possibly these are opinions which might be contested. However, they are no apodictic utterances, but the results of serious research and deliberation. As such, they cannot simply be swept under the rug, even though they might not fit notions held dear by many today. In this connection, it may not be out of place to draw attention to the admonition of William Schweiker, even though this concerns the field of theological ethics (Schweiker 2005: 144f.):

The current intellectual scene is then a balancing act with very high stakes. In the desire to break legacies of distorted discourse and perception, navigate pluralism, and endorse an engaged life, we can easily further the most basic assumptions of a market driven, manipulative, and complacent culture. [...] The various presuppositions that undergird and motivate current intellectual labor require some balancing lest they slide into their own worst expressions.

Transposed to the context we are discussing, this means that one would be justified in questioning the premises behind the vision of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature as mirroring global diversity. Obviously, that would be a highly explosive question. This shows that, further, any relevant debate on the nature of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, whatever the constitutive elements of this debate may be, will also willy-nilly have to come to terms with relevant problems of classification and categorisation that might lead straight into controversies having to do not as much with literature as with political stances and ideologies. One such potential case concerns the term “Westernisation,” already alluded to as problematic in note 9 above. On this, Habibul Haque Khondker has remarked (Khondker 2005: 190):

Thus, Westernisation as a category has limited conceptual value. One can associate certain literary forms, genres, and traits as part of the cultural zone vaguely called “the West,” yet these are mere influences as can be seen in artistic, literary, and architectural styles. [...]
Westernisation as a concept has some value if used only as a descriptive rather than analytic category. As an analytic category it is rather limited.

But if “Western” and “Westernisation” are questioned as analytical categories, this must needs also apply to any “-ism” or “-isation” arrayed, or seen to be arrayed, against this, whether this be “Sinicisation,” or any others, including those which Joel Whitney characterised as originating from a “School of Resentment” (Whitney 2010: 19). Whatever one’s individual position may be in such matters, it is obvious that this cannot but lead into the midst of – probably severe – controversy. And yet this has bearing on delimiting and defining ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature, and on making the relevant choices.

One could be inclined to take a backseat view of all this, and to hold that in the long run such debates and controversies are inconsequential, as the ultimate judge will be time, unswayed by current excitements. That may very well be. However, the judgement of time is not a natural force suddenly overcoming humankind, but the aggregate of the judgement of countless individuals bygone, present and to come – and also not necessarily invariable. And for all these individuals to pass judgement, they will of necessity have to have at least some sort of knowledge of what it is that is being judged.

But on what basis can such a judgement of literature actually take place? For this, we may recur to Sartre (Sartre 1972: 341): “Après tout nous pensons avec des mots” (“After all, we think with words”). We cannot get past the fact that (Oschmann 2010: 425)

die Literatur ist sprachlich, nämlich mündlich oder schriftlich, gegeben – oder gar nicht; Sprache ist die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Literatur.

Literature is invariably language-linked (Urbich 2010: 9):

Was durch Literatur, wie auch immer man sie begrifflich bestimmt, dem Erkennen zugänglich wird, muss grundsätzlich in den Potentialen der Sprachlichkeit begründet sein, in denen sich die literarische Repräsentation vollzieht.

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60 Cf. on this, e.g., Katzenstein 2012.
61 Whitney explicates this as: “Marxists, feminists and other fellow travellers.”
62 Cf., e.g., Damrosch 2003: 6: “A given work can enter into world literature and then fall out of it again if it shifts beyond a threshold point along either axis, the literary or the worldly. Over the centuries, an unusually shiftly work can come in and out of the sphere of world literature several different times; and at any given point, a work may function as world literature for some readers but not others, and for some kinds of reading but not others. The shifts a work may undergo, moreover, do not reflect the unfolding of some internal logic of the work in itself but come about through often complex dynamics of cultural change and contestation.”
63 “literature obtains in a linguistic, namely oral or written, form – or not at all; language is the precondition for the possibility of literature.”
64 “That which becomes accessible to cognition through literature, however one may define it terminologically, has fundamentally to be rooted in the potentialities of the linguisticality in which the literary representation takes place.”
But if literature is language-based, it follows that access to this is language-based too, so that for those with no knowledge of a particular language some means to overcome this lack is required, namely, a change of language. Even though, and intriguingly, literature studies’ occupation with language in the context of literature seems only marginally to have been focused on the process of the transferral of literary content from one language medium to another, this is one of the fundamental prerequisites for any ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature. And this process is translation, notwithstanding its undervaluation in the realm of literature studies. As Horace Engdahl pithily formulates: “In the realm of literature, there is no universal language other than translation.” (Engdahl 2010: 45), whilst Michael Cronin points out that “there is no ‘world’ literature without translation” (Cronin 2006: 132). Those lacking access to a language have none to the accompanying literature either, unless in the form of translation.

Ning Wang attempts to describe how this process functions (Wang 2010: 3):

Thus world literature also denotes literary works with “transnational” or “translational” significance, common aesthetic qualities, and far-reaching social and cultural influence. World literature is thus by no means a fixed phenomenon but a traveling concept. In the process of circulation, translation plays a vital role, for without it some of these literary works might remain “dead” to other cultures and literary traditions or consigned to their peripheries. As they travel, some works become so celebrated internationally that their renown in new languages overshadows their original national standing, while other works lose their significance and value because they are judged incompatible with foreign cultural soils or literary contexts.

But translation also requires evaluation and choice to decide what merits translation, and what does not. Access through translation is, thus, not a free access, and this must have consequences. Briefly stated: no selection, no translation, no cognisance, no acclaim or influence.

Commenting on the “subjective and dynamic selection of world literature in the Chinese language environment,” Wang points out (Wang 2010: 12):

This principle of selection has honed a canon of world literature unique to China and therefore sometimes at odds with the canon known in the West and in eastern Europe.

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65 The two German sources just quoted do not cover this topic either.
66 Cf. Roberts/Nelson 2011: 54: “The ideology of linguistic originality together with the expressive understanding of literature and culture as an inner, authentic essence – underlined and reinforced by copyright – combined to devalue the very concept of translation and with it the transnational, occluding the hybrid nature of “national” identity.”
67 In this, there does seem to be a difference to music.
68 Though David Damrosch has taken pains to differentiate between translatability and questions of value (Damrosch 2003: 289), from the point of view above “value” as a factor is not independent of, but dependent upon translation.
It is obvious that this cannot but hold true, *mutatis mutandis*, for other language environments too, bearing out David Damrosch’s assertion that “global patterns of the circulation of world literature take shape in their local manifestations” (Damrosch 2003: 27). Language thus is not only a formative factor for literature, but also a means of selection.

Clearly, translation changes the original; it cannot but do otherwise, for it regulates the passage from one linguistic medium to another.\(^{69}\) This then raises the question of what it is that is being received, processed and assimilated. Ástráður Eysteinsson remarks on this, simultaneously highlighting the issue of selection (Eysteinsson 2006: 23):

Which text does the concept of world literature refer to? It can hardly allude exclusively to the original, which the majority of the work’s readers may never get to know. On the other hand, it hardly refers to the various translations as seen apart from the original. It seems to have a crucial bearing on the border between the two, and on the very idea that the work merits the move across this linguistic and cultural border, to reside in more than one language.

Though there is a flourishing academic discipline devoted to the theory and application of translation, namely translation studies, I am not concerned here with translation *per se* as a product or as a process, but how it makes individual literary works be seen and received. For translation (Simon 2002: 28)

is not simply a mode of linguistic transfer but a translingual practice, a writing across languages. [...] The double vision of translators is continuously redefining creative practices – and changing the terms of cultural transmission.

It is, therefore, not the general phenomenon of translation as such that is of relevance here, but what the individual translator does, the person who has to come to terms with parameters set not by any model or theory, but by the individual work he or she is grappling with, and by the target language and culture.\(^{70}\)

There are different ways of seeing the way in which the translator functions or should function. Thus, one may hold that (Rion 2009: 169),

translation is always based on somebody else’s work and that should be respected. The task of the translator is a humble one, because he is a mediator he is not to be too present in the text; very often, when a great writer translates a literary work, one can find signs of his style, vocabulary or linguistic preferences in the text, then the author is not really a good transla-

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\(^{69}\) Tonkin/Frank 2010: viii: “Holding this world together, or keeping it apart, is language. At the boundaries of languages are the translators – mediators of cultures, enablers, but also gatekeepers.”

\(^{70}\) Cf. on the latter Bäuml 1980: 253: “Obviously the reception, the understanding, of written texts, as of everything else, is conditioned by the expectations of the perceiver, which are formed by prior experience.”
tor. To translate one has to be chameleonic and respectful of the otherness of the text, conscious of the changes and aware that there has to be a reason for them [...].

Or, one could envisage a more active role for the translator (Murphy 2011: 43f.):

Translators have gradually become acknowledged as important participants that read, interpret and translate the text inevitably entering into the process and manipulating the source text. [...] Once regarded as a traitor, the translator can now be considered as an essential figure throughout the whole process of translation, to the point of being designated as a re-writer of the source text, bringing to the fore different ethical and cultural issues.

But both these points of view do not impinge upon the fact that the translator has the potential to redefine what is being transmitted.71

Since each author, text and translator is unique, this poses difficulties for attempts at systematic evaluation. It is probably considerations such as these that led Shimon Markish, who himself was also a translator of literature from or into various languages, to make some very decided, and also polemical, remarks to the effect that (Markish 1999: 7)

any general theory of translation has very little to do with the translation of poetry or poetic prose, or of literary translation at all. Theorizing on translation could explain and/or systematize interesting phenomena in such fields as linguistics (first of all), psychology, sociology or ethnology, but is impotent in front of masterpieces of poetic creativity, because a really great achievement of translation is unique, as any original chef-d’œuvre is; so to say, a specific lucky chance which calls for a specific theory. I have always admired Itamar Even-Zohar for example, but I could never understand what his polysystem theory has to do with distinguishing between Good and Evil in translation. [...] “Ibersezn ken ikh nit, ober ikh veis ibersezn”72 – this is the message I hear in any theory, and specifically in comprehensive ones.

Whatever one may hold of this view, it is clear that in the context of ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature the process of mediation plays a crucial role, and that the quality of this mediation is an important factor in establishing the status of what is mediated. But this quality cannot but depend upon the skills of the individual mediator. Whether this function of an individual is something that can be theorised or not, it surely needs to be given more consideration and prominence than seems hitherto to have been the case.73

71 While this holds true for any translation, it must be kept in mind that we are here concerned with its application in only one sphere, namely that of literature, however defined. The problematics of other spheres, such as news media, are not part of these deliberations. For such issues, as well as related issues such as crowdsourced translation or internet translation communities, see, e.g., Salzberg 2009.

72 Yiddish: “I can’t translate, but I know all about translating.”

73 This also holds for the widened usage of “translation” referring no longer to the translation of texts (as in the discussion here), but more and more to intercultural transactions which are not necessarily text-based (cf. on this development of the concept of “translation,” e.g., Bassnett 2011: 102–104).
Awareness of this aspect of the matter is already there, as the following remarks of Kirsten Malmkjær make evident (Malmkjær 2011: 122):

Meaning is formed on each occasion of linguistic interaction and is therefore unique and not replicable. Therefore, a translation can never ‘mean’ the same as the source text. But this does not matter, because practice and the principle of charity suffice to ensure that translators ‘get away with’ translating sufficiently well sufficiently often – as the fact of the spread beyond a single language, and regular refinement through re-translation, of texts from everywhere testifies.

One is, in fact, tempted to see just such an approach in Umberto Eco’s work on translation first published in 2003 (Eco 2010), which consists basically of developments and musings based on his own encounters with translation and translations.

Finally, there is the question of by what exact means a process by origin not only multilingual, but also, and maybe even more problematically, multicultural, can effectively take place even through the means of translation. One alternative is a multitude of interconnected nodes, each node representing the interface of two or more different languages, a multitude of different languages thus being involved. The other is a single node where all other languages interface with one language. Though obviously the alternatives do not preclude each other, and various permutations and combinations of the two are possible and also to be actually found, the inertia of convenience can be expected to tend toward the single-node alternative, as this involves just one language serving as an interface, a language which thus has to be mastered for general interaction. Even in the multiple-node alternative, the number of nodes cannot be infinite, but will tend towards privileging certain languages and thus minimising the number of nodes.

One may find this unfair, one may decry the dominance of one language, or only certain languages, over others, but the fact is that literature in a global(ised) context is not a game played on a level field. Some languages are more equal than others when it comes to establishing global reach. And I do not think that there can be any doubt that paramount among these today is English. Indeed, there is at present no other language in sight which actually or potentially can serve as a similar interface, even among people who are not mother tongue speakers, in the same manner.

Though English of course still functions as an important mother tongue, its international predominance today is most probably owed to its status as a lingua franca and discourse tongue. However, this status cannot satisfactorily describe the literary interface function, in which English is clearly more than any of the above, more than a “language of communication,” but not a “language of identification” (on these terms see, e.g., Fiedler 2011). One is inclined to see English as a “stepmother tongue” (Skinner 1998) here, but this term was coined to refer to authors whose mother tongue is not English, but who write in English (Skinner 1998: 11). The interface function, however, also implies the passive usage (such as reading) of the language in literary contexts by people having it neither as a mother tongue nor actively using it as a literary medium. This does not justify calling English the predominant international Kultur-
sprache\textsuperscript{74} (which I am sure would raise more than a few hackles), though it does imply mastery of it in a register which entails more than the transmission of information for practical purposes. And, though English is indeed a “prestige language”\textsuperscript{75} in various human aggregates, and also a Bildungsprache\textsuperscript{76} in the context we are here dealing with this is not its primary function. I must admit to not having a convenient label for the usage and status of English in the context described.

This usage of individual languages has been going on for ages, though not on such an international scale. Prominent examples of languages used thus are, for instance, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and Chinese. The supersession of such a language by some other language is a gradual process, and may be accompanied by regulatory measures trying to stem the development (French is a good example). But so far the process has always taken place, or is taking place today. This makes many assume that it will also take place with regard to English. On the other hand, the spread and usage of English is unprecedented in human history. David Crystal has speculated that this might result in a critical mass of users being reached which would cement the dominance of English “for ever” (obviously hyperbole for: a very long time) (Crystal 1997: 139f.). Should this happen, then it would, of course, also ensure the use of English as the interface for literature internationally, certainly with repercussions on the nature of the literature passing through the interface.

Should, however, English gradually be replaced, then the question is, clearly, what might replace it. Nicholas Ostler has advanced the theory that no other language can in the future achieve a similar status, but that technological advances will create instantaneous machine-based interfaces, making it unnecessary for languages to directly interface with each other (Ostler 2010). It is intriguing to speculate on what this would mean for ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature.

Such a development, too, would, of course, only underpin the contention that communication or interaction in a globalised context cannot, as a rule, function on a major scale unless through the medium of some common interface, whatever that may be. The need for this interface means that, on the one hand, there will always be some sort of distortion due to the necessity of adaptation, at both ends, to this interface, which, as should be evident, can never be culture-detached as long as it is by origin grounded in a particular human group. What this means has been summarised by Eleonora Federici (Federici 2011: 155):

\textsuperscript{74} “Kultursprache” is used as a loanword in English scholarly publications, though it is not found in the OED. Suggested equivalents such as “cultural language,” “civilisational language” or “language of culture/civilisation” do not convey quite the same meaning.

\textsuperscript{75} On this concept, cf. particularly Kahane 1986, though note that this study is concerned mostly with Europe, which might impinge upon the deductions made when dealing with other parts of the world.

\textsuperscript{76} This is another German term difficult to reproduce adequately in English; various equivalents proposed being “academic language,” “language of schooling,” “scientific language,” “language of education” etc. It may refer to a particular language, but also to a particular register of a language. Commonly taken to refer to “the language in which topics of general interest are discussed in public and which is also prevalent in the field of education” (Thürmann/Vollmer/Pieper 2010: 9 note 2), it is, in fact, a multivalent term (cf., e.g., Morek/Heller 2012, also Gogolin 2009: 96f.).
The receiving context affects in some way the translator’s choices and strategies, primarily because the reader interprets the intertextual references according to his own literary, historical and cultural archive, his own baggage. At the same time, the translator’s choices influence the reader’s reception of the text in the target context. His insertion of new elements or omissions inevitably characterise the text, and the paratextual elements he can include assure a communicative act between the agent of the translation and the reader.

On the other hand, those not able to utilise this interface, or ignored by it, will either not be heard at all, or else not as prominently as they might deserve. In this, ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature is definitely both “one and unequal” (Moretti 2000: 55f.).

There is, thus, no means by which we can obviate the necessity for some sort of interface, or maybe interfaces. And the dominant one today is English. In the light of this development, it is no use lamenting about the dominance of English internationally. Indeed, one might at times have the feeling that those complaining the loudest might be doing so precisely because they would like their own language to have this status, and not because they as such deplore any one language having this status.

These rambling ruminations might leave one with a sense of frustration, since they cannot, and have not even attempted to, answer the question of what ‘world’ or ‘global’ literature actually is and how it may be arrived at. But that was not the point of the exercise. What was attempted was to show up and discuss the various ramifications of the concept and the problematics associated with it, in the context of a globalisation hitherto unprecedented. Franco Moretti has resignedly stated that “world literature is not an object, it’s a problem” (Moretti 2000: 55). One need not adhere to this view, but one does feel sympathy with it.77

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77 I am grateful to Carmen Brandt, Agnieszka Kuczkiewicz-Fraś and Werner Nell for their critical input.


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Murphy, Elena Rodriguez 2011: “The Translator as Rewriter of Postcolonial Literature: Ethical and Intercultural Considerations,” in: Javier Ruano García, María Jesús Fernández Gil, Miriam Borham Puyal, María José Diez García, Santiago Bautista Martín, Pedro Álvarez Mosquera, Blanca García Riaza (eds.): Current Trends in Anglophone Studies: Cultural, Lin-


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*Prof. Dr. Rahul Peter DAS* is the professor for Languages and Cultures of Post-classical South Asia at the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in Germany, and the President of the German Association for Asian Studies. Further particulars on <http://www.suedasien.uni-halle.de/das.html>.
The main focus of interest in the paper is the attitude of Western and Eastern stems of Christianity towards religious painting with reference to the problem of equality of word and image as far as the Church teaching is concerned. The roots and basic notions of Christian anthropology as well as positions revealed by both Churches during the discussions in 7-8\textsuperscript{th} centuries are regarded as foundations for noticeable differences in interpretations of meanings, means, artistic principles, reality representations, ways of passing on the truth on man in Orthodox icons and Western religious paintings either. Taking in to account the relationship between object and its representation the paper develops the idea of metonymical principle being crucial for Western religious paintings and symbolic connection between signans belonging to the earthly reality and signatum pointing out to transcendent realm in Orthodox icon painting.

**Keywords:** word, image, Russian Orthodox icon, western religious painting, axiology
The Eastern and Western stems of Christianity coming from the single source of the Revelation and referring to the same Holy Scriptures and the same tradition of the first centuries of Christianity have developed their own visions of man resulting in different representations of anthropological views in the visual arts and even in literature.

Dogmatic discussions that focused on the problem of the origin of the Holy Spirit – the third person of God (cf. Hryniewicz 1972: 219) resulted in a schism that was formally announced in 1054. The dogmatic split brought about consecutive changes in the teaching developed by the Eastern and Western Churches. Regarded as the inspiring powers of Western and Eastern cultures, both Churches encouraged the development of different value orientations and patterns of culture, concepts of the person, possible ways of Redemption, views on man's relationships with his community and the acceptable shapes of his freedom as well.

The basic idea for Christian anthropology is expressed in the biblical statement from Genesis about the creation of man in the image and likeness of God [Gen 1:27]. According to Christian theology, the image of God is given to everybody and it is present even in the soul of the sinner (cf. Špidlík 2005: 92), whereas the likeness is regarded as a task for man invited to become alike to God (cf. Meyendorff 1984: 184). One of the most important aspects of Christian anthropology is the idea of the person (cf. Lossky 1985: 137). For the first time the notion of the person was developed in the Trinitarian dogma, pronounced by the First Council of Nicaea in 325 (cf. Leclercq 1911), passing on the idea of God appearing in 3 persons (the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; these Three Persons being truly distinct one from another, but appearing in the unity of the Godhead) (Meyendorff 1984: 236). Simply from this dogma, the notion of a person was transferred to Christian teaching on the essence of man, stating that the person in the absolute sense is God itself, whereas man can be perceived as a person due to the fact that he was created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Lossky 1985: 106-107; Hryniewicz 1972: 222).

The idea of the Redemption and deification of man is another context for Christian anthropology. Orthodox thinkers used to emphasize the opinion expressed for the first time by St Irenaeus of Lyon (Adversus haereses) in the 2nd century: “God made Himself man, that man might become God.” (St Irenaeus of Lyon: 97) That notion was repeated several times afterwards in the writings of St. Gregory of Naziansus, St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa (cf. Lossky 1985: 97). According to the belief, the true vocation of man is the deification of his life, which means – approaching the state of a likeness of God (cf. Evdokimov 1986: 121). Eastern theologians used to point out that the path to deification leads not as much towards imitating God but rather could be described in terms of participation in divine energy and light and the inner connection between God and man (cf. Cognar 1968: 858).

Taking into account the above mentioned assumptions, Orthodox anthropology draws a conclusion by pointing to two fundamental aspects of man:

1) his true nature has been established by the image of God imprinted in his soul;
2) his empirical form is regarded as a sort of elusive, ephemeral, changeable outer layer of person, influenced by time.

Having discerned the ambiguous aspect of ontology, Orthodox thought used to stress that man can be described in two forms of existence: a real and true one – belonging to the realm of being and unreal, and a fleeting one – specific for the realm of becoming, manifested by changing psychological appearances, resembling masks being put on frequently one after another in order to conceal the true face.¹

According to Christian theology, Beauty is an ontological attribute of being (cf. Jażykowa 1998: 10): everything that really exists is beautiful, because any created being bears in its form information pointing out to the Creator (cf. Gilson 1953: 291-292). These signs are a sort of *vestigia Trinitatis* reflecting God’s power². Such being the case, *vestigia* are signs of the Creating Word – Logos (“The Word was with God and the Word was God” [John 1:1]). Created beings regarded as signs resemble symbols through their two constitutive aspects: *signans* and *signatum*. *Signans* in that case stands for the visible part of the sign, the material vehicle of meaning, whereas *signatum* in belonging to another reality constitutes the idea of the object represented. *Signatum* constitutes the more valuable, ontological reality of being, whereas *signans* belongs to the elusive reality of becoming.

The 7th century abounding in keen discussions between iconoclasts and iconodules appeared to be a very important time for Eastern Christianity in as far as principles of Christian aesthetics are concerned. The heated debate on the admissibility of a cult of artificial images that was mainly to involve Eastern theologians was to culminate in the acquiring and deep-rooted reverence for the canons within Eastern Church painting. At the same time, the Western branch of Christianity generally did not interfere with Eastern theological and aesthetic argument having accepted the interpretation issued by Pope Gregory the Great who, in a letter written in 600 to Bishop Serenius, explained the appropriateness and the usefulness of religious paintings being exposed in churches (cf. Безансон 1999: 164). The decisions undertaken by the Second Council of Nicaea in 787 settled the Iconoclastic Controversy by stressing the symbolic character of icons enabling icon worship (cf. Łukaszuk 1998: 43). In the decision of the

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¹ The Platonic idea of the opposition between being and becoming was developed in the story about the ring of Giges included in Republic, Book II, 360b-d. In the history of Russian religious thought that notion has become a foundation of the anthropological concept of opposition between the true and false existence of man, developed by Vyacheslav Ivanov (1866-1949) in his several works (*Fio, ergo non sum*, Человек, О кризисе гуманизма, Кризис индивидуализма, Лицо, Пролегомены о демонах. See: Дудек 2010: 53-64.

² In the treatise *De Trinitate* St Augustine raised the conviction that all created things teach us something about the Creator. On Augustine’s theory of natural and intentional signs see: Chydenius 1960: 5-12.

³ Roman Jakobson referring to C. S. Peirce’s classification of signs (icons, indexes, symbols) presented in 1867 in the paper *On A New List of Categories* explains: “Stoic doctrine viewed the essence of signs, and especially of verbal signs, in their necessarily twofold structure, namely, indissoluble unity of an immediately perceptible *signans* and an inferable, apprehensible *signatum*, according to the ancient Latin translation of the corresponding Greek terms.” See: Jakobson 1971: 699.
Council Fathers, word and image were regarded as equal means for the Church teaching of transmission. That decision was to have some important anthropological connotations. One of them was the acknowledgement of the equality of the two human senses: sight and hearing. Both were regarded as appropriate to perceive God’s Word (cf. Безансон 1999: 137).

The Caroline Books (Libri Carolini) written in 790-792 exposed the Emperor Charlemagne’s critique of the General Council held at Nicaea in 787 (cf. Шахан 1908). The Emperor supported the opinion of Pope Gregory the Great about religious paintings and stressed that the Western Church was not involved in the Iconoclastic Controversy. In the opinion expressed by the Pope and Emperor Charlemagne, there is neither any reason to destroy religious artificial images nor, on the other hand, – such paintings should be worshipped (cf. Безансон 1999: 137). Religious paintings, however, can be useful in transmitting Church teachings to the illiterate in the form of Biblia Pauperum. According to Libri Carolini, such images may perform three functions: a) to act as a caution for common people, b) to commemorate important events and c) to serve as temple wall decoration (cf. Wолицка-Вольшлер 2010: 165). The Eastern Church being seriously engaged in discussions on the appropriateness and principles of preparation and the liturgical sense of religious paintings has established the foundations for the theology of the icon – one of the most developed branches of Orthodox teaching, whereas the Western Church has not concentrated to such an extent on the meaning of visual representations (cf. Дяб-Калиновская 1993: 102).

The different positions that were revealed during the argument between the Western and Eastern Churches seriously influenced ideas of artistic freedom, aesthetic styles and views on man included in the religious art developed within both cultural circles.

The word “icon” is derived from the Greek εικων (‘eikon’) meaning “image.” Taking that notion into account, according to Eastern theology man created “in the image and likeness of God” can be perceived as the icon of God (cf. Булгаков 2002: 50-51).

An icon, in comparison with a portrait, reveals a tendency to avoid mimetic, detailed representation. An icon is not a realistic picture as far as the faithfulness and verisimilitude of reflection are concerned (cf. Евдокимов 1999: 186). A mimetic attitude towards changing reality is regarded as inappropriate or even a dangerous technique for representation because concentration on detailed reflection draws our attention away from the ontological truth. As an example of the Orthodox conviction in the inappropriateness of mimetic, realistic techniques in representing divine reality we may refer to a passage from the novel The Idiot by Ф. Достоевский. In the fragment describing the reaction of Prince Myshkin looking in Rogozhin’s house at a copy of the well known

4 Jean Calvin’s (1509-1564) critical views on religious paintings as elements of temple decoration are regarded by some scholars as cases of a new iconoclasm. Cf. Безансон 1999: 201-209. The Orthodox theologian Paul Evdokimov has stated that Protestant believers do not regard art as a form of a sermon because “art does not pass on any real meaning.” Cf. Евдокимов 1986: 282-283.

5 The author refers to man as a “a pan-icon of the world” also (cf. Булгаков 2002: 40).
painting *The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb* by Hans Holbein the Younger,\(^6\) Dostoevskii relates as follows:

“That picture! That picture!” cried Myshkin,\(^7\) struck by a sudden idea. “Why, a man’s faith might be ruined by looking at that picture!”

This was the presentment of a poor mangled body which had evidently suffered unbearable anguish even before its crucifixion, full of wounds and bruises, marks of the violence of soldiers and people, and of the bitterness of the moment when He had fallen with the cross – all this combined with the anguish of the actual crucifixion. [...]

It is strange to look on this dreadful picture of the mangled corpse of the Saviour, and to put this question to oneself: ‘Supposing that the disciples, the future apostles, the women who had followed Him and stood by the cross, all of whom believed in and worshipped Him – supposing that they saw this tortured body, this face so mangled and bleeding and bruised (and they must have so seen it) – how could they have gazed upon the dreadful sight and yet have believed that He would rise again?’ (Transl. by Eva Martin).

The above mentioned picture drew the writer’s attention during his journey to Switzerland in 1867. The naturalistically presented dead body of Christ reveals the first signs of decay:

Holbein’s painting equalized the human and the divine […], his Christ is subject to the laws of physics. The two meet chiasmically in his art. When Dostoevsky encountered Holbein, he was seized by what we would call gnostic doubt: The painting, for a moment, disclosed the Resurrection as a mere hallucination and Christ as a man who really died, who once lay putrefying in a sarcophagus (MORTAL IMMORTAL).

The endangered faith of a believer looking at Holbein’s picture representing the dead flesh of the Saviour becomes the source of a metaphysical feeling of *horror vacui* in the ekphrasis made by Prince Myshkin. The optimistic and hopeful Gospel message: “Word became flesh” [John 1: 26] is confronted with a representation restricted to the earthly, profane aspects of the Incarnation without any signs of hope for an eternal life: “Holbein’s painting draws the miracle of the resurrection into an unbearable, and yet all too human, encounter with the physicality of Christ’s broken body.” (GATRALL 2001: 219.)

Such a topic can hardly appear in Orthodox iconography. In paschal icons Christ is presented either on the Cross or during the descendents to Hell. Orthodox theology does not stop at the moment of Christ’s death, contemplating His overcoming of the death instead. In Orthodox icons Christ is always presented as the Lord of his life and death (cf. EVDOKIMOY 1999: 259-260).

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\(^6\) *Der Leichnam Christi im Grabe* (1521-1522), Öl auf Lindenholz, Kunstmuseum Basel.

\(^7\) In this quotation I have changed the spelling of the hero’s name. In the translation by Eva Martin the name appears as “Muishkin.” Myshkin seems to be more adequate transliteration of original Russian: Мышкин.
Western believers and Western art do not omit the moment of the Saviour’s death. Worship, songs, prayers and series of pictures are full of empathy with the suffering God, caused by images of Saviour’s bleeding wounds.

The form of an icon is much simpler in comparison to the form of a portrait and any other genres of Western religious painting as well (cf. Evdokimov 1996: 128). It is believed that a portrait cannot reveal the essence of man because such a painting shows only the outer, vague and momentary layer of each person. A portrait is constructed according to the principle of pars pro toto – the part standing for the whole. The painter makes a selection of characteristic features in order to compose an individual, unique representation of the person being painted (cf. Bulgakow 2002: 42, 59-61). The principle of metonymy – the tendency to keep a close, adjoin, mimetic connection between an object and its representation is characteristic for the art of the portrait, whereas an icon is organized by means of symbol – the device being part of one reality and pointing out to another one (cf. Evdokimov 1996: 118). In the realm of symbolic representation the image becomes a sign. Signans in that case stands for a material, graphic set of shapes, light and colours. Signatum constitutes the idea of the represented object belonging to another reality (cf. Gadamer 1991: 100).

The ascetic simplicity of the means accepted by the Orthodox canons of icon preparation as well as noticeable deformations in body shapes, space, architecture, the things being presented are characteristic attempts undertaken in order to stress the symbolical meaning of the depicted world which under no circumstances can be judged in terms of a mimetic representation of sacred reality. According to canons, an icon should neither imitate nature nor make any views of illusion (cf. Bulgakow 2002: 67). Such being the case, an icon makes a predominance of the semantic way of transmitting the meaning over the geometrical one, the latter prevailing in Western paintings (Uspienski, 1975: 332).

In the case of an icon individual features are consciously, however not totally, reduced to reveal the spiritual image of a person. We may say that an icon is a sort of portrayal of the image of God imprinted in the soul of a person represented (Uspienski, 1975: 54-56; see also: Paprocki 2011: 46). Because of that the icon is called a “window to the higher reality,” conveying meaning from the space-time dimension to a transfigured eternity (Jazykowa 1998: 22).

The above mentioned differences between an icon and a portrait lead one to a specific definition of the preparation techniques adopted by icon masters. An icon, due to the acquired semantic mechanism of connection between signans and signatum, resembles a word. Therefore, in the circle of Orthodox theologians it is said that icons are not painted, but they are written. According to the theology of Eastern Church

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8 Gadamer has stressed that “an inseparable connection between visible image and invisible meaning” is the characteristic feature of a symbol.

9 The contemporary Ukrainian iconographer Valentin Streltsov explains on his website: “The most literal translation of the word Greek: εἰκονογραφία (eikonographia) is ‘image writing,’ leading many English-speaking Orthodox Christians to insist that icons are not ‘painted’ but rather ‘written.’ From there, further explanations are given that icons are to be understood in a manner similar to
an icon is a sort of code enabling one to express the Gospel by means of colours (cf. Архимандрит Рафаил).

Reduced details, simplified ways of presentation and repeated compositions are canon based principles (cf. Булгakov 2002: 64-65). A master of each icon is supposed to refer to the so-called podlinnik – a set of written instructions (sometimes accompanied by drawn patterns of composition) accepted by the Church. According to Eastern tradition, the true author of each icon is the Church itself whereas the master appears to be only a humble tool used by the community of believers in order to acquire the image necessary for cultic purposes. Consequently, a master was not supposed to sign his icons. There are clearly shaped expectations towards icon masters as far as their attitude to life is concerned. An icon master, while not being formally a monk, was subjected to more restricted behavioural practices than a real monk himself (cf. Evdokimov 1999: 181-182).

In Western circumstances such restrictions have not appeared. The Church has usually not interfered with the private life of a painter. A master is not anonymous, he can sign his works. Western paintings were created in a close connection with real everyday life being a source for the individual inspiration of a painter. The task of an artist is to disclose the harmony and beauty existing in the real world but which is covered with unnecessary veils. A western master in preparing a portrait of a saint can use a real person as a model (which is strictly forbidden and regarded as a blasphemous action in Orthodox teachings) (Dąb-Kalinowska 1993: 103). This is the case with Raphaele Sanzio working on a cycle of images presenting Madonna and using, as it was believed, his mistress Fornarina as a model (cf. Stuart 1914: 453). The Western master, however sinful and morally weak, is thought to be able to create a realm of beauty pointing

Holy Scripture – that is, they are not simply artistic compositions but rather are witnesses to the truth the way Scripture is. Far from being imaginative creations of the iconographer, they are more like scribal copies of the Bible. While the explanation of the purpose and nature of icons is certainly true and consistent with the Church’s Holy Tradition, there is a linguistic problem with the insistence on the word written rather than painted. In Greek, a painted portrait of anyone is also a γραφή (graphi), and the art of painting itself is called ζωγραφική (zographike) while any drawing or painting can be referred to as ζωγραφία (zographia). Ancient Greek literally uses the same root word to refer to the making of portraits and the making of icons, but distinguishes whether it is “painting from life” (ζωγραφία) or “painting icons” (εικονογραφία). Thus, from a linguistic point of view, either all paintings – whether icons or simple portraits – are “written” or (more likely) “painted” is a perfectly usable English translation, simply making a distinction between the painting appropriate for icons and that appropriate for other kinds of painting, just as Greek does.” See on the website: Eastern Orthodox and Catholic teaching about Icons.

10 “Podlinniki” are known in the circle of Russian Orthodoxy, whereas in the circle of Byzantine Church the analogous set of composition patterns and principles of presentation was called “hermeneia.” Cf. Smorag-Różycka 2003: VIII-IX.

11 Cf. Expectations towards icon authors was clearly voiced in the final document of the Russian Orthodox Council of 1551 (called a “Council of One Hundred Chapters”). Cf. Florenski 1984: 142-147. See also: Jazykowa 1998: 20; Архимандрит Рафаил.

12 As the author points out, a real person as a model for an iconographer would have meant a total breaking off from the connection of the archetypal sanctified image.
out the divine reality. The work of Western artist is regarded to be “neither devotional nor godless” (Cf. Безансон 1999: 166).

The Eastern master in turn, convinced that patterns of real beauty are to be found only in the other world, tries to avoid the interspersing of elusive and real elements. That is the reason for imparting a non-mimetic, symbolical form to every detail, colours and patterns of composition. One of the most striking features of icon composition is the principle of diverted perspective creating the impression that all lines are focused in front of the icon on the onlooker looking out from the icon window at a transformed, sanctified reality (cf. Evdokimov 1999: 189).

Though the images of man are simplified, they pass on two kinds of information: a) symbolic vision of a deified, transfigured person existing in eternity b) metonymic, vestigial items of information about the bodily and social characteristics of the presented person in his or her earthly life (height, sex, occupation).

Icon representations of man can be regarded as a set of symbols: the body itself, even every part of it, gestures, clothes, objects held, applied colours and the perspective presented in a visibly non-mimetic manner bear the symbolical notion of a higher reality. The saints appearing on icons are presented with big, open, piercing eyes, contemplating an extraterrestrial reality invisible for the sinner. Sometimes ascetics were presented with closed eyes, which means that by means of inner glance they look at the image of God imprinted in their soul. The foreheads of the saints are usually very high, meaning that God’s wisdom fills them. The very thin, almost marked out with a single line lips of the saints are regarded as the badges of a sinless state. Clenched lips are the indication that the person represented in the picture keeps silence and observes fasts, that he does not violate the commandments through gluttony or bad language. Elongated ears are the indication of a susceptibility to God’s voice (cf. Evdokimov 1996: 131; see also: Jazykowa 1998: 27-28).

The icon though represents a new, transformed man in which his altered body is no longer a prison for his soul, but becomes a sort of temple for it (cf. Evdokimov 1999: 190). A holy person is always presented en face, motionless, with a gaze full of tranquility. In the case of human beings presented in a profile or caught in motion, with bodies twisted and full of anxiety – the applied devices of composition pass on a message of perfection, a lack of sanctity (cf. Evdokimov 1996: 131). Man in that form of existence has not yet reached the state of being – he still remains in the realm of becoming. Therefore, the image of man in an Orthodox icon is constructed by means of a system of symbols and, consequently, the presented person resembles a compound symbol itself. The sign becomes the principle for iconic representation. Image in that case acts as a word. That is the semantic aspect of the statement stressing that man is an icon of God.

Western religious paintings usually used to obey other principles. The Western painter, endowed with artistic licence, creates images that illustrate the truth expressed in the holy text of the scriptures, sermons or hagiography. But pictorial principles, influenced by changing artistic styles, philosophical schools, concepts of man and pat-

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13 That principle of presentation is especially visible in icons undertaking the themes of the Transfiguration and Christ’s Descend to Hell. See: Evdokimov 1999: 252.
terns of culture are regarded as the main code of translation from the reality described in words into an actuality expressed by images. In that case the word inspires the artistic imagination and creativity. The form of such an expression is closer to the changing sensitivity of man in consecutive centuries. Western religious art speaks to the believer in a language emerging from culture, whereas Orthodox icon does not change its language, attempting to influence the changing culture. The source of the message being passed on is the same in both cases.

The symbolic, meaningful clarity of Russian Orthodox icons based on observing rigorous canons started to disappear gradually at the beginning of the 19th century (Jazykowa 1998: 31) due to the visible influences of Western aesthetic principles. Since that time Russian icons have become more and more imbued with details, decorative motives and mimetic concentration on imitating the profane reality. Icon masters have started to apply techniques of visual illusion, introduce real landscapes and use real persons as models. Disobeying canons led to a replacement of icons by paintings in the religious life of Russia (cf. Dąb-Kalinowska 1990: 126). As a result, “the unity of word and image,” regarded since the Council in Nicaea as equal in means for the passing on of Christian teaching, was broken (Dąb-Kalinowska 1990: 126). That process stopped only at the beginning of the 20th century, due to the discovery of the beauty of early Russian icons, which encouraged the Russian Church to redefine their attitude towards icons and return to the forgotten canons of before (Трубецкой).

An interesting case in the establishment of intercultural space and recognition of the same values between Roman Catholic and Orthodox believers is the cult of the Black Madonna icon from the monastery in Częstochowa. For Polish Catholics the picture is one of the most revered and worshipped religious paintings. In the Polish Church calendar, a special day for the worship of the Black Madonna falls on 26th of September. For Orthodox believers the image of the Black Madonna is regarded as a holy icon. The Orthodox calendar has designated the 19th of March as a special occasion for the worship of the image. Both Christian Churches used to evoke a legend in connection with the image stating that the Częstochowa Madonna is one of the 70 icons written about by St Luke, who was seen as a person unifying two skills in his service to Christ. As one of the Evangelists and the author of icons as well (cf. Cormack 1999: 50-52), St Luke used to prove the equality of word and image as appropriate media passing on the same meaning of vital importance.

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HUMAN VALUES EXPRESSED

AN EXAMPLE OF THE APPLICATION
OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS IN THE STUDY
OF HUMAN VALUES TERMINOLOGY
IN THE TAJIK LANGUAGE

ABSTRACT

The present article discusses the problem of how selected human values like ambition, freedom, honesty and piety are expressed in the Tajik language. The semantic fields of the forms in question is analysed in order to understand the associations and connotations they raise. Analysis of the semantic fields of language forms denoting a particular value may help us to understand the place of this value in the value hierarchy of some culture.

Keywords: Tajik language, human values, ambition, freedom, honesty, piety
Human values are difficult to define and even more to classify. This results not only from the complexity of the concept itself, but also from the fact that they are an object of research conducted within various disciplines of science, e.g. philosophy, religious studies, psychology etc. (Salzwedel (2013)).

One of the most successful attempts to do that has been presented in the works of Shalom H. Schwartz. In the present work, in accordance with Schwartz’s methodology, we will understand human values as ‘desirable trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity’ (Schwartz 1994: 21). This definition is elaborated on in other publications by the same author (see e.g. Schwartz 2006: 931).

According to Schwartz, human values may be divided – on the basis of their motivational content – into ten basic types, i.e.,

1. Power,
2. Achievement,
3. Hedonism,
4. Stimulation,
5. Self-direction,
6. Universalism,
7. Benevolence,
8. Conformity,
9. Tradition,

These categories form a continuum with the last one neighbouring both the penultimate and the first one, again. Thus, they may be best imagined in a form of a circular graph, with every category forming one sector (with the exception of Tradition and Conformity sharing the same intersection) (Schwartz 1994: 24). These value types are not discrete. In fact, they overlap with their neighbouring ones (Schwartz 1994: 25). This circular model of value types serves as a map or coordinate system for locating particular values. Values of similar motivational type appear close to each other, while those entirely distinct are placed on the opposing parts of the map (Schwartz 1994: 31). Similarly to the basic value types, particular closely related values may also overlap with each other (Schwartz 1994: 25).

The presented vision is quite similar to the spectrum of colours, with two important differences: it is two-dimensional and it is looped, without a beginning or an end. However, probably every linguist – having thought of this parallel – will remember the variations in the segmentation of the spectrum into base colours in different languages. Thus, it would be interesting to include in the analysis of human value types the problem of semantic fields of the forms used to express them in particular languages. However, unlike in the case of colours, apart from the languages, another factor is important here. Values (or systems of values) are culture-dependent. They are most often studied in relation to cultural circles of religions (Salzwedel (2013)). In fact,
it is possible to draw a cultural map of values which shows that societies belonging to
certain cultural and/or confessional circles (e.g. Protestant Europe, Catholic Europe,
ex-Soviet, English-speaking, Islamic etc.) share similar value schemes (INGLEHART/
WELZEL (2013)).

In the present work, the author is going to present an attempt to analyze the se-
monic field of words denoting values in one particular ethnolect – the Tajik lan-
guage. Tajikistan is a very promising field for such a research. Linguistically, it is very
close to both Iran and Afghanistan (with the Tajik language often classified as a dia-
lect of Persian). It also shares common cultural Iranian roots. On the other hand, de-
nominationally, it is distant from Iran, as Sunni Islam is dominating in this Central
Asian country. Moreover, Tajikistan remained for a considerable time under Russian
and then Soviet rule. Thus Tajikistan is both Islamic and ex-Soviet, both Iranian and
Sunni Muslim etc. In other words, it is a borderland of different cultural environ-
ments.

One important remark has to be made – the present work focuses on the Tajik lan-
guage and the way it expresses certain lexical items related to human values. One should
remember, however, that the results found are valid only for the Tajik-speaking part of
the population of this country. However, Tajikistan is not a monolingual country, apart
from Tajik, Russian, Uzbek and Pamir languages are spoken there. For those ethnolects,
separate research should be conducted (NAGZIBEKOVA 2008: 228).

We are going to analyse semantic fields of words used to express exemplary values
belonging to selected value types defined by Schwartz:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Ambition (&lt; Ambitious)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-direction</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Honesty (&lt; Honest)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Piety (&lt; Devout)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* To make the linguistic analysis coherent, where Schwartz referred to a value using an adjective, these are
converted into a related noun.

AMBITION

Let us find out, first, what words are used in Tajik to convey the idea of ‘ambition’, and
what other meanings – apart from that – they may possess. In establishing the semantic
field of the forms in question the author has used a number of modern Tajik diction-
aries (see bibliography). Apart from that, the Steingass’ dictionary of Persian, which is
based mostly on the classical texts – a part of the common heritage of Persians and Ta-
jiks, was used as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Ambition</th>
<th>Arrogance</th>
<th>Haughtiness</th>
<th>Hubris</th>
<th>Swagger</th>
<th>Careerism</th>
<th>Aspiration</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>истикбор</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 253; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 560; Шукуроев et al. 1969: 1, 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>батар</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ingratitude; (unexpected) joy; disobedience</td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 78; Шукуроев et al. 1969: 1,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>борнома</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 117; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 232; Шукуроев et al. 1969: 1, 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>шумат</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>greed</td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 755; Назарзода et al. 2008: 2, 658; Шукуроев et al. 1969: 2, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>рутбапаразти</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>чохпаразти</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>мансаб-паразти</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>иззатталаби</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>шуҳрат-паразти</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vanity</td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 757; Мокхтор et al. 2003: 337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>чадал</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fight, battle</td>
<td>Мокхтор 2003: 318; Назарзода et al. 2008: 2, 576; Шукуроев et al. 1969: 2, 767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we see, a number of ideas coinciding with ambition appears repeatedly in the semantic field of the listed forms. We may present their importance (resulting from the number of forms in the semantic fields of which they appear) in the following diagram:

One striking observation is that most of the meanings coinciding with ambition are negative features. Trying to explain this one recalls the negative vision of ambition in the traditional Muslim ethics. Together with solicitude, ambition is believed to be “the root of all misery in the world” (FAKHY 1994: 171). Ibn Ḥazm sees ambition as a destructive power that brings disagreement (HECK 2009: 104). The origin of such an attitude may be possibly traced back to the Islamic strict monotheism: neither wealth, nor one’s ego, nor ambition may be an object of worship (ESPOSITO 2010: 42). It is only the teaching of some modern and – at least in some sense – reformist Islamic activists that ambition is presented in much more favourable ways, e.g. as “a sign of God’s love” (HANAFI 2009: 125).

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1 The broader the line joining two semantic items, the more often they coexist within the semantic field of one form.
FREEDOM

The next value chosen by the author of the present article is ‘Freedom’. Just like in the case of ‘Ambition’ we shall start with identifying the words which contain this notion in their semantic field and we shall try to find other meanings they may possess.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Freedom</th>
<th>Liberation</th>
<th>Independence</th>
<th>Will</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>озодӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>emancipation; elegance; joy; thanksgiving</td>
<td>САЙМИДИНОВ et al. 2006: 433-434; М.С. АСИМОВ 1985: 119; МОУКТОР et al. 2003: 181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>парвос</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>САЙМИДИНОВ et al. 2006: 455; НАЗАРЗОДА et al. 2008: 2, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>хуррият</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td>М.С. АСИМОВ 1985: 119; САЙМИДИНОВ et al. 2006: 695; МОУКТОР et al. 2003: 305; НАЗАРЗОДА et al. 2008: 2, 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>истиколият</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sovereignty</td>
<td>М.С. АСИМОВ et al. 1985: 119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case of the form хуррият is particularly interesting, as its semantic field covers at least two different values described by Schwartz. i.e., freedom and independence (< independent) (Schwartz 1994: 31). In other words, affinity of the two values in the sense of social sciences is reflected by their linguistic relationship. The word хуррият is a borrowing from Arabic, where حُرِّيَّةٌ hurriyya is an abstract noun derived from the adjective حُرّ hurr ‘free’ (Rosenthal/Lewis (2013)). It is related to the verbs حَرَّ to be free-born and حَرَّر to liberate a slave’ (Lane 1968: 2, 538). In most of the Qur’anic passages where the idea of freedom appears, freedom or liberation of slaves as a pious deed is meant (see 5:89, 24:33, etc.). However, already in the pre-Islamic times, apart from the legal meaning (i.e. the antonym of ‘slave, unfree’), the adjective hurr conveyed the ethic notion ‘noble’ (referring to character or behaviour) (Rosenthal/Lewis (2013)). Even if the Qur’ān, as stated above, encouraged to liberate slaves, still Islam approved of the institution of slavery, thus denying freedom in the case of a part of the population (Ibid.). The Islamic notion of ‘freedom’ was later significantly influenced by the translations of Greek literature and some political aspect was added to the meaning of ‘freedom’ by great philosophers al-Fārābī and Ibn Ruşd (Ibid.), which is quite important for us, taking into consideration the affinity of the two values: ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’. However, a clearly political understanding of ‘freedom’ is to be found in the Muslim world much later, in the 18th-century Turkey (Ibid.).
The form озодӣ in its turn is a word of Iranian origin (cf. New Persian آزادی َāzādi). As we see, the form covers a number of specific meanings not conveyed by the rest of the lexemes used to convey the sense of ‘freedom’.

As far as the image of ‘freedom’ in Islam is concerned, we have to note that the early Muslim works refer to ‘freedom’ in an unfavourable manner, using the notion as a synonym to ‘anarchy’ or ‘libertinism’ (Ibid.). In fact, even in the writings of modern Muslim thinkers, the general concept of ‘freedom’ is a controversial subject (ALSHAMSI 2011: 93; TIBI 2007: 35). It is understood as a positive value only as long as it is contained within the limits of what is lawful (halāl). Alternatively, these limitations of freedom may be presented as resulting from the prohibition to make harm to others or to oneself by one’s deeds (ALSHAMSI 2011: 93).

A research in understanding freedom in the East and in the West would be a fascinating one, however, this is far beyond the scope of the present article. What we may notice here is that there is a significant difference in the understanding of freedom and the idea of protecting it between the Muslim East and the West. No institutions aiming at protecting the idea of freedom were developed in the previous one, as power in Islam was always associated with individuals and not institutions (TIBI 2007: 35; see also ROYSENTAL/LEWIS (2013)).

Another difference, in the author’s opinion, is that while – always and everywhere – freedom is limited by some external (e.g. law) or internal (e.g. conscience) factors, the people of the West tend to look at these limitations as a necessary evil, while the Muslim ethics perceive them in a much more favourable and positive way.

As has already been said, theoretically, the main factor limiting personal freedom is protection of others and the society so that they are not harmed by the deeds of an individual (ALSHAMSI 2011: 93). This concept is not alien, of course, to the Western World. However, its practical application is surely different, as it leads to opposition to full religious freedom (especially to apostasy from Islam and to undertaking missions among Muslims) or freedom of speech, as no criticism of religion (i.e. Islam) is allowable (Ibid.).

Now, to sum up, ‘freedom’ (esp. individual freedom) does not seem to be a particularly important value in the Islamic world, especially, when compared to that in the so called Western World. This is supported by the data provided by the World Values Survey, according to which the societies of the Muslim countries significantly prefer the value of ‘maintaining order in the society’ to ‘freedom of the individual’ (results starting from 79,10% preferring order in Turkey to 89,50% in the post-Soviet Azerbaijan), while the data from the non-Muslim ex-Soviet countries show a lot of variation, never – however – approaching comparable numbers (in Latvia the preference for order is chosen only by 39,10%, while in the neighbouring Lithuania the result is 54,90%).

Unfortunately, Azerbaijan was the only post-Soviet Muslim state for which this data have been provided and a similar research in Tajikistan would be welcome. Nev-

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ertheless, on the basis of this sole example we may at least put forward a hypothesis that the preference for order at the expense of individual freedom is typical of Muslim countries, and the starting point of this factor at the beginning of the Soviet period (not a particularly good era for personal freedom) was at such a level that the communist rule could not have made it any higher.

**HONESTY**

The lexical corpus related to the idea of ‘honesty’ value is the largest one among the groups of vocabulary analysed in the present work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Honesty</th>
<th>Decency</th>
<th>Conscientiousness</th>
<th>Purity</th>
<th>Nobleness</th>
<th>Unselfishness</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Innocence</th>
<th>Sincerity</th>
<th>Simplicity</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ахлоли покиза</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>буномусїй</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 68; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>бовичдонїй</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 108; Калонтаров 2007: 262; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 211</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>боинсофїй</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 113; Мокктор et al. 2003: 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>бошарафїй</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 120; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 239</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>диёнат</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>religiosity, piety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 198; Мокктор et al. 2003: 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>дилпокїй</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Forms</td>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Decency</td>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>Purity</td>
<td>Nobleness</td>
<td>Unselfishness</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Innocence</td>
<td>Simplicity</td>
<td>Sincerity</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>дилсофий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>дурушткорий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Калонтаров 2007: 262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>инсоф</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 201; Моукнтор et al. 2003: 87</td>
</tr>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>rightness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>поквицдоний</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>покий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>пок-сириштий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>magnanimity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>росткорий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>салох</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>kindness, rightness, benefit, wisdom, rationality, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>софдилй</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>ingenuity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>тозакорий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>хулус</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>friendship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>хуштинатий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>халолкорий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>халолий</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Калонтаров 2007: 262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the meanings coinciding with ‘honesty’ (a value within the ‘Benevolence’ type (Schwartz 1994: 31)) in the semantic field of the analysed forms we notice ‘friendship’ (belonging to the same type (Schwartz 1994: 31)), ‘piety’ (of the neighbouring ‘Tradition’ type (Schwartz 1994: 31) – see below), wisdom (adjacent ‘Universalism’ type (Schwartz 1994: 31)).

Now let us present the proportions between particular coincidences in the semantic field of the analysed words in a diagram. Like in the case of ‘ambition’, the width of the lines between two ideas reflects how many times one form comprises both of them within its semantic field.

As we see, there is a particularly strong link to the features of purity, decency and nobleness.

In Islam ‘honesty’ is an important virtue. Ibn Ḥāzm understands it as a composite one, comprising features such as courage, generosity, intelligence and justice (Fakhry 1994: 174). It is an interesting idea, as it partially coincides (cf. justice and generosity/unselfishness) with our semantic findings.
Miskawayh’s ideas are less compatible with our results. Following the Platonic classification of virtues, he includes ‘honesty’ in the set of the temperance virtues together with modesty, self-control, self-discipline, liberality, contentedness, good composition, piety etc. (Fakhry 1994: 112) From among these, probably modesty may be a counterpart to simplicity with no other evident parallels. Moreover, e.g. piety and self-discipline belong to a different set according both to Schwartz’s classification of values and our semantic findings.

Also al-Iṣfahānī’s classification of virtues, which places honesty together with contentment does not particularly support the semantic analysis.

In the case of the Soviet reality, it is quite difficult to assess the position of ‘honesty’ in the value systems of Soviet societies. ‘Honesty’ was one of the ideas with a kind of ‘double life’ in the Soviet Union. It was highly praised officially (note Kalinin’s urging to teach people ‘absolute honesty’ (Hoffman 2003: 54)). “Moral Code of the Builder of Communism”, an official document issued by the Communist Party in 1961, being a manifesto of values of the Soviet society, mentioned ‘honesty’ among the 12 most important ones (Klumbytė 2012: 92). Moreover, at least two other Soviet values mentioned in the same document match the lexical items associated in Tajik with ‘honesty’, namely: ‘simplicity’ and ‘moral purity’ (Ibid.). On the other hand, we should not forget that the actual aspects of the Soviet reality practically eradicated ‘honesty’ from everyday life (Hoffman 2003: 54).

The linguistic data support the importance of ‘honesty’ as a value of modern Tajik society. This is, however, not surprising because, as we have noted, at least on the declaratory level, the Soviet society praised it as well. This makes the situation different from that of the finally discussed value, i.e. ‘piety’.

PIETY

Let us now analyse the vocabulary referring to the value of ‘piety’ understood as “respect for God and religion, often shown in the way you behave” (Longman 1995: 1064). Among the analyzed values, ‘piety’ is the one most strongly associated with the religious aspect of human life. Even if Schwartz excludes ‘spirituality values’ from the set of universal value types (Schwartz 1994: 23), nevertheless, many of the values either possess an inherent spiritual element (‘piety’ being an excellent example) or may obtain additional (positive or negative) religious meaning in various cultures. We have already observed such a ‘spiritual bias’ in the case of the value of ‘ambition’. As far as the relationship between values and religion is concerned, they both may be described as two factors coexisting on the social level (Blasi 1995: 29).
Again, we shall start with analysing words for ‘piety’ used in the Tajik language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Forms</th>
<th>Piety</th>
<th>Self-restraint</th>
<th>Righteousness</th>
<th>Fear of God</th>
<th>Honesty</th>
<th>Worship</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>варъ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Бертельс et al. 1954: 89; Шукуро́в et al. 1969: 1, 224; Сайми́динов et al. 2006: 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>пархезгорӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Бертельс et al. 1954: 301; Шукуро́в et al. 1969: 2, 42; Сайми́динов et al. 2006: 458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>покдинӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Сайми́динов et al. 2006: 472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>порсоӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>purity, honesty Бертельс et al. 1954: 311; Шукуро́в et al. 1969: 2, 87; Сайми́динов et al. 2006: 474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>худотарсӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Бертельс et al. 1954: 429; Сайми́динов et al. 2006: 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Forms</td>
<td>Piety</td>
<td>Self-restraint</td>
<td>Righteousness</td>
<td>Fear of God</td>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Worship</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>худошиносиг</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>recognition of God, monotheism</td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>хакпарасти</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Саймиддинов et al. 2006: 676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>тарсгорӣ (тарсқорӣ)*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Назарзода et al. 2008: 2, 317; STEINGASS 1892: 294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>туқо</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Шукуро в et al. 1969: 2, 381; STEINGASS 1892: 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>такия</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>caution, 'pious fraud' (esp. concealing one’s religious beliefs)</td>
<td>Шукуро в et al. 1969: 2, 352; steingass 1892: 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>танассук</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>worship</td>
<td>Шукуро в et al. 1969: 2, 319; STEINGASS 1892: 328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>зоҳидӣ</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Бертельс et al. 1954: 157; Шукуро в et al. 1969: 1, 458; STEINGASS 1892: 608; Назарзода et al. 2008: 1, 527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>худобиний**</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>STEINGASS 1892: 449.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The form is not extensively used in Modern Tajik, however, it is noted in the Nazarzoda’s dictionary and Shukurov mentions the adj. тарсгор / тарсқор ‘the one who fears God; порсо (cf. порсо above; Шукуро в et al., 1969, vol. 2, p. 333).

** This word is not attested in the modern Tajik lexicography. It appears only in the Steingass’ dictionary based on the material of classical Persian. However, it is also present in the modern day Tajik texts (Google search, худобинӣ, 2013-11-01).

*** Not found in the Tajik lexicography, however, possible to be found in Tajik online documents (Google search, диёнатдорӣ, 2013-11-01).
Presenting these coincidences in the semantic field of the analysed forms in a diagram we find out three important and two secondary associations for ‘piety’ in the Tajik language.

Let us now discuss the idea of ‘piety’ in Islam. The affinity of ‘righteousness’ and ‘piety’ is well attested in Muslim philosophy (Fakhry 1994: 13). The importance of self-restraint (as a component of piety, in fact) is derived from the Qur’ān itself (Rane 2010: 23-24). So this association is not restricted to the Persian or Tajik languages, but it is also present in Arabic, where both ‘piety’ and ‘righteousness’ may be meant by the wordbirr, appearing already in the Qur’ān 2:177 (Fakhry 1994: 13), which may be seen as a guiding direction, indicating true piety (an inner attitude towards God), rather than rituals as a condition to get to paradise (Kinberg (2013)).

Another Arabic term that may denote both concepts is تقوىtaqwā (Fakhry 1994: 25). The latter is particularly interesting for us because of its etymology; it is related to the verbal radix <WQY> (hence taqā) ‘to fear [God]’ (Lewisohn (2013)). And indeed, the association of ‘piety’ with the fear of God seems to be deeply rooted in Islamic philosophy and theology (Fakhry 1994: 153, 160). In fact, the fear is one of the motives of obedience to God and moral behaviour in Islam (Reinhart (2013)).

Apart from birr and taqwā, the idea of piety happens to be conveyed in the Qur’ān by the wordiḥsān, which – however – may be also used in the sense of the ‘filial piety’ (Kinberg (2013)).

Finally, two non-Qur’ānic terms may be used referring to piety, i.e. waraʿ (cf. Tajik вараъ) and zuhd (Ibid.).

As a matter of fact, the idea of piety seems to be one of the most important of the religious notions in the Qur’ān (Lewisohn (2013)). It is important not only in the individual relationship between God and an individual believer, but it has also an important communal aspect. As an attitude shared by all the faithful it helps to introduce peaceful relationship between them (Ibid.).

Among textual meanings of the term taqwā in Islamic religious literature, we find the ‘pious abstinence’, and, even though the studied Tajik lexicographical works do not
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Human Values Expressed

ascribe the meaning of ‘self-restraint’ to the borrowed тaквo, Persian dictionaries do so (Ibid.). This trait of the Islamic тaqwá is rooted in fear, as well. It may be explained as an “abstemious fear of following one’s passions” (Ibid.).

Contrary to – for instance – understanding of freedom (see above), the notion of piety in Islam seems to be quite universal and is not much different from similar ideas in other religions (Ibid.).

The coincidence of piety and self-restraint, or even asceticism, is typical of Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, which, however, is not restricted to the Iranian World, including Tajikistan.

The position of ‘piety’ as a value probably reflects the position of religion and religiosity and religion in a society. In the Soviet Union, religion was officially deprecated and religious institutions and activists were persecuted. Atheism was one of the new positive values established by the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Society (SHLAPENTOKH 2005: 218). Thus, traditionally understood ‘[religious] piety’ was not an important value in the Soviet society\(^3\).

Thus, it would be very interesting to undertake a research focused on finding out how the importance of religion in the lives of Tajiks or how important ‘piety’ is for them as a value. Such a study for involving a large number of countries of the world has been done a number of times within the framework of the World Values Survey project. Unfortunately, as we have already noted, Tajikistan has never been included in this research. However, we may analyze the data provided for other Muslim, ex-Soviet countries of the region, e.g. Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. One of the questions included in the survey is how much is the religion is important in life, with possible answers: ‘Very important’, ‘Rather important’, ‘Not very important’, ‘Not at all important’. What we notice is that the percentage of answers ‘Very important’ and ‘Rather important’ is lower in the case of Muslim ex-Soviet countries than in the case of Muslim non-ex-Soviet ones. On the other hand, the results for the Muslim ex-Soviet countries are clearly higher than for the non-Muslim ex-Soviet ones.

Religion very important:\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim, non-ex-Soviet countries</td>
<td>88.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim, ex-Soviet countries</td>
<td>30.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim, ex-Soviet</td>
<td>25.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\) The situation is, however, a bit more complicated. It is obvious that a kind of (subconscious?) piety survived and – in fact – flourished. Many phenomena widespread in the Soviet Union, such as the personality cult or reverence for the communist symbolism, strongly resemble certain religiously motivated behaviours that are usually associated with ‘piety’.

Religion very important + religion rather important: 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim, non-ex-Soviet countries</td>
<td>97.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim, ex-Soviet countries</td>
<td>76.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Muslim, ex-Soviet</td>
<td>58.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, it is not very surprising that in the Muslim post-Soviet societies, where religion is still esteemed by over ¾ of the population, the positive semantic connotations of ‘piety’ and e.g. ‘righteousness’ are preserved, and not over-shadowed by potential negative associations like ‘piety’ – ‘superstitiousness’ or ‘piety’ – ‘[religious] bigotry.’ In other words, the results of the World Values Survey are compatible (even if not referring directly to Tajikistan) with the linguistic connotations of the forms denoting ‘religious piety’.

In other words, although the Soviet period certainly influenced the position of religion in the Tajik society, the results of secularization (or atheization) were more humble than in non-Muslim parts of the Soviet Union.

THE HUMAN VALUES TERMINOLOGY AND LANGUAGE RELATIVISM

From the times of Sapir and Whorf, we are accustomed to the idea that the language spoken by a person influences the way they see the world. In the context of the present article, this means that the language spoken by a person influences her or his value system. This may be seen as an aspect of the relation between the linguistic relativity and cultural relativity, a problem discussed e.g. by S.C. Levinson (Levinson 1996: 133ff.). The problem of the impact of the language spoken by a society on its system of values is certainly a very promising field of research, especially taking into consideration the impact of bilingualism (multilingualism) on the value system of individuals and societies. If we accept the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, we have to admit that differences in understanding human values between e.g. Tajik, Russian and Tajik & Russian speakers are to be expected.

Let us pay some attention to the question of correspondence of the analyzed Tajik lexica to the New Persian vocabulary. We find out, that practically all the analyzed Tajik vocabulary items belong to the common Persian-Tajik lexical heritage and exist in both idioms (e.g. вары/varа’: دینداری dindāri, xudātarsi, etc.). Only a very limited number of classical forms seems not to be used in Tajik (e.g. دیانتگری diyānatgari ‘piety, honesty’ (Steingass 1892: 550)).

The semantic field of particular lexical items in Tajik and New Persian may differ. For instance, in the case of the form ДИНДОРИ dindори we find the idea of the ‘honesty’
and ‘righteousness’ among its primary meanings in New Persian (apart from ‘piety’, of course) (Рубинчик 1970, vol. 1: 696), while the Tajik lexicographers do not mention it (see above).

In spite of the differences in particular lexical items, the over-all spectrum of the semantic fields of the ‘piety’ related terminology en mass, we find in New Persian forms an image quite similar to that of Tajik.

![Semantic field diagram]

The only noticeable difference in proportions is the higher position of the idea of ‘honesty’. Otherwise, the picture is very similar indeed. Strikingly, even the balance between ‘self-restraint’ and ‘Fear of God’ is reflected. In the context of the linguistic relativity theory, this would suggest that the value system of the New Persian speakers and that of the Tajik-speakers remain pretty similar.

Now what is the relationship between the semantic fields of the ‘piety’ terminology in Tajik and Russian? First of all, let us recall the data of the World Values Survey, according to which, religion is far less important for the inhabitants of Russia than for the people of Muslim countries (including post-Soviet ones).

The importance of religion in life for the inhabitants of the Russian Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The percentage of answers in the survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In fact, the WVS provides the data for the Russian Federation as a whole, so one may understand that some predominantly Muslim regions in the Caucasus or predominantly Buddhist ones (e.g. Tuva) were included, so the results for the Russian-

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speaking regions may be a bit different (presumably – with the role of religion – even lower). This means, the results are significantly different from that of the Tajikistan population.

Now what about the semantic field? Here we have a striking difference, too. The meanings of the four Russian terms equivalent to the English ‘piety’, i.e. набожность (adj. набожный) (Волин/Ушаков 1938: 303-304), богомольность (adj. богомольный) (Ушаков 1935: 161), благочестие (adj. благочестивый) (Ушаков 1935: 151; Чернышев 1950: 497), религиозность (adj. религиозный) (Ушаков 1935: 1333) are extremely narrow when compared to the discussed lexica of the Tajik language. It does not exceed the closely related concepts as ‘fulfilling religious duties’, ‘[religious] faith’, ‘associated with religion (adj.)’. What conclusion may be drawn from this? First of all, this means, that for Russian-speakers (contrary to e.g. Tajiks) ideas such aslike ‘honesty’ or ‘righteousness’ have no obvious connotations with religion. From the more general perspective we may put forward a hypothesis that there is a correlation between the extensiveness of the semantic field of the terminology related to a human value in a language and the importance of this value for the society using that language.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the lexical data related to the selected values does not provide any evidence for some significant change of the value system in the Tajik society. The associations resulting from the semantic fields of the names of particular values seem to be in accordance with the ideals of the Muslim ethics. If the results of sociological research indicate some differences between the post-soviet Muslim nations and those with no communist episode in their history, they are rather of quantitative than qualitative nature.

From the more general perspective, the present paper is just an indication of a potentially very promising field of research combining achievements of social sciences, psychology and philosophy in the description and typology of human values with the results of linguistic research. It is certainly too early to propose any decisive conclusions. However, some observations may be made.

First of all, the analysis of the semantic fields of language forms denoting a particular value may help us to understand the place of this value in the value hierarchy of some culture. Repetitive coincidence with obviously negative features may be an indication of its relatively low position (see ‘Ambition’ above).

Lexical items referring to one particular value tend to comprise similar additional meanings within their semantical field. These may be common to all the analyzed forms (see e.g. ‘decency’ and ‘purity’ in the case of ‘honesty’) or may break the analyzed set into groups (see ‘righteousness’ group vs. ‘self-restraint’ group in the case of ‘piety’).

Some lexical items may refer to more than one value. It is interesting to note that in the analyzed material these values belong either to the same type (as defined by Schwartz) or to neighbouring ones. We may put forward a hypothesis that the contin-
uum of values happens to be reflected – to some extent – by the continua of semantic fields of language forms.

Linguistic research may be helpful in understanding if (and to what extent) external factors influenced the value system of some society, as can be seen in the case of the post-soviet Tajikistan. What the author sees as a particularly promising field of research is the relationship between the extensiveness of the terminology describing a value and its importance for the society that uses it.

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THE MYTH OF EUROPE IN ART
AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES¹

THE DIVIDED MEMORY OF EUROPE –
WILL EUROPE SUCCUMB TO DISINTEGRATION?

The Polish government commissioned from Franciszek Starowieyski, a renowned Polish painter, a composition to embellish the new building of the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland at the European Union in Brussels. The monumental *Divina Polonia rapta per Europam profana*, executed in 1998, was put on permanent show in the main hall of the Permanent Representation seat. ‘Divina Polonia,’ the second female figure featured in the canvas next to Europe, is depicted with a halo. F. Starowieyski referred to the classical myth of Europe (a Phoenician princess abducted by Zeus disguised as a bull) in order to emphasize the contrast between secular Europe and ‘holy’ Poland. What is the source of this combination of nudity and saintliness? Why has this otherwise liberated artist, who in hundreds of compositions obsessively portrays the female nude and remains distant from bigotry or clericalism, suddenly resorted to religious symbols? These intriguing and disturbing questions arose after seeing the exhibition on the myth of Europe shown in Florence. There, works of twentieth-century artists from Western Europe did not contain religious symbols. We seem to be approaching the topical problem of the unity of Europe. The canvas *Divina*

Polonia rapta per Europa profana is a symbolic summary of the two different historical experiences of the East and West of Europe.

**Keywords:** Europe, myth, art, history, values, identity

1. **WEST BEST, EAST BEAST OR JAMMER-OSSIS AND BESSER-WESSIS**

Europe shall not integrate until its two parts, western and eastern, do not become acquainted with the path which they have traversed. At the European Parliament forum it is the past which frequently proves decisive for the future of Europe since the Euro-deputies are outright doomed to become embroiled in assorted debates imposed by various historical experiences.

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2. In this respect Western Europe has greater arrears to overcome in order to become familiar with the past of the East. In turn, Central-Eastern Europeans will find that more detailed knowledge of the past of the West will enable them to understand why their Western neighbours find some of our problems outright irritating.

3. Such an example could be the spectacular conflict concerning the inclusion of the “Christian roots of Europe” into a project of the European Constitution. Immediately after Poland became a member of the Union on 1 May 2000, she became engaged in a fierce battle waged on the European Parliament forum. This is the reason why the whole of Poland, her leftist government (which in a programme-like manner remains secular) and rightist opposition (connected with the Church), the Polish post-communists (whose majority is composed of atheists) and anti-communists all joined ranks to defend the controversial entry. Why are the Poles being opposed by almost the whole of Western Europe? The most hostile attitude appears to be that of France while the most fervent spokesmen of the inclusion of the Christian roots are the Poles. Why have those two countries, friends for centuries, now assumed such extreme stands? Let us go back to sixteenth-century Europe when France became the scene of a religious civil war. According to Tazbir (2000: 97) on St. Bartholomew’s Night (23-24 August 1572), King Charles IX (a Catholic) leaned out of the windows of the Louvre to aim at the French Calvinists – “it would be difficult to imagine one of the Jagiellons in this role.” Some 30 000-100 000 French Protestants died at the hands of their Catholic compatriots. Under the impact of such experiences France became the first European state to carry out a radical separation of the Church from the state (so as to prevent future violence inspired by religious differences). This particular historical experience probably became the source of the tradition of French Enlightenment-era laicism. At the time when the French Christians slaughtered each other for the sake of dogmas of the faith, Poland proved to be a country where Europeans found refuge from religious persecution. This is not to say that she was free from troubles of her own, being engaged in the protection of her frontiers against the enemies of Christendom: the Turks and the Tartars (subsequently, at the time of the partitions, the struggle conducted in Poland against Russia, Prussia and Austria aimed at the preservation of national identity). In both those battles the Poles sought the support of the Catholic Church and creed. During the partition era the Poles owed the preservation of the feeling of national identity only to their closely connected strong religious faith and national culture. Those two historical experiences of France and Poland, with religion proving to be a downfall or salvation, are the fully-fledged experiences of a single Europe. If the Europeans do not learn about their past, they shall be doomed to continue their barren disputes which merely reinforce the enmity between the East and the West. The West will continue perceiving the East as a “beast” while the residents of Eastern Germany will be seen by their compatriots from the West as eternal grumblers (“Jammer-Ossis”).
Two different histories of Europe are suggestively rendered by European painting, and this theme (whose artistic merits remain outside the range of our reflections) constitutes a suggestive historical narration; its components include i.a. the works by Dürer, Perugino, Parmigianino, Veronese, Titian, Rembrandt, Rubens, Moreau, Vallotton, Bonnard, Masson, Picasso, Grützke, Topor, Carol Rama, Hambling, Starowieyski, Hasior and Grzywacz. All these artists tell two different histories of Europe with the assistance of a single classical legend. The representatives of the East and West were inspired by the identical myth of Europe recorded by Ovid.

All these Rapes of Europe refer to the legend about Zeus abducting Europe, a Phoenician princess, to Crete to inaugurate a new civilisation. The imagery itself was created in the course of two and a half thousand years, from antiquity to the twenty first century. The visualisations of the legend of Europe that emerged in the twentieth century (on which we shall focus) deserve our particular attention since they prove to be a specific mirror reflecting not only the history of art and its most recent currents, but also primarily the history and drama of Europe. They portray the evolution of twentieth-century Europe, spanning from the trauma of the First World War and the encroaching epoch of totalitarianism (fascism and communism) to the newly integrated Europe and the globalisation of European ideas radiating beyond the Old Continent.

The myth of Europe, visualised by artists from Central-Eastern Europe, shows the special connection between culture and religion. In Eastern European interpretations of the myth of Europe we observe, most importantly, an evolution of the classical myth of Europe into the myth of the antemurale. This conception has been functioning in the awareness of the East Europeans for more than five hundred years, while remaining totally alien to the historical tradition of the West (see: Tazbir 2004: 206). The legend about the rape of Europe also becomes a pretext and a universal tool for demonstrating not merely the political transformations transpiring in Europe but also their social counterparts. The discussed likenesses show the position held by the woman in West European societies, from bourgeois dependence to emancipation and feminism. The social-moral-mores motif is present also in the Eastern and Western European interpretations of the myth of Europe, but the antemurale is an invention of the eastern part of the Continent exclusively.

What sort of archetypes, symbols and myths does the legend about the rape of Europe stir? How did our awareness of affiliation with Europe evolve in the course of two and a half millennia? Does the universalism of certain themes in European art stem from its classical roots, Greece and mythology, which KERENYI (2002: 13) described “as collective psychology operating with common and universally understandable archetypes comprising a supreme individual factor of directly perceived imagery”?

2. VISUALISATIONS OF THE LEGEND OF THE RAPE OF EUROPE IN THE ART OF EAST AND WEST EUROPE

This particular theme has been present in European art from antiquity to contemporaneity. A metope preserved from the temple on the Acropolis (fifth century B.C., fig.1)
refers to the same symbols used for constructing Claudio Parmigiani’s *Pellemondo* from 1968 (fig. 2). A bull’s hide stretched over a globe symbolises the process of globalisation, i.e. the dissemination of traditional European concepts and values. Today, the bull may signify also financial power (after all, the expression “bull market”, denotes the rising prices of shares) and is symbolised by the sculpture of a golden bull executed by Arturo di Modica (1980) and situated in Wall Street (fig. 3).

The Greek myth about the rape of Europe (the subsequent mother of Minos, the ruler of Crete) by Zeus, who for this purpose assumed the shape of a snow-white bull, was described at the turn of the eras by the Roman poet Ovid in his *Metamorphoses*:

> And, now perceiving all her fears decay’d,  
> Comes tossing forward to the royal maid;  
> Gives her his breast to stroke, and downward turns  
> His grizly brow, and gently stoops his horns.  
> In flow’ry wreaths the royal virgin drest  
> His bending horns, and kindly clapt his breast.  
> ‘Till now grown wanton and devoid of fear,  
> Not knowing that she prest the Thunderer,  
> She plac’d her self upon his back, and rode  
> O’er fields and meadows, seated on the God.

From that time on the legend continued to inspire artists for the next two millennia. The legend of Europe[^4] mentions Zeus who abducted the princess of Phoenicia (today: Lebanon) to Crete, thus transferring westward the fruit of the older civilisation of Egypt to the younger colonies located on the islands of the Aegean. The legend (let us note that Europe herself was not a European) described the onset of the Mediterranean civilisation, at the same time indicating its eastern source[^5]. Europe astride the bull’s back followed the Sun from the East to the West, from an old civilisation to a new one, and from that which was familiar to that which remained indeterminate. The journey accomplished by Europe designates not merely the sources of our civilisation but also its essential features: mobility and variability. In contrast to the great civilisations of Egypt, Mesopotamia and China which, according to Norman Davies (2003: 20-21),

[^4]: The name “Europe” appeared for the first time in seventh century B.C. in Hesiod’s *Theogony*, in which Europe and Asia are presented as sisters, the daughters of the god of the oceans. See: Cardini 2002: 29.

[^5]: “This story begins in Tyre, a town in that part of Syria which will become known as Phoenicia: let us recall that here lay the source of the Greek alphabet, the ruin of natural memory according to Plato (*Phaedrus*, 275a-) but at the same time more precise. According to a tradition recorded by the authors of myths and Greek historians, Tyre was ruled by King Agenor, born on the Nile as the son of Poseidon and Libya, the daughter of Epaphus. Agenor wandered from the banks of the Nile to Phoenicia where he married Telephassa, the mother of his three sons, including Cilix and Cadmus, as well as a daughter named Europa […] the beautiful girl was admired by Zeus who in order to possess her assumed the shape of a tame bull. He frolicked in the meadow until Europe succumbed to temptation and climbed onto his back. Then the bull carried her across the sea to Crete.” Kubiak 1998: 369.
developed gradually, the Mediterranean civilisation was from the very outset characterised by three elements: the bull, the woman and the sea. Already during the Palaeolithic era the bull was regarded as a component of nature, a symbol of strength and potency. In Persia, the bull symbolised the beginning of life, both animal and plant. In turn, in Egypt, a bull’s hide served as a shroud and guaranteed the deceased a safe journey to the “other side” of life. The woman introduces a human element into the myth of Europe, neutralising the divine nature of the bull-Zeus. It is she who “tames” the bull’s divine force. The third element of the myth – the sea – combines the diversity of all symbolic associations: the human tendency to become familiar with new religions, other ways of life and cultures. The most important of all seas, described by Herodotus (1954) as the “great sea,” is the Mediterranean, which turns into a spatial and temporal liaison connecting the memory of our joint European past with the spatial notion of European integration. The myth of Europe depicted in sculpture and painting proves to be a universal instrument. It adapts its symbolism to the changing requirements of the epoch, captures the essential features of the reality surrounding the artist and renders them indelible in ever-changing compositions always built out of the same elements: the bull, the woman and the sea. The twentieth-century depictions of the myth of Europe devised in the imagination of artists from both parts of the Continent comprise an excellent instrument showing two different versions of the history of European civilisation.

*The Rape of Europe* by Felix Vallotton from 1908 (fig. 4) is a depiction of the relation between Europe and the bull characterised, on the one hand, by the strength and protectiveness of the bull-man and, on the other hand, by the dependence of Europe-woman. The bourgeois model of those relations is emphasised by the image of the sea, which seems to resemble more Lake Geneva than the Mediterranean. In turn, Valentin Serov’s *The Rape of Europe* from 1910 (fig. 5) discloses already a slightly different relation between man and woman, namely, emotional unity. In Pierre Bonnard’s painting from 1919, also entitled *The Rape of Europe* (fig. 6), the woman and the man constitute not only an emotional but also predominantly a corporeal unity.

During the 1930s, the beauty and informality of the depictions of the myth of Europe from the beginning of the century were replaced by the dread and a foretaste of the catastrophe which Europe was to experience in the near future. In the political caricature by Arthur Johnson from 1935, *In the Roman Market* (fig. 7), featured on the cover of a German nationalistic and anti-European periodical “Kladeradach,” two bulls (brown and red) embody the forces governing Europe. In Werner Peiner’s *Aryan Europe* (see: Guthmüller 1997: fig. 101) from 1937 (fig. 8) the massive figure of an Aryan woman in the foreground and the tamed bull led by her in the background stress the new fascist vision of Europe. In Beckman’s *The Rape of Europe* (see: Davidson Reid 1993: 428; Guthmüller 1997: fig. 98) from 1933 (fig. 9), a brown bull has overpowered the woman-Europe. Andre Mason in *Pasiphae* (1937, fig. 10) protests against rape, racism, encroaching genocide and an era of contempt. Maggi Hambling (*Pasiphae and the Bull*, 1978, fig. 11) shows moral emancipation and corporeal partnership, this time of Pasiphae and her partner, the bull-man. *Huguette’s Mirror* from 1983 by Carol Rama (fig. 12) portrays conscious, dominating womanhood. In Roland To
Por's *Europe or Minotaur* (the painting has two titles) from 1985 (fig. 13) we are dealing with the moral frenzy of the Continent, symbolized by a transvestite bull.

The leitmotif of contemporary depictions of the myth of Europe is, in the opinion of Luisa Passerini, the sheer sexuality of Europe-woman, contrasted with the bull symbolizing primeval masculinity (see: Passerini 2002). The author notices that in Western twentieth-century art the classical relation between the abductor and its victim has been interpreted *à rebours*. The oppressor becomes the victim and *vice versa*, an evolution exemplified by the two earlier mentioned paintings, the first being Felix Vallotton's work from 1908. In this case, the woman appears to be totally at the mercy of her abductor-saviour. An example of an *à rebours* perceived relation between the abductor and his victim is Carol Rama's *Huguette's Mirror* – the black figure of a bull with a lolling tongue, walking on a strange wall decorated with human limbs and shown against a green background, carries the powerful figure of the female Europe. The latter's sexuality is manifested in the ample proportions of her body and stressed by its red colour. Her hair is embellished with a floral or laurel wreath, a symbol of victory. Behind her back the artist has placed a rectangular ornamental mirror frame. The half a century separating the two works shows the fundamental difference in the system of European values and mentality. Vallotton drew attention to the dependence of the woman upon the male, while Carol Rama, who in 1938 portrayed a resigned bull groaning under the weight of the female, showed conscious and dominating femininity. A step further in progressing feminisation was taken by the comical vision of the “transvestite bull” proposed by Roland Topor. In the epoch of belligerent feminism, the myth of Europe ceased to satisfy the artists of the second half of the twentieth century. The changing social role played by the woman calls for still other references. Artists began to resort to different classical heroines, one of whom was Pasiphae. The myth of the “valiant” Pasiphae carried an unambiguous message: “the absurd love for the bull [...] a horrible infatuation [...] a disgusting passion” (Kubiak 1998: 370-371), portrays her as an “embodiment of a mockery of the natural and divine laws, and a triumph of animal passion over the intellect” (Kopaliński 1987: 839).

The 1930s witnessed the emergence of paintings expressing crushed human dignity and the violence rampant in the century of both varieties of totalitarianism. In anti-fas-

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6 See: Kerenyi 2002: 94: “The family history of Minos contains the recurring motif of wedlock with a bull. Minos married Pasiphae, ‘she who shines for all,’ the daughter of Helios and Perseis, whose name became familiar to us as a description of the goddess of the Moon. It was said that Pasiphae fell in love with a magnificent, radiant white bull that the gods – Zeus or Poseidon – dispatched to Crete. Since the bull indubitably emerged from the sea, we call him ‘Poseidon.’ On the other hand, it was claimed that the bull was Zeus. For the ancient Cretans a bull was unquestionably one of the forms of the symptom of a supreme deity. In our famous tales Pasiphae was, however, enamoured by a real bull – she commissioned master Dedalus to execute an artificial cow and then concealed herself in its interior. The deceived bull conceived with the queen a son – Minotaur, the ‘bull of Minos,’ known as ‘Asterius’ – a child with a bull’s head who had to be kept hidden. Minotaur grew up in a Labyrinth – a building composed of a network of passages without an exit, specially designed by Dedalus. Ultimately, Theseus the Athenian killed the bull-man.” Assorted authors of myths offered different descriptions of the conception of Minotaur; further on, I shall cite still other versions of the same legend.
cist art the woman-Europe once again played the part of the victim, and the bull symbolized violence. During the period preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, the myth of Europe fulfilled chiefly a political function. The most representative example of such an approach is Beckman’s *The Rape of Europe* from 1933. The brutal bull, whose raised head and dilated nostrils bring to mind a field gun, carries Europe-the victim. The nude, helpless female body draped across his mighty back appears to be emitting a “cry of death” (Guthmüller 1997: 326). Her forearm displays a yellow band, this being the colour used already in the Middle Ages to brand prostitutes and Jews.

The secular allegorical language of colour considered yellow, wrote Rzepińska, to be the hue of enmity, evil intentions and shamelessness, and ascribed it to streetwalkers and Jews, which appears to confirm the Spanish genealogy of this emblem. During the Renaissance, Italian courtesans were forced to wear yellow as part of their clothes (Rzepińska 1983: 132).

The yellow band used by Max Beckmann becomes, therefore, an archetype of the Star of David with which the Nazis marked the Jews at the time of the Holocaust. Just as characteristic is the brown colour of the bull, applied by the artist in a reference to fascist uniforms.

1932 was the start of a whole series of paintings, some of which dealt with existing myths, such as “Ulysses and Siren” or “The Rape of Europe,” both painted in 1933 [...]. Myths are not based on a canonized text but on images which can be constantly reworked and updated (Boehm/Mosch/Schmit 1996: 319).

Brimming with expressive tension and voiced with the help of simple synthetic measures, the visualisations of myths proposed by Beckmann did not serve the past but showed archetypes in the, at first glance, haphazard contemporary human existence.

Another voice protesting against fascism was that of the above mentioned Masson who during the 1930s executed a series of works in which Europe was replaced by Pasiphae. This myth, according to the artist, referred to fascist cruelty much more convincingly than the legend of Europe. In this manner, the myth of Europe once again assumed the form of the myth of Pasiphae. Both appear in the oeuvre of numerous European artists, not only in the West – the same holds true for the works of the Polish artists Jan Lebenstein and Adam Hoffmann. Upon his return from the front, André Masson, a gravely wounded veteran of the First World War, was treated in a mental asylum. His wartime experiences acted as a direct inspiration for a series entitled *Abductions, Massacres and Rapes* (Leiris 1971: fig. 13-26), with the artist comparing the cruelties of war to rape. In 1937 Masson showed his Pasiphae in a portrayal of a woman raped by a brown bull.

Those who regarded fascism as salutary for Europe worked alongside artists protesting against its growing tide. Norman Davies (2003: 67) wrote about fascism’s striving to transform European culture: all was to become exclusively Aryan. An allegory of this vision is Peiner’s mentioned work from 1937, known also as *Aryan Europe*. Here
Europe has been granted the features of a nude displaying distinctly Nordic beauty – an image of European civilisation, degrading the role of tradition and subjugating it to a new race embodied by the Aryan female (see: Guthmüller 1997: 327).

Contrary to gloomy reality, Pablo Picasso (Minotaur, 1937) showed Europe in the gentle embrace of a monster that appears to be a saviour carrying his willing victim onto a ship envisaged as a source of refuge and solace (the scene was interpreted either as salvation or as... rape) (Cowling/Mundy 1990: 223, fig. 146).

References to Central-Eastern Europe are made in the depiction of the myth of Europe proposed by the German painter Johannes Grützke (Guthmüller 1997: 191) (1976) and entitled Woman on a Bull (fig. 15). The figure of Europe sitting on the back of a bull promenading along the Berlin Wall points to the other side of the Wall. The composition won first prize at a competition on the history of the world and is the property of the Berlin Wall Museum – “Checkpoint Charlie.” Europe makes a symbolic gesture of her hand towards the East, and both the artist and the viewer see the Wall and the figures on it from the viewpoint of the West, which has “forgotten” the East.

The myth about Europe and the bull in the interpretation proposed by Grützke is a symbolic reference to the political situation in Europe in the mid-1970s, and especially the history of Eastern Europe. The myth of Europe inspired painters and poets who created works constituting diverse interpretations. Raphael, Titian, Dürer, Rubens, Gauguin, Max Beckman, and Picasso painted Europe carried by a bull. Such writers as Antoine de Baif, Andre Chenier, Laconte de Lisle, Georg Kaiser, Massimo Bontempelli, and Heinrich Boll described the same motif. Innumerable interpretations of the myth appeared in successive centuries, always bearing religious and philosophical contents (Guthmüller 1997: 310-311).9

The majority of the above described paintings inspired by the myth of Europe were shown in 2002 at an exhibition held at the Uffizi Gallery in Florence10, in itself a significant contribution to an important moment in the history of our Continent (the expansion of the European Union). The weight of the show, however, consists of something more – an opportunity for observing the evolution of a single motif in

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7 The story of Minotaur, closely associated with the genealogy of the myth of Europe, contains new details depending on the author treated as a source: “The enraged Poseidon (angered by Minos) breathed into the bull concealed within the passion of ferocity, and into Pasiphae – a ridiculous love for the bull [...] the queen, probably discerning in the incomparable constructor [Dedalus] the nature of a lowly lackey, confessed to him her disgusting passion (Apollodorus, 3, 1, 4). Dedalus obediently built a wooden cow on wheels, covered with real hide. He dragged this quasi-cow, with Pasiphae hidden inside its empty interior, to the meadow where the bull was grazing [...] Their horrible intercourse was to give birth to a monster, Minotaur, or ‘Minos’-‘Bull,’ with the head of a bull and a human body. In order to imprison and conceal him, the king ordered Dedalus to erect a labyrinth.” KubiaK 1998: 370-371.

8 One of the versions of the myth of Europe describes rape as “carrying onto a ship.” See: Calasso 1995: 17-18.

9 Translated by B. di Biasio.

time, as well as the manner in which the myth of Europe appears in art from antiquity to the present day. Changes of its depiction in successive epochs demonstrate the essential features of European civilisation: “Our existence in history receives its energy from the very roots of the myth” – maintained Kolakowski – “and thanks to it we win the right to render events meaningful” (Kołakowski 1994: 39). Everyone who has seen the exhibition must ask oneself whether the myth of Europe is a love story involving a man and a woman or rather whether it describes the roots of European civilisation. Could the legend of the love between the bull-Zeus and the princess-Europe become a pretext for reflections on European identity? Another prominent question, which remained unresolved in the wake of the Florentine exhibition, was whether artists from Central-Eastern Europe resorted to the classical theme just as often as their colleagues from the West. Unfortunately, the display did not provide a satisfactory answer. Among the 181 works at the Uffizi, there was not a single one from regions located to the east of the (fortunately no longer extant) Berlin Wall. For all practical purposes, the display never embarked upon the presence of the myth of Europe in art from this part of the Continent. This absence was even stranger considering that it was precisely at the time of the Florentine show that Central-Eastern European states, in the company of Malta and Cyprus, were signing the access treatise, and that the exhibition itself was conceived as a *sui generis* commemoration of the eastwards expansion of the Union!

This paradox urged the co-author of the article to initiate a further quest. A survey conducted in Polish museums provided an astonishing outcome. Apparently, more than ten twentieth-century painters had referred to the myth of Europe. Moreover, it became obvious that it was precisely this myth which inspired Franciszek Starowieyski, who in 1998 was commissioned by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to execute a fresco for a new seat of the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Poland to the European Union in Brussels. The moral message of Starowieyski’s *Divina Polonia rapta per Europa profana* (see: Franciszek Starowieyski 1998) was clearly distant from the secular symbolism present in the majority of works on show in Florence. What is, therefore, the specificity of the treatment of the classical theme in Polish twentieth-century painting? So far no one has sought a solution nor studied the perception of the myth of Europe in Polish artistic culture from earlier centuries

*Divina Polonia rapta per Europa profana* (1998, fig. 16) is a portrayal of a metal and much tarnished bull, a symbol of disintegrating communism. *Divina Polonia*, which the artist contrasts with secular Europe, recalls the Christian tradition of *Polonia semper fidelis*, ever alive in this part of the Continent. *Divina Polonia* – the second female figure – boasts a nimbus [...] Starowieyski resorted to the classical and thus “pagan” myth, and upon this occasion contrasted secular Europe and saintly Poland. What is the source of this combination of nudity and sanctity? Why did the openly liberated artist, who in hundreds of his works obsessively sketched the female body and who re-

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11 Scarcie Polish-language studies on the presence of antiquity in Polish art refer mainly to the earlier period and make no mention of the myth of Europe.
mains distant from bigotry or clericalism, suddenly apply religious symbols? This issue shall be discussed more extensively in a further part of our text.

In his assemblage The Rape of Europe from 1983 (fig. 17), Władysław Hasior, another Polish painter and sculptor, replaced the bull with a black bird and reduced the figure of Europe to the accessories of womanhood: a slender hand and a thick braid. The background is composed of a Gothic cathedral and a townscape. The foreground shows Christ – the shepherd tending a lamb. The black eagle’s talons hold a female hand made of soap and plaited human hair trails along. The soap symbolizes the fragility and sensitivity of the human body, so easily annihilated in the age of genocide. After all, in the century of crematoria human fat was used in the production of soap.

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12 An interesting contribution to understanding the antemurale ideology are the circumstances of the origin of Divina Polonia mentioned in an interview conducted by our student, Aneta Kaprzyk, with Jan Truszczyński, at the time the Polish Ambassador to Brussels:

A.K. What are your recollections of the reaction of Polish diplomats to the painting by F. Starowieyski?

J.T. Naturally, the reactions were extremely diverse but generally speaking the prevailing feeling was anxiety that the message transmitted by the canvas – especially together with its title – could be interpreted by viewers from the European Union countries as pretentious pomposity and a conviction about the exceptional status of Poland or, worse still, as Poland’s unfriendly attitude towards a Europe devoid of all virtue and our inclusion into the club by force, as if contrary to our will. Obviously, such an interpretation of the Starowieyski canvas would have been at odds with the general image of Poland, whose creation and reinforcement were the objective of the efforts pursued by our diplomatic corps. On the margin, we were worried that such an overwhelming amount of female nudity, in extra large dimensions, could produce critical remarks among the more conservative/traditional guests from Poland. All told, less attention was paid to the artistic merits of the painting and more to questions concerning the possible interpretations of its message.

A.K. Upon the request of Your Excellency, part of the inscription was painted over already prior to the unveiling and in this fashion Divina Polonia Rapta Per Europa Profana exists up to this day as Divina Polonia.

J.T. True, this took place upon my request and after consultations with my superiors in Warsaw who were also of the opinion that the words rapta per Europa profana contain an overly obvious verbal message, imposing a certain interpretation of the composition and in all likelihood suggesting a conviction that Poland wishes to accentuate her Euro-scepticism and not her willingness to join the region of European integration. (Interview conducted on 28 December 2006 as part of qualitative research for an M. A. dissertation: Kaprzyk).

13 Unpublished work, property of the Tatra Mts. Museum in Zakopane; the Hasior Gallery in Zakopane features also two other works by this artist, both entitled The Rape of Europe, executed in 1986 and 1988.

14 The fact that Hasior replaced the snow-white bull (in antiquity a symbol of adventure but also of love and security) with a black predatory eagle carrying in its talons the emaciated hand of a woman-Europe is a reference to twentieth-century European experiences – fascism and communism. During the reign of those two forms of totalitarianism, the Europeans were deprived predominantly of the security which in accordance with classical symbolism the bull was supposed to provide. See Kerenyi 2002: 94.

15 The photograph shows probably the cathedral in Ulm (1377) whose tower was designed by Mathew Boblinger in 1482; in the opinion of Pevsner, the building owes its present-day appearance to reconstruction carried out in 1877-1890. See: Pevsner 1979: 257. See also Erlande-Brandenburg 1989: 542-543 and 582-583.
The whole composition is rendered additionally horrifying by the strand of hair which in European imagination brings to mind associations with death camps, those macabre entrances to Hell where the victims were deprived of the last attributes of their humanity: hair, eyeglasses, prosthetics and children’s toys. The figure of Christ is a clear reference to Polish Catholic tradition and messianism. Suffering Poland is compared to the torments of Christ. Deprived of her independent statehood by the partitions and, subsequently, by fascism (the Second World War) and Soviet communism, Poland feels anguish. Polish consciousness is obsessively concerned with a longing for freedom and a wish to possess a sovereign state. Polish national identity thus consists of a mixture of religious and national symbols present in Polish art and arranged into a dramatic appeal addressed to the West:

Adherents of radical secularism, understand us! – wrote Bohdan Cywiński. Us from a geographical region known for long as “antemurale christianitatis”! We are by no means merely simpleton obscurants and clericalists! You and we have been shaped by different historical experiences: in our case mainly the feeling of insecurity16, an incessant threat posed by strangers representing a different faith as well as the knowledge that the fruit of the labours of a whole lifetime can vanish in the course of several minutes and that all possession is impermanent while an experienced and confirmed truth maintains that often the price to pay for one’s faith is our life; finally – there is the distrustful distance towards those privileged few who could cultivate their Christianity in a luxurious and safe fortress (Cywiński 2004).

All becomes connected with the specific role played by culture (associated with religious faith) in Eastern Europe. Here, culture and religion proved to be the strongest bastion in the centuries-long battle waged by small nations against the imperialist proclivities of their mightier neighbours. In the second half of the twentieth century, Polish national awareness, closely linked with religious consciousness, was protected against totalitarian enslavement and subsequently took part in the struggle for toppling communism in Central Europe. A negative aspect of such a union was the growth of nationalism, whose consequences have been adversely experienced by the minorities living in Poland. During the “Solidarity” era, however, its edge was directed not against the ethnic minority but against communist rule.

The work of yet another Polish artist, Zbysław Grzywacz, this time from the period of the emergence of “Solidarity,” refers indirectly to the myth of Europe. The central part of the composition entitled Ursus (from 1979 – and inspired by Quo vadis by Henryk Sienkiewicz) (see: Pawlak 1978) is filled with a mighty charging bull whose back displays the sprawling and lifeless figure of a woman arranged in dramatic pose, an embodiment of helplessness, exhaustion and resignation. Her limp left hand holds

16 According to Tazbir, from the mid-fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century there were about thirty Turkish and Cossack invasions of Lithuania and 75 of Podolia. The statistics of murder, rape, arson and captivity along the antemurale was quite imposing – these acts took place every three years in Lithuania and on a yearly basis in Podolia.
a shopping bag and a purse. The painting shows the moment when a worker wearing a protective hardhat of the sort used by miners and dockworkers and a T-shirt revealing muscular arms grasps the bull’s horns. The train tracks on which the scene takes place suggest its site – possibly next to a mine or a shipyard. The background is composed of a long row of presumably female figures standing next to a wall and queuing up in front of a shop in which they will be more than likely to find empty shelves. The motionless observers watching the scene transpiring in the foreground stand against the backdrop of a red stand featuring microphones similar to those used by Party chiefs to address shipyard workers, the ever-hungry citizens of a communist state.

The painting by Zbylut Grzywacz presents the national myth in its pure form, without any admixtures of religious symbolism – an excellent example of the way in which the myth of Europe has changed in the course of the twentieth century into the myth of the antemurale. The crimson flayed body of the powerful stampeding bull (already lame – without a leg) is indubitably an allegory of communism. The worker wearing a hardhat suitable for a shipyard worker or a miner is, in turn, an allegory of “the Polish working class” and “Solidarity” while the swooning, exhausted woman, carried by the bull, is Poland. Taking the bull by the horns, literally and metaphorically, he is not only saving Poland from the system destructive for the substance of the nation but also quite possibly protecting Europe against the communist onslaught.

3. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN MYTH OF THE “ANTEMURALE”

In the East, the classical myth of Europe is intertwined with a much younger national myth; thus, the East European version has assumed the shape of the myth of the antemurale. The visualisations of the rape of Europe which emerged in Central-Eastern Europe during the course of the twentieth century echo with the mission ideology of the antemurale, which has been functioning in the historical consciousness of Central and Eastern Europe for more than 500 years and now has been brought up to date:

The average nobleman believed firmly that by protecting the south-eastern boundaries of his state against the Tartars, Turkey or Muscovy he was guarding the whole of Christendom. More, that by doing so he was also winning a reward in heaven [...].

This was the origin of political reflections at odds with views prevailing in Western Europe where the award (or punishment) in the netherworld had long ceased being included into the balance sheet of anticipated profits (Tazbir 2004: 207-208). Almost from the very outset it [the antemurale – BdB and BM] possessed a double edge: religious (since it was conceived as a barrier against Islam) and civilisation-political (considering that it was to constitute a dam protecting European civilisation against Asian barbarians) (Tazbir 2004: 205).
The antemurale evolved from the seventeenth-century anti-Turkish and anti-Cossack stand to its anti-Russian successor (nineteenth century); in the twentieth century it signified the protection of Western civilisation against communism.

The Serbian case is a version of an antemurale mentality even more distinctive than the Polish example. Defeat at the battle of Kosovo, waged against the Turks in 1389, left an indelible imprint upon Serbian mentality. Six centuries later, its repercussions remain very much alive in contemporary Serbian literature, as if the battle had taken place during the twentieth century. The significance of this historical experience for the Serbs has been described by Adam Ryszkowski:

If we were to refer to Polish history we would be forced to find in our past a single moment that would combine the symbolic of the battle of Grunwald, the humiliating defeat at Cecora, the catastrophe of the partitions, and the tragedy of the Warsaw Uprising (Ryszkowski 2006: 126).

The imposed Turkish servitude (which the Serbs suffered for over 400 years) was the reason why in South-Eastern Europe, just as in North-Eastern Europe, religion became a constitutive element of the state and the nation giving rise to the conviction that “Serbia is the work of God.” During the centuries of servitude, the Church became a guarantor of freedom concerned with the survival of Serbian ethnic identity. The image of the “true Serbian” cultivated in national literature shows an ideal defender of the antemurale. This is a warrior ready to make sacrifices, a “hero” willing to forfeit his life for the sake of protecting the freedom of his nation, “a Serbian Troy besieged by foes.”

The symbolic culture of Serbia is suffused with messianism. A nation intended for greatness and the construction of a new Byzantium, the antemurale of Eastern Christianity, fell as a result of betrayal and Turkish, Moslem barbarian supremacy. From the death of Tsar Lazar at Kosovo the Serbs have been lauding their defeat [...]. If from the very onset of its history a nation is attacked, ridiculed and insulted, it is simply impossible for its origin to be other than divine’ (Bruckner) (Nawrocki 2001: 241).

The mission ideologies (which include the antemurale myth) are by no means a novelty, even in Western Europe. As the Polish historian Janusz Tazbir wrote, the French Revolution proclaimed the slogan of introducing the principles of social equality across all of Europe and postulated the dissemination of progressive French culture. In turn, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Englishmen of letters were deeply concerned with the “mission of spreading white man’s civilisation on other continents” (Tazbir 2004: 210). Moscow, on the other hand, regarded herself as the Third Rome. In the West, such mission ideologies served territorial expansion while in the East they were used for defence and comfort in the face of catastrophes.

The myth of Europe in Polish twentieth-century painting is present simultaneously in both embodiments. On the one hand, the “Western” version describes, similarly to the art of the West, the social emancipation of women and comments about timeless
relations between the man and the woman (Skoczylas, Nacht-Samborski, Manastyrski, Linke, Hoffmann, Lebenstein, Nowosielski). The myth in question is also present in its “Polonised” or “national” variant in which it tells not so much a story about Europe but a legend about the special mission to be carried out by Poland in Europe – “Poland as the antemurale of Christianity and Europe” (Starowieyski, Hasior, Grzywacz). The example of Polish painting shows how the antemurale myth underwent a renaissance at the time of the emergence of “Solidarity” and after the proclamation of martial law in 1981. The works of Grzywacz (1979), Hasior (1983) and Starowieyski (1988) executed at the time are definitely the outcome of the uncertainty, rebellion and trauma associated with the “Solidarity” revolt and its subsequently stifling by the communist authorities, which thus deprived the Poles of all hope. It became apparent that thanks to Polish painting from the second half of the twentieth century the antemurale had not – as Tazbir maintained – “been relegated to the storehouse of Polish historical myths” but continued to be embedded in the historical awareness of yet another generation.

The concept of the antemurale is absent in Italian, Hungarian or Austrian historical consciousness although de facto this was precisely the role played in the seventeenth century by Venice, the whole of Hungary and Vienna. Why did this type of political reflection not become part of Western awareness but pervaded only the thought of the East? The decisive factors included the subsequent history of Venice, Hungary and Austria, which contrasted with the plight of Poland or Serbia. Austria and Hungary jointly created a strong empire while Poland and Serbia, suffering the torments of servitude, sought comfort in utopia.

Those visualisations of the legend about the rape of Europe which were devised in Poland in the second half of the twentieth century resound with an echo of the historical experiences of the East emphasised by the more recent dramatic political events from the end of the twentieth century.

4. A DEFICIT OF JOINT EUROPEAN SYMBOLS

While on the subject of Europe, we all probably agree that regardless of the nature of the united Continent its very existence, seen from the perspective of the tumultuous European past and even more so from that of the horrendous twentieth century, appears to be a sheer miracle. This is the reason why it is even more disturbing that the European Union monolith has already disclosed its first cracks (as evidenced by the refusal to enact a common constitution). Will the Europeans, therefore, be capable of creating a single European nation which in accordance with a definition by Ernest-Wolfgang Böckenförde:

Is constituted to a lesser degree by biological-natural factors and to a greater one by [...] living memory and consciousness passed on from generation to generation [the nation lives – BdB and BM], common hopes, shared suffering and the contempt expressed by others, jointly anticipated pride and finally, jointly cultivated myths.
The phenomenon described by Böckenförde is usually known as “identity” although Adolf Muschg recommends treating the concept of united European identity rather sceptically (Muschg 2005: 5). 17 As regards this particular question, he claims it would be better to manage without words since a “joint European past” suffices for determining European identity. The heart of the matter, however, does not consist in the claim that there is no such thing as a “joint European past”! The historical experiences of the new members of the European Union (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Slovenia) differ essentially from those of our western neighbours, the old Union members – Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Portugal, not to mention Sweden, which has avoided war for over two centuries. Only familiarity with history will make it possible to alleviate many of the debates conducted at present on the European Parliament forum. Such knowledge will make it feasible to understand that the source of multiple conflicts between the West and the East is not ill will but divergent experiences. The experiences of communism among the Poles (and the populations of other countries-members of the so-called bloc) were totally at variance from those of the democratic and free West. Parliamentarians from the East are entitled to their own appraisal of communism, which they have often conceived as a project for a just social system. That same right is also due to us who remember well various communist acts of genocide, such as the one committed in Katyn or the death of millions of Ukrainian peasants punished by Stalin by means of an artificially induced famine. Once we become aware of this disparity, it will become obvious why the European Parliament refused to commemorate the victims of Katyn with a minute of silence (a gesture postulated by Euro-deputies from Poland) and at the same time remembered the victims of the terrorist attack carried out in Spain in 2004. It will also explain why Western deputies voted on the issue of condemning totalitarian systems differently from their colleagues representing the new member-states (located to the east of the former Iron Curtain) and protested against including the word “communism” in the pertinent document. Just as understandable will be the attitude adopted by the ministers of justice of some of the European Union countries who disagreed about a project establishing penalties for “historical lies” or the controversy whether the crimes of the Holocaust and those perpetrated in former Yugoslavia, regarded as crimes against mankind, should be treated on par with the crimes of communism. Although understanding such approaches does constitute a step towards constructing a joint identity, it still is not tantamount to their co-ordination.

The reason why attempts were made to divide the victims of the twentieth-century genocide into “better” and “worse”, lies in the absence of consent as regards an inter-

17 One should agree with Muschg who maintains that every attempt at grasping the entity instead of a fragment is mythical and does not possess a logical character. It belongs to a metaphysical order of thought and not its scientistic counterpart. Today, when positivistic hostility towards the mythical core of culture is already a thing of the past, the cognitive role of the myth can no longer be doubted. We are no longer compelled to protect the myth by referring to the opinions of Cassirer, Jung, Fromm, Levi-Strauss, Eliade, Gadamer and, last but not least, Kolakowski, who consented that we learn about man primarily from his myths and symbols.
interpretation of the past. Up to this day, Europe does not have its own “commissions for truth and reconciliation” whose task would consist of determining a certain minimum of facts from the past; all the interested parties universally agree about their assessment.

The onset of the new century inclines towards formulating a fundamental question: will the Europeans become a single nation or will divided memory prove to be an obstacle? Will it be possible to overcome the different historical experiences of the East and West and discover some sort of a joint foundation that will facilitate better harmony? In other words, will the “European dream” about a contented 450-million strong nation living in harmony and sharing a past, symbols, dreams and objectives come true? Will conflicts and the apocalyptic twentieth-century European genocide become a mere warning and recollection?

In the introduction to the collected material from “Figures d’Europe. Images and Myths of Europe” (Passerini 2003), one of the most important conferences on integration (examined, unfortunately, solely from a Western perspective) organised by the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence in 2002, Romano Prodi wrote:

These ‘Images and Myths of Europe’ remind us that tomorrow’s European Union cannot be based exclusively on economics and that, if Europe is to become a positive example for the whole world, it is perhaps necessary to place greater emphasis on ethical and aesthetic values [...] looking beyond day-to-day concerns, however elevated these may be, is not the European Union too inclined to neglect these values? I am deeply convinced, and profoundly worried, that this is the case (Prodi 2003: 9).

Nonetheless, it seems worth asking about the contents of the joint symbols and myths required by the Europeans so that after 1 May 2004 they would be capable of merging the West and the East into a certain entity. What sort of myths from their past should the Europeans make a selection from in order to render them the joint myths of the future? Does there exist a single idea that could turn the two parts of the Continent into a single Europe? We have in mind a conception which all the Europeans will regard as their own and around which they shall commence building a joint identity.18

18 After the disillusionment with their “American dream” experienced by the Americans themselves, the eyes of the whole world turned to the “European dream” which became a source of new hope for creating an “ideal” society. This was the spirit in which also the Americans, including Timothy Snyder, George Soros and Jeremy Rifkin, began to write about Europe. The first of these authors has ascribed the role of the common denominator of European identity of the twenty first century to the myth of civic society. He went on to ponder whether the outcome of Polish “Solidarity,” i.e. a civic society transformed in Eastern Europe into an instrument of protecting the individual against the threat of global forces, could become the myth of an international civic society. Could a thus comprehended freedom legend assume the form of the founding myth of a United Europe? Are the Europeans capable of becoming a “group of citizens on the European Maidan of Freedom” who in the twenty first century will take matters into their own hands for the sake of joint protection against new global hazards? Snyder 2005: 2. The advice proposed by Soros is similar: “Europe is seeking her identity. In my opinion, she is not forced to seek far. I believe that the European Union is an embodiment of the principles of open society and should serve as a model and spiritus movens of global open society.” Soros 2007. In turn, Rifkin regards Europe as the first empire in history emerging by peaceful means
Or could it be that in order to exist Europe simply needs diversity? After all, one of its possible definitions mentions “a maximum of differences in a minimum of space.”

First and foremost, we have at our disposal the old “minimum of European security” myth, based on fear. Today, it may be expressed by asking what could be done to prevent the twenty first century from becoming an age of a new Auschwitz, Kolyma, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Kosovo and two world wars, an age of “two totalitarianisms,” “an age of the wolf,” or of the “puzzle of evil,” so that it may become an age of the “puzzle of reconciliation.” Second, there is the “Solidarity” myth; over a quarter of a century old, the idea that created the first “civic society” in the former communist bloc. Ten million citizens opposed the monopoly of power wielded by a single party which identified itself with the state. Third, the Europeans cherish the myth of the “velvet revolution” which thanks to the person of Vaclav Havel brings to mind exclusively positive associations. Finally, there are the myth of the “fall of the Berlin Wall,” the “orange revolution” myth and the “civic society” myth.

“Solidarity” demonstrated – Timothy Snyder (2005: 2) wrote – that a group of citizens is capable of cooperating for the purpose of creating a force that is not identical with the individuals building it and is separate from the state.20

The same author asserted that the idea of a civic society possesses a European mandate, and that the modification proposed by Eastern Europe, i.e. that society produces means for protection against the state, renders this idea particularly attractive for all civic ventures protesting against globalisation. Could, therefore, the “civic society” myth be proclaimed the contemporary European freedom legend? Might it become the new founding myth for the second European integration of 2004?

without resorting to violence, plunder and conquest: “Our links are vanishing. Without a strong binder in which the decisive majority firmly believes, a country is incapable of functioning well. This is why the binder created by another great dream appearing across the Atlantic has become so important. [...] In the American dream success is individual. Some win all while others lose all. In the European dream no one is a total loser. [...] In our model the superiority of American culture is unquestioned. In the European model each culture has something to offer to the others. [...] In America emphasis is on wealth. In Europe – on the quality of life. [...] We live in order to work, and you work in order to live” (Żakowski 2005). The above cited positive opinions about the European Union are not the only voices about the Old Continent heard in America: “American anti-Europeans have produced a steady stream of books with titles like ‘America Alone,’ ‘Our Oldest Enemy,’ ‘While Europe Slept,’ ‘The West Last Chance,’ [...] America’s anti-Europeans have three big complaints about the Old Continent. The first is that Europe is committing demographic and economic suicide: the European birth rate is well below replacement level, and the economy is hog-tied by regulations and overburdened by welfare commitments. The second is that, unlike America, Europe is a post-Christian society. [...] The third complaint is that Muslims are filling Europe’s demographic and spiritual void. Bernard Lewis, the White House’s favourite Islamic scholar, thinks that Europe will turn Muslim by the end of the century, becoming part of the Arab West” (Lexington 2007: 56).

19 By following the example of Alexis de Tocqueville they could be described as a network of voluntary associations.

20 Timothy Snyder is a professor of history at Yale University.
One thing is certain, namely, that the first integration myth (based on the need for security and on economic reasons) has already fulfilled its task. The presence of the new members in the Union calls for discovering an equally novel historical myth, a legend that would define anew the factors capable of uniting all the Europeans and showing them the direction in which they should strive. Will Europe prove capable of finding such a common denominator, or will it simply disintegrate?

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Beata KLOCEK DI BIASIO, Ph.D., graduated from the Faculty of Art History of the Lublin Catholic University and Departamento Lettere e Filosofia of the La Sapienza University in Rome (awarded with the title of Dottore in Lettere). She was awarded the title of Ph.D. in humanities at the Institute of Art History of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She is associated with The Institute of Culture of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, the SWPS University and the University of Florence, where she organised international conferences focusing on European identity. She is a member of the Scientific Council of the series “Europe XXI. New Perspectives,” published by the Adam Marszalek Publishing House. Her academic interests focus on the problems of visual communication and the traditions of antiquity in contemporary culture, and her latest book was devoted to the sculpture of Igor Mitoraj.

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Figure 18: Zbylut Grzywacz, Ursus by 'Quo Vadis,' acrylic on canvas, 1979
In the opinion of the vast majority of the Arab society the literary Arabic is considered as a core value. Many even elevate it to the rank of sanctity, due to the fact that it is the language of the Koran. On the other hand Standard Arabic has never become a means of daily communication for all Arabs. It remains the language of written texts, ritual prayers and official speeches, while in everyday life people use dialects. Even Arabic language teachers in the Arab countries, when conducting classes in schools, speak a kind of intermediate Arabic or simply a dialect. In this context, the author tries to answer the question posed in the title of the present article.

Keywords: core value, standard Arabic, dialects, dyglossia, identity.
What inspired me to write this paper was a citation I came across while reading an article by Niloofar Haeri (2000: 61-87). It was the following piece of autobiography of prof. Leila Ahmed, a well-known Egyptian-American author specializing in the issues of Egyptian feminism:

The teacher called on me to read. I started haltingly. She began interrupting me, correcting me, quietly at first but gradually, as I stumbled on, with more and more irritation, leaving her desk now to stand over me and pounce on every mistake I made. She was an irascible woman, and I had not prepared my homework. “You’re an Arab!” she finally screamed at me. “An Arab! And you don’t know your own language!” “I’m not an Arab!” I said, suddenly furious myself. “I am Egyptian! And anyway we don’t speak like this!” And I banged my book shut (Haeri 2000: 79).

The described situation took place in the middle of the past century, when Egypt, like the rest of the Arab world, was immersed in the ideology of pan-Arabism. As Haeri accurately remarks, it is a very compelling illustration of the problem of identity in the Arab society. And in this particular case it relates to the dilemma of being either Arab or Egyptian. In addition, it also demonstrates another fundamental issue for the Arabic language which is diglossia, i.e. a situation in which – according to the definition of C.A. Ferguson (1971: 16) –

in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an Earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversations.¹

However, the scene presented above contains something more. The rebellious behavior of a teenage schoolgirl reveals the awareness of the unnatural linguistic dichotomy that she, like the rest of the Arab society, experiences. Because, for her, the mother tongue is not the imposed and detached from everyday life Standard Arabic, but the commonly used Egyptian dialect, that she learned at home from her parents.

In this context it should be mentioned that the Standard Arabic to a great extent owes its development and survival to Islam with which it is inextricably linked. As it is reiterated in the Koran, God revealed the Book in Arabic, which was the language of the prophet Muhammad and his tribe Qurayş:

An Arabic Koran have we sent it down, that ye might understand it (12:2).

Thus have We sent down to thee an Arabic Koran, and have set forth menaces therein diversely, that haply they may fear God, or that it may give birth to reflection in them (20:113).

It is thus moreover that we have revealed to thee an Arabic Koran, that thou mayest warn the mother city and all around it, and that thou mayest warn them of that day of the Gathering, of which there is no doubt when part shall be in Paradise and part in the flame (42:7).

We have made it an Arabic Koran that ye may understand (43:3) (The Koran).

Over the centuries, Muslim scholars have continually stressed the uniqueness and antiquity of the Arabic language. Twelfth century scholar Ibn Asākir (1106-1175) in his opus vitae “The history of Damascus” (Tārīḥ madīnat Dimāq) reports, citing Ibn Abbas, a cousin of the Prophet and the first Muslim exegete, that the language of Adam in paradise was Arabic (Ibn Asākir 1995: 406-407). But when he disobeyed God, the Creator deprived him of Arabic and since then Adam spoke the Syrian language. Only when he expressed regret and repentance, God restored his ability to speak Arabic. The same story was quoted by a famous Islamic theologian and jurist Ġalāl ad-Dīn as-Suyūṭī (1445-1505) in his book “The Luminous Work Concerning the Sciences of Language and its Subfields” (Al-Muzhir fi ʿulūm al-luġa wa-anwāʾi-hâ) (As-Suyūṭī 1986: 30).

According to the Muslim faith, the original copy of the Koran is in heaven where it was deposited on the so called Protected Tablet (al-lawḥ al-mahfūẓ), so that no impure forces could have access to it.2 In the opinion of some medieval exegetes, the Koran was written with light on a tablet made of red sapphire located at the throne of God and supported by the angel named Matiryun. Before its verses began to gradually descend to the Prophet Muhammad, God commanded angel Gabriel to place the Book in the lowest of the seven heavens called House of Power (Bayt al-ʿIzza) (Al-Qurṭ Ubī 2006: 198-200).

Hence for Muslims, Koran is the purest holiness. Its text has no equal. It is unique and cannot be faithfully translated into any other language. That is why every Muslim (not just Arab), in order to make his everyday prayers ordered by the Supreme valid, must say them exclusively in Arabic. Thus, Koran in some measure has sanctified the Arabic tongue, whereas Islam has given it unprecedented growth, making it a literary language par excellence – the strongest medium of the rapidly expanding Arab-Muslim empire. The Koran, Islam and the Arabic language formed – as Nihād al-Mūsā put it – a triad of organically linked elements (Al-Mūsā 2007: 37), that completely subdued the territory stretching from the Atlantic coast of North Africa up to the western boundaries of the Central Kingdom. The elements of this triad became core values of the new culture that started emerging in the beginning of the 7th century.

However, despite such a high rank to which the literary Arabic has been raised through the Koran, it has never become a means of daily communication for all Arabs. Even relatively early codification of its grammar in the second half of the 8th cen-

2 As stated in the Koran: Yet it is a glorious Koran, Written on the preserved Table (85:21-22).
tury, together with the dissemination of its teaching, could not help. Standard Arabic remained the language of written texts, ritual prayers and official speeches, while in everyday life people used dialects. And with the passage of time the dialects became more and more differentiated and at the same time increasingly distant from the standard written language. In the 13th century, the famous Arab lexicographer Ibn Manṣūr (1233-1311), in the preface to his monumental dictionary “The Arab tongue” (Lisan al-ʿArab), warned that in his time the Arabic language had fallen into sloppiness and people competed with each other in showing off their eloquence in foreign languages. With a hint of sarcasm he compared his work to the ark that Noah built accompanied by jeers and laughter of his countrymen (IBN MANṢŪR n.d.: 13). A hundred years later, the historian Ibn Ḥaldūn (1332-1406) wrote that the Arabic of his contemporaries was no longer the language in which the Koran had been revealed. The reason behind that, according to him, was Arabs mixing with the conquered nations. He advised that in order to regain the ability of speaking Standard Arabic, people had to memorize as many texts as possible from the Koran, Sunna and old Arabic poetry (IBN ḤALDŪN 2001: 771-772). Nevertheless, the advent of the 16th century brought the Turkish rule that lasted almost 400 years pushing the Standard Arabic almost completely into the realm of religious rituals and sanctioning the eventual split between the literary and spoken Arabic.

The Arab cultural renaissance (an-nahḍa) at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries, initiated, after ages of stagnation, a battle for restoration and adaptation of the Arabic literary language, so that it could meet the challenges of the new times. In Egypt, modern-oriented intellectuals opted for creating an intermediate form of Arabic as a combination of the Standard and Spoken Arabic. Some more radical reformists proposed elevating the Egyptian dialect to the position of the literary language of modern Egypt. Many well-known personalities from the world of culture and politics supported these ideas. Among them was one of the most prominent Egyptian intellectuals Aḥmad Luṭfī as-Sayyid (1872-1963), a long-time director of the Arabic Language Academy in Egypt (ZAKKARIYĀ SaʿĪD 1964: 123-149). In May 1943, a member of the Arabic Language Academy, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Fahmī (1870-1951) suggested even replacing the Arabic script with Latin, following the Turkish example (ZAKKARIYĀ SaʿĪD 1964: 144). The main arguments in favor of such profound and far-reaching reforms (except nationalistic political motivations) were: 1) saving Egyptian children hardship caused by the difference between the written and the spoken language, 2) elimination of the chasm between literature and the nation, 3) development of national literature, 4) and – what seems surprising – rapidly increasing interest of foreigners in learning Egyptian spoken Arabic (ZAKKARIYĀ SaʿĪD 1964: 143).

These pursuits, however, were doomed to fail against strong opposition from the religious authorities and the conservative circles of the Muslim Al-Azhar University. Supporters of breaking with the Standard Arabic were exposed to massive criticism and often branded as enemies of the language of the Koran. Thus, the status quo binding for the past thirteen centuries was maintained and the problem of diglossia remained.
The last quarter century, the era of internet and mobile phones, has provided new challenges. Especially the latter caused a real turbulence in the space of the Arabic language. When the first mobile phones appeared in the Arab markets they did not have Arabic keyboards. So, in order to be able to write text messages efficiently in Arabic, the phone users developed special Latin notation in which the letters denoting characteristic Arabic sounds have been substituted with digits similar in shape to the corresponding Arabic alphabet letters. *Ipso facto*, the appeal of Abd al-Azīz Fahmī to romanize the Arabic script has partly materialized. The language used in text messaging is colloquial Arabic interspersed with English or French words and phrases. The text messages are characterized by a shorthand style often saturated with foreign (mostly English) acronyms. The appearance of mobile phones with Arabic keyboards has not eliminated this phenomenon and the style quickly spread to internet instant messaging and chats rooms. Special name was even coined for this particular slang, namely *Arabizi* which is a combination of two Arabic words: ‘ʿarabī (Arabic) and ingilīzī (English). Over time, the term *arabizi* included also the macaronic jargon that has been used in everyday speech especially by young Arabs at least since the mid-eighties of the last century.

On the other hand, the Arabic internet forums are dominated by dialects or some kind of hybrid Arabic, in which the literary forms intermingle with dialectal ones. Interestingly, this also applies to the language of discussions concerning diglossia. To find that out, one only needs to google the following question in Arabic: لماذا لا نتكلم الفصحي؟ (Why do we not speak the literary Arabic?) and then enter any listed forum website. What indeed has no precedent is the Egyptian Arabic Wikipedia (Wikipedia Masri). It was initiated in the end of 2008 and is available under the url <https://arz.wikipedia.org> as a counterpart to the literary Arabic Wikipedia (<http://www.ar.wikipedia.org>) founded in the middle of 2003. Currently the Egyptian Arabic Wikipedia contains more than 16000 articles and is constantly evolving.

An attempt to revise the condition of the Arabic language in modern times has been made lately by Nihād al-Mūsā (2007). In eleven chapters of his study he emphasizes a close relation of the Arabic literary language with Islam as well as with the cultural heritage and identity of Arabs. In this close relation he sees the strength and promise of survival. With regard to the problem of diglossia he points to the impact of the Turkish rule and the methodical francization of Maghreb in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He speaks critically about the methodology of teaching literary Arabic on various levels of education in the Arab countries. He also points to the negative influence of the media3 as well as the advertising and spread of education in foreign languages. Nihād al-Mūsā expresses his concerns about the process of globalization, which he identifies with Americanization. He asserts with bitterness that the usage of the literary Arabic by an average Arab resembles often broken English in mouths of non-native speakers (AL-MŪSĀ 2007: 70). He warns that the literary Arabic is losing prestige among its own users, which manifests itself, among others, in reluctance on the part of students and low rank of Arabic teachers compared with teachers of other subjects (AL-MŪSĀ 2007).

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3 On diglossia in Arabic media see for example: ALSHAMRANI 2012: 57-69.
Nihād al-Mūsā, however, does not give answer to the question why the Arab society, especially its intellectual elite, has not solved the problem of diglossia so far and why the vast majority of educated Arabs still speak, at best, a sort of intermediate Arabic (al-ʿarabiyya al-wusṭā) which places sixth in his hierarchic list of thirteen varieties of Arabic being in use nowadays (AL-MŪSĀ 2007: 20-21). The fact is that Nihād al-Mūsā does not even pose this question in his otherwise comprehensive work.

Case studies on Arab minorities in the West show that the Arabic language is considered by these communities as a fundamental value. However, the priority is always given to colloquial Arabic, a particular dialect which is considered as native language learned by children from the first moments of their life and naturally used every day. Literary Arabic is seen primarily through the prism of the Koran and Islam, or as an important element of education enabling full functioning in the Arab society. It is a rather difficult language, which one must laboriously learn in school like any foreign language and which is basically not used in everyday speech (GOMAA 2011: 46-53; ALGHAZO 2007: 73-101). These studies also provide interesting insights on teaching Arabic to children and young people. Manal Alghazo in the conclusion of his article on factors affecting the maintenance of the Arabic language among Arab immigrants in the United States writes:

The curriculum taught at the school does not accommodate student’s needs. It is abstract, linguistic based rather than being reflective of children’s everyday lives. Although the school is lacking trained teachers and the use of good methodology and good curriculum it is still a factor in language maintenance for this group of Arab Americans, but not a very effective factor at this stage of the school’s development.

The teachers should also have a positive effect on language maintenance, but in this study, the students showed lack of interest in their teachers, they didn’t care much about them. Most of the children even felt that the teachers were not interested in teaching and didn’t like teaching at all (ALGHAZO 2007: 96).

These observations entirely confirm the opinions of Nihād al-Mūsā. It is worth mentioning that even Arabic language teachers in the Arab countries, when conducting classes in schools, speak a kind of intermediate Arabic or simply a dialect. Examples of that can be found in numerous educational programs broadcast on Arab state TV channels, including programs aimed at dissemination of practical knowledge of the literary Arabic such as Yawmiyyat mudarrissa that is broadcast from Monday through Friday on Moroccan Arrabia TV, or the Moroccan Government-sponsored animated course for the illiterate, available on-line at <http://www.ealpha.alphamaroc.com>.

Maḥmūd Muḥammad Yūnīs ʿAlī (2004: 659-707), like presumably many other contemporary Arab scholars, considers that the Arabic language is currently in a crisis which is a consequence of what he calls “backwardness of the Arab mentality” (at-tahalluf fi bunyat al-ʿaql al-ʿarabī). According to him, there are five main manifestations of such “backwardness” in the Arab society: dogmatism, emotional thinking, egocentrism, intellectual complacency and superficial thinking (Yūnīs ʿAlī 2004: 665). All of them translate into the poor condition of the Arabic language. M.M. Yūnis
Ali picks to pieces educational programs and institutions responsible for Arabic language teaching, blaming them for indifference and shortsightedness. He also criticizes teachers for their incompetence and lack of commitment. But the most worrying for him is the separation of the literary Arabic from life, i.e. that it is not used in everyday conversations and is seen as if it were not a means of interpersonal communication. Consequently, it is taught as if it were a foreign language, though having much in common with the normally used local dialect.

Saudi columnist Māgid Bin Ġāfar al-Ġāmidī in his provocatively titled article “Identity and values – as exemplified by death of the Arabic language” (Al-Huwiyya wa-al-qiyam – mawt al-luġa al-‘arabiyya namūdağan) (<http://www.saaid.net/arabic/355.htm>) postulates abolishing of many practically not applied grammar rules as a remedy. Although he does not indicate what specific rules he has in mind, one can only assume that he means taking advantage of the “benefits” of a relatively large range of linguistic redundancy present in Standard Arabic. But this does not require any institutional intervention, because, as a specificity of the spoken literary Arabic, it falls within generally accepted linguistic correctness. Al-Ġāmidī believes that such simplification could stop averting of young Arabs from the literary language, and subsequently encourage them to use it in daily verbal communication. Interestingly, Al-Ġāmidī, with unconcealed respect, refers in this context to Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and the revival of the Hebrew language.

However, the problem of diglossia appears to be a much more complex and vital issue. In view of the latest neurolinguistic investigations diglossia can have a negative impact on cognitive processing in children. The reason is that it overtasks the working memory which plays an essential role in the development of the reading skills of persons who learn Standard Arabic. According to Raphiq Ibrahim (2011: 571-582):

The diglossia and the gap in phonological distance (auditory-hearing) between dialects may play an important role in the processing of words from the literary language. The distance between the components is related to the existence of different phonemes in the spoken and literary language and to the differences in phonological structure of the syllables in the two languages word. This phonological distance between the two forms of the language can have a detrimental effect on the precision and speed of stimuli processing. [...] It can be assumed that the reduction in phonemic analysis ability, which is a basic ability in reading and writing, slows reading acquisition in the Arabic language early age. [...] Exposing children to this language before they enter school should help prevent immaturity in meta-lingual mechanisms in the standard literary language, reduce the gap between the spoken and the standard language, and ultimately make the process of reading acquisition easier.4

Therefore, solving the problem of diglossia is crucial not only because the future of Standard Arabic is at stake, but because it can negatively impact the linguistic development of children.

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4 See also Ibrahim 2009: 93-105; Khamis Dakwar 2005: 75-86.
There is unanimity in the Arab society that the problem of diglossia should be definitely and quickly overcome. Countless opinions and discussions on internet websites are sufficient evidence for this. But the fact is that the problem has not been solved yet and the prospects for the future do not seem encouraging. Therefore, although in the opinion of the vast majority of the Arab society the Standard Arabic is considered as a core value and by many even as sanctity, it appears to be rather a value added, i.e. something “extra” that goes beyond the standard expectations.

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ABSTRACT

The discussion over universal vs. cultural relative values hits the core of anthropological knowledge. Although cultural relativism served as an almost irrefutable basis for anthropological practice of understanding the Other, several factors of a recent origin have started to undermine the obvious. The “Arab spring,” the “Occupy” movements, the debate over female circumcision that attracts global attention, local uses of the relativistic arguments in political contexts and the debates over universality of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all of these trigger a new discourse on the universality of human values. Universality turns our attention to the problem of translatable of cultures – without an assumption that there is shared, intercultural space and a certain level of commensurability between cultures, any rapport would be impossible. The translation problem directs us toward a discussion on cross-cultural communication and the universality of values and their hierarchies. The discussion has showed that values are not constant residua within intercultural space but rather they are part of an interpretive activity of the participants of a cross-cultural interaction.

Keywords: universalism vs. relativism, universal values, translating cultures
The repertoire of anthropological “obvious truths” starts with the one perfectly expressed in a famous passage from Clifford Geertz’s *Local Knowledge*:

To see others as sharing a nature with ourselves is the merest decency. But it is from the far more difficult achievement of seeing ourselves among others, as a local example of the forms human life has locally taken, a case among cases, a world among worlds, that the largeness of mind, without which objectivity is self-congratulation and tolerance a sham, comes. If interpretive anthropology has any general office in the world it is to keep reteaching this fugitive truth. (Geertz 1983: 16)

This truth is virtually fugitive nowadays. The debate over limits of cultural relativism, which still serves as an almost irrefutable basis for anthropological practice of understanding the Other, have been stimulated recently by several factors.

Among them the crucial one is connected with the fact that recently the so-called, and described in the above quote from Geertz, “anthropological attitude” has been becoming a more and more common experience of diverse groups. As Thomas Hylland Eriksen puts it:

anthropologists offer finely grained accounts of other people’s cultures and the way their everyday struggles are being shaped by cultural ideas. However, anthropologists also critically question their own ideas and theories about how these cultural worlds come into being, since these ideas, too, are culturally constructed and have an ideological dimension. Anthropologists could thus tell multiculturalists that if they criticize their adversaries for providing a slanted and partial view of the world, by the very same token they have to question their own view of the world. If more people did this, society would become more democratic as a result. (Eriksen 2006: 45)

I do not share Erikson’s optimistic vision of the result of the process, but nevertheless he is right that we are observing a kind of blooming of consciousness of the conventional nature of the socio-cultural world we live in (i.e. of its political and economic system), mainly in the Western world but not only, the consciousness that is paradoxically accompanied by the critique of the existing order in the name of universal values. Such is e.g. the phenomenon of the “Occupy” movements. It is very significant that during Occupy Wall Street of September 2011, Slavoy Žižek in his emotional speech emphasised that the taboo is now broken, we do not live in the best possible world, so we are allowed to think about alternatives (Shin 2011), but within the same appeal he surprisingly turns to universal values:

What is the holy spirit? It’s an egalitarian community of believers who are linked by love for each other, and who only have their own freedom and responsibility to do it. In this sense, the holy spirit is here now. And down there on Wall Street, there are pagans who are worshiping blasphemous idols.
It is not just the fact that social movements that share what I recall as an “anthropological attitude” are becoming more significant and influential, that “the merest decency” that expresses itself in unveiling the conventional nature of the cultural and social settings we live in, and at the same time expresses a critical attitude to those settings, has become a widespread experience.\(^1\) It is also the fact that such events as the so-called “Arab spring,” the worldwide discourse on circumcision of women in sub-Saharan Africa that hits back the societies practicing it, or finally the critical discourse on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have become triggers for the new discourse on the universality of human values nowadays, a very critical discourse marginalizing the relativistic core of anthropological sciences.

In that vein James Lull cites an important passage from Kofi Annan: “We may have different religions, different languages, different colored skins, but we all belong to one human race. We all share the same basic values” (Lull 2001: 139). Do we? Lull is aware of a possible critique of the passage, but at the same time he underlies the universalist stand that it promotes: freedom, justice and peace in the world, the values that were codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN in 1948. Among the universal values within the Declaration are those stating that all human beings are born free and equal, that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security, that there should not be slavery, torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, that everyone should be recognized as a person before the law and no arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence is allowed, that everyone has the right to work, free choice of employment and equal pay for equal work, the right to basic, free education, the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, etc. Lull easily discovers that the document “with its explicit emphasis on marriage, family, property ownership, individuality, freedom, rule of law, even the right to leisure – reads like a laundry list of basic Western, middle-class, heterosexual values and lifestyles” (Lull 2001: 139–140).

Although it might be true that the universality of the Declaration is limited and that it may even enforce Western values on non-Western societies, it is also true that the document is well known to policy makers of different levels around the world.

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\(^1\) By those social movements and widespread experiences I mean e.g. “indignant movements,” Greeks protests and weakening of the trust in political class and national state institutions in general, and also something that might be perceived as the peak of that process, especially important to the Catholic Church and Christians, that is Benedict XVI’s act “to resign” from being the Pope, the gesture that so directly withdrew sacrum from the institution of papacy changing it into a regular office.
in non-Western cultures ranges from widespread skepticism to intense opposition. What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest. Universalism, it seems, is hardly universal. (Lull 2001:140)

What is more, the debate over universal values is neither innocent in itself nor politically naive and the anthropological defence of relativism has its very concrete and unforeseen consequences. It should be remembered that for the relativists as influential in anthropology as Melville Herskovitz “beliefs in egalitarianism and cultural relativism convinced him to reject racial hierarchies, to oppose the notion of universal values, and to argue that no outsider could objectively evaluate another culture” (Gershenhorn 2004: 10). And that is what really happened.

As “globalizing” third world nations compete with one another to create export-oriented economies, they are frequently aggressive in enforcing order. These actions are frequently abhorrent to first world politicians and academics, just as they are defended by third world governments as necessary. Anthropology is not an uncompromised player in this debate. Anthropology’s strong defense of the concept of cultural relativism has created a social scientific basis for many third world governments to defend their actions as uniquely adapted to local cultural values and circumstances. They argue that human rights, as defined by such bodies as the United Nations, are not a universal value but are the indulgent product of a wealthy and dominant first world obsession with the legal rights of the individual. They further argue that in order for the group, or the nation, to benefit from development, individuals may have to suffer in the process. In addition, the argument is extended by many state leaders to suggest that democracy can be achieved in such contexts only through intense state control over order and discipline. Anthropology’s own disciplinary history reveals that it too has often questioned the universality of human rights. When the United Nations initially drafted its Declaration of Human Rights a half century ago, the American Anthropological Association declined to participate on the grounds that such a document was contrary to the concept of cultural relativism. (Peacock 2001: 130)

The examples such as the Arab spring to some extent restrict governments’ opportunities for applying relativistic ideology in the manner just presented by Peacock. On the other hand, however, one may hardly deny that possibilities of translating cultural experiences are quite limited and as such they make freeing a discussion on universalism/relativism from the shackles of ideology almost impossible. That does not mean that although the total translation is an illusion, there is no reasonable solution to the problem. First of all, being entangled in socio-cultural settings does not automatically cuts off possibilities of intercultural communication, though there are sometimes significant communicative barriers in systems of values and mentalities. For the last century, anthropologists have been trying to convince their readers that the understanding of the Other is not impossible and not necessarily puts one into despair, although it relies neither on the intensity of mutual contacts, as it is commonly acknowledged, nor on a long-time stay in a particular place among particular people – the “parallel worlds”
existing for a long time in southern Africa are the best examples, but there are of course examples of a positive hybridity (Bhabha 2010).

Anthropologists have a lot of arguments against extreme relativism and they usually refer to common experience as a basis for mutual understanding and translatability. Even a cursory glance at anthropological statements on the possibility of cultural translation exhibits that it would be virtually impossible to sustain the thesis that such a translation is impossible and, at the same time, it shows that universalists’ enthusiasm must also be suspended on theoretical and empirical grounds. For the majority of anthropologists the problem of translation is the fundamental one in the discipline (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 12; Leach 1982: 53), and the assumption of the possibility of translation of meanings between cultures itself is the fundamental condition of the existence of such a discipline as anthropology (Tyler 1987: 96). Edmund Leach notices that at the beginnings of the discipline we started by emphasizing how different are “the others” – and made them not only different but remote and inferior. Sentimentally we then took the opposite track and argued that all human beings are alike; we can understand Trobrianders or the Barotse because their motivations are just the same as our own; but that didn’t work either, “the others” remained obstinately other. But now we have come to see that the essential problem is one of translation. The linguists have shown us that all translation is difficult, and that perfect translation is usually impossible. And yet we know that for practical purposes a tolerably satisfactory translation is always possible even when the original “text” is highly abstruse. Languages are different but not so different as all that. Looked at in this way social anthropologists are engaged in establishing a methodology for the translation of cultural language. (Leach 1973: 772)

There are no reasons to imply that the same does not refer to the cultural world of values. Even if values form clusters within cultures that are very difficult or resistant to perfect translation, it does not mean that they are not accessible outside those cultures – in fact, without an assumption about the possibility of the existence of shared, intercultural space – the space within values more than within language and meanings – without an assumption of a certain level of commensurability between cultures, any rapport would be impossible, and the rapport is what Jürgen Habermas claims to be the fundamental dimension of communicative activity (Habermas 2004).

Some theoreticians of culture believe that the contemporary world is more and more commensurable because of the globalization and hybridization processes that penetrate the world of values as well:

Over the last ten years or so this has changed radically. Hybridity has become a regular, almost ordinary fixture in popular and mainstream culture – widely recognized as “The Trend to Blend.” The Tiger Woods and Barack Obama aesthetic and sensibility – pardon the shorthand – have become standard fixtures in media and marketing. In social science and cultural studies, hybridity is inching up to become the leading paradigm with a steadily growing literature. Cultural studies take hybridity as a point of departure; region and
country studies use hybridity perspectives as analytics. Criticisms of hybridity arguments [...] persist, but the thrust and appeal of everyday and experiential hybridity is unstoppable and outflanks the criticisms. The point of most discussion now is not to argue for or against hybridity but to explore finer points and meanings of hybridity. Since “everything is hybrid,” hybridity is an avalanche and discussing examples of hybridity is like drinking from a fire hydrant. (Pieterse 2009: viii)

Others, like Benjamin Barber (Barber 2007), Samuel Huntington (Huntington 2008), or Shmuel Eisenstadt (Eisenstadt 2000) are trying to convince their readers that there are opposite, “centrifugal” movements that accompany hybridization and unifying processes, that there are movements that underlie and strengthen differences and through those differences the Others are perceived, or those differences sometimes even become impassable gulls.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis was a kind of support for such a view and was for a few decades very popular among anthropologists. The main argument was that while one may describe languages, they impose on their users cognitive schemes that categorize reality and values in such a way that, first of all, those schemes create separate worlds (there was a famous phrase by Clyde Kluckhohn that there are as many worlds as languages (Kluckhohn 1949: 160)) and that crossing those worlds over is impossible – in consequence, the translation between cultures is impossible. In the light of the contemporary linguistics as well as anthropological empirical data, however, the hypothesis cannot find any serious support.

Thomas Shweitzer discusses the hypothesis in a very interesting way when he states:

_interpersonal and cross-cultural communication can be difficult. But difficulty should not be made an obstacle in principle. The statement that I can’t, in principle, understand the Other (say, some utterance or text) presupposes that I know the meaning of all the terms that the Other uses. If I don’t, I can’t tell that their meaning is totally different from meaning of comparable terms that I can use to express his or her ideas. This tacitly presupposes that I first have to completely understand the Other’s words to make the outrageous claim that I can never understand him or her. The argument is self-defeating, because I’ve just managed to understand the radical Other, which is the claim that this argument denies. (Schweizer 1998: 56)

The author while denying those contradictory theses proposes to focus on the “sympathetic and charitable” translation that turns to Donald Davidson’s idea of the impossibility of radical alterity. Davidson wrote that if

_by radical conceptual relativism we mean the idea that conceptual schemes and moral systems, or the languages associated with them, can differ massively – to the extent of being mutually unintelligible or incommensurable, or forever beyond rational resolve – then I reject conceptual radicalism. Of course there are contrasts from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture, and person to person of kinds which we all recognize and struggle with;
but these are contrasts which, with sympathy and effort, we can explain and understand. (DAVIDSON 1989: 159-160)

For practitioners of cross-cultural translations it is rather obvious that the same cultural text might be translated differently, especially since it functions in different frames of reference within the same culture and thus the total translation is a myth (TOROP 2000: 73), so it is rather a “creative transposition” that is a more common practice of inter-cultural translation than a “recoding interpretation.” As Stanley Tambiah puts it, inter-cultural translation implies some kind of double subjectivity, which is characterized by both sympathy and empathy and distance and neutrality on the part of an observer. We must try to get as close as it is possible to the “experience near” of the people we study and, at the same time, distance ourselves from observable phenomena and “translate them into or map them onto usually Western language terms and categories of understanding. This in turn induces another process of self-reflexivity by which our Western understanding of ourselves, our own cultural valuations and presuppositions, are deepened and filled out” (TAMBIAH 1990: 111).

Thus the possibility of any kind of translation relies on the basis of the assumption that there is always some kind of common ground, shared space between communicating parties and a certain level of commensurability. For that reason the first task in anthropological research practices, in their fieldworks, is to find or produce that space that will serve as a starting point for translation. The process is in itself almost unstandardisable and makes the whole cross-cultural translation a highly risky and frustraating domain. That is why the anthropological approach to culture is self-critical, self-aware and suspicious to its own tools of description and interpretation. This type of training and experience makes ethnologists particularly sensitive to attempts of instrumentalization of “local knowledge,” “scientific metalanguage” or “self-evidence of our own culture,” it engenders also a critical distance to “universals,” “universal values,” broad intercultural comparisons and generalizations. For anthropologists the issue of reliable cross-cultural comparisons is very complex. If one would like to juxtapose elements of cultures that are really comparable, he/she should be sure about the meaning of those elements and their comparability in that scope. Meanwhile, when we discuss “values” even within Western cultures, we face the problem of a wide range of meanings attributed to the term. Roy D’Andrade enumerates a few most common meanings of the term value:

Value 1 – the amount or quantity of some variable; Value 2 – the preference for or utility of something; Value 3 – the price of something; Value 4 – the goodness of something important; Value 5 – the degree to which something is morally right. (D’ANDRADE 2008: 11)

Many authors try to formulate definitions that seem to have a universal quality, indicating that “values” can be described as shared standards of thinking, perceiving, and behaving within a specific group, society, environment or region that result in unconscious specific mentalities and frames of reference which distinguish members of one group or culture from another in many diverse ways (HERMEKING 2007: 161-162).
Stressing the shared standard of thinking, behaving etc. directs our attention toward proximity of experience, which is universal within very limited space of our biological dowry as many scholars argue (Dan Sperber, Paul Grice or Jurgen Habermas). However, there is some evidence that cultural values may also be similar interculturally without any common biological traits.

Roy D’Andrade has recently showed that societies do not differ much in personal values, but rather in “what-counts-as-what,” so that “customs differ more than habits of the heart.” Values are institutionalized in roles and that is the process where differentiation in value orientations proceeds.

And a moment’s thought shows that the differences in what-counts-as-what will always be a reflection of the basic cultural differences in values, and that personal values are always reflected in the values that are expressed in the roles we play. Once this story seemed right. But now the evidence is against this story and it is time to construct something better. (D’Andrade 2008: 141)

D’Andrade presents empirical data supporting the thesis that there is common ground for proximity of values on a personal level. He shows that while there is a generally high degree of similarity between societies, we observe small differences in values between them and a high degree of agreement on what counts as a value and what values are especially highly ranked. He has discovered that such value clusters (as values are intercorrelated and forming clusters within particular cultures) as e.g. self-fulfilment, choosing one’s own goals, being optimistic, individualism (unless it gets too close to disorder), having a family, being respectful and polite and altruism are rated predominately above average. In sum, “everywhere, it seems, it is good to be good, and to be good typically means treating others well. [...] In contrast, the world of self-interest receives low ratings” (D’Andrade 2008: 56-57). D’Andrade shows how we value particular values within our own society and how that valuation differs from the similar judgements in other societies. Although his own study was devoted to only three societies (American, Japanese and Vietnamese), he used as a support for his generalizations a larger comparative project by Schwartz and Bardi, who had studied 56 different cultures – unfortunately tribal cultures were excluded (Schwartz/Bardi 2001).

Thus cultural range of the data somehow limits the general conclusions, but the limitation is even clearer if we impose on the data more precise social factors that provide exact coordinates of what we call “space” in intercultural encounters.

Those factors have a decisive role in defining values, especially when we do not treat values as lifelong constant residua (non-culturally inherited, species specific) but something dependent on socio-cultural environment within which the communicative abilities are crucial. Let me explain that by those factors I mean e.g. gender and age (as culturally significant and culturally endowed in meaning), class and economic status of the ego and his/her social setting. There are, however, additional factors conditioning the process of semiosis of values (imprinting particular meaning to particular practices) especially important in intercultural space, although those enumerated above are also
of a great importance. In the second class of factors, I would include first of all social relationships of communicating parties (strangers, close friends, acquaintances, conscious of belonging to different or the same social or economic clusters, etc.), linguistic proximity/distance (dialects, closely related languages; George Bernard Shaw is credited with saying that “England and America are two countries separated by the same language” – in other words even the same sounds or sentences can sometimes mean totally different things, which nowadays is so apparent in multicultural societies) and a general culturally conditioned behavioural manners. The American linguistic anthropologist Zdenek Salzman perfectly explains the last factor with some Canadian examples. He compares the linguistic behaviours of English-speaking Canadians and Athabaskans, for whom English is also the language of everyday communication, in their encounters. The way they adjust to one another within the intercultural communicative space depends not only on the definitions of the situation but also on the mutual stereotypes of the expectations of possible behaviour of the parties.

In summary, the native speakers of English (that is, Canadians) thought that the Athabaskans preferred to keep silent, avoiding situations when talking was expected […] they played down their personal abilities and did not talk about themselves; in referring to events yet to happen, they did not try to plan ahead; they avoided direct questions, and when they did say something, it frequently did not relate to the main topic of the exchange; they talked in a monotonous tone of voice; they were not very clear in what they said; and eventually they would leave without saying anything to conclude the exchange.

The Athabaskans had virtually the opposite view of the communicative behavior of the Canadians. These people, in their opinion, always talked first and spoke too much; they talked about the future as though they were able to predict what would happen; they bragged about themselves; they frequently interrupted the other person and asked too many questions; and they became rather excited when they spoke and even made some specific comments about other people without any restraint (Salzmann 2012: 32-33).

So taking those views and expectations into account as additional coordinates of the intercultural space and in the context of a particular utterance or communicative act might result in misunderstanding and confusion when parties do not adjust to such imposed schemes. Accordingly, it occurs that intercultural communication is related or even determined by the cultural setting of interacting parties. The space of the contact is filled with interpretative activity on both sides, filled with socio-culturally different definitions of interaction and differently perceived situations that represent the proper context for understanding of the interaction (not necessarily the same tokens may play the role or be significant as part of the context on both parties of interaction). We may also expect that values, and particularly their hierarchies, would be differently defined according to the type of relation they are part of: one to one encounters, one to a few or group encounters with their formal/informal variations etc.

The general idea I have wanted to deal with here is that we should be especially cautious in our reflection on values in intercultural space and any generalization in this
scope must be secured with special criticism, or even all time present readiness to reject the theory we work with. I mean a kind of readiness present in the axiosemiotic theory of culture of Stanisław Pietraszko, a theoretician who “encompassed in his reflections a tendency to pose himself absurdly audacious goals with a deeply moving – and probably rhetorically effective – continuous questioning of the value or at least relative conclusiveness of particular pieces of the possible theory building process, also and above all his own theory” (Kuligowski 2011: 101). This is not only because within the discourse on values in intercultural space instead of understanding we often face a merely learned ideology that suppresses the Other with seemingly universal values of the American-Western culture, but because the structure of the phenomena, involving the terms and situations described and mutual relations of those matters cannot simply be transformed, as I have been trying to show, into an unproblematic entity.

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VALUES – THE CORE OF CULTURE

ABSTRACT

Cultural values are formed by a particular community and not individually. Any member of a given community comes across these values and may assume an individual attitude towards them. Discovering values and exploring them is a defining characteristic of a free, thinking, and active individual. In the culture of any society there are values on which there is a general agreement; they are the basis of its identity; actions of social institutions and individuals focus upon them; they create a stimulating environment; their implementation binds society together; they unite what is fragmented and universalize what is individual and temporary. Such values are called central or native values (A. Kłoskowska) or higher values (S. Ossowski). They determine the quality of a given society and its cultural specificity. In any culture individuals seek self-fulfilment, but it always happens in the social context. Due to the fact that culture always has both social and individual character, a social group maintains the same culture and at the same time develops it. Each new generation enters the heritage of previous generations and adds something new to it but in compliance with values that have already been provided. Material products and behaviours are subject to constant change, many become forgotten, but values that are the basis for their formation remain and continue to stimulate new actions. This means that culture is a social message and a creation that requires human effort of adhering to what has already been valuable to individuals and society but at the same time creating something new that is in close correlation with the existing heritage. Fidelity to roots “is always creative, ready to descend into the depths, open to new challenges, alert to the ‘signs of the times’ […] Fidelity to roots means above all the ability to create an organic synthesis of perennial values, confirmed so often in history, and the challenge of today’s world” (JOHN PAUL II 2000: 204). So far, significant changes in individual and social life in the European culture have taken place with the dissemination of the following
values arranged in threes: truth – goodness – beauty; faith – hope – love; freedom – equality – brotherhood. Undoubtedly, they are all spiritual values. The first three values served as the basis for Greek democracy; the next three as the basis for the development of Christian communities; the last three values underline the development of modern international relations where every nation and every state has a guaranteed right to its existence and development but with respect for individual rights. This context raises the question – which triad of values would be most beneficial for today’s modern societies? Most certainly the value of solidarity should appear among them because this idea was stated by the social movement that freed societies from the totalitarian structure of Soviet politics. The dynamics of the implementation of this value resulted in the fall of the Berlin Wall and initiated a more complete unification of Europe. Apart from solidarity, two more values should also appear: human dignity and social justice. Therefore, the triad of values that could be the basis for the development of modern society would be: human dignity, justice, solidarity within each society and on an international scale.

Keywords: cultural values; core values; values in modern society

INTRODUCTION

The term ‘culture’ brings to mind various ideas. Descriptive definitions of culture, created mostly by ethnographers and historians (e.g. Edward Tylor, Maria Bogucka), mention such constituent elements of culture as language, customs and habits, religious beliefs, rituals, ideas, values, moral norms, laws, forms of social organization, material goods and the process of their production, or educational institutions.

Both sociologists and anthropologists draw attention to the interrelation of cultural elements, their organization and their mutual dependence. This prevents cultural anthropologists from reducing the meaning of culture to the mere list of its constituent elements, forcing them to seek their manifestation in every culture. Therefore, a sense of cultural distinctiveness of any society does not depend on the multitude of cultural components or on their originality, but rather on the links between them, their structure, the interconnections and influence of particular elements on one another.

1 “Culture […] is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” Tylor 1871: 1.
2 Maria Bogucka in her analysis of the history of Polish culture sees it as “a group of (material and non-material) human products, socially accepted ways of being and systems of values that are typical of a given era and territory.” Bogucka 2008: 8 [translation – Z.S.].
3 This is emphasized by Clyde Kluckhohn in his definition of culture “Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups […]” Kluckhohn 1962: 25.

In the semiotic approach, Umberto Eco, continuing the thought of Ferdinand de Saussure, highlights the components and functions of culture⁴. Both signs and meanings are important and used for interpersonal communication; they are inseparably connected with people, and through interpersonal communication they acquire their significance, activate new meanings and are repeatedly introduced in new forms. The formative and creative processes of culture are inseparably interlaced with interpersonal communication. The weakening of social bonds further decreases the value of cultural formation processes and diminishes the continuity of cultural heritage, and as a result no new cultural content of a given society is created. The weakening of social bonds in terms of primary groups (family, neighbours, nation), parents and children, teachers and students, various religious and political groups or social categories could serve as a reason behind the cultural crisis of a given society, a break in its continuity, or the relative scarcity in cultural output in various social groups and in society as a whole.

Although academics have failed to arrive to a single comprehensive definition of culture, some of its features tend to be universally emphasized.

1. Culture is a sphere that is constantly created and recreated by humans. The interplay of cognitive, volitional and emotional powers and human energy constantly expands and enriches the world of culture which, according to Bronisław Malinowski, is essentially an advanced and sophisticated apparatus which helps man cope and adjust nature to his needs. However, man’s cultural formation process can be detrimental both to nature and to himself, as the products of such process could destroy nature or make it hostile to man. It is a highly topical issue, which is visible in the establishment of many new environmental organizations that protect nature and natural heritage from the negative influence of culture, especially from the rapidly growing material culture. Man lives in two worlds, the one he is presented with – the natural world, and the one that he creates – the cultural world. The mutual complementary relationship of the two, its incompatibilities and the level of these incompatibilities are all dependent on the values that man chooses and the manner in which he chooses to implement them.

Man always seeks to give a concrete shape to what he meets, experiences and wants. Even the most sublime idea calls for a specific material shape. The value of love should be expressed in a kind gesture, friendly word or a small gift that would remind both parties of the subtle feeling they share. The values such as truth, freedom or justice should be expressed in various artefacts (behaviour, customs, material and spiritual products, law, institutions etc.). Any cultural products are just objectification of these or other values realized outside of the human body […] They persist in such a manner in which they have an objective reality as something permanent, often for a longer period

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⁴ According to Umberto Eco, signs are viewed as a means of interpersonal communication or as elements of sign systems.
of time than the duration of an individual human life; they are frequently forgotten, wait-
ing for someone to rediscover them, to revive their system of assessments and standards to
which their owe their existence and which was subsequently abandoned or which disap-
peared with the people who used it (RODZIŃSKI 1989(a): 225).

Culture is a set of values which serve as a direction for human actions and desires
and which form the basis for the evaluation of everything that man believes in, wants
or does. It gives him the ability to differentiate between good and bad, real and unreal,
beautiful and inharmonious. The value orientation category of good and bad belongs
strictly to the world of culture and it is not used in relation to nature. In case of nature
one can only evaluate to what extent nature serves (or does not serve) man and whether
something is functional or non-functional, whereas in the world of culture everything
created by man can be interpreted in the categories of good and evil.

2. Culture is inextricably linked to the social aspect of human life. Culture is created
and transmitted by a particular social group or community. It always belongs to some-
one, a specific collective entity. The most natural culture-forming groups include fam-
ily, ethnic group and nation or religious group, but at the same time specific groups can
also create their own culture. Culture provides such groups with means for establishing
interpersonal communication in a group but also outside of it. Man lives within the
culture he belongs to; he expresses himself in it, which means that he embodies the val-
ues shared and implemented by most members of the group (or community) to which
he belongs but at the same time he maintains individual consciousness. Therefore, his
understanding and realization of these values and may slightly dissent from the general
approach.

Values, although permanent, can be variously interpreted and implemented by dif-
ferent individuals, groups and social categories, hence within the same culture some
groups are at variance with the larger culture and they are most often referred to as sub-
cultures. Polish or American culture establishes peculiar subcategories of culture such
as of men and women; the young and the elderly; bank employees and the military;
clergy and laymen; members of the Neocatechumenal Way and skinheads; conserva-
tives with national profiles and liberals with cosmopolitan leanings. This cultural diver-
sity is based on different preferences, store of knowledge, experience, living conditions
and vision of the past and future of society. The diversity of values and forms of their
realization in the same culture ensures its cultural development that springs from in-
ternal dynamics. Combining all the above-mentioned features of culture it can be de-
defined as follows: culture is an integrated system of values, psycho-social behaviours and
products created and adopted in a social group (community), designed to satisfy hu-
man needs and to provide interpersonal communication, all of which are fully under-
stood only in this particular group (community). Assuming such definition of culture,
the author of this article deliberates the priority role of culture, types of cultural values
and their functions, and as an example discusses a set of Polish cultural values which
played a very important role in the past and are still treasured up to this day. Each soci-
ey has a specific set of values that are particularly important, their implementation is
Values – the Core of Culture

rewarded, and which is constantly renewed (in various forms), because these values are the basis of identity, continuity and development of society.

1. THE PRIORITY ROLE OF VALUES IN CULTURE

Many anthropologists that try to define the essential elements of culture come to a conclusion that the answer lies in values. According to Heinrich Rickert (Rickert 1915: 20) “all cultural phenomena contain an embodiment of a recognized value.” This opinion is shared by Florian Znaniecki (Znaniecki 1971), who believes the cultural world is a world of values that are the primary data of human experience, irreducible to any category of natural world. Everything that is perceived as culture is related to these values. According to Andrzej Tyszka (Tyszka 2001: 49), they are the “main basis of culture, its most important component and its main frame.” Values are what defines culture, its character and quality. At the same time, culture forces individuals and groups to serve these values. This is the understanding of culture shared by (inter alia) Stefan Czarnowski, Stanisław Ossowski, Antonina Kłoskowska or Leszek Korporowicz. Value is automatically assumed to be something positive, but in fact where there is truth there is a lie, where there is justice there is injustice, where a person helps others there is someone who harms them. Therefore, what is perceived as values by some could be seen as anti-values by others. In the culture created by man there are values and anti-values, or in other words, positive and negative values. This does not occur in the world of nature and material beings. The topic of positive and negative aspects of material beings refers to their functionality for humans, that is whether or not they serve their function. In the world of culture negative values (or anti-values) are seen as something that is not conducive to human life and development but rather they lead to its destruction or demise. Therefore, the basis for the evaluation of an individual or collective action is the relation of such action to a human being. The life and development of an individual is the ultimate criterion for distinguishing values and anti-values, thus ultimately culture is human-centred. “Therefore, just as Copernicus taught people to look at Earth by focusing on the Sun, in a similar manner the complex cultural issues should be tackled by focusing on a human first” (Ródziński 1989(a): 227) or, in the opinion of religious people, on God in whose image and likeness man was created. Culture is thus based upon the belief that a human being is the most precious value of individual and social life. Culture in which anti-values are given equal authority to values becomes inhuman. The most extreme example of such situation occurred in the concentration camps and extermination camps during the totalitarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Man is a fundamental and primary point of departure in respect to culture, and, according to Znaniecki, all products are only secondary values (Kłoskowska 1988: 45, 56). Therefore, every culture is humanistic (or human) with that respect that some cultures are more so than others. Mankind is the content of culture, postulate and objective of both individuals and social groups, and both a result and a consequence of historical

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5 Translation – Z.S.
processes. In any human activity, more human elements are admired, preserved, transmitted, and, if destroyed, reconstructed; at the same time, any inhuman elements are condemned. This is particularly visible in biographies of significant individuals and in the assessment of artistic and literary works. Shaping the humanity in man, namely the development of those features that are desired by an average person, constitutes the general purpose of culture.

Values form the basis for the formation, continuity and development of each culture. They are essential; in fact, they form the core of culture. Such opinion is shared by the most eminent scholars of culture, many of which use this criterion to make a categorization and division of culture or civilization (understood as a combination of similar cultures) into big forms; each of them constitutes a distinguishable whole. The most popular and well-known concepts in this field were developed by Feliks Koneczny and Samuel P. Huntington. Koneczny on the basis of the dominant values of his contemporary cultures distinguishes Arab, Byzantine, Brahmin, Chinese, Latin, Turanian and Jewish civilizations. Taking into account the value of man and the position he has in a given civilization, Koneczny (Koneczny 1935) views Latin civilization as superior and has the lowest opinion of Turanian civilization which is dominated by violence and destruction. Over sixty years later, on the basis of values that prevailed in each culture and religion Samuel P. Huntington (Huntington 2000) distinguished Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western and Latin American civilizations.

Researchers of culture, when they try to assess the quality of cultures, penetrate through most noticeable behaviours and cultural products and seek values that inspired them. However, at present quality is one of the most ambiguous concepts. Undoubtedly, there is a great number of definitions and classifications of values. In the most general sense, according to Adam Rodziński (Rodziński 1989(b): 42) value is the “worth of just anything; whether for an individual, a group or for everyone it will always be a real worth and not just an implied one that was 'read' incorrectly.” What is worth discussing is the cultural understanding of values, accompanied by the philosophical, ethical, psychological and sociological one.6 The cultural approach defines value as:

1. Normative and existential judgements (valuing orientations), commonly accepted in a given society, which support the development of an both individual man and society; for example truth and justice form the foundation of a peaceful coexistence (social cohesion); goodness is to be desired and evil is to be avoided; freedom must be protected and defended; human life is the greatest value and should be cherished and not harmed or destroyed in any way; knowledge is a prerequisite for innovation and leads to higher positions in society and as such it should be broadened and improved.

2. Psychological conditions and corresponding behaviours that are prevalent in a given society, for instance the willingness to help others, hospitality, sacrifice for others or the common good, tolerance towards different views and customs, respect for the elderly, patriotism.

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6 Definitions of values and their classification in terms of sociological and philosophical are discussed by many authors, e.g. Misztal 1980; Marczuk 1990; Pawelczyńska 1992; Kowalczyk 2006; Dakowicz 2006; Dyczewski 2009(a): 185-205.
3. Products, historic sites and events which are widespread and widely appreciated. In the Polish society these include for instance the oldest Polish hymn “Bogurodzica” (The Mother of God), the poem “Pan Tadeusz” by Adam Mickiewicz, the Wawel Castle in Krakow, the Jasna Gora Monastery in Czestochowa, the Jagiellonian University, the Catholic University of John Paul II in Lublin, the victory over Teutonic Order in Grunwald in 1410, the Union of Lublin in 1569, the Battle of Warsaw in 1920, the election of Karol Wojtyła as pope, the overthrowing of the communist regime by the Solidarity movement in the 1980s etc. The importance of these cultural artefacts, sites or events is passed on the young generations of Poles in the process of family socialization and education.

4. A general belief popularized in a society that a given system of values, norms or behaviour patterns is important for the functioning of a society, e.g. Christianity, is valuable for Polish society and inextricably associated with it, hence this relationship should be cherished; the Ten Commandments (Decalogue) comprise the basis for both individual and social life; The European Union and Poland’s EU membership is viewed positively.

Such understanding of cultural values is emphasized by their following features:
1. Values in a cultural approach are transcendent in relation to individuals, namely they exist independently of them; 2. they have a super-individual and supra-temporal character, therefore values are universal; 3. they have binding power, hence they fill people with the urge to act in accordance with them.

In the cultural understanding values exist beyond individuals and have both social and individual character. Individuals learn and experience them and either interiorise them or not. If individuals accept values as their own they realize them in their own manner. Cultural values often demand sacrifices and renouncement, yet such acts bring benefits and happiness. An example of such situation is death in defence of the liberty of the fatherland, faith or justice. Ultimately, the valuable does not bring benefits or happiness to individuals, but it is what is valuable that renders happiness and brings benefits. Saint Maksymilian Kolbe was happy to make an exchange for Franciszek Gajowniczek and die of starvation in order to save Gajowniczek’s life, despite paying the highest price for his heroic act. In fact, a great number of people with unbounded enthusiasm and determination defended their national freedom. It is also important to note that Christians repeatedly speak out against killing unborn children even when medical indications and the public are in favour of an abortion, and the abortion is further justified by poor material conditions.

A cultural value may be defined in the following way: it is a socially sanctioned value that is typical of a given culture, interiorized by members of a society and it helps them make choices, directs them to their goals and means for achieving them, and it also strengthens the action in the same sociocultural domain in which it is rooted. An objective criterion of the importance of a cultural value is its place (or role) in a given system of values. A subjective criterion is the place and role of a given value in the life and personality of a concrete individual, i.e. if and to what extent values are factors that affect development of one’s personality.
Assuming such understanding of a cultural value it is also believed that:

1. Not all cultural values are equally important for a society; however, they form a particular hierarchy. Some cultural values are so crucial that in absence of these values a given society would disintegrate or change substantially. Apart from these there is an abundance of other values that function in a society. They can be widespread and popular but they are neither typical nor important. A society would not lose anything from its own character if these values weakened or disappeared. The primary criterion of the hierarchy of cultural values is the extent to which a given value serves the development of a society and its members.

2. Individuals, as well as particular societies appreciate different values at different times. This depends on the awareness of the significance of these values, as well as on current needs and conditions. Therefore, the choice and popularity of values depend on a situational context. For example, in comparison with their ancestors modern people are more aware of their physical health so they can take greater care of it. Moreover, they have a greater respect for work and education.

3. The same values in private life and in public life may be understood and realized differently. Two factors are crucial here: consciousness and external conditions. The same value in different periods of time can be realized fully, partially or even be entirely rejected. In times of the partitions or during the German and Russian occupation, an average Pole did not work productively in the state administration sector or in state enterprises because Poles were convinced that such work would have a deteriorating effect on their own society. Therefore, they often simulated work or even boycotted it. As a result, the occupant came to a conclusion that Poles do not appreciate the value of work, are negligent and lazy. Such a stereotype became especially popular e.g. in Germany and it is still strong today, despite the fact that Poles in Germany are one of the most diligent workers. The judgement was hasty and untrue as the same Poles worked hard and creatively in the private sector, especially the self-employed ones.

Cultural values are formed in the mutual relations between an individual and groups to which he belongs, with family life as the first stage of the process. Family passes on values to its members and organizes their lives on the biological and spiritual level. These values are later confronted with the values of any social group that an individual interacts with, the values of any people that are perceived as significant or the values encountered through education or media. All these circumstances can strengthen, modify or alter values, as they are not static but rather linked to the personality development, identity and changeability of living conditions. The transition from one social group to another often causes a clash of previously adopted values. On the whole, this is how one’s own individual system of cultural values is formed.

Cultural values neither offer any precise guidance, nor impose any firmly established life plan; instead, they are gradually recognized, experienced, assimilated and implemented in an individual manner. Cultural values play a double role: they stimulate individuals to act according to their content and make them refrain from any actions contrary to it. The barrier to innovation which is sometimes built by cultural values may be so difficult to break through that even the best organized violence or rationally
planned action is crashed in the collision. An example of this phenomenon was an unsuccessful attempt to nationalize private farms and organize State Agricultural Farms (PGRs) in Poland after World War II. The socialist government tried various means to carry out this plan but the cultural barrier was so strong that it resulted in a complete failure. State Agricultural Farms were successfully organized only on the grounds that previously belonged to great landowners that were legally deprived of their property or on the Recovered Territories. Altogether the State Agricultural Farms covered only about one-fourth of all cultivable grounds, while the rest remained in the hands of private farmers because Polish peasants did not consent to nationalization of their lands. It was a remarkable phenomenon in the whole socialist bloc because in other countries the government managed to carry out their nationalization plan much better than in Poland. The reason behind this failure could be the fact that Polish peasants valued private ownership of their land as they fought for it during partitions and defended their lands and properties from the communists. A private farm was not only a place of work and a source of income but also a symbol of personal freedom, independence and a pillar of Polishness. Polish peasants practically treated their lands as something sacred which made it impossible to pass them into foreign socialist hands.

Nowadays material, hedonistic values (collectively referred to as consumption values) are widespread. They occupy a prominent place in the society’s consciousness and they contribute to the expansion of store chains and help those political parties that make unrealistic election promises to improve living conditions – the promises which are usually proved worthless after the election. Even though the majority of voters are aware that these political parties would not keep their promises, they still vote for them; it proves that consumption values are so highly desired that people are ready to base their votes on false campaign promises.

2. TYPES OF VALUES AND THEIR REALIZATION

Undoubtedly, there is a great diversity among values and literature offers a number of different types of their categorization. The most common classification of values within the field of social sciences is the one proposed by Max Scheler (1874-1928), because the types of values he distinguished most closely correspond to human needs. Therefore, by adopting this classification the author of this paper distinguishes the following categories of values:

1. Hedonistic values. Pleasure becomes the greatest value and the main goal of actions. It is desirable to have a comfortable flat, a car that is elegant and fast, and to be able to lie on the beach during summer, not thinking about anything else than the sound of the splashing waves. It is easy to only befriend people who can say nice things about us. Pleasure is the basic criterion for taking any kind of action and evaluating interpersonal relations. There has never been a shortage of such people who make pleasure the main principle of their lives. They keep in mind that life is short and they focus on the temporal thing and the measure of their happiness is in direct relation to their attainment of pleasure.
2. Vital values. Anything that contributes to the physical attractiveness and physical fitness is valuable and desirable. Anything that is potentially damaging to human life and body is perceived negatively. Weakened vitality usually leads to the loss of meaning in life. In societies that exhibit a high regard for vital values and are concerned with the cult of youth, old and disabled individuals do not enjoy a high position in the society and such state contributes to the recognition of various types of euthanasia.

3. Material values, material goods. Anything that increases the number of things one owns, raises the standard of living, or contributes to a comfortable and carefree life belongs to this category. Any loss of material goods or a decrease in the standard of living is considered to be detrimental. Endless multiplication of goods often cause individuals to engage all their power and abilities to pursue those goods; this often results in negligence of health and family life and generally leads to harmful consequences.

4. Sociocentric values. Anything that expresses the collective will and effort of individuals is perceived as valuable. Such values include nation, country, religious group, family or a political party. Individuals may take various actions in order to ensure the development of these values; sometimes they even willingly sacrifice their life. Throughout history there have been many who advocated the superior position of their own nation, country, religious group or family and the positive aspect of everything that served their development. In the name of development they oppressed individuals, groups, social categories or even whole nations that in their view were obstacles in the process of pursuing goals of their own party or nation.

5. Aesthetic values – harmony, order, beauty, and all that compels admiration, moves or excites, brings solemn feelings and stimulates creativity, makes life more happy and creative.

6. Ethical values (also called altruistic values) – they include various forms of good, i.e. those activities that strengthen the life and development of human beings and other living creatures. The implementation of good is accompanied by other values such as justice, mercy, support, generosity, forgiveness, honesty, diligence, hospitality etc. Whoever cherishes these values becomes closer with other individuals and as such these relationships are built on solid foundations.

7. Cognitive values – that is the knowledge and truth about an individual and the world. Man in search for the truth gains a broader and more in-depth knowledge about himself and the world and eventually comes to a better understanding of the reality and can shape it in a more creative way taking a broader role as a creator.

8. Religious values – they include God and eternal life in communion with God and other spiritual beings. Religious values bring man into the supernatural world; they let him expand his horizons, leave the temporal world, reach the state of holiness and enter the realm of the supernatural, as well as obtain a fuller understanding of himself, others and the world.

The first three types of values are closely interlinked with the human body, instincts and senses, feelings and desires and the need to confirm one’s own existence. Their realization is marked by utilitarianism, pragmatism and striving for success expressed by experiencing pleasure, having a beautiful body, high standard of living and a good social
position. Efficiency becomes a priority and frequently the idea that the end justifies the means is implemented. This idea is usually also put into practice during the realization of sociocentric values when they become the dominant ones.

The realization of the first four types of values is, in fact, limited by a variety of circumstances e.g. time, space or material possibilities; nevertheless, they can be fully implemented. An individual can satisfy his hunger and thirst so that he feels completely full; he can arrange his flat to meet all his needs; the nation or country that he identifies with can overtake his cognition, understanding and desires to such an extent that he will sacrifice everything for their development. However, the idea of satisfying hunger and thirst, gaining prestige or political importance is not necessarily associated with happiness and meaningful life. The implementation of these values does not provide an individual with complete fulfilment as these values do not stimulate his development nor lead to the full enjoyment of life. Therefore hedonistic, vital, utilitarian and sociocentric values are also called instrumental. In addition, their implementation is often made at the expense of others and involves various forms of inflicting harm.

The implementation of the next four types of values has the following significant features that distinguish them from the previous i.e. instrumental values:

1. Their realization does not have to be justified by other values; hence they are values in themselves.
2. The realization of these values involves all aspects of human capacity and it takes place within an individual who thereby develops comprehensively.
3. These values when implemented cannot be fully satisfied. It means that one cannot fully satisfy the need of knowledge, the need to do good, the need of beauty, the need of admiration and the need to be loved by God and others. No one in his right mind would say that he has already experienced everything, learnt everything, been good enough to others, seen all the beauty and loved the loved one just enough. Despite the best efforts man is aware that he still knows too little, does not do enough good, always has room for improvement, and does not love his loved one or God enough. The conclusion is obvious – as long as man learns, recognizes, realizes and lives according to these values he will still feel a lack of fulfilment and he will want to realize these values because he is never able to do it completely and through the repeated implementation of these values he evolves. These values are somewhat perfect even though they are not perfection.
4. The realization of these values provides an individual with a feeling of satisfaction and happiness but it is often accompanied by effort, suffering or even sacrificing one’s own life.
5. They form a basis for the evaluation of a particular individual or social group.

Values of this kind are spiritual. Antonina Kłoskowska (Kłoskowska 1981: 196-215) calls them autotelic, while other researchers refer to them as desired or developmental. They include, among others, truth, virtue, beauty, love, justice or God. Man finds them particularly important and they affect every sphere of his life and every aspect of his personality. They are independent of individuals and serve as a sign. An individual should apply these values in every stage and every sphere of his life (which ba-
sically means anytime and anywhere). For instance, the value of charity should always be implemented and any actions that are in opposition to it are viewed negatively. Only autotelic values give meaning to individual lives, and at the same time to culture and social life. They go beyond an individual and hence are socially valuable. They are predominantly popularized and defended by those who have little to lose in the sphere of material possessions and social system. Such people do not have luxurious mansions, expensive belongings or lucrative bank accounts and they do not obtain support from rich and influential people; in general, most of them are intellectuals, clergy or young people.

3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VALUES AND ITS EFFECTS

Values serve important functions in the life of individuals and society: they arouse interest; shape the consciousness; broaden experience and stimulate action; formulate objectives; appeal to the conscience; integrate actions and give meaning to their outcome; integrate people and societies; but at the same time diversify the society, stimulate, determine and stabilize its development or disrupt and block it. The realization of these values requires constant effort, but such effort is not futile as these values offer protection but man must constantly be cautious of their proper understanding and hierarchy. Jan Strzelecki aptly commented that “values are fragile without a constant effort of man and man is fragile without a constant effort of realizing them” (Tyszka 1999: 175).

Man and the society in which he lives need values to exist and develop. Therefore the values that are recognized, implemented and serve as inspiration are essential both for individuals and the society. Values determine cultural products and they are essential for defining the overall culture.

According to Jadwiga Puzynina (Puzynina 1992: 185), the promotion of hedonistic values and encouraging people to choosing them is, always has been, and always will be

the greatest danger to man. Man obsessed with hedonistic motivations becomes an easy prey for authoritarian appeals. At the same time, he limits horizons of his creativity and opportunities for self-realization. He also reduces his participation in the lives of others or his participation in various communities (such as his family or nation). Finally, he risks living in deception as he usually proclaims a different set of values than the one he truly follows.7

Furthermore, the belief in vital and economic values in not less dangerous, as they are tinged with utilitarianism. According to Puzynina (Puzynina 1992: 185)

The belief that that the value of an action is determined by its utility firstly does not reveal the ultimate value hidden behind the notion of utility (which in most cases is hedonism), and secondly it easily leads to recognition of what is encapsulated in the statement that the

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7 Translation – Z.S.
end justifies the means and consequently leads to the elimination of differences between moral good and moral evil.\(^8\)

The domination of sociocentric values poses a serious threat as it can lead to various forms of totalitarianism and restriction of rights of individuals and social groups. The belief that one’s nation, country, ethnic group, political party or even family constitute the most important value lets them gain a better, more privileged position which leads to aggression against other groups, limiting their rights or even their destruction. This type of situation occurred during the regime of German National Socialism and Ukrainian nationalists in south-eastern Poland.

The realization of hedonistic, vital, material or sociocentric values should be kept under constant consideration, control and limitations because they can easily become dominant as they are closely related to basic human needs, man’s existence and his continual striving for higher standards of living.

Popularization, realization and domination of autotelic (spiritual) values do not pose the aforementioned dangers. Raising awareness and increasing implementation of these values transforms members of the society into more analytical, free and comprehensively developed individuals; at the same time the entire society perfects forms of its existence and development, shapes its ability to handle conflicts and tensions by peaceful means. As a result, the value of economic goods and the quality of life increase. Modern societies are firmly focused on economic development and achieving a prestigious position among other societies and as such they need spiritual values and should put more effort into their popularization and show greater concern for their realization.

Man responds to values, realizes them and in this manner shapes himself and the world. The values according to which he directs his cognition, desires and actions are certainly not without significance. It is worth noting that all the above-mentioned values mean “something” to a particular person, and they must be evaluated with this particular person in mind. Therefore, in considering value one cannot omit the personal aspect of a human individuality.

In the process of realization of values man offers a piece of himself and in exchange values serve man – they strengthen his existence and help his development. Józef Tischner (\textit{Tischner 1982: 87}) concludes that

\begin{quote}
\textit{at the centre of the universe human value, that is a human being, is a value of special significance. This value does not need ‘justification’ because it is already ‘justified’ by values that serve man. Therefore this value is primary, absolute [...]}. Man cannot be a means to a goal; he must be the goal himself. Otherwise man would serve something that should serve him.\(^9\)
\end{quote}

By applying these words to the previously mentioned hierarchy of values it could be stated that hedonistic, vital, material and sociocentric values consolidate the individual

\(^{8}\) Translation – Z.S.

\(^{9}\) Translation – Z.S.
or collective life of individuals. On the other hand, spiritual values open one’s mind to others; they integrate man into an interpersonal community, and religious values incorporate him into the divine realm and save his life from oblivion and death. Culture that is disconnected from transcendent reference points – such as truth or religious events – is neither conducive to a deeper understanding of man, nor contributes to the creation of a stable axio-normative order and continuity of culture.

4. AN ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF POLISH CULTURE DEVELOPED

The values that function in society are closely linked with ideologies and current fashion, with policies of ruling groups, economy, technology or its position among other societies. Thus, as soon as these factors change the world of values that has been internalized by all members of the public inevitably changes too, though often at a slower pace. Even such basic values as truth, virtue, beauty, justice, hard work, family, fatherland, honour, God or the supernatural world do not have a fixed social value attached to them. The old world of values can – undoubtedly and for a long period of time – function in a new reality, but after a while something will start to change. If basic values do not alter, what changes is their interpretation and the ways of their realization.

At this point it is worth discussing values that have functioned in Polish society in the recent past and the present. The description is general and brief, hence the statements provided here are simplified and most probably subjective and as such they should be an inspiration for further discussion.

The Polish system of values preserved in Polish literature and contemporary Polish consciousness had been formed throughout all periods of Polish history but it was clearly defined only during the partitions which took place in the XIX and the early XX century. The conditions in which this process took place are not without significance. In this period Poland went through the partition to three different states and had to function in three different social, political, economic and religious systems. The invaders’ government discriminated Polish culture, applied all sorts of methods in order to divide Poles against themselves and to impose germanization and russification. However, Polish society divided between the three invaders was united by Polish culture and the Catholic Church, which distinguished Poles from Protestant Prussians and Orthodox Russians. The Catholic Church with its universal character did not take part in the government as much as the Protestant Church or the Orthodox Church and consequently it enjoyed some freedom of action. The two characteristics – its universal character and independence from a dominating power allowed the Catholic Church to be the basis for unity of the residents of the Commonwealth territories divided among the three invaders and those that emigrated; it was also the biggest foundation for storage, continuity and development of the Polish culture. The Catholic Church took advantage of its position, but the governance of alien invaders noticed this role of the Catholic Church and in order to weaken it its estates and cultural products were con-
fiscated, its activity limited, monasteries destroyed and the clergy that showed patriotic attitude were sent to prison or were forced into Russian exile. In this period the bond between the Polish culture and the Catholic Church strengthened and everything that was Polish began to be associated with being Catholic.

During the First Partition of Poland it was mainly the representatives of Romanticism that shaped the cultural values of Polish society; during the Second Partition – the representatives of Positivism; during the Third – the representatives of the Young Poland movement.

Romanticism had a profound impact on the popularization of the following values in Polish society: 1. feeling of the unusual; intuition; irrationality; mystery; supernatural world; God; sensitivity to what is sacred. 2. devotion to “higher” matters 3. independence, freedom, patriotism 4. experience, especially the experience of suffering 5. transcendence, that is going beyond oneself, beyond one’s capabilities; the pursuit of perfection; omnipotence; omniscience; the sense of the world and the unity of people and the universe. The model of a Pole who is attached to his country and religion, loves his motherland and fights for her freedom and is devoted to the great cause of her independence was shaped on the basis of values popularized by social elites, especially poets, artists and educators (e.g. A. Mickiewicz, J. Słowacki, A. Grottger). A patriot, a conspirator, one who fights even though he knows he shall lose but still waits for a great change and believes that it should come one day was a model to be followed.

During the period of Positivism, after two failed uprising (1831, 1863) slightly different values became emphasised among the Polish society in comparison the period of Romanticism. These were: rational thinking; professionalism; respect for practical knowledge; education and work; technology; effort; social commitment; love for the homeland expressed in the action of shaping Polish cultural awareness and economic development. There was also a general belief that another uprising would not help Poland’s struggle for independence. Therefore, waiting for the opportune time to regain independence was advised as it was thought impossible to restore it without the international support and a favourable geopolitical situation.

Representatives of the so-called Young Poland (1890-19198), in the period immediately preceding the regaining of independence would popularize the following values: experience; the will to act; authenticity; aestheticism; equality; justice or freedom. During the partitions these values were interpreted and promoted by writers, poets, intellectuals, clergy, activists, educators, educated gentry and the middle class. The values gradually spread to the lower social classes; this happened through family, informal education (lodgings), monasteries, parishes or various associations (cultural, scientific etc.). Nonetheless, it was family that played the most important role. Maurycy Mochnacki (MOCHNACKI 1984: 217-218), Polish politician and historian of the XIX century, described its role in the following manner:

Poland, a political power eliminated from the European map, removed from there by deceit, managed to find in itself a peculiar kind of existence, yet unknown to history, a kind of homely existence, a familial one, stronger than any of the alien powers that divided it
What has been left inside is a burning life, unaffected by external turmoil. The governance did not drain all there is 
[...], what history has proven, despotic hereditary monarchies perish when they lose their independence, but our Republic raised from the dead so many times, and I believe it could do so because two centuries preceding its political destruction it was not a hereditary starostaship of a king, as by this time it consisted more of people than of the governance, more a family than a country. Home, family – they constitute the whole secret of Polish insurrections. Familial existence, strong at the time of the political collapse that is the spark of our uprisings [...]. Polish nation after the partitions still has the image of a great, Slavic family using its domestic virtues to overcome adversity.\textsuperscript{10}

Mochnacki’s comment on the XIX century Polish family stated that it was family that distinguished the Polish society from other despotic countries, and the Christian-Slavic culture of Polish families was the basis of national existence and a guarantee of the continuity, identity and autonomy of the Polish society among other European societies of that time.

In a similar manner to how Otto von Bismarck with the words “The Prussian teacher has won” claimed that the victory of Prussia over France in 1871 accounted for the Prussian education system, Polish family played a similarly important role in the history of Poland. In this manner, when Poland disappeared from the map family and the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the development of Polish socio-cultural identity and eventually lead to the rebirth of Poland in 1918. It could even be said that it was the Polish system of values, so tenderly cherished and protected over the years, which lead to the defeat of the invaders. Those who interpreted and popularized these values would in the course of time come to hold positions of authority and, often unwillingly, become political leaders. To exemplify this phenomenon it is worth mentioning Adam Mickiewicz (poet, who can be compared in greatness to Johan Wolfgang Goethe) in the early period of the partitions, and Ignacy Paderewski (composer) in the final period, who, appointed the first Prime Minister and Foreign Minister since Poland’s rebirth, signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which officially recognised the country’s independence. Following the newly regained independence of 1918, the Polish society strengthened its system of values by adding such qualities as the will to act in every aspect of life, perfectionism, desire of being respected, uniqueness of character, strong personality, drive for learning and action. In a country devastated by partitions, especially in the territories previously annexed by the Russian Empire, the popularisation of these values had a great impact on the country’s fast recovery. The development of practically every area of life, especially education, industry or communication was so dynamic that within one generation before the outbreak of World War II Polish society could be placed on the par with many Western European countries. Values promoted among Polish society clearly distinguished it from neighbouring Germany and Russia which in 1939 once more invaded Poland and brutally divided the country. Polish society again had to fight for its survival and cultural identity. Anna Pawelczyńska

\textsuperscript{10} Translation: – Z.S.
a vast majority of Poles in the period of 1939-1945 was brought up in the spirit of traditional patriotic and Christian values. These values laid the foundation for many impulsive and improvised reactions. No one indulged in the cult of power as it was not in line with these values. Both national and religious traditions influenced Polish mentality in such a way that it would oppose any form of brutality, violence or any action against the values which unified Polish society.\footnote{Translation – Z.S.}

Once again Polish cultural values could celebrate a glorious victory, a phenomenon visible in the history of Poles during World War II. Urszula Wińska (Wińska 1985) perfectly encapsulated it in the title of her book *Values have won*, which is a collection of 158 memories of Polish women who were prisoners in the Ravensbrück concentration camp.

Even though Polish society was biologically and economically weakened, especially with the removal of its elites (intelligentsia) during the occupation and in the first decade of People’s Republic (PRL), it began to rebuild the country with the aid of values that originally helped them to survive. However, the new socialistic government was against this culture and by any means tried to reorganize it and spread new, respective values: 1. complete rejection of religious values; 2. superiority of the state over individuals; 3. fighting seen as the main principle of life and social development; 4. state property over private property; 5. breaking off with the past and tradition 6. state as the only patron of culture, in charge of all artistic and cultural activity.

For two generations Polish society successfully defended itself against the popularization of values alien to it. A large section of the population accepted social changes but was against accepting any alterations that would affect cultural values, as reflected in the rise of Solidarity in the 1980s. More than ten million Poles demanded improvements in their living conditions and freedom in deciding about their own values. In addition, among 2,8 million members of the Polish United Workers’ Party, which was the official promoter of socialist values, a significant number of these members did not agree with them. In the period of political upheaval they quickly joined Solidarity and opted for an entirely different system of values, switching from their former socialist views to liberal ones and becoming their enthusiastic propagators.

The change in the political system that occurred in 1989 lead the Polish society to the path of the so-called modernity as this year introduced democracy, free market economy and opened the road to the so-called new culture. Undoubtedly, this kind of culture is hard to define or assess, especially in the aspect of values that are the main point of interest of this paper. Moreover, there are many terms used to refer to the new culture such as: popular culture, consumption culture, global culture.

This kind of culture introduces a huge range of values that, however, do not form a coherent system as many of them are in fact mutually contradictory. Similarly to a free
market of goods in economy there appears to be a free market of values in the modern Polish culture. If some common values are found a very liberal interpretation is allowed. Collective memory that nurtures values valuable for Polish society gets distorted by political history, as the interpretation put on certain events is guided by political interests of parties or groups, often acting contrary to the interest of the country. The memory of crucial historical figures – intellectuals, saints, heroes who fought for justice and freedom – is often neglected, and their place in collective memory is taken by film stars, businessmen and celebrities.

Ethical and religious values are pushed aside or even neglected; instead, hedonistic, vital and economic values are promoted. This leads to a situation of uncertainty, moral relativism, ethical minimalism, ambiguous character of principal symbols and elimination of axiology from one’s social life, reducing other people and the world to a mere description and increasing consumption. There is a lack of moral authorities and role models who would promote religious and spiritual values. What links different elements of modern popular culture is not the combination of religious and spiritual values but rather technology and aesthetic and any values that are present are the hedonistic and utilitarian ones. This facilitates the spread of anti-values; consequently, new forms of violence, exploitation, brutality and violation of good manners appear.

Polish society currently faces a peculiar kind of crisis of values which is becoming increasingly dangerous due to the fact that many individuals who perform public functions have drastically changed their socialist system of values into a liberal one – from the allies of the Warsaw Pact they transformed into supporters of NATO; from the faithful friends of the USSR and other socialist countries they became enthusiastic propagators of the European Union. On the other hand, many former activists of Solidarity adopted liberal views and personal interests took precedence over the common good. In turn, a peculiar kind of axiological chaos has been formed. It manifests itself in trials for political or economic offenses that take long years and arrive at a variety of completely distinct verdicts due to the lack of permanent values that could provide the basis for the assessment of human actions. Legal codes fail because the same laws are applied differently to seemingly identical situations.

However, the symptoms of the crisis of values that is now observed in Polish society should be interpreted neither as a collapse, nor as a disintegration of Polish culture. Instead just like any other crisis, this one must be simply overcome. It is worth recalling the idea expressed in one of the Prefaces for Christian death that “life is changed, not ended.” This could be related to Polish culture which simply transforms which is why representatives of Polish culture are looking for ways that would help them find themselves in the new political and economic reality. Polish culture has entered a new stage of development and younger generations are obliged to find new interpretations of values that constitute its core; they need to create new products inspired by the permanent values of Polish culture that worked well in the past and at the same time correspond to current knowledge and imagination, desires and capabilities; they also need to create new values. The effects of this process are already visible and they include such phenomena as: increased respect for work, seeking new methods of work organization;
development of organized forms of altruism; more precise indicators of social justice; respect for knowledge and increased educational aspirations; deeper religious life manifested in the creation of new religious groups and movements; fuller understanding of life and the development of various forms of its protection.

5. THE VALUES THAT FORM THE BASIS OF POLISH CULTURAL IDENTITY

Polish culture today, although in its external forms very different from the one that developed one or two hundred years ago, is firmly rooted in the overall cultural heritage and constitutes a continuation of values that are anchored in it. These values are visible in poetry, literature, music, painting, architecture, noble figures, important events and heritage sites. They are echoed and reinterpreted; in fact, even today’s media so focused on the news tend to do so. This ensures the continuation of Polish culture which is still the same culture, although it may appear different because it is in the state of constant development. The core values of Polish national culture cherished and passed on to younger generations set the limit to possible changes. Such values are the reason why Poles who live outside of their own country find themselves so different from people that surround them.

Below the author presents a short analysis of values present in Polish culture which are clearly visible in the Polish cultural heritage, constantly recalled by the creators of modern Polish culture and, to an extent, clearly present in the consciousness of an average Pole who if he happens to find himself outside of Poland clearly notices the differences between him and society members of the country of his stay.12

1. Family closeness and a sense of community. A successful marriage, family life and children are all crucial in the eyes of Polish society. Young Poles place them above any other values. Marriage and family life have not lost their importance; just the opposite, majority of people believe that the importance of marriage and family life is increasing rather than decreasing. Despite migration and social mobility, family bonds remain strong. Choosing a life away from the family is never seen as a self-imposed obligation (Dyczewski 2009(c): 191). A strong family bond also includes the deceased members of the family – Poles frequently visit the graves of their deceased relatives. On All Saints’ Day trains and roads are overflowing with people because almost everyone is on their way to visit the graves of their relatives.

2. Home. In fiction and memoirs, home, whether rich or poor, is shown as a hospitable, safe and serene place with characteristic trees and flowers that surround it. In its interior, except for typically functional items one would also find items of decorative or religious character, family heirlooms and, above all, one’s loved ones.

Home in Polish culture has a distinct symbolic value and exceptional importance which was referred to in the periods of chaos and unrest especially in moments of per-

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12 A more detailed discussion of typical Polish cultural values may be found in: Dyczewski 2002; Dyczewski 1992; Dyczewski 2009(b): 149-179; Kłoskowska 1990; Lewandowski 2008.
sonal or collective calamities. It provides the basis for restoring order in one’s personality and social life. In addition, it is closely associated with nation’s history; the bond between home and nation became stronger and richer during the period of partitions, during the German and Russian occupation, and during the reign of the communist regime. During these periods, home was viewed as a place of shelter, safety, comfort, mutual aid, national and religious tradition and production of necessary goods.

Strong familial bonds and the attachment to one’s home was to a great extent the reason behind the fact that Polish society managed to avoid slavery, enjoyed liberty and lead a free life. Two kinds of lives existed: an official one, based on imposed laws and institutions; and an unofficial one, based on one’s home and family life. The opposition against the communist regime, the circulation of the so-called unofficial culture, the development of Solidarity – these all found a source of support in the institutions of home and family. Home is still the place where many old values and traditions are cherished; it satisfies all needs throughout the different stages of one’s life that the state cannot meet; it is viewed as the bedrock, the most important place in the Polish consciousness.

3. The bond between generations and a sense of affinity. The enduring bond between generations and a strong sense of affinity in Polish society is visible in the following aspects: frequent cohabitation of generations; frequent and good relationships between generations and relatives; a wide range of mutual support; a great involvement of grandparents in the upbringing and education of grandchildren; the importance of intergenerational cultural transmission. The majority of adult Poles views their grandparents as the source that provided them with moral principles, love, religious faith, the knowledge of many historical events and virtues such as dutifulness, diligence, self-discipline, willpower, love of the country and a variety of other practical skills.

A strong bond between the generations and family members proves its real worth in the modern society because it protects against loneliness, helps to develop a sense of dignity and an attitude of openness and helpfulness to others (Dyczewski 2010: 238-324).

4. Children. A child is the most desired value. The vast majority of the young generation of Poles (18-26 years) wants to have children; also the vast majority also believes that the average Polish family should have more children. Limiting the number of children in one’s family, a situation that occurs among the youngest generation of parents, is conditioned by the bad housing situation and poor living conditions, the desire to provide a better life for one’s child and the increased aspiration of achieving a higher standard of living.

5. High position of mothers. In Polish culture, in comparison with the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon countries, the position of wife and mother was and is high. Its establishment has its basis in the following conditions specific to Polish society.

1. From the Middle Ages to the present day women has been equal to men in terms of inheritance (with the exception of certain periods, and in specific regions and social classes), while in the majority of western countries it was the eldest son that had a privileged position and the right to inheritance, often leaving younger siblings dependent on him. Full voting rights (both active and passive) were granted to Polish women right after Poland regained its independence – in
1918, while in the UK it happened in 1928, in France in 1944, in Italy 1945, and in Switzerland it did not happen until 1971.

2. In Polish religiosity the cult of the Mother of God is highly developed, and her virtues and maternity are highly respected. This religious attitude towards the Mother of God was adopted towards any woman who is a mother. The mere state of motherhood that likened her to the Mother of God helped to develop the attitude of special respect, support and help for any woman (e.g. offering one’s seat to a woman with small children, letting women through the door first, lifting and carrying heavy things for them etc.).

3. Woman: wife-mother is usually in charge of organizing the whole domestic life. This situation is expressed in a well-known saying “Ojciec jest głową rodziny, a żona-matka jej duszą” (the father is the head of the family; the mother is its soul). She is responsible for the home interior, the atmosphere of celebrated holidays, thus her role is to shape aesthetic feelings and interests; she passes down family traditions and maintains genealogical knowledge. During the periods of partitions and occupation, in the situation when the husband-father died in the fight for freedom, wife-mother was left as the only breadwinner and protector of domestic life. She was also involved in the public affairs of her community.

4. Woman-wife-mother has a completely dominant role in the process of domestic socialization. She has a strong emotional bond with her children and can easily observe their needs and abilities. She introduces them to life, teaches them to perform domestic chores and helps them to develop their preferences and characteristics such as diligence, honesty, kindness, responsibility, selflessness and dedication. She also increases their political knowledge and develops patriotic attitude among them.

6. Religiosity. For centuries religion has been closely linked to Polish society. In the most difficult times the nation’s faith in God gave it the strength to survive and to rebuild the devastated country and a chance for moral renewal. Polish society today is among the most religious societies in Europe. Polish religiosity is characterized by the following qualities: 1. It has more experiential than rational character, but it is a rational experience; 2. It is firmly connected with family, hence the current popularity of religious family movements; 3. It is strongly linked with the nation; during the partitions and in the period of German and Russian occupation the Catholic Church and the Polish nation were equally oppressed, hence the political character of Polish religiosity. 4. There is a strong cult of the Mother of God; 5. Religiosity is expressed in a wide variety of rituals, celebrations and holidays, especially Christmas, All Saints’ Day and the Day of the Dead. In contrast with Western Europe there is a strong bond between young people and the Catholic Church, and also between the Church and poorer members of society.

7. Emotionality and rationality complement each other. Polish culture does not lack rationality but it is completed by emotionality which works as a buffer against excessive pragmatism. In relationships and actions Poles are characterized by strong emotionality, which usually manifests itself on such occasions as family celebrations or while receiving guests. It makes relationships more affectionate, enhances sensibility, but also
stands behind the feeling of irritability. It certainly does not promote acquisitiveness and economic calculation which seem rather common in contemporary societies.

8. **Open intimacy and patriotism.** In western countries public affairs are discussed in offices and conference rooms while home is a private space, safe from strangers and public eye. This thought is expressed in the English saying “My home is my castle.” On the other hand, in Poland where public life in recent decades was often constrained by invaders, occupants or the communist rule, this private sphere of home was opened as a space of public discussion where decisions about social and political issues were made. Home was a place of national education and meetings on national liberation. It is often said that the French Revolution, which introduced the idea of civil equality to European countries, began over discussions in one of the Paris cafés; whereas Poland's Solidarity, which restored democracy and helped former communist territories of Eastern Europe become sovereign entities once again was largely built upon the institution of family and home. Home was a space of discussion on the restoration of Poland and the whole Eastern Bloc, where opposition activists from the present Czech Republic, Hungary, German and other republics of the former Soviet Union. Such combination of the intimacy of private life and openness to public affairs is typical of Polish homes.

9. **Hospitality.** The concept of hospitality is valued within any society, but it is expressed in various manners. Polish hospitality is characterized by: 1. high willingness to receive guests and to meet all their needs; 2. a feeling of great joy caused by the presence of the guest; 3. generosity towards the guest; 4. various ways of showing respect. For centuries Polish families have greeted their guests with openness and warmth. All this is expressed in a common Polish saying “Gość w dom, Bóg w dom” (Guest in the house is God in the house). Nowadays the guest is still seated first at a table, he is offered the best accommodation and the host dedicates time and money to his guest, and when saying farewell presents his guest with a gift.

10. **Socialized individualism.** Polish individualism is deeply rooted in democracy and in the style of family upbringing. Children, especially younger ones, enjoy great freedom and later are free to choose their own school, education, profession and life partner. This is conducive to the development of their individual skills, talents and curiosity, but also leads to the growing sense of independence. Such attitude in adults often hinders the success of collective initiatives. However, in critical situations even the greatest individuals understand the superiority of the common good and act in favour of it.

11. **Sense of dignity and honour.** In the past these terms were associated with nobility; during the partitions – with intelligentsia and patriotic gentry; between the wars – with all those who had a sense of responsibility for regained freedom and the creation of a new statehood. The sense of dignity was so strong that anyone who betrayed the duties of their office or abused it would relinquish the office or could even commit suicide. The German and Russian occupants systematically eliminated such people. During the period of PRL (People's Republic of Poland) human dignity was constantly violated and people were required to adopt an obsequious attitude to authority. The Polish Round Table Talks which officially initiated the change from the socialist system to a democratic one at the same time created an unfavourable situation for the for-
mation and reinforcement of the attitude of dignity and honour. Too many figures with ambiguous attitudes in philosophical, religious, social or economic matters obtained key administrative positions. Acting in one’s own self-interest and the pursuit of the benefit of one’s family or party dominated the process of public decision-making. As a result, public life abounded in numerous scandals and abuses of power, and corrupt local and state officials went as far as developing links with the criminal world. Dignity and honour, so highly valued in the past, lost their value in the new socio-political reality. Nowadays acts of resigning from an office due to fraud scandals rarely take place.

12. Freedom – sovereignty – patriotism. These three values are deeply rooted in the tradition and consciousness of Poles, who in the last two centuries struggled with political violence, fought for their lands and for themselves, and engaged in a battle for religious freedom. The concern for the nation and state was expressed in the struggle for the following: the dominance of the most progressive social forces; providing social order; the continuity of Polish cultural identity; and a significant position of the Polish society among other societies and countries. Patriotism was expressed in a deepened sense of responsibility for the future of the country and the quality of life of its citizens.

13. Lack of vindictiveness and ease of forgiveness. In the last two centuries Poles suffered many cruel injustices. Millions of innocent and respected citizens were brutally murdered. Cultural goods were stolen and the country’s economy was destroyed. Resorting to hatred, revenge and terrorist attacks seemed natural, especially that the occupants often provoked this kind of behaviour and emotions. Clergy and intellectual elites would put in a great deal of effort in order to eliminate the attitude of hatred, teach forgiveness and the necessity of building good relations. They recounted many stories of forgiveness and reconciliation in order to provide people with inspiring examples. Gradually, the promoted attitude entered the consciousness of Polish society; it is visible in many Polish folk sayings such as “Nie czyń drugiemu, co tobie niemiłe” (Do nothing to others you would not have done to you) or “Lepiej krzywdę darować, niż się prawować” (It is better to forgive than to argue). There are many prayers and poems that contain the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation, especially from the period of occupation and imposition of martial law in the 1980s. There are many examples of forgiveness and reconciliation between the oppressors and the oppressed e.g. the letter of Polish bishops addressed to German bishops from December 1966, which could be summarised in the words “Przebaczymy i prosimy o przebaczenie” (We forgive and ask for forgiveness). Those who were aware of the harm done to Poles by Germans during World War II did not know how to interpret such attitude. Worth recalling is also the fact that immediately after the funeral of Jerzy Popiełuszko (1984), thousands of people spontaneously gathered round the building of the Security Service which bore the blame for the savage murder of the priest and shouted “We forgive, we are sorry.”

14. Democracy – citizenship – criticism of government. Starting from the early period of Polish history, there has been a clear attitude of submission to governing authority. Although Poland before the partitions was a monarchy, it was never an absolute monarchy but rather was considered one of the few European republics of that time. This opinion was justified in the institution of wolna elekcja (free election) in which
the nobility voted for the candidate to the throne; the sovereignty of the nobility and the system that emphasized its existence.

Polish parliamentarism emphasized the sovereignty of the nation. Therefore, the royal power was severely limited, which is visible in constitutions and laws such as the act of Nihil Novi (1505) or the Henrician Articles and the so-called pacta conventa (1573). The latter required the king to convene the parliament every two years and allowed the possibility of revolting against the king if he was accused of committing serious violations against the law.

The sense of sovereignty and equality among the nobility (who were much more numerous and diverse than in other European countries) could gradually be observed in all layers of Polish society. The Great Sejm (1791) equated the civil liberties of the bourgeois and the middle class, while the first constitution after regaining independence in 1918 provided equal rights to all adult Polish citizens.

The notion of citizenship developed quite early in the Polish political culture while in other European countries people were still “subjects.” The main difference lies in the fact that subject has mainly instrumental value, the power over him is placed in the hands of the monarch, dictator or party, who can decide on his fate; on the other hand, being a citizen is expressed in the consciousness of participation in power and a sense of responsibility for its decisions. A balance of individual freedom and social order, personal interest and common good is a sign of a mature democracy.

15. The sense of service and readiness for self-sacrifice. The sense of service is primarily associated with national heritage, religion or country and it can be seen in actions that require effort and bravery. These actions are performed voluntarily and honourably, with no financial benefits. Those who decide to be involved in such actions gain approval and respect, and become part of the collective memory. Polish history provides many examples of this kind of service; since the Middle Ages it had been present in the form of pospolite ruszenie (mass mobilization). Many public functions were honourable, performed without any financial compensation. During the partitions any person who had a sense of belonging to Polish society had a moral obligation to defend his cultural heritage and the Catholic Church. There are many heroes from this period who sacrificed their life and wealth in defence of Polish values. The sense of service is displayed most often in emergency situations; it also shows in everyday situations but is not equally strong.

16. Openness to other cultures – tolerance. For centuries the Polish society had willingly borrowed elements from other cultures and incorporated them into their own. Poland first received Christianity from the Czechs; the image of Our Lady of Częstochowa that became a national symbol had originally come from Russia; Polish education incorporated many elements from the German, French or English system of education; Polish artistic work adopted elements from Italian and ancient cultures; moreover, Poland experienced no religious wars.

The spread of openness and tolerance towards other cultures was encouraged by the following factors: 1. a clear dominance of Christian values with their universal character and deep respect for fellow human beings; 2. multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism of the state, where various nationalities managed to coexist peacefully (Poles, Lithu-
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Values – the Core of Culture

17. The triumph of hope over realism and ignorance. Hope is closely linked to the attitude of defence and perseverance. It appears in situations of extreme danger and is associated with an attitude of sacrifice. It is firmly rooted in the Christian faith, in providence and the goodness of man, but also in a kind of irrationalism, which is not equal to the lack of rationality but is closely linked to the experience which in turn makes it difficult to examine different perspectives provided for the decision-making process. Hence, the concept of hope is often associated with gullibility, lack of cynical calculation, weak pragmatism. Poles often make a decision without considering all possible consequences. They scale their abilities up to their aim, rather than the aim down to their abilities.

18. The Polish language. The development and improvement of the Polish language constituted one of the main topics of concern in the Age of Enlightenment. There was an attempt to purge the language of Latin elements and enrich it with legal, economic and scientific terminology. The demotic and middle-class speech variety, spoken language of villagers or everyday language were often used as sources. The Polish language gradually became a national value. In the late 18th and in the early 19th century different forms of the Polish language emerged such as the official language, office language, public language, language of political journalism or literary language. Such terms as nation, freedom, independence, uprising, and rebirth became ubiquitous. During the partitions when the invaders wanted the Polish language eradicated it gained tremendous value especially in the eyes of poets, writers, clergy, and it was defended with great devotion. Between the 17th and 20th century it became the symbol and factor of integration of the Polish population.

More values could be added to the above list, as only the ones that are still cherished in most of modern Polish families and are present in the process of socialization have been included. Their interpretation depends on such elements as legislation, social elites, journalists, political parties, cultural policy, and teachers. Currently there appears to be no coherent approach to the idea of popularization of common Polish values, characteristic of Polish society. In fact, there is a complete chaos in this area and a sheer lack of responsibility when it comes to joining the two main tendencies: preserving and developing one’s own culture with its typical values, and, at the same time, opening oneself to other societies and new cultures in order to enrich one’s own culture with new elements.

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CONFUCIAN WAY OF TAN KAH KEE: PURSUE EXCELLENCE, STRIVE FOR PERFECTION

ABSTRACT This paper aims at analyzing achievements of Tan Kah Kee, the unique figure of the overseas Chinese community in Southeast Asia. He lived up to Confucian standards, underlining the importance of knowledge that could transform the position of a country in different areas. Tan focused his attention on improving educational standards in China. Therefore he set up the Jimei Schools and Xiamen University (the first university in China founded by the overseas Chinese).

Keywords: Tan Kah Kee, Xiamen University, Confucianism
This paper aims at analyzing the achievements of Tan Kah Kee, the unique figure of the overseas Chinese community in Southeast Asia, in the field of education. Tan’s Confucian approach of social responsibility was to serve society. He mainly put emphasis on social obligations. According to Confucian standards Tan Kah Kee showed his commitment to social responsibility. Stressing the importance of knowledge, he contributed to the promotion of education in China.

The inspiration to write this article was a personal experience of the author, who conducted a year-long research at the Xiamen University (Amoy University) and gradually discovered the life and the great works of the school’s founder Tan Kah Kee (also known as Chen Jiageng). The Xiamen University celebrated 90th anniversary in 2011, and is one of the best universities in China. The Xiamen University was included in ‘Project 211’ and ‘Project 985’ – two major governmental programs to develop universities in China. Both programs are related to promotion and increasing research standards of high-level universities and cultivating strategies for social and economic development.

Tan Kah Kee (1874-1961), an overseas Chinese, was known as ‘Henry Ford’ of the Malaya community both in Southeast Asia and in China. He was one of the greatest philanthropists in the modern history of China. He was also a Singaporean businessman, who during his life allocated most of his money for education in China. Among his greatest achievements was establishing of the Jimei School and Amoy University in Xiamen.

If we consider the motivation of these activities we have to indicate his Confucian mentality. The Confucian code of human behavior tries to change everyone and strengthen their sense of morality. In that case any actions could be undertaken by people with higher motives in the interests of the country. In the Confucian tradition the state was a joint venture of all Chinese citizens who share the results of their work. The state has functioned like a family, in which everybody supports others, both in good and bad times. All of them are equally responsible for others when they are suffering hunger or scarcity.

The development of the country comes from the human activity. People must operate in a fully conscious manner, and must understand the purpose of these actions. Their efforts contribute to the prosperity or recession in the state. According to Gu Hongming, Confucius gave the Chinese nation a real idea of the state. Thus, the sphere of politics received the religious sanctioning. Confucianism has led to the creation of something which could be described as the Social or State religion (Gu: 29). The first sentence which is learned by each Chinese child at the starting point in their education says that human nature is good (Gu: 4). This statement clearly indicates that Confucianism teaches people how to be a good citizen, and how to properly fulfill the duties towards the society.

Confucianism underlines that in relations between people, besides the activities motivated by interest and fear, there is one more important element related to the sense of duty. It is a system of mutual obligations and dependencies. The essence of the struc-
ture of these hierarchical relations is obedience and respect for authority. In the family the father has a casting vote, but in practice he makes allowances for the suggestions of other family members. This position of the father comes from his knowledge and experience. Family members accept his moral superiority. The virtue of obedience was interpreted as a social obligation. In the society individual morality may become the basis for the public morality.

Lin Yutang said that in China there is a doctrine of social status, which specifies what obligations must be completed through the fact of belonging to the community. The term “status” or mingfen clearly defines the place of individuals within society. Ming means “name,” and fen – “duties.” Confucianism is known as the “religion of names” (mingchiao). The name suggests the person’s place in the social hierarchy, and also defines a way to build relationships with other people. By knowing these rules, a person is able to behave properly in this structure. It also means that they know what they should do. Confucius spoke about five dependencies: between the ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, between older and younger brother and between friends. The existence of these dependencies implicates the appearance of the obligations. The family is “the starting point for all moral conduct,” and is the basis of the state (see: Lin: 173-177).

John King Fairbank stated that individuals in China are incorporated by nature and society. There are strong relations between a person and his family and neighbors. In that case, group dominates over individuals (see: Fairbank/Goldman: 14-17). Private interests take a back seat. Collectivist approach is inherent in a Confucian society. It was treated as the antithesis of Western individualism. Confucianism puts emphasis on the importance of the family as well as social harmony, avoids conflicts, and protects the integrity of groups. The consensus is reached through consultation between different groups. Real interests of these groups do not contradict each other. The highest common interest concentrates on the state. All citizens should be incorporated into the construction of its power, especially in the field of education, economy, and culture. These areas determine the real strength of the state.

Chinese diaspora (huaqiao) also has played an important role in building the prosperity of the motherland. In many cases diaspora identification with China could be easily observed. In accordance with the Confucian tradition people cooperate with each other to contribute to the growth of the importance of their country. Indeed, they have created strong links with the motherland. Imperial China treated local born and new immigrants as Chinese nationals overseas. A lot of new immigrants who left China at the end 19th century and the beginning 20th century often considered themselves as sojourners, and could return home. The Chinese Government argued that they were huaqiao, or Chinese nationals who resided overseas. Some immigrants decided to stay in Southeast Asia and adopt local citizenship, affirm their different national status and political loyalty by referring to themselves as huaren (ethnic Chinese) or huayi (Chinese descent) (Suryadinata: 2). Karin Tomala argued that Chinese have always treated emigrants by indicating their Chinese roots. The Chinese who live in Southeast Asia are also called nanyang huaqiao, which means the Chinese who have migrated to the
South Seas (nan yang) (Tomala: 21-22). South Seas was the traditional Chinese term for Southeast Asia region.

Tan Kah Kee was born on September 21, 1874 in Yingchuan Shizetang, Jimei village, Ton’an county, in Fujian province. His father Tan Kah Peck (1942?-1909) was the third youngest son of Tan Chien-chi. He married three times and had ten children (among them six were adopted). Tan’s mother was Soon Ch'u She. She died as a result of epidemic in Jimei in 1897.

During 1870s, Tan Kah Peck established his own rice-trading company and set up a business network in the rice trade. His company, North Boat Quay, popularly known as Soon Ann, specialized in importing rice from Cochinchina, Siam, Burma and then selling it to retailers in Singapore and Malaya Peninsula. Capital accumulated from this business allowed the family to expand its operations into other areas, like real estate business, as well as producing sago and pineapple for export. He became the largest pineapple producer on the Malay Peninsula controlling about 70 percent of canned pineapple export by the early 1900s. The value of his assets was estimated at more than 400 thousand dollars (Yong: 21).

Tan Kah Kee education was strictly Confucian. He has received a basic education in China. And when he was nine years old he started education in the Nanxuan Private Village School. In autumn 1890 at the age of seventeen, he left Jimei and went to Singapore to support his father’s business. He returned to Jimei three years later and married Teo Po Ke (Zhang Baoguo). In 1994 he founded the Tizhai Village School in Jimei. This was the first time when he invested funds for improvement of regional education. He spent next three years in Singapore.

Sudden financial losses in his father’s business in 1903 let Tan Kah Kee take the lead and extend their activities onto new business areas. The most important was the necessity to reorganize the indebted company. Initially Tan developed the pineapple and rice industry, but soon afterwards he entered into rubber business. He decided to extend its business into the fastest growing markets in Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and China. Tan company became leading manufacturer of high quality rubber products, like tires, shoes, and toys. Together with other Chinese merchants, Tan founded the Chinese Commercial Bank in 1912.

At the time Tan was closely associated with Hokkien groups that consolidated the people from Xiamen and its suburbs in Fujian province. The term “Hokkien” is etymologically derived from the Southern Min pronunciation and it means “Fujian.” The inhabitants of these areas emigrated mainly to Penang, Malacca, Java, and the Philippines islands (Tomala: 49).

Southern Hokkien Chinese like Tan settled in Malaya and Singapore, were pioneers in setting up rubber plantations and the trading sectors (Yen 2017: 217-218). The Hokkien community was also dominant in banking, finance and manufacturing (Yen 2017: 218-221). They also handled export trade with Europe and America (Kuo 1994: 168). Due to the fact the rubber tree is ready for tapping in five to seven years, which requires considerable investments while the returns are expected in the long-term period, it was a perfect business for the financially independent Hokkiens. This helped them
to form unique business operations. Huge demands for rubber during the First World War accelerated the increasing wealth of these groups. Apart from industrial plantations, Hokkien communities developed of the river sea transport corridors that allow to ship the raw materials (Cheng: 92). A lot of Singaporean Hokkien who have studied at the Amoy University in Xiamen returned later home and set up their own businesses. Currently, Hokkien has enjoyed high status in Singaporean economy. The Hokkien community is dominant in banking, financial, insurance, sea transport, production, export and import of flour, feed, Chinese tea, equipment, ship handling, building materials, textiles, tropical fruits, real estate and construction (Cheng: 93).

The First World War was a period of great prosperity for Tan Kah Kee. Just a few years later he became a millionaire. The Tan Kah Kee and Company founded in 1919 has dominated in the rubber sector. Therefore he was better known as the ‘Rubber King’ of Southeast Asia. In 1925 his company employed 32 thousand of workers (Pan: 207). In the 1920s his total capital investments was estimated at around 4.54 million dollars (Gomez: 30).

Tan Kah Kee was also involved in Chinese politics even before the Republic of China was established. In 1910 he joined the Chinese United League in Singapore. The Xinhai Revolution, also known as the Chinese Revolution, created deep social divisions among the Singaporean Chinese. League members supported the revolution and declared their political commitment, while reformists from Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce adopted an antievolutionary attitude (Yong: 177-178). Many Chinese in Singapore underlined close relations with the motherland. According to Yen Ching-Hwang the overseas Chinese nationalism was an ideology and a movement which expressed a deep concern for China’s welfare and China’s survival as a nation state. It opposed the threat of foreign imperialism in China. It also strove to unite the overseas Chinese communities in a particular region, and to provide the Overseas Chinese a sense of pride and dignity (Yen 1994: 29).

Internal and external pressures were the major reasons for the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism. At the time the ethnic Chinese strongly exploited ethnic and cultural links with motherland and opposed Western and Japanese imperialism in China (Yen 1994: 30). These attitudes had mainly anti-imperialist and anti-Manchurian character. European colonialism was an attempt to demolish the old international order in Asia. China was divided up into foreign spheres of influence. People’s memory of the past humiliation is still deeply rooted in contemporary China. Emigrant communities often appeal to Chinese authorities for the strengthening of the power of state and support for nationalist activities.

Sun Yat-sen (the first president and founding father of the Republic of China) underlined the strategic importance of the overseas Chinese in support of the revolution movement. He travelled to meet with them and appealed for financial assistance for revolutionary activities. Tan Kah Kee met Sun Yat-sen three times (twice in 1909 and once in 1911). During the last meeting on December 15, 1911, Tan promised to gather
50 thousand dollars to fund revolution in China. Next year he sent a letter out to Tan asking for the promised money (YONG: 176). On November 13, 1911 Tan became the chairman of Hokkien Protection Fund, founded by Hokkien Chinese in Singapore. After the Republic of China was formally established on January 1, 1912 following the Xinhai Revolution, Tan managed the Fujian Protection Fund. Resources that were collected by him were transferred for implementing the different development projects in Fujian province in China. During the second and third decade of the 20th century, Tan refused to get involved in the politics and devoted himself to establishing educational institutions. He believed that education played an essential role in society and had positive influence on the modernization process in China.

Tan Kah Kee mainly focused his activities in Singapore and China by taking an active interest in education. Between 1904 and 1931 he allocated a total of 13.21 billion yuan, including 8.37 billion yuan directly on education itself, and 3.8 billion yuan on interest charges related to his educational funding (TAN KAH KEE). Tan was the founder of six Chinese schools in Singapore, including Tao Nan School (established in 1907), Ai Tong School (1912), Chung Fook Girls’ School (1915), Chung Pun (1915), Nanyang Girls School (1918) as well as the Chinese High School (1919). He promoted also English education by donating the Anglo-Chinese School and the Raffles Collage. In 1940s, he set up the Nanyang Normal School (1941) and the Nan Chiao Girls High School (1947), and after the Second World War the Nanyang University in Singapore (1955).

In 1912 Tan returned China and contributed much money into building schools beginning in his home village of Jimei close to the city of Xiamen. Jimei Primary School was opened in next year. Meanwhile, land was being purchased for more new schools. Thereby, he established another educational institutions – the Jimei Normal School and Jimei Secondary School (1918), Jimei kindergarten (1919), and Jimei Marine School and Commercial School (1920).

During his stay in Jimei, Tan often emphasized that there was not even a single university in Fujian province with a potential of about 10 million people, while neighboring provinces, including Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, had high schools. It inspired him to establish a modern university in Xiamen and allocated 1 million dollars for initial costs in the first two years of operation and further 3 million dollars for operating expenses in the next 12 years (250 thousand dollars per year). He also wanted to solicit contributions from the rich overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. He stressed close relations linking Chinese Western provinces like Fujian with Southeast Asia (WARD/CHU/SALAFF 1994: 25-26). Jamie Mackie characterized Tan as a person whose primary aim was not simply to make money but to contribute to the modernisation and emancipation of China (and, by extension, the Chinese community in Singapore) through education and the creation of new industries. In this he was indeed a remarkable visionary, quite unique in the recent history of Southeast Asia (MACKIE: 8-9).

In October 1919, at the first meeting of the committee for the establishing of the Amoy University in Xiamen, Deng Cuiying was appointed as the first President of the
university. On April 6, 1921 he formulated the basic principles for the development of the university. He emphasized the priority of academic research, cultivation of talented researchers, and importance of multi-level cooperation framework between educational institutions and society (Visions). On the same day (April 6, 1921) the Amoy University was formally founded in Jimei (Ward/Chu/Salaff 1994: 29). Initially, the university had 98 students and about 20 staff members (Hong: 16). After Deng Cuiying’s resignation in 1921, Dr. Lim Boon Keng (Lin Wenqing) was appointed as a president of the Amoy University. He held the position until 1937, when the Nanjing Nationalist Government of the Republic of China took over the university that was transformed into state university. The first years of the university’s existence were difficult because of financial problems. During 1920s and 1930s Lim often traveled across Southeast Asia raising funds from philanthropic sources. This time there was another problem with the intensification of radical attitudes among students. The May Fourth Movement (Wusi Yundong) grew out of nationwide an anti-imperialist and political student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919, protesting against China’s treatment in the Treaty of Versailles. These ideas influenced many students of the Amoy University, who joined to protest against Japanese colonialism. During this difficult time, university constantly developed and new buildings were constantly being constructed. In 1930 the university consisted of medical and engineering schools as well as five other faculties like arts, physics, law, commerce, and education. Three years later academic reorganization reduced the number of faculties to three i.e.: arts, physics and law, commerce. Education was incorporated into the arts faculty. Until 1937 the number of students fluctuated between 300 and 600 and after the Second World War it significantly increased. In 1961 a total of 3560 students were enrolled at the Amoy University. Among them 312 originated from Southeast Asia. The university had 752 employees, compared to 60 employees in 1924, and 80 in 1930. Many famous or notable people have worked there, among them Lu Xun, Lin Yutang, Ku Chieh-kang, and Cheng Te-k’un, as historians point out (Yong: 104).

Tan Kah Kee also promoted education in the press. He formally owned the newspaper Chinese Daily Journal of Commerce, commonly known as Nanyang Siang Pau (Nanyang Shangbao) between 1923 and 1936. It was the first Chinese newspaper of commercial profile published in Singapore. The first issue appeared on September 6, 1923. Tan wrote an article entitled Relationship between Enterprises and Education where he emphasized the need of supporting commerce and education. He indicated that the economic development of commercial enterprises depends on education. Universities play a highly significant role is to train commercial, educational, and political talents for society and country. The development of education also requires financial assistance from business sectors. So, he encouraged entrepreneurs to support a higher education institutions like the Amoy University (Yong: 117-118).

Tan Kah Kee was involved in variety of charities. Between 1915 and 1941 he led five major fundraising charity campaigns. In 1917 he was elected chairman of Tientsin Flood Relief Fund of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. A year later was nominated treasurer of the Kwangtung Flood Relief Fund under the auspices of Tong Chai
Medical Institution. The Fund provided financial assistance to victims in Guangdong province in China. In 1924 Tan was again appointed as a chairman of the Kwangtung Flood Relief Fund under the auspices of Cantonese Hoi Thin Club. It was responsible for a campaign for the relief of flood victims in Fujian and Guangdong. In March 1925 Hoi Thin Club launched a fund-raising campaign for the protection of the health of children in Singapore. The fifth charity campaign organized by Tan took place in 1934 in response to the disastrous Bukit Ho Swee fire in Singapore (Yong: 107-108).

In 1920s and 1930s Tan undertook the reform of the Chinese societies in Singapore and Malaya. In 1929 reorganized Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan and was elected chairman of that organization. He stayed at this position to 1949. He argued for the revision of the constitution of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce & Industry, postulating that recruitment of new candidates should be arranged in the order of their merit.

Until mid-1920s Tan’s business was doing well. In the second half of the 1920s, due to the collapse in international rubber prices, Tan reduced his investments in Xiamen and Jimei. The Great Depression badly affected Tan’s business empire. Finally, his company collapsed in February 1934. Despite financial constraints, he offered continued support for schools.

During 1930s Tan supported Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his efforts to unify China. Tan with his friend even sent a letter to Chiang’s opponent Wang Jing-wei in Germany, urging him to abandon his hostile attitude to the Nanjing Nationalist Government of the Republic of China (Yong: 180). He many times appealed for the unity of the country and stopping the civil war in China in the face of Japanese expansion. In 1930s, after the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, Tan intensified his efforts to solicit support for China. When the Second Sino-Japanese war began in July 1937, he established a lot of relief and aid funds for Chinese refugees.

Since the attack the Japanese on Jinan on May 3, 1928 Tan collected money for victims in the Shandong China Relief Fund Committee (1928-1929). He also called to boycott Japanese products. Soon, was he elected chairman of the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee (1937-1941) and the South Seas China Relief Fund Union (1938-1950).

The untenable situation in Singapore after the Japanese occupation forced Tan to leave for Sumatra and Java. There he looked after the graduates from Jimei and Xiamen. On Java wrote his two memories. At the time when Japan attacked Malaya on December 1941 he supervised the formation of the Chinese Mobilization Committee. This committee was supported by the Nationalist Party (Guomindang), the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the British. Its members resisted the Japanese occupation and acted an auxiliary police in Jahore Bharu (Purcell: 303).

In 1940s Tan modified his political priorities. In March 1940 under his leadership the group of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia visited Chingqing and Yan’an. He criticized Chiang’s government mainly for despotism, corruption, and inefficiency, supported the Communists instead. In September 1946 he even sent a message to American President Harry Truman calling to stop financial aid to the Nationalist government (Boorman: 169).
After the Second World War ended, the Chinese civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party was back on. Tan returned to Singapore as a hero. In 1949 he and his supporters founded a newspaper *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* (Nanqiao Ribao), where many articles criticizing dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek and his determination to continue of the civil war in China were published. The newspaper declared sympathy to communists and its leader Mao Zedong (Yong: 118-119).

Finally, communists defeat the Nationalists in 1949 takes place – Mao Zedong officially proclaims the existence of the People’s Republic of China, while nationalists depart for the island of Taiwan. On January 1949 Tan was invited by Mao to return to China. Mao offered him a government post. In the mid-1949 Tan participated in the first National People’s Consultative Conference. In September 1949 he took part in the founding ceremony of New China. In the next months he substantially reduced his involvement in business in Singapore. In February 1952 he returned to China permanently. In 1950s. Tan Kah Kee held numerous positions within the Communist Party of China, including executive member of the National People’s Congress and Deputy-Chairman of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference.

During this time, Tan was constantly engaged in the rebuilding and financing schools in Jimei and Xiamen. He spent time by planning, designing and inspecting construction of school buildings in Xiamen and Jimei. In 1954, twenty four new buildings at the Xiamen University personally designed by Tan were completed. At that time university consisted of five faculties including arts, physics, law, finance and economics, foreign languages, and eleven departments. Apart from it, he established the Nanyang Research Institute in 1956 to promote Southeast Asian studies (Yong: 339-340). In September 1956 Tan pledged a donation to build a Huaqiao Museum (Xiamen Overseas Chinese Museum) in Xiamen. Two years later it was completed. It worth saying that Tan also proposed the founding a similar *huaqiao* museum in Beijing, and promised to donate 500 thousand dollars for the project (Yong: 340).

Despite his political commitment, he promoted the development of Fujian province. The construction of a railway line in Fujian in 1956 was a reality thanks to Tan’s financial support. In 1953 he introduced the idea of constructing the Jimei-Amoy Causeway. The project supported by the government was completed in two years. He also proposed building reservoirs in Fuzhou to supply fresh water to a 800 thousand population. Among other projects that were finalized in 1950s, was the conversion of some of Fujian beaches to fishery and wet-rise cultivation, establishing a salt pan in Xiamen, and experimenting with production of electricity from surf power in Jimei (Yong: 338-339).

Tan Kah Kee died of a stroke in August 12, 1961, in Beijing. He was buried in the Ao Garden in Jimei. Thus passed away one of the greatest philanthropist in Chinese history. He emphasized that education was a main force in the development of a country. He devoted his fortune for improving the education system in China. Tan believed that potential of knowledge could accelerate the development and transformation of the country. Confucianism suggests that everyone has responsibilities to others. It seems that he put those principles into action. The aim of education is to produce good
citizens and help people achieve social and personal perfection. Currently the Xiamen University established by Tan is among the leading multidisciplinary research universities in China. This testifies that the work that he began almost one hundred years ago, is bearing fruit today.

REFERENCES

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The current role of information culture is combined with the change of the role of information in modern media civilization. This gives rise to new educational needs, including multicultural education, with relevant education in the field of information competence as its important element. In the new space of presence of a man, which is formed as a result of the interaction of real and virtual resources, these competences become more intercultural. At the same time, the diversity of cultures in space and their variability in time results in a lack of uniformity in the interpretation, perception and analysis of information, which leads to difficulty in defining a uniform model of culture and information competency. In this reality one of the main challenges facing today’s cultures becomes keeping up with the changes of the information society and the dynamics of contemporary information culture which are generated, exceeding the barriers of stability, sustainability and predictability.

Keywords: information culture, intercultural space, values in information society
The concept of information has accompanied mankind since its very beginnings, but it is the contemporary development of the information society and technological advances associated with it that greatly increased the importance of information culture. This increase is linked to the creation of a new social and cultural reality which for the first time in the long history of mankind is a subject to numerous processes of transgression, thus transitioning and exceeding the boundaries of what man has previously achieved, developed or any area he embarked on. At this moment as never before, these areas are significantly expanding, which happens due to the technical and technological progress, the development of the human symbolic imagination, and man's possession of a variety of skills and competencies, particularly those associated with the ability to use the strategic resources of new forms of civilization (such as information resources) but also communication skills developed through them.

Current information resources have increased due to the expansion of human presence which also applies to the information space. This new information space, formed as a result of the interaction of real and virtual resources, has become a place of information exchange that is outside the traditional boundaries. Shaped through the interaction of a great number of subjects, it is part of dynamic, often virtual – and as such ‘disembodied’ – communication processes. The combination of classic and virtual elements of such space generated the need to redefine the understanding and significance of information culture which, as it constitutes a part of both virtualization and media-tization of culture, ceased to be a steady state and instead has become a volatile and intense process. Therefore, it has gained different functions while its role and the intensity of changes have acquired a new significance in the context of new forms of cultural mobility. These, on the other hand, lead to a different perception of cross-culturalism which in the virtual dimension is distinguished by the reduced significance of cultural differences, minimized through frequent meeting of cultures. The cultural dialogue that occurs in the cyberspace is spontaneous and natural. The changing understanding of intercultural processes which currently satisfies human desires for crossing the boundaries of one’s own culture still requires a more acute, in-depth and reflective skills of existing and functioning along cultural (intellectual, mental, social, political etc.) frontiers.

The expansion of human presence into the virtual space creates a need and necessity of a new understanding of cross-culturalism and cross-cultural processes which lead to their interpenetration, synergy, convergence or symbiosis. Information culture which undergoes similar transformations gains a new meaning due to new methods of cultural interaction. Individual pieces of information analysed in separate and self-reliant cultures would be attributed a different meaning than under circumstances of the enhanced fusion of varied cultural context.
VIRTUAL SPACE – THE FIFTH DIMENSION

The development of new technologies that form part of the everyday reality inevitably leads to major modifications in the social structure and culture, along with norms and values which create bonds between people and societies. The quantity, quality and complexity of current changes due to their unprecedented intensity are called “the great disruption.” The Internet is a crucial building block in the information revolution, interpreted as both its cause and its subsequent effect. Undoubtedly, the Internet has become one of the most powerful tools in the hands of the information society which ensures the free flow of information, and furthermore, one which has revolutionized the modern world.

The nature of the Internet and its potential is still unexplored due to its constant and rapid evolution, complexity and undefined ontological status. It can be defined from a technological perspective but measuring its potential impact on the human presence remains an enormous challenge. Tomasz Goban-Klas (Goban-Klas 2004: 39) observes that despite virtual reality being only an illusion the influence of the Internet on interpersonal relations is a fact. Therefore, due to the development of information and communication technology the space of human presence has acquired a new dimension – the virtual space. Its uniqueness should also be examined in terms of the fact that it goes beyond dimensionality and exceeds the currently known physical parameters.

There is an intuitive belief, deeply embedded in the human brain, that people live in a three-dimensional world, i.e. any object can be interpreted as a three-dimensional object and described according to its width, length and depth. The late physicist, Heinz Pagels (Pagels 1985: 324), observed and commented on this phenomenon – “One feature of our physical world is so obvious that most people are not even puzzled by it - the fact that space is threedimensional.” Einstein extended this concept by adding time as the fourth dimension. Scientists today want to go beyond Einstein’s concept of the fourth dimension, with the desire to observe the higher dimensions. The topic of hyperspace is becoming more and more popular among modern physicists; in recent years, Kaluza – Klein theory (also called the superstring theory) which suggests that there are ten space-time dimensions is enjoying a resurgence of interest.

In order to fully understand the essence of human presence in the virtual space it might be advisable to transfer it into the new, fifth dimension. The perspective, generated through the development of new technologies, would undermine the deeply rooted concept of three (or four if time is included) dimensions, an extensively debated topic dating back to famous Greek philosophers over two thousand years ago; on the other hand, such practice would make it possible to put an interpretation on many processes that take place in the virtual realm. Today, scientists are more and more aware that any four-dimensional theory is “too small” to describe all of reality and modern phenomena. An example of this limitation is the deep-rooted belief that each part of the world
is connected in an orderly way, i.e. a particular door always leads to the same, familiar place that remains unchangeable and predictable. On the contrary, the ease with which the virtual reality can be changed is impressive; when entering a particular website no one expects to see the same image as they did the day before – change is, in fact, expected. Accordingly, web developers aim to modify the content on a regular basis and invent new forms that aim at attracting attention. Moreover, there is never any certainty that a particular website still exists or whether it has been taken over by someone else.

Another interesting subject that arises when examining the new patterns of human presence is the possibility of a connection between the real and the virtual world, as well as the question of how and to what extent it is possible to transfer from one world to another. Such transfer between the parallel worlds is somewhat similar to moving through the space-time tunnel. These parallel worlds, which could be compared to two parallel planes, are completely unrelated until the construction of a tunnel that one could travel and communicate through is completed. The multiplicity of connections between the virtual and the real world is due to the fact that it is possible to move from one to the other at any time and as often as necessary, despite one’s online presence being only a mental existence.

The problem with understanding the nature of virtual space and its relationship with reality could lie in the fact that it is impossible to visualize multidimensional space. The impossibility to see the fifth dimension (if we follow Einstein’s concept that time serves as the fourth dimension) is often compared with the inability of a blind man to grasp of the concept of colour. According to Michio Kaku, who popularized the concept of multidimensionality, evolution may ultimately be responsible for the human lack of ability to visualize higher dimensions. So far man had to escape the dangers that existed in four dimensions, and as a consequence the human brain did not develop skills needed to access higher dimensions (Kaku 2011). Peter Freund, a professor of theoretical physics at the University of Chicago’s Enrico Fermi Institute, was one of the first to work on hyperspace theories when they were still viewed to be too extravagant for mainstream physics. In order to explain why higher dimensions excite the imagination of the scientific world Freund used a metaphor in which he compared the laws of physics in their natural space to a cheetah that roams freely on the savannahs of Africa; analogically, the laws of physics measured in a laboratory are like a cheetah that was captured and placed in a zoo cage, where it loses its original elegance. It is important to note that perhaps the same mistake occurs when making an attempt to analyse the phenomenon of the Internet that is based on a real-world perspective. Thus a possibly worthwhile idea would be to formulate the laws of the virtual world in the multi-dimensional space-time, as in such circumstances they are likely to become uncomplicated, understandable and might allow the development of more advanced theories. This necessary transformation consists in the realization that the comprehension or even the study of phenomena requires a proper environment, natural in its essence.

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1 The real and the virtual world can be described as “parallel worlds;” the existence in either one is independent, an individual can exist in them interchangeably; naturally, in one of them only in a metaphorical dimension.
The creation of virtual space raises an increasing number of questions about relationships, coexistence, connections, references, transfers, but also about differences in relation to the traditional space described in literature as the real one, which is indicated by the physical dimension. Just as fascinating is the human ability to move, exist, co-create and function simultaneously in the two worlds that are equally close and distant. Man, who for thousands of years struggled to adapt to life on Earth needed only few years to learn to exist in the virtual space which he adjusts to the familiar reality. At the same, he transfers all his past experiences, both conscious and unconscious, into this newly designed sphere.

The reflection on the duality of human presence raises questions about the impact that the two spaces have on each other, that is how the virtual space influences the real space and vice versa. It is obvious that the virtual space cannot exist without its real counterpart (one-sided implication) because it is built by real individuals independently of what images of themselves they create or what roles they adopt there. The appearance of one-sided implication in this case is not, however, so strikingly clear and obvious; furthermore, determining the kind of symbiosis between these two spaces is equally difficult.

New spaces – created through the interaction and influence (but also as a result of needs) of many subjects, which become part of dynamic, often significantly “disembodied” processes of communication thus combine both classical and metaphysical or symbolic elements. Regardless of whether the modern online space (or spaces) is still a structure of primary interactions or an already developed civilization, it is a place which creates numerous opportunities but also leads to many dangerous or even pathological situations. The extent to which it is possible to understand and make use of the virtual space remains an open question. Even more intriguing is the potential of the duality of the two worlds – the real and the virtual one – achieved by combining their values and resources, and above all by opening up to new possibilities.

VIRTUAL SPACE AND SIMMEL’S SOCIOLOGY OF SPACE

The social construction of space is one of the main concepts that contribute to the development of social thought in the works of Georg Simmel. The main ideas concerning the sociology of space were presented in his two essays, “The sociology of space” and “On the spatial projections of social forms,” both first published in 1903, in which Simmel discussed socially relevant aspects of space, the impact of spatial conditions on

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2 The division into the real and virtual space is merely conventional, because determining the boundaries of interpenetration, coexistence and separation of these two dimensions causes a major difficulty, and often it is even impossible to resolve. The virtual world is created in the real world and some ideas and designs are often spontaneously transferred from the virtual space into the real one. However, for the purpose of this paper, in order to perform a thorough analysis and draw valid comparisons these two terms are used separately.

3 Original title “Über räumliche Projektionen sozialer Formen.”
social interactions and the forms of social, physical and psychological distance. Typical of his work is the fact that in his analysis he does not provide an organized theory of space; on the contrary, he introduces vague concepts, examples and contexts which can be seen as the early beginning of a further discussion as they provide his followers with ideas and inspirations within the sociological, pedagogical and interdisciplinary approach to “space,” at the same time creating the basis for a new model of cultural studies.

A theory of space formulated about one hundred years ago in many areas resembled a combination of contemporary human presence and the virtual dimension. This new area of human activity which makes extensive use of the Internet creates new forms of space which are difficult to define as it is impossible to provide their description in terms of the physical distance between the channels. By the same token, an attempt to provide a definition of its characteristics is equally futile as the currently used terms were coined under conditions that no longer exist and their use in relation to the space of our contemporary presence has a purely metaphorical character. Contemporary problems were easily circumvented by Simmel who in his descriptions of space replaced the aforementioned metaphorical character with spirituality. Undoubtedly, it must not be discounted that in 1903 only a small number of scientists could envision the possibility of existence of many dimensions other than physical, which is why the approach where human existence goes beyond its physical attributes was truly innovative. For Simmel space is more than an orderly social life in its material shape; it is the product of social relation, constituting at the same time the mediation of these relations. Whilst it is a result of human activity, it also influences this activity and determines its course. This idea corresponds to Simmel’s complex understanding of philosophy which in his opinion should not explore only the outer world but also concentrate on the inner world.

Such understanding is presented in “The sociology of space” in which space is merely an empty form that is modelled by subjective preferences and relations between individuals. These two elements – form, which is a sort of regular pattern, something that stimulates certain behaviours; and content, that is what is happening at the very moment combined with its individual character – are mutually influential, they interpenetrate and create a new value in the process.

Worth-mentioning in this context is the juxtaposition of the interpretation of Simmel’s theory and modern space of human presence that combines both real and virtual elements, and consequently is, to a great extent, de-territorialized. Modern space that defies any description in terms of physical distance of the channels becomes part of dynamic, often virtual and substantially “disembodied” processes of communication. The imagery of this space destroys the colloquial character of its understanding because it is impossible to describe it parametrically using only physical categories. In the virtual space individuals are always suspended between what is real and what is not. What follows is the reinterpretation of the human physical realm as it becomes a collection of data incorporated into network (or sociocultural) structures. However, to Simmel it was the Earth that was essential to his understanding of the physical space, as it forms the condition for the implementation of three-dimensional space for human purposes. Simmel’s approach to spatial analysis is motivated by his desire to prove the rela-
tion between social structures and physical categories of time, weight and dimensions which he described as the “geometry of space.” Still, his concept allows the idea of its non-physical forms, in which “modifications of the real energies are indeed revealed.” Therefore, space is not defined merely by a geographical expanse but also by the “psychological powers.”

While facts occur in specific spatial conditions, the space itself is seen by Simmel as the “activity of the soul” formed by joint experiences and sensations. Socialization has created the possibility of generating space through spiritual participation and spiritual possibility for the coexistence of individuals. This concept was influenced by Kantian thought in which space is an abstract concept; therefore, the world is a collection of physical objects in abstract space. Simmel in his conception of space involved the process of socialization by adding to it the spatial reality of social life. The modern world of human presence enlarged by the virtual dimension is, similarly to Simmel’s view, a peculiar “activity of the soul.” The world that combines both traditional and unreal elements is shaped by conscious human activity with its symbolic character, which is yet determined by emotional, strongly evaluative states that can adapt space to their own ideas whilst simultaneously experiencing it. In modern virtual space, formed primarily by the Internet, individuals are suspended between what is real and what is not. What follows is the reinterpretation of the human physical realm as it becomes a collection of data incorporated into network (or sociocultural) structures.

It is important to note that modern (virtual) space should not be placed in direct opposition to Simmel’s conceptualization of space. The more than a century-old theory has many corresponding features to the modern concept, and the two seemingly contrastive ideas are mutually exclusive, yet at the same time they complete each other.

One obvious difference is the priority category for defining location in a precise, parametric way. In the modern space the idea of location loses its value, there is no reference to the classic ideas of physical existence. Nothing is really linked to any particular location parameter; moreover, the need to identify the specific physical location disappears – in fact, it is by any means impossible. Even though Simmel’s social structures are not defined spatially, they are fixed; however, they do not divide space according to quantity but rather according to function.

Another category that differentiates the traditional and modern understanding of space is the category of time. In modern space time loses its importance because it is possible to access virtual space beyond any time frame which can therefore be overlooked. This insignificance of time in virtual space stands in complete opposition to Simmel’s idea of time, where all human activity is subordinated to specific and defined time window, with time being one of the physical categories of the aforementioned “geometry of space.”

Next characteristic that Simmel mentions is the exclusivity of space understood as the possibility of existence of only one general space. The people who operate within that space or within its fragment become part of it and as a result they too gain a sense of uniqueness. Therefore, the simultaneous presence in two or more places is rather improbable, conversely to what is achievable in the virtual space. Because it does not re-
quire the physical presence of an individual his presence is mediated (tele-presence) by the unity of man and technology which often leads to many unintended consequences. Moreover, tele-presence is not limited to the virtual reality but it reflects the rise of two perspectives, i.e. the virtual and the real one, along with all the fusions, flows or designs.4

Another key feature of space that Simmel discusses is the existence of spatial divisions and boundaries. The boundaries Simmel emphasises are not typically physical as they are not determined naturally but rather they mark the place for experience and interaction through social goals. The process of determining these boundaries is highly subjective, making it possible to discuss subjective boundaries such as the cultural ones. They are so distinct that they design the living space of society whilst uniting it internally, forming reciprocal interactions and relations between the members. At the same time the boundaries in Simmel’s view are spiritually active, i.e. they have a possibility of change, movement, extension or junction. Simmel defines them as a neutral state between the offence and the defence expressing latent relations between the neighbours. Therefore, the existence of subjective boundaries established by the mental unity of individuals is possible when the intensity of cultural contact and the extensiveness of space meet. Only the psychological boundaries are considered real by Simmel (SIMMEL 2008: 373): “Granica nie jest faktem przestrzennym o znaczeniu socjologicznym, ale faktem socjologicznym, który kształtuje się przestrzennie.”

A similar principle of extraterritoriality applies to the modern space. Its boundaries are independent of the physical, material or biological range within which man can move during his daily existence. However, the boundaries are metaphorical and refer to the social or individual regulations.

The divisibility of space and the existence of borders outline different areas inhabited by societies with unique features that characterize interpersonal relations of both internal and external character. In fact, Simmel emphasizes that the creation of group structure depends on spatial relations of its members. The function of space is to consolidate; however, it does not mean to transfer this consolidation rule (which is viewed as stabilization and long-term order) from this space to social relations, but rather to understand that the higher the level of consolidation, the lower the need for regulation and control. Still, it indicates a strong bond between society and space. What connects the traditional mindset with the modern space of human presence is “the pivot point” that is, when spatial fixity of an object of interest causes certain forms of relations to group around it. Thus, in the virtual space social relations are formed mainly around themes that unite individuals and that are fixed and steady. However, it must be noted that modern space is a powerful tool of liberation from local, contextual and physical limitations, where the possibility of moving from one place to another (or even to a number of places at the same time) gradually increases. Today’s idea of mobility of

4 The first of these perspectives immerses man in the substantially fictional world, while the latter introduces an irremovable distance between the two worlds because to exist in one of them is only possible with the use of technology. Tele-presence means existing in two places at the same time – the feeling of being present in both of them, with the often unconscious problem of “ontological security.”
information is no longer limited by methods of its exchange. The presence of man in this new space is not merely confined to the physical presence in the world with stable, clearly drawn borders; instead, the individual can have an impact on this world and has the possibility of constructing the virtual space.

The need to overcome physical distance lost its importance due to the different nature of objective and real distances in the virtual world, often replaced with the wide span of meanings, approaches and cultural values as determinants of the new type of space, in which there is a distance of images, visions and perceptions; it is the space that realigns the reality through their representations and their mental constructs and as a result develops new skills and capacities.

Furthermore, human activity also changes as it becomes dynamic, spatially dispersed, generally difficult to locate and often taking place simultaneously in different locations. This new environment has become a source of various sensations for people involved in it, thus acquiring a self-referential character (i.e. aimed at improving the observer’s own sense of direction) instead of a hetero-referential character (i.e. directed at other people’s attitude and place) (LUHMANN 2000: 9-14). The diversity and ambiguity of the new place of human presence contributed to the loosening of social ties – they evolved from strong bonds created by the mutual environment, history and context to abstract ties often devoid of face-to-face interaction (VIERKANDT 1928; cf. van DIJK 2006; MAY 2002). It is important to note, however, the existence of the virtual social network; virtual space is where relations that would not have a chance to develop otherwise are fostered. The result of the space generated by technologies is the possibility to build and maintain a community in the absence of geographical proximity. Virtual communities go beyond any traditional models of society and their communities, forms of solidarity and identity. The temporary character of social ties and lack of commitment are characteristic of all virtual relations and contacts. In contrast, human relationships in Simmel’s sociology are conditioned by spatial distance, thus social influences have a different nature depending on whether or not there occurs spatial separation of individuals.

**INFORMATION CULTURE IN THE FIFTH DIMENSION OF INTERCULTURAL SPACE**

Currently developing civilization of networks with its global character becomes an increasingly stronger mechanism for the popularization of cultural values while it builds multicultural societies on one side, and societies that remain isolated from cultural differences on the other. With a world without borders and no barriers to human mobility, there is a growing need to understand not only multicultural space but, more importantly, intercultural one (in which there is a coexistence and dialogue of cultures). It neither includes comparing or confronting different cultures, nor involves the act of inspiring meetings and mutual exchange of experience because in the virtual space all this takes place constantly. The significance lies in broadening the knowledge of the
nature of these contacts and in transforming this nature from observant to understand-
ing; from unreflective to consciously involved; and finally from polemical to dialogical.

In recent years, the scientific debate focused on the appearance of multiculturalism
in traditional space. The time of Giddens’s “macro-level change” introduces a new vir-
tual dimension of human presence and strongly encourages individuals to reflect on the
processes of cultural mixing in virtual reality. Moreover, formerly spontaneous intercul-
tural relations should also be reflected upon.

The ease with which Internet users establish intercultural contacts is incredible; one
could even ask if any intercultural education is needed if participation in different cul-
tures in this environment has a voluntary and natural character. The answer however
is only seemingly obvious. Even though nowadays the interactions of different cultures
are increasingly frequent, it does not mean that difference and diversity ceased to give
rise to misunderstanding and conflicts. The world has become a global village but its
implications are mainly visible in business, media and economy. Across different cul-
tures people wear similar clothing, listen to the same music, study at the same univer-
sities, have common symbols, contact via Facebook and prefer the Internet to books.
However, situations of particular importance trigger deep-seated social reactions. The
acquired ability of intercultural communication loses its significance in favour of initial
behaviours and influences.

It can be seen that the expansion of modern space with the virtual dimension has
resulted in experiencing new forms of understanding intercultural relations but also
in a possibility of appreciating the information culture. The link between these ele-
ments results from a simple relationship of the terms “communication” and “informa-
tion.” The communication process always involves information transmission, and at
the same time information requires the communication process to exist. A new ap-
proach to the intercultural space with intercultural communication that arises there
requires a redefinition and intensification of understanding of the information culture
with an increased awareness of the very concept of culture and the culture of digital
literacy (Castells 2003). The challenges that both modern and information civiliza-
tions face require reflection that surpasses current understanding of the technocratic
and technological understanding of its infrastructure. It becomes necessary to under-
stand the origins, motivations, goals and purposes of human actions in relation to the
acquisition and use of information as actions to which specific meanings and values are
attached. In the era of constant intercultural interactions and occasional clashes, stra-
tegic planning of organization development, educational programs, careers and various
models of social interaction, when broadening the knowledge of people and the world
one should not ignore questions about the intentions or the models of cultural evalu-
at ion and skills development. The necessity of such careful consideration is noticeable
in the significant increase in the role of information which has become one of the most
cherished values of modern civilization; a value that often reveals the tendency to elimi-
nate its original functions, depart from them and act against man. Many examples of
information and cultural confusion show that individuals are still not thoroughly pre-
pared to effectively respond to challenges posed by overproduction, media overload
and, finally, by the information chaos. In fact, there are numerous occurrences of poorly analysed, processed, understood or interpreted information. Essentially there is a great demand for information anthropology that would approach in a holistic manner the relationship between man and the world in the context of both his needs and cognitive values. In the era of advanced technical civilizations which experience the digital revolution, space expansion and virtual interactions, the significance of this type of reflection, research, and abilities developed in the process, together with the aforementioned anthropology, is substantially increasing (BATORSKI/MARODY/NOWAK 2006).

Among the reasons behind the growing interest in the field of the information culture in the multicultural space are the following:

- introduction of new electronic communication systems in the global network that construct the virtual space, along with the development of a new multicultural space;
- the necessity of developing new forms of information literacy that would allow participation in many cultural spaces that combine real and virtual elements;
- the need for acquiring skills that would help to manage information in culturally diverse information systems;
- constant development of increasingly modern, innovative and unconventional perspectives of education due to the development of modern media;
- the need to overcome information dysfunctions in the situation of the multiplicity of overlapping cultures;
- the development of new educational needs in the society of advanced information culture;
- the need for intercultural education that extends its scope beyond the real space;
- intensive processes of information flow in the cross-cultural social systems of transgressive character etc.

Though the term “information culture” is no longer new, it is still not widely used. In the analysis of literature which contains attempts to define the notion of information culture it is indicated that the term is usually associated with one of the information models, for instance teaching information literacy (OLIVER 2004: 287-314), information management (WIDÉN-WULFF 2000: 3; CURRY/MOORE 2003: 91-110), the culture of organization (CURRY/MOORE 2003: 91-110; MARTIN/LYCETT/MA-CREDIE 2003) etc. Despite the increasingly evident shift from the needs related to operating information technology to the necessity of using it to directly process information, the notion of information culture is still only limited to technological aspects. In the definitions that appear in the scientific literature it is easy to notice the practice of simplifying the description of information culture and merely reducing it to the technical and instrumental perspective. While such a simplification facilitates the process of understanding the concept, it also narrows the meaning and significance of the term. Probably this act of reduction is directly linked to the aforementioned understanding of the information society, the definition of which has also evolved from a society characterised by the use of information technology to a society distinguished by a high level of information intensity.
A number of earlier attempts to define “information culture” can be found in Polish literature, especially in the works of Tadeusz Furmanek and Tadeusz Piątek who define it as:

1) “a range of generally stable dispositions to assess information technologies and create emotional responses, and fixed beliefs about the nature and characteristics of these technologies leading to certain behaviours towards information technologies” (Furmanek 2002: 64),

2) “the way of life of a particular community, the system of developed behaviour patterns; overall human achievement which is the result of the use of broadly defined information technology.” (Piątek 2003: 282)

The abovementioned definitions demonstrate a strong link between the understanding of the concept of “information culture” and its technological aspect. They focus on the analysis of developed behaviour patterns of its representatives towards information and communication technologies. The omitted aspect of knowledge, abilities and attitudes towards the role of information and limiting it merely to information technologies identifies the term described here with the concept of the culture of digital literacy. However, it is important to distinguish between information skills and digital competence; proficiency in the use of information from the proficiency to use information and communication technologies; information efficiency from technical literacy; information awareness from digital literacy; or finally information skills from digital skills, while ignoring that all these categories are deeply involved in different types of symbolic culture and information itself is seen in the context of various systems of meanings and values without which it remains unnoticed even in its instrumental function.

Modern understanding of information culture must reach beyond the boundaries of technocentrism and technological determinism and embrace all aspects of the development of information society. Therefore, information culture can be understood at multiple levels in relation to various interrelated dimensions i.e. information, communication, cultural and intercultural competencies that create a culture of open information flow and build culturally-shaped systems of norms and information standards (Korporowicz 2011). Interdependencies may generate an attitude of more integrated and reflexive understanding of information culture, definition of which would go beyond technical solutions and at the same time would explain its dynamics and evolution. In this context the definition of the concept of information culture could take the following form:

Information culture is an open system that involves, on the one hand, the knowledge, skills and attitudes of information users which is formed through social experiences, and on the other it contains their products that are a result of participation in the information process.

It is therefore a culture of:

1) participation – in structures, resources, processes and changes. The conditions and scope of this participation determines the degree of what can be described
as openness. The participation itself becomes the supreme value, postulate and purpose of social development as a constitutive value of individual and social development. It is assumed that this participation has a developmental character and is does not involve any degradation of personality, relationships or social structures; however, there is an increasing need to carefully observe such processes.

2) various transgressions – therefore it overcomes many existing borders in a great number of fields and aspects. The central issues for the theme of this paper include cultural, mental and spatial transgressions, which in the era of latest information and communication technologies is becoming increasingly possible or even progressive. As in the case of the previously analysed characteristic, these transgressions can lead to many different results and presently there is a much higher awareness of the relativity of their evaluation.

3) communication – modern information culture cannot be the culture of participation or transgression without strongly developed means and forms of communication (interpersonal, cultural, intercultural and that which today is developed through electronic communication and is rapidly advancing network of communications and transmissions. The development of social communication processes becomes an inherent feature of modern information culture, as well as of culture in a general sense, making them progressively interdependent or even define one through the other.

Not only elements in the virtual space are experienced in distinct ways, but also the activities that take place there require redefinition in order to use them to analyse the rapid pace of changes that occur in the modern type of participation in culture. The necessity of such redefinition is also necessary due to the modern dynamics of social and cultural change and related technologies. With reference to the above analysis of information arises a need to modify the understanding of information competency, a concept closely linked to information culture. Accordingly, the recognition of information competency as stable structures, i.e. the skills of searching, evaluating and analysing information which allow individuals to adjust their actions to the conditions set by the changing environment is becoming less needed. This transformation heads towards competencies that are understood processively, with the recognition of the transgressive potential of the subject, assuming that types of activities generated by an individual and associated with searching, storing, organizing, processing and implementing information are prone to creative modification that occurs as a consequence of dynamic changes of the environment and human personal development.

CONCLUSION

The nature of modern intercultural processes changes with the progressive transformation and globalization, but also with the modernization of possible means of communication. The Internet, the fifth dimension of modern human presence amply fulfils
human aspirations of going beyond the boundaries of one’s own culture; therefore, it indirectly shapes the abilities of existing and functioning on the cultural (intellectual, psychological, social, political etc.) borderlands. On the one hand, technology allows people to travel, move between countries, visit places that are hard to access or communicate with people that are thousands of kilometres away; on the other, it has reduced communication to an electronic process of transmitting information. Therefore, the Internet is simultaneously a tool of liberation and limitation. Great haste and anonymity offered by the virtual space impoverish communication by introducing nonverbal language, reducing direct contact, decreasing closeness and leading to superficiality and brevity of relationships. Intercultural contact is constantly established, although often unconsciously. The Internet is a world in which someone must finally intervene to show how to wisely use the cultural richness it offers, and appreciate the interpenetration of cultures but also their mutual exclusion. There is a necessity of deepening the respect for others and for oneself, developing mutual understanding for one another, establishing mutual interactions, highlighting the importance of diversity and adopting an attitude of tolerance and mutual appreciation in the fifth dimension. Only this kind of complex and multidimensional approach that is not only limited to the understanding of reality but it actually changes it, can face the challenges of modern civilization, including a global network civilization. They require a reflection that goes beyond the technocratic and technological question of how the modern intercultural communication develops. In the new multicultural space it is necessary to understand the origins, motivations, goals and purposes of human actions, including the use of interpersonal contacts and incorporating them into active communication processes in which they can become a subject of dialogue and moderation, interpretation and inspiration.

The newly created need for understanding multicultural space generated a necessity of a different view of information culture. One of the main challenges that modern man faces is the desire to increase the flexibility of his presence; consequently, it involves finding and limiting those factors that block the ability to easily adjust to a new environment. This flexibility must directly relate to the dynamisms of modern information culture which exceeds the barriers of stability, durability and predictability. This change in the understanding of information culture is interlinked with the change in the role that information plays in everyday human life, as it is becoming increasingly significant in the process of supporting its development. It is important however, not to ignore the fact that the interpretation of information depends on the cultural context. Modern space of human presence has brought various cultures closer together, but at the same time it increased their diversity and variability in time, hence the lack of uniformity in the reception and analysis of information. The consequence of this diversity is the difficulty in establishing a single model of culture and information competency which also changed their status by undergoing a transformation from static models to dynamic, transgressive ones.

Translated by Zuzanna Sławik
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At the dawn of the twenty-first century there is a widespread belief in the unique character of this moment of history, but military forces still remain a fundamental tool at the disposal of the authorities of the state which wants to play a significant role. Primary role of the armed forces of a sovereign state is still to provide military security of the state and its defence. The capacity of taking action, the nature and structure of the armed forces determines the credibility and effectiveness of national defence, the position and contribution of the state in the creation of its own and collective safety. Ensuring effective implementation of the objectives of the security policy is the subject of a military strategy. This role of strategy has been perceived by philosophers and representatives of other sciences since ancient times. Linking strategy with the policy was stressed and well-characterized by General Andre Beaufre, Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. It is a fascinating subject of studies how military leaders and decision makers from antiquity, through Middle Ages, Renaissance, to the present days implemented Sun Tzu’s lessons even without any knowledge about *The Art of War’s* existence, and how the ancient Chinese conclusions are similar to the those of the European prophet of strategy – Carl von Clausewitz.

**Keywords:** military strategy, Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Andre Beaufre
According to *Encyclopedia Britannica*, strategy in warfare is the science or art of employing all the military, economic, political, and other resources of a country to achieve the objects of war (STRATEGY). Such a kind of present defining of strategy has its roots in early Chinese and European research on strategy.

**PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY STRATEGY BY ANDRE BEAUFRE**

At the dawn of the twenty-first century there is a widespread belief in the unique character of this moment of history. This awareness is a reflection not only of the evolution of historical events such as the advent of the “third wave” of civilization (TOFFLER 1997). It is also the result of, for instance, the extension of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999, widening the European Union, or ubiquitous globalization.

However, despite these processes military forces still remains a fundamental tool at the disposal of the authorities of the state which wants to play a significant role on the international arena to guarantee defence of the interests of the state and its citizens, respect for the law, the objectives set by the government. The former president of Czechoslovakia, Vaclav Havel described the important role of armed forces of a democratic state in the following way: “The Army will always remain an unspoken expression of the will to live in peace, the defence of freedom and engagement in joint efforts to ensure the freedom of others” (HAVEL 1996). If a state is able to ensure safety in the military sphere, it means that it is sovereign and reliable, and when it comes to foreign policy it is a subject – not an object. In turn, the sovereignty and credibility of a state also affect other areas of security such as economy, rule of law, and even ecology.

Today, there are different models of the armed forces: a professional (vocational) army, a recruitment-based army, a militia-type army, an army being a compilation of various other models. In addition we can observe a dynamic development of private military companies offering very wide spectrum of security and defence services. Structure of the armed forces is a reflection of historical, political, cultural, ideological, economic, and geographic circumstances. However, the primary role of the armed forces of a sovereign state organization is still to provide military security of the state and its defence. These issues are governed by the most important documents such as constitutions and security policies. This in turn compels state authorities to provide the armed forces with the ability to conduct certain activities, to create, to maintain and modernize their structures.

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1 Compare: The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence of the state and the integrity of its territory and ensure the security and inviolability of its borders (*The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997*: art. 26, sec. 1) or: The Polish Armed Forces are an essential element of the defense system of the state. The unique capacities within the state make the armed forces a multifunctional tool to perform a wide range of missions, which include: ensuring national defense and opposition to aggression in the context of alliance commitments, participation in the stabilization of the international situation, supporting homeland security and providing aid to the public. (*The strategy of development of the national security system of the Republic of Poland 2022*: 19).
The capacity of taking action, the nature and structure of the armed forces determines the credibility and effectiveness of national defence, the position and contribution of the state in the creation of its own and collective safety. Ensuring effective implementation of the objectives of the security policy is the subject of a military strategy. This role of strategy has been perceived by philosophers and representatives of other sciences since ancient times. Linking strategy with the policy was stressed and well-characterized by General Andre Beaufre², who wrote that a military strategy: “is the art of using force to achieve the objectives of politics” (Beaufre 1965(b): 18). The purpose of the strategy is thus: “to achieve objectives set by politics, using the best available means” (Beaufre 1965(b): 19). And today, in the United States, the national military strategy is: “the art and science of preparation and use of the nation’s armed forces to secure the objectives of national politics with the use of force or the threat of its use” (Doctrine for Joint Operations: GL-10). Therefore, in the context of the creation of state structures which are supposed to effectively apply the policy of the state, one of the most important tasks of legislative and executive authorities in the area of security policy is to transform the armed forces and their potential in a way that allows effective, immediate and flexible response to re-emerging newly emerging, often unpredictable, threats – but this is not possible without the development of a strategy. What should the decision makers be guided by? General Beaufre argued that:

strategic reasoning should combine psychological data with physical data using an abstract and rational thinking process. It requires a very large capacity of analyzing and synthesizing. The analysis is apparently used to gather the elements needed for the diagnosis; it actually should mean some selection (Beaufre 1965(b): 28).

The complexity and variability of the contemporary environment of each country and global systems pose the creators of a military strategy of states a lot of questions. General Beaufre put it in the following way:

versatility and the inability to predict make the builder of the defence system face an extremely difficult problem. It is even more difficult given the fact that in every age there is a fixed truth proclaimed in a scientific manner by prophets and momentary leaders, but very rarely confirmed by life (Beaufre 1965(a): 163).

² A French general André Beaufre (1902-1975) is well known as a military strategist and as an exponent of an independent French nuclear force. A. Beaufre in 1921 entered the military academy at École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr. In 1925 he saw action in Morocco against the Rif. While serving as permanent secretary of national defence in Algeria in 1940-1941 during World War II, he was arrested by the French Vichy regime, and after his release in 1942 he served in the Free French Army on several fronts until the end of the war in 1945. Beaufre studied at the École Supérieure de Guerre and at the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and was subsequently assigned to the French army’s general staff. Beaufre also commanded the French forces in the 1956 Suez War campaign against Egypt in 1956. Beaufre later became chief of the general staff of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe in 1958. He was serving as chief French representative to the permanent group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Washington in 1960 when he was named général d’armée.
This creates a number of challenges for reformers of the armed forces and makes them face the need for reliable analysis based on contemporary and historical experience, both of their own and of others. Even more so as:

The difficulty of solving problems connected with creating appropriate armed forces lies in it being impossible to use a well-established and precise pattern (standard) of any state or its armed forces which would be suitable for Poland. The character (shape) of armed forces is in fact an autonomous attribute of each state (Jakubczak 1998: 7).

This does not preclude, however, and does not exempt anyone from the analysis or summary outline of the achievements and experiences of other states in this field.

CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In the past, the dominance of wars as sources of danger and misery for nations developed two basic areas of security: a military and a political one. However, the development and the evolution of technology, information, as well as human relations means that the subject, object and space of security indicate a tendency to expand. Security is both a state and a process. Protection is sometimes individual and collective by means of subordination and coordination methods.

Such wide frames of security result from equally broad ideas and definitions of its endangerment which is also of diverse dimension and character. In terms of the subject of security the threats may be of: military, political, economic, ecological, social, psychological and social, civilization or cultural nature. They can be internal or external, as well as direct or indirect. Modern understanding of the security does not assume that it is only the opposite of those threats. In addition to physical survival it also means ensuring the preservation of freedom.

Contemporary understanding of security assumes its broad treatment, far beyond military issues. Based on the subject criterion it covers the range of military, political, economic, ecological, social, cultural and other issues. Security is related to the intertwining dimensions: at an individual, national, state and international level. It reaches: a local, sub-regional, regional and supra-regional and universal level. The subject, object and space of security have a tendency to expand. Security is both a state and a process. Protection is sometimes individual and collective by means of subordination and coordination methods.

The essence of a broad perception of national security, in addition to ensuring survival, boils down to the creation of prosperity of nations, and to providing the development of freedoms. This reflects the progress of civilization of nations and the desire to live in prosperity.

After 1989, predictions about the future of international relations were filled with a naive belief in the advent of universal peace, universal prosperity and triumph of rationalism. However, we may witness a renewal of wars waged by powerful empires in order to maintain their spheres of influence, religious wars, development of organized
crime and terrorism. The impact of the so-called asymmetry, which is in fact a strategy of choosing the right tactic, is more and more visible in today’s conflicts and wars. French general Andre Beaufre noted:

It is true that technological progress is an essential power factor. Everyone knows that you cannot stop a tank fire with a rifle or shoot down a plane with an arrow from a bow. It is also known that the advantage that the Romans gained by arming and tactics of their legion allowed them to conquer the greater part of the ancient world. It is absolutely clear that advancement in techniques and tactics gives a great advantage to the one who achieved it, because it provides a strategy with additional and more effective measures.

This progress, however, may prove useless if it serves a wrong strategy. This important matter should always be remembered. Recall, for example, our recent experience with Algeria. Did our modern weapons and equipment allow us to solve the issue? In fact, there is no best tactic in itself, because each tactic has a value only in comparison with the tactic of the opponent. We could, for example, come to realize that airplanes and tanks did not seem to succeed in the fight against guerrillas and that the possession of nuclear weapons did not allow the United States to obtain in Korea anything more than a compromise ceasefire (Beaufre 1965(b): 56-57).

These statements are perfectly complemented by the exception of Clausewitz:

Theory should also take into account a human element and allow itself to be reflected in courage, boldness and cheekiness. The art of war has to do with the living force and moral factors; it thus follows that it cannot reach confidence and ruthlessness anywhere (Clausewitz 1958: 31).

The above thesis perfectly reflects the complex contemporary phenomena associated with the growth of asymmetric threats. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York conducted on 11 September 2001, the course of action in Afghanistan and Iraq, just confirm the above quotes.

The demanding nature of the contemporary security environment and the wide spectrum of modern military forces tasks is explained by Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. According to the above mentioned paper the United States employs its military capabilities at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that range from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, and if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities shapes the operational environment and helps to keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining United States global influence. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as civil support and foreign humanitarian assistance, may not require com-
bat. But others, as evidenced by operations like RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and may require combat operations to protect forces while accomplishing the mission. Individual major operations and campaigns often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is part of the global war on terror). The nature of the security environment is such that the military often will be engaged in several types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations. For these operations, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stability missions and activities to accomplish the objective. The commander for a particular operation determines the emphasis to be placed on each type of mission or activity (DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES: I-15/16).

SUN TZU AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ IN THE MODERN VISIONS

Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, civil wars in Libya and Syria, define a new meaning of security and threats, refresh discussion on strategy, particularly areas of military affairs and warfare. As mentioned above, the present definition of strategy has its roots in Chinese and European early research on strategy. Today when one considers the use of force, the proposals from classic works by Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz in military theory hold enduring value. For example “The art of cunning and secrecy is divine. It teaches us to become invisible, to be noiseless and consequently hold the enemy’s fate in our own hands” it is a quotation from Sun Tzu which is placed on the title page of the NATO’s SOTG MANUAL.3

Sun Tzu, traditional accounts place him from c. 544–496 BCE in the Spring and Autumn Period of China (722–481 BCE), a military general serving under King Helü of Wu, and eye witness of Napoleonic Wars, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz are the most notable authors of such works. Both of them and their treatises (Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clausewitz’s On War) are most popular in modern day’s Western strategic, security and military thinking. Despite almost two and a half thousand years dividing them, Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s creative analysis of the nature of war are surprisingly convergent.

The question is why? Because there are only few authors of classical works in military theory. This of course is not true, as Herve Coutau-Begarie (2011) in his Traité de stratégie listed really plenty of them. The reason is, because of the enduring nature on their contributions and of their insights, it is useful to cite these authors on key points using their own words. Both prophets of military strategy note that the decision to go to war has significant consequences. Sun Tzu writes: “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.” Similarly, Clausewitz writes that war is “no place for irresponsible enthusiasts” but rather “a serious means to a serious end.” These cautionary notes are the best places to start when thinking about employing the military instrument of power (JORDAN 2009: 267).

3 Version 1.0 (2009), title page.
Both authors discerned and lay out convincingly that war is not an independent act, and is not only domain of warriors or soldiers. They put war in the frame of a bigger sketch of kingdom or state activity. Clausewitz’s famous statement that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means” has significant implications for those who must make decisions relating to the use of force. It is clear from the context of this passage that Clausewitz is writing against a contemporary view that, when war begins, the role of politics and political leaders recedes and perhaps even vanishes until peace is once again achieved. Clausewitz finds this dichotomous view of peace and war to be “thoroughly mistaken.” Politics and diplomacy do not cease when states resort to force; instead, political leaders have just added one more instrument of power to the means that they are applying to achieve their purposes.

I think that we can propose a thesis that Sun Tzu expressed the same theorem more than dozen hundred years before Carl von Clausewitz was born.

In third chapter of The Art of War (Sun Tzu 2004: 70) found that:

Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans,” and next “Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

In this passage of his work Sun Tzu points out that victory should be achieved without military tools, rather by the use of diplomatic and economic measures, by active diplomacy, destroying the opponent’s alliances, and keeping prevent enemy from accomplishing his plans and strategy. Exploring the history of military conflicts (for example Punic wars, Polish wars with Teutonic Knights, Second World War or the Gulf wars) surely we will find that above-mentioned excerpt contains true important claims in spite of the passing centuries.

The present Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States points out the same elements as important for strategic plans. The security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats are constantly appearing, is appearing, or in remission. The military is well positioned to conduct operations but must also be prepared to address emerging peer competitors and irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges (Doctrine for the Armed Forces: x).

The subsequent part Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States seems to repeat Sun Tzu’s paragraphs but with more modern vocabulary:

The ability of the US to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of the United States Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. These various ways can be understood to occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from peace to war (Doctrine for the Armed Forces: x).
In accordance with the further text of the Doctrine... these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic), are normally coordinated by the appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council direction. They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

In Israel this complex (political and military) nature of war is well recognized, too: Many strategy experts such as Ephraim Inbar or Shai Feldman have argued that Israeli deterrence was restored after the clash with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, thus qualifying it as a success. But in a democracy, an assessment cannot be made according to security criteria alone. It must be more thorough, and especially take into consideration international political issues (COHEN 2010: 155).

Title of the Sun Tzu’s third chapter according to older western translations is Attack by Stratagem, but we can also meet a different translation of this chapter Offensive Plans, in fact it has completely different meanings. The older translation of the title of this chapter created a false conviction that Sun Tzu’s military methods were based on tricks and deception or simple, primitive means.

In a different part of Sun Tzu’s work we can find following excerpt:

When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on (SUN Tzu 2004: 66).

This excerpt is especially important in the face of US, Polish or German experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not long ago I found a book The Clausewitz Delusion. How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by Stephen L. Melton. The author of the book finds out the truth discovered by Sun Tzu many hundreds years ago:

Despite America’s overwhelming military firepower and unprecedented global reach, its excessive overmatch in air and naval forces, and its more than ample political and budgetary support, we are now bogged down in both of these countries, unable to conclude wars we began by our own choice over a half decade ago. The American citizenry, once very supportive of these wars, has become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned by the efforts. As victory remains elusive, defeatism grows.

Do we still understand how to win offensive wars? Has the U.S. military emerged from two generations of Cold War with a sufficient understanding of the nature of of-
Of course I can make a long list of significant factors described by Sun Tzu which already have been identified as very important for national security and strategic military practice. Among them are for example:

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions can only be obtained from other men. (SUN Tzu 2004: 80)

Today the total of the capabilities that will allow a given force to seek out relevant information on the capabilities and intentions of opposing forces, in other words, intelligence (especially human intelligence), surveillance, and reconnaissance are most crucial points of every one military doctrine.

Finally, it is a fascinating subject of studies how military leaders an decision makers from antiquity, through middle ages, Renaissance, to the present days implemented Sun Tzu’s lessons even without any knowledge about The Art of War’s existence, and how the ancient Chinese conclusions are similar to the European prophet’s of strategy – Carl von Clausewitz.

Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s works still remain the cornerstone of the science and practice of war.

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The strategy of development of the national security system of the Republic of Poland 2022.
The paper focuses mainly on the doctrine concerning the approach of the Christian state towards pagans which described the practice of respecting the values that regulate social relations, and came as a result of the lifestyle of the society. It discusses the approach of Paweł Włodkowic, the rector of the Kraków Academy, who became famous for a speech given at the Council of Constance in 1415, and was a distinguished representative of this current of thought. Using theological and evangelical inspiration and legal knowledge, Włodkowic pointed to the effectiveness of practising the rules of spiritual life in social life. It allowed for the definition and recognition of the level of dialogue, understanding and compromise. Tradition, which in itself encapsulates consistency, is an important element of cultural and religious transfer. For it to occur in society in practice, it requires reception in the form of the normalisation and substantiation of its existence.

Keywords: Paweł Włodkowic, the Polish-Teutonic conflict, human dignity, tolerance, Jagiellonian model of the state, Council of Constance
The issue of whether to refer to the historical roots of Europe, and therefore also to Christianity and the Christianitas cultural circle, is currently perceived as problematic. This may be due to the different dynamics of change in Eastern and Western Europe, the result of religious divisions experienced over the centuries. From the 12th century onwards, the persecution or exclusion of representatives of different religions, for instance the expulsion of Jews from France and Spain, was a recurring occurrence in Western Europe. Eastern Europe, on the other hand, was generally characterised by peaceful coexistence in areas inhabited by diverse cultures. In later years social relations would undergo change due to the influence of social processes which were the result of revolution and the imposition of new political systems. The model implemented in Central-Eastern Europe, especially in the 15th-17th centuries, may be more familiar to Europeans. It was also based on the Western model, but, in its particular context and distinctive social conditions, it was transformed into a new quality, which would be far more acceptable today. This quality is connected with the return to universal values which safeguard human dignity and rights.

Cultural heritage, an important building block of human dignity, shapes the feeling of freedom which respects the law, morals and culture, love and solidarity with others. It is one of the fundamental elements of the durability of the state and of national ties. Great energy lies in the Central-Eastern European culture of old, in the Republic of Poland, the energy which may still fuel morals, styles, literary genres and language, which may shape moral norms, especially in difficult times. The practice of tolerance in this region, here, has undoubtedly had an impact on the development of European culture and culture in general. Polish political culture, reformist thought and most of all the practical functioning of the Polish state constituted a “state without stakes” in the 15th-17th centuries, which greatly influenced the formation of the idea of tolerance.

Among other goals, the aim of science is to present cultural and intellectual heritage while maintaining the continuity of research on the achievements of past centuries. It is therefore important to discover the tradition of socio-political and theological thought formulated by such exceptional Poles as Paweł Włodkowic, at a time when modern political doctrines were gradually taking shape and when modern ways of defining the law and state were being determined. This practice aids in the expansion of the perspective and scope of thought concerning tradition and the difficult task of restoring that which
has been forgotten or lost, in the context of understanding the contemporary trends which shape social life.

The twilight of the Middle Ages was a time of great importance in terms of its effect on the thought, culture and politics of that period. The time between the Middle Ages and Modernity was a period of great change, characterised by the first signs of modernity. At the time Europe was experiencing political turmoil, the continent was split into small states and principalities and religiously divided into Orthodoxy (East-West Schism) and Catholicism, which was itself divided due to the unstable and scandalous situation in the papacy, whose authority had to be rebuilt after the so-called Western Schism (cf. Wesołowska 1997: 25-27).

In the European social reality of the time, it was important to call on the heterogeneous experience of the Polish society, characterised by a religiously, ethnically, culturally and linguistically rich and diverse structure. This type of society was undoubtedly something different and new in comparison to Western Europe, with its goal of building monolithic social structures governed by absolute monarchy. The prevailing mindset and social restrictions of the time usually resulted in society being defined as a political/religious organism rooted in religious unity (cf. Kracik 1993: 66).

Towards the end of the Middle Ages, Central-Eastern Europe possessed the cultural foundations necessary for dialogue which would build the future of a heterogeneous European society based on a strong but open identity, a future based on responsible participation, resulting in a more dynamic civil society, which would justify the rule of tolerance on the basis of the pragmatism of the experience of past epochs. The phenomenon of Polish culture during the Jagiellonian Era was a result of the fact that it was primarily a matter of the spirit, that is the creation of values which cannot be converted to material goods. The ideas which emerged at the time were a product of the need to appreciate those traits of human personality which make it possible to consider man a being more perfect than other beings. In other nations this often resulted in the need of achieving a sense of belonging to a society which cherishes the ideals of freedom and justice, and appreciates human dignity or tolerance (cf. Samsonowicz 2003: 445-454).

This very image of Europe was experienced by the scientific minds who, through studies conducted at the universities of the time, which were spiritual and intellectual centres of exchange of knowledge, thought and experience, benefited from the opportunity of discovering the diversity of a world which was gradually becoming more familiar. The Kraków Academy, founded in 1364 by Casimir III the Great, contributed to the creation of an intellectual base in the form of theologians, lawyers and moralists – specialists who were to serve the state in the creation of a suitable policy towards the papacy, empire and neighbouring countries (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 135, also cf. Fijalek 1900).

The founding of the Jagiellonian University was also the birth of theoretical science in Poland, from which materials were drawn for the practical defence of the interests of the Polish state during the Council of Basel and the Council of Constance. As a result, the most distinguished representatives of the Kraków Academy were not only theoreticians, but practical theologians (cf. Michalski 1997: 113-122). A practical approach,
directed at the good of society and state (cf. *Maciołek* 2011: 71), became the convention which defined and shaped the general approach to learning of the entire university. Another highly important idea, which served as inspiration for the majority of the currents of thought of the time, was the idea of universalism. With the historical formation of the European community, Christianity should become *Republica Christiana*, under the leadership of two universal powers: the Pope and the Emperor. In theory this concerned universalism in reference to the entire world, but in practice this idea was connected with Europe, understood as a historical community associated with Christianity (cf. *Halecki* 2002: 140).

The doctrine concerning the approach of the Christian state towards pagans, which opposed Western views and was gradually developed in the 15th century in Poland, described the practice of respecting the values that regulate social relations, which was the result of the lifestyle of the society. Paweł Włodkowic, the rector of the Kraków Academy who became famous for a speech given at the Council of Constance in 1415, was a distinguished representative of this current of thought.

**THE MASTER – PAWEŁ**

Paweł Włodkowic, a professor, theologian, lawyer and diplomat, was born in 1370 in the village Brudzeń near Dobrzyń nad Wisłą, and passed away in Kraków towards the end of 1435. He is considered one of the most vibrant and outstanding figures of the Jagiellonian Era (cf. *Niesiołowski* 1935(a): 153). He studied not only in Prague, where he obtained the titles of Master of Liberal Sciences and Bachelor of Canon Law, but also in Padua, where he obtained the title of Bachelor of Decrees (canon law). In Padua he was a student of an exceptional lawyer, master Francesco Zabarella, the Cardinal of Florence, with whom Włodkowic developed a strong bond and whose views he would later quote in his work. Upon returning to Poland in approximately 1411, he obtained a PhD in Law and began to teach law at the University of Kraków. He was rector in the years 1414-1415, and after 1418 vice-rector of this university. When King Władysław II Jagiełło ordained that the dispute between the Polish state and the Order of the Teutonic Knights be moved to an international level, Włodkowic, who acted as envoy and was one of the king’s ambassadors, took part in the proceedings of the Council of Constance in the years 1415-1418.

Three of the most important pieces of writing which came into being during the Council, *Saevientibus* (1415), *Opinio Ostiensis* (1415), *Ad aperiendum* (1416), outline, in an orderly manner, the rules of coexistence with non-Christians and pagans and the ways of proclaiming the gospel among them. Włodkowic, who wanted to demonstrate the universality of his views, touched upon the issue of the Pope’s and Emperor’s competences in terms of the power of man over man, the relation between papal power and

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1 This sentence would usually begin with the words: „Pan mój Franciszek kardynał florencki...” Cf. among other titles QUONIAM II: 347, 362.
secular power, the legal situation of the believers and non-Christian subjects, the attitude of Christians towards religious dissenters and the attitude of Christian states towards those who are non-Christian or pagan (cf. Dyl 1990: 68-73).

His excellent legal and theological preparation, intellectual abilities and his status of scholar, professor and university rector, granted Włodkowic access to the diplomatic and political spheres of the kingdom in terms of both Polish and European affairs. His abilities also allowed him to constantly develop and improve his views concerning broadly-understood reality. His erudition, synthetic mind and diplomatic intuition gave rise to treatises, epistles, legal conclusions, supplications or maxims which surpassed similar texts from that age in their form and content. Włodkowic’s writings were precise lectures of a clear structure and the argumentation contained within them was always convincing and very rich (cf. Wielgus 1996: 12-13; Wesołowska 1998: 5-18). What is more, the earliest political papers authored by Włodkowic, which deal with social issues considered important at the time, are evidence of a high standard of science and civilisation and testify to the nobility and superb moral stance of Włodkowic himself and the environment in general (Tarnowski 2000: 22-23). Additionally, his use of “arguments on natural freedom, historical laws and the political subjectivity of nations, striking in their intellectual maturity and moral standards, served as a calling card with which Polish politics could oppose 15th-century Europe.” (Ekes 2010: 68-69)

The theological and political thought which was materialising at the time created the foundation of the Jagiellonian model of the state and the Jagiellonian model of that part of Europe, which was implemented in the Republic of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria during the reign of the Jagiellonian dynasty. The values cited by Paweł Włodkowic, and the discussion concerning the need for religious tolerance, emerged in the 15th century in the context of abuse and injustice committed by the Order of the Teutonic Knights in the Republic of Poland – under the guise of religious motives and the need to evangelise the pagans, the Order did great harm not only to pagans, but also to Christians. Paweł Włodkowic was decidedly against this treatment and invoked universal human rights, arising from the Scriptures and natural law and concerning the scope of the power of secular rulers and the clergy, the rulers’ approach towards nonbelievers and believers, and the believers approach towards pagans. This was clearly a statement on tolerance which went beyond religious tolerance and demonstrated a type of social order characterised by a humanistic stance resulting from a sense of respect towards people and the organisation of national laws. In this manner Włodkowic became a precursor of ideas which would emerge in Europe in the 16th-century or later.2

It appears that Włodkowic’s social experience, supported by his legal and theological education, and the influence of his professor and master from Padua, Francesco

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2 The degree of originality of the views presented by Włodkowic is being discussed by historians. There are contrasting views; those which claim that Włodkowic only represented his predecessors and did not develop their ideas and those which highlight his originality and the modernity of his argumentation. Cf. Maciołek 2011: 69-79.
Zabarella, a representative of the so-called “tolerant line,” resulted in the fact that his doctrine, presented at the Council of Constance, referred to the need of creating order in social relations based on the law of God and natural law. This explained and justified social relations based on the commandments contained in the Decalogue, which was considered the source of the generally recognised moral law (cf. Świężawski 1987: 135). This concerned both the relations between Christians and the stance of individual Christians towards religious dissenters or Christian countries towards non-Christian countries. This message was certainly considered novel by his listeners, both his supporters and opponents.

During the time when Europe was still considered Christianitas but was gradually assuming its new form, councils were by far the most important and largest opinion-forming and legislative type of assembly. They could alter the form and nature of social life for a period of time and determine the direction of cultural and moral changes. The Council of Constance, considered the largest international gathering until the beginning of the 20th century, was no different. Even towards the end of the 19th century it was considered the greatest national congress which the world had ever seen. Its attendees hailed from all walks of life: cardinals, patriarchs, hundreds of bishops and archbishops, princes, representatives of monarchs and the representatives of cities and universities (cf. Ehrlich 1968: XXI). During its proceedings, the council brought up the issue of the so-called West Schism, which began in 1378 and consisted in the simultaneous recognition of three different popes: Gregory XII, Benedict XIII and John XXIII. Another issue which, at the time, was particularly important to the Church, were the effects brought about by the statements given by John Wycliffe and Jan Hus, considered not only a threat to the purity of the faith and ecclesial discipline, but also a violation of the social order. The need for reformation, which could not be carried out by the popes since they were involved in the conflicting interests of the countries which supported them, accelerated the development of the concept of conciliarism, an ecclesial orientation characterised by reformist and democratic tendencies in the Church which recognised the superiority of the Council over the Pope. 3 The Council of Constance was home to a creative, highly intellectual environment, which managed to speed up the necessary reforms of the Church and effectively take care of the most important problems of the socio-religious life of the continent. Włodkowic, who highlighted “the primacy of ethics over short-distance expediency,” stood out in this environment for his exceptional political sense (Niesiołowski 1935(b): 775).

Włodkowic’s greatness was based on the fact that he did not merely refer to the experience of injustice, ambition and political interests, but also highlighted the diversity of spiritual attitudes resulting from the misinterpretation or ill will in the imple-

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3 The council, as a body of control and a buffer against the misuse of power, stands above the pope only in specific exceptional situations (moderate conciliarism) or fundamentally and universally (radical conciliarism). This theory was based on the thesis that the entire Church and ecumenical council as its fullest representation are by their nature carriers of all forms of power, including that which during the normal functioning of the papacy is vested in the office of Peter. Cf. Schatz 2004: 157-158; also: Baron/Pietras 2003.
mentation of intentional actions related to the practice of preaching the gospel, conversion and religious life. Włodkowic’s genius manifested itself in his use of language, the wording employed in his writings, which would affect and successfully defend the Polish national interest against the finest European minds of the time. In addition, his writings were in opposition to the prevailing beliefs of the preferred ideological stance at the time. On the one hand, they would highlight the unity of Christian nations based on Catholic universalism, on the other hand, they were against the measures which stemmed from evangelical roots and opposed the Order. This resulted in tension, because it required the clear support of the Council for one side of the conflict. Additionally, the Polish side expected the support of the European opinion and the imposing of sanctions as a result of the victory at the Battle of Grunwald. The sanctions could even have been the dismantling of the Order or its relocation to Turkish or Tatar borderlands, where the “shield of Christianity” was still needed (cf. NIESIOŁOWSKI 1935(b): 780-781).

Without limiting himself to only the Polish case, Włodkowic undertook other important problems in relation to the Council and the reform of the Church. In his speeches he criticised the hallmarks of simony in the form of giving benefits and expressed his support for conciliarism (cf. BRZOSTOWSKI 1954: 43, also cf. FIIJALEK 1900). Pope Martin V’s approval of the nomination of King Władysław II Jagiełło and Grand Duke Vytautas to the Apostolic Vicariate as vicars to the Eastern lands of Europe was an important effect of the works conducted by the Polish delegation with the participation of Paweł Włodkowic. Another event of great importance was the condemnation and imprisonment of John of Falkenberg, an advocate for the eradication of the Polish nation, who supported the Order of the Teutonic Knights. Ultimately, Falkenberg admitted he was mistaken and officially withdrew his slanderous remarks directed at Poland (cf. NIESIOŁOWSKI 1935(b): 782 ff.).

The Polish delegation at the council was one of the greatest to have ever taken part in such a gathering. From the very beginning the delegation actively participated in the proceedings of the council and was regarded with respect and admiration (cf. BRZOSTOWSKI 1954: 43). The commission under Francesco Zabarella, appointed by the council and focusing on the relations between Poland and the Order of the Teutonic Knights, could not settle the Polish-Teutonic dispute because of the deception, bribery and hypocrisy represented by the Order of the Teutonic Knights. Moreover, the Teutonic Knights presented themselves as defenders of the faith and the Poles as a nation which supported pagans and barbarians in order to persuade the Council to support further activities of the Order in the East. This situation required a competent reaction on behalf of the Polish delegation. In his treatises written during the Council, which contained theoretical and legal justification exposing the lies and hypocrisy of the Order of the Teutonic Knights, Paweł Włodkowic based his investigation of the truth and defence of the Polish national interest on moral principles, because law and morality are connected in numerous ways and therefore related to one another (cf. SWIEŻAWSKI 1987: 135). Włodkowic, always referring to the truth, presented the universal foundations of his doctrine which could be defended in any part of the world where man lives in harmony with the truth.
During the Council of Constance, the Polish delegation spoke in defence of the rights of pagans and schismatics, which, as in the case of Spanish thinkers defending the rights of Native Americans infringed by the conquistadors, despite apparent marginalisation, fulfilled an important role in the further spiritual fate of Europe. The opinions presented by the Polish members of the council set the country on a difficult path through pluralism and tolerance and towards social and political decisions such as, for instance, the passing of the Warsaw Confederation Act more than one hundred and fifty years later. However, the opposite path, a path of intolerance, leading through fanaticism and a lack of understanding of diversity, was also followed, which led to harrowing events such as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Therefore, every word in support of tolerance and the defence and appreciation of diversity was precious. Opponents of this approach, often succumbing to the pressure of political power, considered it a damnable heresy. This attitude led to the embarrassing period in European history when people were burned at the stake, inquisitorial processes intensified, fratricidal religious wars were waged and the superiority of ideology over truth was argued through the practice of torture. In this context, the activity of Paweł Włodkowic, a spokesman for universal values, an advocate of truth and a defender of legitimate rights, becomes all-important for the practice of social life, especially in Central-Eastern Europe (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 196-197).

The Polish-Teutonic conflict was one of the primary topics of concern for Polish diplomacy during several decades of the 15th century (cf. Graff 2010: 9). The first systematised reactions to the Teutonic problem which emerged before the year 1410 were connected with the environment of the University of Kraków. In his statement on the subject, Stanisław of Skarbimierz attempted to systematise the rules of the war and the position of Poland in respect to Teutonic aggression. Basing his assertions on the existing norms of canon and natural law which were in force at the time, Stanisław defined the concept of a just war in a clear manner and he defined its admissibility and the consequences of waging this type of war. In addition, he described the legal consequences of particular approaches towards pagan states (Barycz 1958: 120). Paweł Włodkowic continued to develop Stanisław’s thoughts with the inclusion of the principles of Roman law. Many authors believe this to be the beginning of the modern Polish school of international relations, which was more than one hundred years ahead of the classical theory of the law of nations. This historical universalism, which is so strongly supported by Paweł Włodkowic’s writings, is evident in his thoughts on law, man, social relations in the context of justice and the conformity of human life with the natural law according to the Bible.

The source of Włodkowic’s diplomatic, journalistic or scientific/cognitive activities focused around the Teutonic issue was deeply rooted in the author’s personal experience of injustice carried out by the Order supposedly in the name of love and in the interest of religion. Włodkowic devoted much of his life to exposing and combating the cruel practices employed by the Order, of which he himself was a witness. Therefore, Włodkowic considered the need to point out the great threat that the Order was not only a theoretical religious and political problem, but an important
issue affecting the sphere of social justice and human dignity in practice (cf. BARYCZ 1958: 121).

In his works, Włodkowic comments on the issues described in the texts in an interesting and competent manner that was deeply rooted in theological and legal knowledge. Facts that relate to the ethics of social life are important in the context of the discussed issues. In Teutonic writings of a doctrinal and polemic nature, for instance those of Jan Ftrebach or John of Falkenberg, Włodkowic saw not only short-term political goals, but also errors of a moral and legal nature (cf. ŚWIEŻAWSKI 1987: 251-252), especially since appealing to falsified facts and manipulated views posed a real threat to Polish national interests and the opinion of contemporary Europe about Poland. Consequently, it was important to demonstrate that the real aim of the political spokesmen of the Order was to convince Christian Europe that the Polish people ought to be eradicated.

In an attempt to expose the real nature of the Order of the Teutonic Knights to the representatives of Western Europe, Włodkowic presented only the facts concerning the activity of the Order for example by pointing to legal errors in the arguments presented by the Order. Moreover, Włodkowic’s indubitable merit was that he was able to present the seemingly internal Polish-Teutonic dispute at the level of the general human struggle for fundamental values (cf. BRZOSTOWSKI 1954: 101, also cf. CHŁOPOCKA 1993: 17), placing it in the realm of ethics and morals. In order to highlight the importance of the council in respect to this issue, he stressed that

because an error which is not resisted is approved, and a truth which is not defended is suppressed, because of this, with the aim of discrediting particular writings, erroneous not only in respect to law and morality, but even, as is evident at first glance, hostile towards the Catholic truth, created for the benefit of the Prussian Teutonic Knights against the king and people of the Kingdom of Poland. [...] The present council, taking place in Constance, was convened primarily in order to eradicate such errors and heresy (QUONIAM I: 216).

The fundamental ideas formulated by Paweł Włodkowic were connected with the defence of the Polish national interests and the position of the Polish king, which was threatened by the ideological manipulation of the Order of the Teutonic Knights. His speeches gained importance due to the fact that he acted as envoy and ambassador to the king (cf. GRAFF 2008: 201). The determination of the Polish delegation and Włodkowic’s professional preparation built upon an excellent extensive doctrinal and legal knowledge allowed him to refer to the foundations of morality in an appropriate manner. He was aware of the difficulty of the task set out before him. The possibility of choosing two paths: the doctrinal (processus doctrinalis) and the judicial (processus

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4 In order to falsify documents, the Teutonic Knights used their own specialists and were even assisted by officials from the papal and imperial offices. One of the most common forms of manipulation was the use of a transumpt, a document which contained a copy of a different false document and whose validity could not be confirmed or whose confirmation was not desirable. In this manner the Order falsified documents that, for instance, gave them certain privileges. Cf. EHRLICH 1968: XVII-XVIII.
iudicialis) highlighted this difficulty and the complexity of his role as a lawyer, attorney, envoy to the king, scholar and university representative, clergyman and official. He did not consider his function representative, but instead chose to put great effort into his speeches, realising the importance of the congregation before which he spoke. To Włodkowic this was not a typical judicial case, but a fight for principles (cf. BRZOSTOWSKI 1954: 51) and so he finally opted for the doctrinal path. However, the difficulty of the task was exacerbated by the fact that he attempted to defend Christianity from the Order which itself acted in the name of the expansion and defence of religion (cf. EHRLICH 1968: XXII-XXIII). Only a man of substantial intellect and sensitive personality could put his broad knowledge to use, link it accordingly with religious values and social morality and present this in writing as generally applicable elements of international law. Włodkowic’s writings contained a requirement of religious tolerance presented primarily in the axiological space since the practice of tolerance allows for building and preserving essential human values (cf. JASUDOWICZ 1994-1995: 49).

In the context of Włodkowic’s writings, it was not only the circumstances of their creation but also their addressees that were of noteworthy importance. His manner of argumentation, the cited sources and unambiguous conclusions point to the practical nature of the texts, a result of Włodkowic’s social and political experience and the internal and external conditions of the Republic of Poland at the time. It is worth noting that the scholar from Kraków did not limit the scope of his work to the Polish situation only. Using his own method, referencing fundamental sources and referring only to the most esteemed moral and scientific authority figures of the time, he created scientific, legal and moral bases for the functioning of the society whose coexistence is based on mutual respect, on the moral system which protects human dignity, on the law, which – when respected – allows for a peaceful life, and on social justice, which defines the reasons for and the scope of social respect. He even went one step further and, on the basis of their relations with the Order of the Teutonic Knights, defined the behaviour and use of power of the wealthy, including the highest offices such as the papacy and the empire which controlled the social and political functioning of society.

When writing about the Teutonic Knights, particularly in his treatise Ad aperiem-dam, Włodkowic highlighted the fact that they committed rape and other forms of crime despite their allegiance to the Church and that they justified their actions by claiming that their activities were associated with the propagation of the faith and the importance of the Church. In Paweł Włodkowic’s work, the humanistic conception of morality was also influenced by the patriotic/political background resulting from direct experience with the Order of Teutonic Knights (cf. OGNOWSKI 1997: 141-144). The situation was further complicated by the fact that both the empire and the papacy generally supported the religious activity of the Order. The Teutonic Knights were given privileges which strengthened their position, but in building their political power they would depart from the ideals of the gospel. Włodkowic’s succinct and harsh description of the Order was sure to cause great commotion or even scandal. Włodkowic described the Teutonic Knights as a sect, as a Prussian heresy:
although it is of course stated in what these brothers presented in court and in articles, in which they admit that their order was established in order to exterminate nonbelievers and claim their goods and countries, this, according to them, is what their current documents state: it must therefore be said that they propagate cruelty rather than love, severity rather than charity, harm rather than aid, which is erroneous in the Christian faith, incompatible with love towards God and man and the truth of the gospel. Consequently, it is obvious that they are no religious order, but, if I may draw such conclusions, that they are a mistaken sect which should not be tolerated in any way by the Church of God (Ad aperiendam: 25-26).

**FUNDAMENTAL VALUES**

Referring to social rights, especially in the context of the unjust activities of the Teutonic Order, Włodkowic raises two highly important issues: respect towards human dignity and respect towards the law. These two arguments are drawn from the teachings of the Bible, which regulate the relationship of man to God and God to man. Włodkowic believes this to be the basis for establishing the correct kind of social relations, where every man has the right to his own identity and diversity, and societies and nations have the right to sovereignty and peace. In some way this serves as an analogy to the twofold way of argumentation of the doctrinal and judicial paths. Although it is not unequivocal, the method and the sources used by the author point to his excellent level of theological and legal knowledge. Some of these elements reveal a relationship contained in Włodkowic’s writings – the relationship between tolerance as an interpersonal relation and human dignity, which constitutes the basis for the creation and preservation of this relationship (cf. Domański 1995: 19-30).

The biblical law of love becomes the basis of proof of the fact that every man has the right to respect and, in consequence, every man ought to be treated in a tolerant manner. The uniqueness of every individual and the dignity which goes with it was previously stressed by Stanislaw of Skarbimierz in the following vivid simile from his sermon on just wars:

> If Catholic rulers can use slingers, machines, bombards and so on in their just war, they can, working against injustice, most definitely use any man, since all men are the most dignified of beings in this world (Kazanie: 131).

Włodkowic claims that, since all men were created by God and consequently share the same nature, human dignity requires not only respect but also love and life in friendship:

> however, according to human nature, according to which man was created in the image and likeness of God, he ought to be loved according to the Lord's commandment [...] “We love our neighbours as we do ourselves only if we love them not for our own benefit, not for expected or given blessings, not for kinship or familial ties, but because they are also members
of our nature”; a vulgar voice may comment on the word “members,” stating that Jews and Saracens are our neighbours and therefore ought to be loved by us as we love ourselves, that that is what concerns us. And this is why laws allow us to associate with the nonbeliever and sit at the same table, so that we can use them (Ad aperiendam: 26).

Additionally, Włodkowic frequently highlights the importance of the law of God and the interpersonal relations that result from it. He usually does this in a similar manner, for instance: “Believers and nonbelievers are our neighbours, there is no difference between the two.” (Opinio: 129; similarly: Saevientibus: 59)

Since man, in contrast to other creatures, is a thinking being, this distinction highlights the special nature of human dignity and man’s place in the world: “God himself made everything serve the thinking being for whom he created it.” (Saevientibus: 12) Human dignity also requires freedom, as per the will of God, since “all men by nature were free.” (Saevientibus: 13) Włodkowic’s comments on the difference between the relationship of man and Christ and man and the Church are particularly interesting: “Although nonbelievers are not part of the Church’s flock, all men are without a doubt Christ’s sheep as a result of creation: ‘I have other sheep that are not of this fold.’” (Opinio: 120) To his contemporaries, this distinction may have been shocking, and yet he still refers to the opinion of Pope Innocent IV in this conclusion. This understanding of the term “neighbour” confirms Włodkowic’s position as not only a supporter of religious tolerance but also of pluralism. His direct reference to the Saracens and all pagans as “neighbours” who ought to be loved suggests that his belief in this idea, presented in the text on the abolition of the privileges of the Teutonic Knights, was deeply held. Since he refers to the unity of man by nature both in terms of body and soul, this points to human dignity being associated with the dignity of a child of God. “One is required to treat the Saracens and pagans with the same amount of love, since not only their soul but also their body is human by nature.” (Cf. Ad videndum: 179) Włodkowic does not equate concern for others solely with concern for one’s own salvation, which was the primary idea of converting others to the faith. He perceives man as a whole, made up of soul and body, and he does not limit his perception of nonbelievers merely to a lack of wrongdoing. Włodkowic’s understanding of the duty of love is directly based on that which appears in the Bible and in the teachings of the gospel, the duty of:

1) doing good: „for love of one’s neighbour does not do the evil work of expulsion, or (perpetrate) any other (evil), for charity does not behave itself unseemly and the right will does not perpetrate iniquity. This natural and divine law is immutable and thus can not be set aside even by the Pope, because its change implies sin. Hence it is also that by this law we are bound to help them in necessity, and to give alms”;
2) forgiving: „since forgiveness is due to him if he were captive, especially where disturbance of the peace is not feared”;
3) respecting ownership: „for the (same) reason for which we must not deprive peaceful pagans of their property, we must not deprive them of it heir native land and expel them”;
4) inviolability, or even defence: „therefore the successor of Peter has to feed and defend them, therefore not to permit them to be attacked or hurt.”

He justifies this by stating that “in the Christian religion [...] there is a gentleness and kindness, whose opposite is cruelty.” He also notes that to understand these words differently is simply to sin (cf. Ad videndum: 179-181).

The anthropology employed by Paweł Włodkowic was deeply rooted in Christianity and the tradition of the Latin civilisation. Man, created in the image and likeness of God, is inherently gifted with dignity and free will, which means that regardless of his background or social position, he constitutes a value in itself (cf. Bizoń 2008/2009: 170-180). As a lawyer, Włodkowic analysed the logic of the law in order to find bases for theological arguments which would allow for the identification and reveal of the mistake which contributed to the immoral practices employed by the Teutonic Knights under the guise of concern for the faith. Taking the law of God as a basis directed towards all people allowed for the opportunity to appeal to tolerance as a form of respect towards that law.

A characteristic feature of Włodkowic’s humanism, which can be found in his writings but was still unheard of in the West at that time, was his highlighting of the dignity of every individual irrespective of faith and his condemnation of religious coercion. He believed that respect towards human dignity also applies to pagans and every form of coercion undermines human dignity (cf. Górski 2007: 90). For instance, he claimed that religious dissenters (Jews and Muslims) and pagans have the right to be in control of their own states and freely practice their own religions within them. What is more, on the condition that their religious worship be practiced according to the norms of natural law, he acknowledged their right to their own form of worship even if they were to live in a Christian state. To quote Włodkowic himself: “if nonbelievers wish to live peacefully among Christians no harm should come to them or their possessions.” (Saevientibus: 59.) Włodkowic based his argumentation on the Bible and the behavioural norms revealed by God, the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and Pope Innocent IV and the views of his master from Padua, Francesco Zabarella. Following in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas, he claimed that no one ought to be forced to believe, but also that a faith once adopted should not be abandoned. He considered punishing someone for their crimes against God a form of piety rather than cruelty. Consequently, despite his tolerant stance towards nonbelievers, Włodkowic referred to heresy and heretics in a very strict manner, as in the case of Jan Hus and Jerome of Prague. He held the very daring theological view, which he expressed in his writings, that the theories which go against love, including loving one’s neighbour, the most important law of the gospel, are the most dangerous, rather than those which go against the idea of God.

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5 Innocent IV, Sinibaldo Fieschi born in approximately 1195 in Genoa, died on 7 December 1254 in Naples – pope in the period from 25 June 1243 to 7 December 1254. He was an exceptional representative of the current of thought related to the concept of natural law, according to which religious dissenters may live in countries organised according to their own internal rules. Cf. Kościelny 2013: 48.
In terms of the literary activity of the 15th century, there was a noticeable change in the nature of the texts written at the time and the style employed by the authors. Lengthy commentaries and voluminous *summae* were replaced with treatises on current ethical issues. This was most definitely the result of the changes which were taking place at the time, the creation of new cultural relations primarily connected with the development of universities. Treatises on ethics, an observable intellectual achievement of the intellectual circles which existed at the time, occupied an impressive place in the libraries that were gradually being constructed during this period. Important and pressing social issues connected with behaviour, ethics and morality also appeared in encyclopaedic works, poems or writings of an ascetic-religious nature. This was also related to the tendency to equate the nature of social relations in Christianity with evangelical morality. The severe and virtually ubiquitous moral and institutional crisis that affected the Church at the time was connected with the heritage passed on from previous times, and it was this crisis that forced people to make life changes on the one hand and, on the other, served as an announcement of upcoming religious splits, wars and persecution.

In the interpretation and evaluation of the present situation, one may note the use of the innate nature of natural law, which came from God because God inscribed it into the human conscience and mind although it was not sacred. This understanding and application of natural law could reveal conflicts both within the existing secular positive law and the church law created at the time. Representatives of this type of understanding of the law, including Włodkowic, perceived one of the main characteristics of natural law in the universal and certain belief that all men without question are of the same nature, that they are unified by having the same goal and, consequently, they should treat one another with respect. However, the commandments of natural law are not determined solely by religion and affect Christians, pagans, rulers and subjects equally. This 15th-century tendency related to the interpretation and usage of law was one of the basic elements of Włodkowic’s argumentation (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 293).

The social situation in Europe described above and the abuse on part of the Teutonic Knights in Poland led to legal-theological treatises by Paweł Włodkowic whose purpose was the search for justification in natural law, that is in “pre-Christian,” universal morality (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 83). Włodkowic’s opinion that that which is correct is just, is important in the context of the dispute on the subject of justice taking place among theologians and lawyers. He defines correctness as the adequate and proper accustomed and harmonisation of two parties (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 94). This led to the determination of the source of good and evil. In terms of this issue, Włodkowic was an adamant opponent of the theory of decisionism, which was preferred at the time and which stated that only the absolute and free decision of God means that a particular action may be considered morally good or evil. He perceived this view as a threat to the unwavering validity of the laws of nature (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 119-120). Włodkowic limits the nature of his legal investigation to the legal order which indicates legal comprehension only within the sphere of juridical issues, which allows for the fullest understanding of the facts and their causes (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 140).
Natural law at that time was commonly accepted as the highest and most important of all laws and was the ultimate criterion in evaluating human activity. “The thinkers of the Middle Ages not only gave expression to this truth, but they also made it an integral part of the spiritual heritage of humanity, and this was their most glorious achievement.” (Świeżawski 1987: 143.) Włodkowic’s assumption that the teachings of Christianity possess a value for every man and natural law – recognising such values as human life, freedom, justice and truth – must be in agreement with the positive law of God became a view which was repeatedly confirmed by history. It is worth noting that the exceptional status ascribed to natural law in the 15th century is no longer noticeable or even ignored. (Cf. Rutowski 1985: 194.)

Pawel Włodkowic also warned about the usage of the law of God against natural law in the name of defending supposedly superior and endangered values, which was often used as an argument when attempting to defend or spread the faith by use of force or violence. Speaking in the name of the king and the law school of the University of Kraków, he used the words of Thomas Aquinas which stated that the law of God may never oppose natural law and not only does it not abolish that law, but it is based on it (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 144-145).

The shaping of social relation in the Middle Ages was clearly influenced by thinkers who spoke of the importance of fundamental values. Theoreticians and experts from that period highlighted the importance of the influence of metaphysics and referring to natural law as the foundations which regulated social and international relations. Medieval adherents to the practice of referring to natural law were often supported by the lawyers and theologians of the time who represented the so-called “tolerant line” represented in the Church by, among others, Pope Innocent IV and Thomas Aquinas. However, little by little, natural law was theoretically and practically marginalised due to the weakening of tolerant tendencies. This situation was influenced by the supporters of radical theocracy who maintained that nonbelievers are not the legal owners of their land and thus may be converted by use of force (cf. Świeżawski 1987: 239).

Christian anthropology not only had a general influence on the development of civilisation, but most of all it was gradually becoming the primary form of interpreting the Roman law which was in force during the first centuries of Christianity. One of the most important effects of the influence which was typical of the Christian natural law was the evolution of the term *ius gentium* – the law of nations. It was related to a number of statements typical for Christianity such as: all men are free by nature, created to live in harmony and peace, and material goods ought to be shared, which leads to different forms of co-ownership and the use of one’s own goods to the benefit of one’s neighbour. The term *ius gentium* evolved in response to slavery, which was the result of numerous wars and the thesis that private ownership is a necessity due to the influence of original sin on human nature. Created by Roman lawyers, the term encompassed slavery, laws of war, military occupation and a number of institutions which, from the point of view of the first Christians, were not strictly connected with the always good and always true natural law. Apart from the institutions created by man, the Christian
idea of freedom emerged at the time – a true force which led to the abolition of slavery, which had a real impact on the shape of social relations (cf. Hervada 2013: 71-72).

Initially, *ius gentium* was most definitely understood as a part of natural law. However, interpretations gradually appeared which considered it the only positive law. This view greatly altered the nature of *ius gentium* since it resulted in the understanding of the law of nations as a law enforced by the ruler rather than a law embedded in the human conscience by God. Paweł Włodkowic disagreed with this type of evolution of the law of nations. He believed that the law of nations does not differ from natural law, which is common to man and animals, and, in a narrow sense, the law which identifies with *ius gentium*:

The law known as natural is common to us and other creatures. [...] The law of nations splits off from this law [...] That which was established by the natural mind among all people is abided by all nations and is known as the law of nations *(Saevientibus* : 92).

In some statements Włodkowic refers to natural law as quasi-natural, in others he considers the law of nature a guardian of the law of nations. However, Włodkowic clearly believes that *ius gentium* is closely tied to natural law and relies upon it (cf. Świężawski 1987: 145-146).

It is worth noting that the views gradually taking shape in the Kraków law school during the 15th century, which were to be so effectively employed during the Council of Constance, were an important element in the development of the legal culture of the time. This was of great importance in relation to the concept of the law of nations, *ius gentium*, whose inception is usually attributed to Francisco de Vitoria (16th century) or Hugo Grotius (17th century). As it was the source of ideas which directly or indirectly influenced the emergence of legal ideas in the modern period, the importance of the output of the legal environment in Kraków cannot be overemphasised. 6 Ludwik Ehrlich states decidedly that Stanisław of Skarbimierz and Paweł Włodkowic created the concept of the law of nations understood as the law of international relations at the beginning of the 15th century (cf. Ehrlich 1955: 77-79). Therefore, it appears that the Jagiellonian state, known for its tolerance, constructed this idea on the rich foundations of the achievements of the representatives of the Kraków law school who, in turn, included the social experience of the Polish nation in their work. It is worth noting that although the academic output of this period was and still is not always correctly evaluated and appreciated, as a theory and a foundation of international law it is of great, and not only European, importance (cf. Świężawski 1987: 147-148).

The 15-century legal and religious texts which accompanied the creation of *Corpus iuris canonici* were a rich source of knowledge on the organisation of social and mor-

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6 Although Western sources do not mention it, one cannot exclude the influence of the Polish school of the law of nations on the formation of later, but considered first, concepts created by de Vitorio or Grotius. One could say that in this creative and inspiring though indirect and underappreciated way Włodkowic and the representatives of the Kraków school introduced the Polish theological and political thought into European culture. Cf. Woleński 2010: 51.
al issues. This was important when, during the strengthening of the papal monarchy, changes took place in the interpretation of canon law. This allowed for the introduction of changes, the organisation of Church life and reaching a state of social peace (cf. Święzawski 1987: 152-153). Peace was already understood at that time not only in a negative sense as a lack of war, but also in its positive meaning as enriched by descriptive, normative and evaluative content. The view exhibited in recent years which states that peace as a fundamental value is realised not only through the elimination of wars, but also by giving it a positive meaning expressed in social justice and respect towards the dignity and freedom of the individual and equality before the law dates back to the Polish social (theological) thought of the 15th century. It was first stated at that time that lasting peace may only be achieved through dialogue, tolerance and cooperation, and not by use of force (cf. Michowicz 1997: 42-44).

RECEPTION OF THE HERITAGE OF JAGIELLONIAN EUROPE

Although Włodkowic included theories and concepts in his works which had their sources in the Middle Ages and were rooted in the Medieval reality, his doctrine was also, to a large extent, based on the timeless values arising from the Bible and natural law. This is why their validity and universality is timeless. In the views of Paweł Włodkowic one can find not only a reflection of the religious and political relations in the Jagiellonian Poland of the time, but a depiction of the legal and political state of the Jagiellonian monarchy (cf. Ogonowski 1997: 141-144). Without a doubt Włodkowic’s entire legal and diplomatic activity, which is also reflected in politics and ecclesiology, greatly influenced the development of views concerning the understanding of interpersonal and international relations (cf. Dyl 1990: 68).

Paweł Włodkowic’s doctrine is charged with moral and intellectual meaning. In response to the threat towards the social order of the time, Włodkowic referred to values which guarantee man respect for his dignity: society – the creation of just law, and in the context of international relations – peace and good neighbourly cooperation. The doctrine was based on the return to the Bible, natural law, life in truth and tolerance, that is the generally understood concept of humanism, which shapes man and influences social life based on universal values. These views are particularly important in relation to the integration processes currently taking place in Europe. The mutual relations between the legal system and moral experience in this case, in Paweł Włodkowic’s doctrine, may help in the struggle for balance which is needed in the formation of society in a united Europe.

The possibility of coexistence in the socially diverse Poland required a constant motivation to accept, respect or, at the least, tolerate. The experience which characterised the Jagiellonian Era was rooted in simple interpersonal relations, respect towards the individual and dignity, which every person ought to respect and demand for themselves. Although this description seems excessively idealised, in practice the correct social relations were maintained, and not only for pragmatic reasons.
In the world affected by the crisis of losing sight of one’s own roots, the decline in
the value of family, the weakening of the manifestations of interpersonal solidarity, the
imposition of anthropology without God, the promotion of the “culture of death” and
propagation of the privatisation of religion and the lack of a value system which would
be an answer to the above problems, a new life based on values which give full and in-
credible meaning to human life is evident. A depiction of these values is always a depic-
tion of God on the side of man, his greatest hopes, ambitions and dreams. In his analy-
sis of the social situation in Europe, Jaime Mayor Oreja warns that the existing crisis is
of a global nature and it will test not only the concepts and different aspects of social
life, but also the basic institutions. The danger is the destruction of these institutions
if the cultural and anthropological effects of the crisis are not taken into consideration
beforehand. The essence of the answer to this crisis is to study it within an anthropo-
logical backdrop taking into account all of humanity with all of its important charac-
teristics (cf. Oreja 2013: 63).

The social effects of the crisis in the spiritual realm are manifested in the form of
powerlessness and discouragement in response to fears and dangers. This can be per-
ceived in all spheres of social life including religious communities. This is why John
Paul II urged residents of the old continent to attain renewal through the restoration of
the evangelical value system and the construction of the future of Europe, the “Europe-
an Spiritual Community,” on its foundations (cf. Zenderowski 2003: 6). The Pope
considered the understanding of the challenges posed by God to test man through
events associated with his life as the modern task of the Church. He searched for the
beginnings of European civilisation, finding that which constitutes its roots. He uncov-
ered its strength in the past but also exposed its weaknesses; for instance, threats stem-
ing from hostile political systems, totalitarianisms and ideologies which distort the
importance of fundamental values. The Pope evaluated the situation in modern Europe
and saw its crisis. By exposing its weaknesses, he highlighted the inability to cope with
history, problems with the value system and visible disruptions in the relation between
“to be” and “to own” – with the re-evaluation of “to own.”

The way in which people communicate has always been essential in the shaping of
the social order. Understanding the underlying mechanisms of community life facilitat-
ed the identification of the sources of social morality, which decided the quality of life
and dialogue. In this context a new value of social life appeared – the need to compro-
mise, which was always the result of searching for the same path with mutual respect to-
wards core values and moral rules. Incorporating the experience of social reality in their
research, scholars who studied this subject searched for ways of describing the mecha-
nisms of collective life, the law which governs it and ways of respecting social morality.
The understanding of social relations in Jagiellonian Poland led, in a natural manner,
through compromise to tolerance, often limited by numerous regulations which pro-
tected the inviolability of the fundamental good. Paweł Włodkowic, using theological
and evangelical inspiration and legal knowledge, pointed to the effectiveness of prac-
tising the rules of spiritual life in social life. It allowed for the definition and recogni-
tion of the level of dialogue, understanding and compromise. Tradition, which in itself
encapsulates consistency, is an important element of cultural and religious transfer. For it to occur in society in practice, it requires reception in the form of the normalisation and substantiation of its existence.

Examples of the reception of Paweł Włodkowic’s ideas can be found in many areas of John Paul II’s teachings, public appearances, official documents and numerous letters. They indicate the need to continue the two-thousand-year-old tradition and its faithfulness in the task of maintaining the axiological order, renewing man, his relationship with God and building social order. Therefore, the point is the humanisation of public life (cf. Nitecki 2004: 119), for “bearing in mind the fruitfulness of Christianity in relation to European culture throughout the ages, the evangelical approach – theoretical and practical – towards reality and man must be presented.” (John Paul II 2006: 886.)

The postulate of respect towards human dignity can be realised in a just and sovereign society, which allows for fully experiencing one’s identity and subjectivity. Relationships resulting from experiencing dignity personally should be based on responsibility for others and the realisation of the principle of solidarity in different contexts of social life, including the reality of a united Europe. On a religious plane such approaches lead to an ecumenical understanding of difference.

The historical heritage of the Republic of Poland co-creates European history even when it is forgotten or purposefully omitted. That is why modern Europe ought to be open to the riches of the cultural heritage of Central-Eastern Europe, the heritage of which it was deprived. It also appears that the duty of the inhabitants of this part of Europe is to present praiseworthy examples of service towards the ideals of freedom, tolerance, human dignity and the law of nations, for these values are timeless and their modernity lies in the fact that they must be constantly rediscovered.

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This article focuses on the processes of transferring the cultural elements between different racial, ethnic and religious groups. The transmission of various cultural products containing symbols, norms and values is the result of cross-cultural contact and multicultural relations. Transgression is a kind of exchange and transcultural diffusion between two or more different cultural groups. The processes of common cross-cultural, two-directional influences lead to the creation of new types of universalized identity and create the transcultural forms of social as well as political organization.

Keywords: transgression, cultural contact
Transgression, a term transferred from the area of psychology to the fields of anthropology and cultural studies, is increasingly used in cultural sciences. Its original meaning, which was determined by psychologists, denotes the human need, inclination, eagerness to take on challenges, overcome barriers and cross borders. Transgressive activity is therefore a natural, inborn human need in an intellectual, axio-normative and behavioural sense.

In the intellectual sense, transgression results in the search for unknown phenomena, their discovery and study, the creation of new theories, descriptive models and attempts to explain reality. It may be said that any cognitive activity, especially that of a scientific character, requires one to go beyond the boundaries of knowledge and is therefore transgressive in nature. Any new idea which refutes the existing body of knowledge is essentially transgressive. The heliocentric theory in the field of astronomy, which led to the changes in the prevailing system of values and norms, serves as a good example. As in the case of all transgressive activity, it was met with considerable and consistent resistance on behalf of political and religious institutions upholding the existing axio-normative order. In an intellectual, cognitive sense, especially in the fields of science and art, transgression may be considered heuristic, creative, sometimes revealing, exploratory, progressive, radical. Transgression which takes place in the realm of thought, in the field of symbols and ideas, is a creative activity. However, not all acts of creative will result in clear, positive cultural consequences, as in the case of the fission of the atom and the resulting invention of a powerful weapon. Additionally, many ideas are never brought to fruition, never realised in social practice. Many creative acts of a transgressive nature remain in the sphere of ideas, taking on the form of utopian visions, artistic and scientific works, philosophical treatises, concepts or theories. On the other hand transgression broadens the borders of culture and enriches it by introducing new elements, not only practical inventions, but also creations of a symbolic nature. Many of these cultural consequences of intellectual transgressions remain in the minds or – metaphorically speaking – the “drawers” of their creators, others spread rapidly and enter the sphere of popular culture. Even in its avant-garde form, which is rejected during the social system’s first negative reaction towards it, intellectual, creative transgression is the engine of progress and cultural development. The social sciences attempt to determine the connections and cause-and-effect relationships between the intellectual output of man and the changes taking place in culture. In other words, anthropology and cultural studies, fields concerned with the cultural creations of man, raise the question of the scope of the individual’s impact on culture. Insofar as the opposite relation, the impact of culture on the individual, is clear, the influence of the mechanisms of cultural change which are triggered by outstanding creative personalities is unclear and virtually unexplored.

Transgression also infringes on the existing system of values and norms, sometimes questioning and contesting one of its elements. It may also take on the form of outright rebellion against all of the accepted and axio-normatively established rules of the socio-cultural order. Phenomena categorised as transgressive are also described as trans-
boundary, nonconformist, contesting, transcultural, intercultural, and are associated with the terms: eccentric, radical, total, extreme. This aspect of transgression, transgression as an activity that infringes on the fundamental rules, values and norms of societies shaped and structured in an organised manner (including in a political and religious manner), is most often discussed in the field of social sciences and the humanities. The transgressive activity of individuals or even entire collectivities, such as artistic groups, secret societies, subcultures, religious, ethnic or sexual minorities, terrorist or anarchist groups, members of new social movements, most often leads to their exclusion, marginalisation or even repression. The questioning and contesting of basic social values and norms is in principle an attack on the culture of a particular group which disturbs the cohesive structure of that group and threatens to destabilize it. The majority’s natural response to transgression is resistance. Transgression is often antisocial, antireligious, antinational or antichurch. The names of many legally or customarily acceptable transgressive activities include terms such as: anti-art, anti-culture, counterculture, subculture. Transgression is therefore frequently innovative not only in the realm of ideas but also because of its tendency to interpret values and norms in a manner which differs from that which is established. It also results in the acceptance and promulgation of an alternative axio-normative system which goes against the existing order, guarded by a network of organisations and institutions, including state authorities and churches.

In the behavioural sense, transgression is an action integrated into creative activities which may take on a constructive or destructive character. Without delving into the nature of the transgressive “hubric metaneed” (KOZIELECKI 2002), a psychologically defined phenomenon determined by both nature and culture, its social and collective consequences, rather than the description and characterisation of its individual manifestations, constitute an interesting object of study for researchers in the fields of sociology, anthropology and cultural studies. Within the term cultural transgression, in the simple merging of two words, lies a relationship fundamental for ontological and epistemological analysis – the relationship between that which pertains to the realm of the psyche, which is a product of human nature and the personality of the individual, and that which is collective and socio-cultural. In other words, transgression, conditioned by both psychological and socio-cultural factors, leads to changes in the position and status of the psychological subject, but also to a cultural reaction. Transgression ought to be defined in a psycho-cultural manner with reference to the analytical category of cultural identity. Transgression leads to changes in the cultural identity of individuals, determined by the set of values and standards considered necessary in the social group. Therefore, transgression should not be categorized as a typical individual act of nonconformity, disobedience, contestation, rebellion or maladjustment, but rather as a particular individual’s reaction to the restrictions and limitations imposed by the system of social norms.

The usefulness of the term is a separate issue. As in the case of transculturation and transnationality, the term transgression has become a permanent element of cultural studies. It stems from the universalising needs of scientific language, the transferral of the English term trans, common to many languages from the area of lingua latina, de-
noting “something in-between,” “on the border,” into a common area. There are numerous equivalents to the term *transkulturowy* (transcultural) in the Polish language, such as *międzykulturowy* (intercultural), *wielokulturowy* (multicultural), *zewnętrzny* (external) or *graniczny* (bordering). For scholars in the fields of anthropology and cultural studies it would be easier and more precise to use the terms *przenikanie kulturowe* (cultural permeation) or *zderzenie kulturowe* (cultural clash), which are phenomena that occur as a result of every type of inter-group meeting and contact, regardless of whether they result in conflict and antagonism or integration and assimilation. Cultural transgression as a transcultural social phenomenon on the border of cultures can be found in the domination-subordination model but also at the point of contact of a number of different communities within multicultural, pluralistic societies. Thus the transferral of this analytical category from the sphere of psychology, art, creative output, from the area of attitude and identity theories, to anthropology and cultural studies is only a step away. Therefore, it would seem that the adoption of the terms “cultural transgression” and “transculturality,” bearing in mind the differences in meaning, is justified not only by the necessity of unifying intercultural communication codes, but by the need to combine, with the end goal of synthesis, the scientific output of researchers from different cultures representing various scientific fields.

Transgression challenges nature and subsequently moves to the sphere of culture, as a phenomenon manifested through nonconformity, a broad spectrum of ideas, attitudes, contesting and rebellious activities, resulting in attempts to oppose the dominant and generally accepted systems of cultural values and norms. At present cultural transgression rarely goes against nature or corporal limitations, it is more frequently associated with contestation and rebellion.

Cultural transgression, considered by the author of the present work to be a complex set of processes and phenomena located on the borders of culture and civilisation, is characterised by pairs of analytical extremes: psychology-society, individual-group, identity-culture. However, transgressive phenomena cannot be understood through psychological or sociological reduction. Transgression, as the effect of not only certain states of consciousness, views and ideas, but most of all behaviours and actions, has psychological as well as social and cultural implications. When conducting an analysis of needs and motives, it is impossible to separate the acting individual from the context and cultural background, the values and norms of a particular cultural group. The situation is further complicated by the fact that transgression no longer refers to the unified, monocentric, homogenous culture of one specific group, but is located at the point where two or, realistically speaking, many cultures come into contact. If one assumes the universal psychological nature of all human action, this also leads to the cultural relativisation of its social and collective consequences. The dominant state in contemporary cultural studies is ambiguity, a result of the multicontextuality and relativism of concepts and their meanings.

Transgression not only strives “towards something,” it is also a centrifugal movement away “from something.” The blurry border between “here” and “there” is also the space between “today” and “tomorrow,” “us” and “them,” “old” and “new.” Crossing
the border which leads away “from something” does not mean reaching another border which leads “towards something.” Transgression transfers individuals from one culture to another, from a traditional, homogenous, “rigid” space to a postmodern, multicultural, pluralist area of civilisation which is open to diversity. However, it is usually the case that upon abandoning their native culture and crossing normative and axiological borders, individuals and the groups created by them do not reach a new order, do not cross the borders in the designated direction, but instead remain “in-between” two systems of values, like a castaway at sea who cannot reach either of the islands in his vicinity, floating in the vast ocean of uncertainty and indeterminacy. Therefore, in many cases transgression is a trap which results in estrangement, alienation, exclusion in a socio-cultural sense. Transgressive individuals and the groups created by them are located at the cultural borderlands between two or more axio-normative systems, contesting and encroaching on their borders and values. As a result of crossing the established borders, to whatever extent and on whatever terms, transgressive individuals and groups no longer belong to any culture, they go beyond the established system, willingly but sometimes also accidentally and unconsciously – they “check out” from the existing order and, in terms of the sphere of values, often find themselves “in the middle of nowhere.” However, in this intercultural area located on the transgressive borderline, in this “in-between” space, there are landmarks which stem from beyond the border. Not only that border which is agreed on, mental, symbolic and cultural, but also that which is real, spatial, linguistic, organizational and common. Transgressive means external, “foreign,” “from beyond the border.” It is also associated with the minority, considered marginal and unfamiliar. It is therefore no surprise that many of the elements of transgression theory were established in the area of research and studies on migration and spatial transfers, especially their cultural and social consequences.

1. TRANSGRESSION AS A FACTOR OF CHANGE

All attitudes, actions and acts of a transgressive nature refer to the existing, dominant culture. More often than not they constitute a challenge for the prevailing values and norms and undoubtedly disrupt the existing status quo. Although not always an intentional activity directed towards change, transgression often leads to alterations in the existing state of affairs or at the least stresses the need to reflect on the range of restrictions, barriers and borders which influence the functioning and development of culture. The transgressive activity of individuals and groups clearly signals the need for change, it is the result of restrictions which are imposed by culture and considered detrimental. As any challenge directed towards society and culture, transgression also has an expressive, autotelic dimension, it serves no other purpose than to demonstrate its disagreement with the status quo. In most cases, even when it is destructive, it has the tendency to change the existing state of affairs. In relation to culture, from which it stems, every act of transgression, by going beyond the limits of acceptability, forces the system to react. In this sense transgressive activity may be considered innovative,
despite pertaining to age-old values, norms and phenomena, such as religion, carnality, abortion and sexual behaviour. The borders of culture, designated by moral or legal standards, are constantly questioned through the act of transgression by both individuals and social groups.

Every civil society maintains its continuity and stability thanks to culture. Culture itself is a correlate of the organizational system and social structure. What is more, it aims to protect them. Law, morality, religion, science, state and economy, understood as elements of the socio-cultural system, are based on fixed sets of fundamental values. Individual elements of culture are complementary and supplement one another. Since they ensure cohesion within the group, the values encoded in them are protected and passed down from one generation to the next. According to Florian Znaniecki (Znaniecki 1992: 277):

This belief in the fundamental immutability of the ideological system of people who believe that it is based on some absolute principles, combined with the popular practice of equating behavioural models with models of activity, was the source of the old and abiding antithesis – cultural order – cultural change, an antithesis that can be found in many religious, political and sociological theories, in cultural theories in general but also in studies devoted to particular cultures.

Attitudes, behaviours and transgressive activities are rarely directed against values considered timeless and unchanging. Moreover, transgression is not directed “against” culture, its aim is rather to go beyond the established cultural boundaries. Individuals and groups who conduct transgressive activities, including new social movements, usually do not negate the meaning of ideals such as freedom, equality or brotherhood, they do not go against God or religion, they do not question the principles of the state and the system of social organization; instead, their aim is to overcome what they perceive as limitations and barriers established by the existing social order. To reiterate, transgression does not aim to bring about social change. Nevertheless, it does signal such a possibility or need on part of the people who, by conducting transgressive activities, point to the limitations which are a result of the “rigidity” of the axio-normative system. It is not the reaction of the socio-cultural system to transgression, but rather the disruption of its functionality and consistency that leads to change, especially when transgressive behaviour becomes widespread and can no longer be considered an attribute and indicator of the dissatisfaction of minorities, subcultures or social movements. Transgression as a means of collective contestation assumes the form of a subculture or social movement. Transgression as a factor of cultural change initiated by subcultures or social movements refers to the following aspects of the functioning of the social system and the restrictions which it imposes:

1. Repressiveness of cultural norms. Transgression goes against the excessive repressiveness of religious, legal, ethical and moral norms. The level of unification, institutionalisation and obligation expressed in prohibitions and negative sanctions, which are applied if one deviates from the norm, has a decisive influence on the degree of
radicalisation and the intensity of transgressive behaviour and activities. Cultural transgression is an act of creative freedom, especially in the area of artistic, scientific and intellectual creation, expressed in ways which are innovative and shock public opinion. In extreme cases, those who engage in transgressive behaviour and activities may be subject to condemnation, exclusion, discrimination and even loss of freedom or life. Contemporary cultural transgression takes place in developed, liberal, democratic societies within Western civilisation. Consequently, deviation from the norm is far more acceptable than in other types of societies, especially when it comes to symbolic culture, literature, art, music or film.

2. Artificiality and dysfunctionality of norms. Contestation on the part of subcultures and new social movements is one of the manifestations of transgression. Transgressive subcultures are to a large extent the product of cultural norms that are not natural or not fully authentic. The term natural here refers to the compatibility of the biological and social needs of the members of these groups with the commonly accepted cultural dos and don’ts. This aspect can be described through the dichotomy of experienced values and recognized values. Not all values considered socially important are experienced in a personal and fully internalized manner. Early 21st-century subcultures, insofar as they can be described using these categories, are the product of multicultural, pluralistic society. Originality, distinctiveness and extravagance are considered normal and almost universally accepted. Transgression as a form of contestation is usually not directed “against something” but rather “towards something.” In groups such as those created by sexual minorities, the art community, new religious movements and the emo, rave and goth subcultures, the point is no longer to rebel but rather to emphasise authenticity and individuality in expressing one’s own needs. Members of these groups direct their transgressive contestation not so much against the rules established by the system, but against the hypocrisy, inflexibility and excessive formalism that are characteristic of the norms of the dominant culture.

3. Codification of norms. In this case transgressive behaviour is usually adopted in order to reduce the excessive rigour of cultural codes and norms (including customary and legal codes and norms), in order to empower the individual in his or her actions. Transgression is the reaction of some members of civil society and participants of culture to the monocentric, hegemonic, homogenous nature of the dominant system of values and norms. To put it another way, people demand the implementation of the multicultural model through their transgressive behaviour, driven by articulated or non-articulated cultural relativism. This relativism is associated with aversion towards uniformity, unification, standardisation and homogenisation. It is also the result of a lack of formalisation and institutionalisation, especially in respect to creative groups, subcultures and among members of new social movements, who base their distinctiveness on a common identity which greatly differs from the monocentric identity. Although there are some exceptions, more often than not transgressive subcultures inevitably “clash” with the dominant organisational model in the nation-state. Hence the aversion of the cultural majority in regard to the “misfits” who question religious and national values through their transgressive behaviour towards the dominant cultural order.
4. Standardisation of communication. One of the key characteristics of contemporary transgressive tendencies is the pursuit of diversity of expression and the need to break out from the norm imposed by tradition. In order to break up the monopoly in communication and to increase the diversity of its forms, transgressive groups go beyond the verbal carriers of meaning and content imposed by cultural organisations, including institutions of mass communication. According to transgressive individuals, the press, radio, television, even literature and esteemed art, are burdened with the “sin” of unification and restrictiveness. Dance, music, happenings, or any form of expression that makes little of the established aesthetic, or even ethical canons, is particularly important to transgressive activity. The internet, a multimedia space, a network of electronic communication, allowing for almost limitless – even in legal terms – communication beyond the control of social institutions, emerges as an area of cultural freedom, of unfettered expression. The existence of transgressive groups in general and especially subcultures is based on a network of direct communication – a network which is increasingly transferred to the worldwide web. Transgressive behaviour and activities can no longer be studied without the use of new internet-based methodology.

5. Instrumentalism of values. Transgression in culture aims to give values as a large a degree of autotelism as possible. Transgression is the realisation of a tendency whose goal is to limit commercialisation, bureaucracy and formalism. Transgression rejects and does not accept rationalism and pragmatism. Autotelism serves as a type of alternative to the dominant culture. It often leads to irrationalism and mysticism, especially in the case of subcultures classified as New Age. The most recent wave of subcultures, classified by the author of this work as post-subcultures, in essence strive only to underline their own autotelic nature as a differentiating element in a multicultural society. Their originality and distinctiveness is transferred into the sphere of symbols, communication codes, rather than into the area of contesting activity. Currently, in a time when globalisation engenders syncretisation and hybridisation, also when it comes to subcultures, the most important purpose of subcultural transgression is to preserve the border of one’s own distinct identity.

6. Exclusive cultures. Some communities and social environments are more prone to transgressive behaviour than others. Every subculture is a transgressive environment that brings together and groups “escapees” who managed to break out from the “golden” cage of culture. The majority of subcultures, apart from those which are established as a result of social marginalisation, the social exclusion of their members, are created by well-fed, wealthy, developed and democratic Western societies. Other forms of social contestation, brought about as a result of poverty, social impairment, humiliation, generally engender the development of social movements of a political nature, although they do also give rise to criminal youth subcultures, such as street gangs or hooligan groups. Transgression is an element of cultural difference, but it does not always lead to a creative alternative. In many cases it can result in social exclusion and cultural marginalisation.

7. Formalisation of behaviour. The aim of transgressive groups, and especially subcultures, is freedom from rigid patterns of conduct and formal regulations that dictate
behaviour. The dominant lifestyle in transgressive subcultures is easy-going and care-free, characterised by the avoidance of commitment, a fascination with details and the tendency to live in the moment, seize the day. Feelings and emotions are far more important than material losses or gains. Spontaneity, next to authenticity, is one of the key factors that characterise subcultures, at least until the point of their ritualisation. Spontaneous access to the subculture, its voluntary and non-restrictive nature, is the source of the transgressive behaviours of its members. However, although access is voluntary, it can become an obligation; this is due to the nature of leadership and intra-group ties rather than the nature of the subculture itself. Since it is a means of breaching formal, statutory and legal obligations and restrictions, transgression is rarely tolerated and accepted by the organizational system and social institutions, especially those which pertain to education.

8. Autocracy. One version of this aspect of transgression contrasts unity with diversity and monism with pluralism. Cultural transgression of a collective nature is a product of democratic societies, but it is also a condition of their existence. Transgressive activities usually take place in societies which generally – though not in all cases – have a tolerant and accepting approach towards difference and focus on the protection of minority rights. They are specific to multicultural civil societies and are an attribute of the deliberative democracy model. Despite their protest-oriented origin, transgressive groups usually do not attempt to confront the system. It is the reaction of the system that usually leads to confrontation and often the escalation and popularisation of particular subcultures, as in the case of student protests, the period of civil unrest in France during May 1968, or the autumn of the “outraged” of 2011.

9. Monocentrism. Transgressive subcultures strengthen the identities of individuals and groups which are part of the social system. Membership in a subculture is usually at odds with the principle of centralism and top-down control over culture. It is therefore automatically against any ideology of a totalitarian nature. All subcultures strive towards social de-monopolisation and attempt to overcome cultural hegemony. Domination is characterised by a monocentric approach, ethnophobia, nationalism, racism and religious fundamentalism. Subcultures affirm the polycentric order; they expand the range of cultural pluralism and new types of multicultural identity. Subcultural transgression inherently goes against the cultural hegemony model and increases the range of diversity in civil society.

10. Unification. Cultural transgression is the expression and the result of dissimilarity and subculturality. That which is extraordinary, non-recurring, exceptional, rather than homogenous and common, is particularly appealing to members of subcultures. Subcultures create mechanisms which stimulate the creativity of their members. They encourage the search for new patterns of conduct and forms of expression. This explains the popularity of audiovisual, multimedia means of communication, which allow for bold, unorthodox experimentation, especially in terms of artistic, ludic, music-related fields. Subcultures oppose mass/popular culture but they are also a product of that very culture. The need to stand out from the crowd, highlight the difference, dissimilarity and originality of one’s looks, behaviour and attitude, becomes an ideologi-
cal obsession, a type of subjective schizophrenia. Subcultures, and especially youth subcultures, are usually based on rebellion against the unification of norms and behaviour.

11. Standardisation. Transgressive groups affirm the right of every individual to freely express their personality without being limited by cultural restrictions. In particular, they object to the manipulation of society based on ready-made, standardised forms of influence, such as televised news, commercials and stereotypes. In transgressive groups, individualisation of behaviours and actions often, though not always, becomes a principal value, leading to the creation of new ideological identities. Nevertheless, subcultures oppose the standardisation and uniformity of cultural values, usually preferring unconventional, unique forms of music, lifestyle and creative activity.

Uniformity. Transgressive groups place particular importance on the right of every individual and group to freedom in terms of shaping their own cultural preferences according to their own needs and taste. These preferences are connected with environmental factors which are the result of inhabiting the same ecosphere as other members of a particular housing estate, neighbourhood, racial or ethnic ghetto – as in the case of rappers, blokersi [representatives of a Polish youth subculture associated with hip-hop, disillusioned young people living in blocks of flats in large urban settlements] or the Rasta subculture, a division of values due to being situated in the same social category – as in the case of dresiarze [representatives of a Polish youth subculture, young people wearing tracksuits as everyday clothing, characterised by offensive, aggressive behaviour and criminal activity], hip-hoppers or kibole [Polish football hooligans], or the articulation of the same needs and goals – as is the case in hippy, student, alterglobalist, feminist, ecological, religious or music-related (such as emo or rave) subcultures. Musicians, artists, rebellious priests, thinkers who go against the “current” of major ideological movements, philosophers, scholars, exceptional people, “superhumans,” who express the needs and aspirations of their imitators, fans and admirers, become the leaders, idols and symbols of transgressive subcultures.

Recent theories of reconstruction and modernisation, especially in post-structural concepts in anthropology, are leaning towards the acceptance of transgression as one of the positive aspects of social change. Nevertheless, due to its rebellious and defiant nature and its disregard for or outright rejection of the rules of the system, transgressive behaviour has generally been regarded as a negative, destructive aspect of change that disrupts the functioning of the system. Terms such as destructive, destabilising, disorganising, anarchist, pathological, discordant, disturbing, and many others which carry a similar meaning, are still frequently used when referring to transgression.

According to Florian Znaniecki, change is a gradual, constant, often unnoticeable process. It is a permanent process of reorganisation, through which the cultural system, and especially its representatives, assess specific types of positions and social roles from the point of view of their functionality and usefulness. Among such creative, innovative, “supranormal” units are members of subcultures who undertake transgressive action, contesters, rebels, remarkable people, at once exceptional, controversial and creative. According to Florian Znaniecki, the reorganisation and disorganisation of culture primarily takes place in conditions which threaten the stability and integrity of the
system. Therefore, it may be regarded as a mechanism which is “inscribed” into the internal logic of the system and the rules that govern it. Systemic approaches refer to the nature of transgression as necessary, regular, routine, rather than accidental.

Change may also be accidental or intentional. The latter type of change is particularly important in the context of the evolution and transformation of the socio-cultural system. It constitutes the basis for the reinterpretation of individual and group needs and the ways in which they are met by particular social circles. An important characteristic of this concept is that a special category of “abnormal” and atypical people, described as “supranormal deviants” by Florian Znaniecki (Znaniecki 2001: 282-294), is of the utmost importance to the process of change. Additionally,

the personality of the supranormal deviant is therefore focused within his objective tasks, not those which are externally imposed, but those which he undertakes of his own choice. These tasks may belong to many fields of cultural life; usually, however, his interests lie in one particular field [...]. His personality does not boil down to a particular set of established roles. In pursuit of his aims he destroys the established framework of role models and disrupts social circles (Znaniecki 2001: 289).

Creative innovation is the primary mechanism of cultural change. According to Florian Znaniecki “It is clear that innumerable cultural crises are the result of innovation, they emerge as a result of introducing new elements into the system, elements which the community or individual borrow from others or produce on their own” (Znaniecki 2001: 61). Innovators, transgressive contesters, are usually people who are particularly suited, both socially and personality-wise, for this type of occupation. They occupy a select, though not always privileged, place in every social circle. In the words of Florian Znaniecki (Znaniecki 2001: 276)

All deviants, both supranormal and subnormal, rebel against the norms which regulate their social roles, especially against social functions imposed by the normal environment. Their defiance may concern factual tasks or the rules that govern moral, individual or collective activity.

Arnold Joseph Toynbee had a similar view of the origin of change and the way in which it unfolds – he believed that the process of change is connected with the increasing complexity of the system and is always the product of a creative, alienated minority. This special category of people has the exclusive ability to resolve the growing tension and conflict in every culture. Change can only be caused by the elite, as long as it is motivated and prepared accordingly. One of the stages of change, according to Arnold Toynbee, is alienation, defiance on part of the members of the elite, withdrawal from active participation in socio-political life in order to establish a non-evaluative set of conditions for change. The contesters are members of a select transgressive category which unites exceptional individuals who are aware of their role and goals. This type of elite usually takes the form of the seemingly unnecessary social category of “marginal
people.” Their role is usually defined by the occurrence of change. If they are unsuccessful in its effective implementation they become outcasts, exiles and anarchists (TOYNBEE 1947). Some avant-garde, transgressive and creative subcultures, such as diggers, beatniks, hipsters, alterglobalists, anarchists, ecologists, new religious movements, artistic groups, are examples of this socio-cultural category.

According to Arnold Toynbee, the road to change leads through protest, resistance, rebellion against the status quo. Consequently, the system will remain stable and cannot develop until the appearance of a category of contesters, rebels, nonconformists (TOYNBEE 1947: 217-240). This approach was particularly popular in the works of sociologists writing about and attempting to explain the mass youth protests in the 1960s. The number of protesting individuals and groups and the scope of their activities prompted some researchers to accept the thesis that change may be both a consequence and a cause of transgressive contestation.

The most fertile and most reasonable theory appears to be the theory that interprets transgression and contesting subcultures both as a cause and a result of change. Transgression, as a form of subcultural contestation, becomes a mechanism of change, a reaction to flaws in particular elements of the system but also a cause for their appearance. Change and transgression become aspects of the same process of re-adapting elements of culture to new requirements and challenges imposed on the system by members of subcultures. In this case transgression cannot be equated with revolution or evolution. It is a separate mechanism of change, one that is always singular, unconventional, unique, colourful, controversial and never emotionally indifferent.

Cultural transgression is inherently of a subcultural, contesting, minority, relativist, multicultural nature. It is also connected with progress, development, social change and culture. It accompanies crises, disturbances of the social and cultural order, it intensifies during periods of instability in the social structure, it functions as an indicator of fluidity and unrest, it is associated with challenges and fears. It breaks stereotypes, questions established norms, it ignores and endures prejudice, it does not respect the borders marked out by nationalisms, ethnocentrisms, monoreligious and monocentric systems of values and norms. In a certain sense, it is a measure of contemporaneity, the current state of affairs. Using a comparison, one could say that every act of transgression is a reflection of the culture in which it takes place. The nature of the act, whether it is creative, an instrument of progress and change, or destructive, anti-cultural, depends on the nature of the social system in which it occurs. Transgression is a response to the conditions determined by the socio-cultural system. In the present times of globalisation, cultural universalisation, rapid technological development, innovative tendencies, “cultural shock” (TOFFLER 1985), fluid and dynamic social life (BAUMAN 1996), transgression has become an acceptable phenomenon and factor of cultural change. However, it is still considered a nonconformist, minority, avant-garde phenomenon which is relative to the requirements of social stability. Transgression is defined and evaluated differently by the organizational system and social institutions, including those of a religious and political nature, and differently from the perspective of the cultural infrastructure, mass media, internet, television, music industry, galleries, museums and...
the art market. Technological change is characterised by a greater scope of creative freedom, but also by the requirement of being innovative, original, exceptional, different, “visible” in the multimedia. In other words, transgressive behaviour and actions must catch the viewer’s attention, arouse interest in the observer, cause some form of public reaction. Transgression is gradually becoming a market product, a cultural commodity “for sale.” It is therefore no wonder that, despite its innovative, nonconformist nature, it may take extreme and radical symbolic forms which are presented and realised in a scandalous and controversial manner. Some consider transgression a positive cultural phenomenon, others believe such antisocial behaviour and actions ought to be forbidden, illegal. Depending on the socio-political contest, structure of the system, organization of the normative-legal system, the position and role of religious institutions, transgression may be evaluated in very different, contrasting ways. Transgressive behaviour is subject to widely differing opinions. It is considered innovative by some and revolutionary and destructive by others. Demands for the freedom of the individual and independence of the cultural group are considered anti-system, anti-state and a punishable offence, but may also be viewed as positive action on part of the citizen. From the perspective of institutions whose purpose is to protect the established socio-political order, transgressive contesters, leaders of new social and religious movements, leaders of libertarian groups, anarchists, homosexuals, those who fight for gender, racial or ethnic equality, members of subcultures, are seen as instigators and often considered criminals. In many cases radical activists from transgressive minority groups, subcultures or social movements are considered terrorists, bandits, heretics, dissenters and traitors by some and heroes, martyrs and innovators by others.

Transgression is accompanied by scandal, notoriety, controversy. As in the case of all other actions and activities that result in the crossing of cultural borders, transgression becomes part of a spectacle – a spectacle which takes place on a local and global scale, on a public and private level, in the spheres of religion, ethics, aesthetics and politics. Currently transgression may be considered not only the expression of individual aspirations and needs, but a necessary element of media culture. Creators of culture, artists, actors, directors, musicians, attempt to outdo each other in their ability to surprise and shock their audience. Transgression increasingly takes the world of mass media into consideration and attempts to target its recipient, mainly the masses. Many instances of transgressive behaviour are provoked by the mass media, television channels or web portals. The press, especially in the case of tabloids, excels in searching for, hunting down and disclosing any phenomena that differ from the norm. Privacy and intimacy are increasingly made public. On the one hand social networking sites such as Facebook provide instant messaging services and allow for the exchange of information, on the other they are used for the purpose of cultural exhibitionism. Transgressive cultural phenomena are no longer marginal; they are gradually shifting from the periphery to the centre of popular culture. Contemporary cultural dynamics are characterised by moral relativism, which accompanies transgression, and the alteration of the boundaries that dictate which creative acts, actions and behaviours are considered adequate, tolerable and customarily acceptable. On the other hand there is an upsurge
in the degree of variety of alternatives and the number of patterns of transgressive behaviour which go beyond the sphere of privacy and which are spread through online communication. Different forms of transgression, those which stem from the fringes of society and from the creative elite, are accompanied by changes in the identity of those who participate in the mass-cultural spectacle. In addition to symbolic culture: theatre, cinema, literature, art, transgression may now also take place in fields such as technology, economics and politics. Concert halls, museums, and galleries are abandoned in favour of streets, stadiums, homes and public places.

2. TRANSGRESSION AND THE IDENTITY OF CULTURAL TRANSFER

Culture has transformed into a spectacle with a network structure which currently prioritises categories such as: the mass public as audience, number of viewers, availability, attractiveness and popularity of content. The space which is “taken over” and dominated by mass media undergoes universalisation. It is an intercultural and multicultural space, composed of the elements of the here and now, transgressive, trans-border, inhabited by active creators and passive viewers of the spectacle, show, transmission. New cultural patterns, fashions, trends and other values, norms and needs, which are elements and components of new types of identities of the participants, creators, recipients, are emerging at a growing rate. It is an interactive space, an area of cultural transfer, complex, transitional, “transformational,” “fluid” types of participant identities. The multicultural, self-universalising, globalised world of popular culture intrinsically creates a new type of identity which can be described as “transitional,” “midway,” “in-between,” located between two or more reference groups. This type of identity is common to travellers, migrants, tourists, but also to the recipients of television, internet and multimedia coverage. The identity of cultural transfer is an answer to the requirements set out by postmodern culture. It imposes new forms of participation, but enables and facilitates intercultural communication and contributes to new forms of pluralism.

The identity of cultural transfer is typical of individuals who have not yet reached their destination, who are “on the way,” which often leads “to nowhere.” It comes with the awareness of participating in transformative processes, an identity which is “in motion,” located in the transitional area between the individual’s native culture, their cultural “starting point,” and the “target” culture, which is in the process of being designed and developed. If one poses the question of whether a Goral (Polish: Góral, literally “highlander”) from the Podhale region in southern Poland can become an American, or if a Silesian can become a European of German national identity, the scope of the analysis of identity transfer is determined in the same way as when one attempts to establish why the Romani people do not undergo Polonisation or Germanisation despite participating in different cultural areas, including those which are European, Western and global. The identity of cultural transfer is not only common to people who live “on the cultural borderlands,” members of cultural minorities, autochthons, residents of cultural reserves, ethnic districts, multinational academic or tourist enclaves (Mac-
Cannell 2002), but also active users of the Internet, who are also located “on the borderlands” of different cultures.

The identity of cultural transfer is characterised by phenomena such as transgression, subjectification and individualisation of participants’ identities, universalisation, democratisation and mediatisation. It is an inseparable element and product of globalisation, especially when it comes to technological development in the sphere of interpersonal intercultural communication. The identity of cultural transfer is an answer to the changing requirements of postmodern culture, a tactic which allows one to function in a social environment which is constantly in motion, full of alternatives and choices. Just as reality itself it is fluid, dynamic, unstable, sensitive to change and open to the diversity and multiplicity of cultures. It is the identity of people who are in motion living in a world which is in motion. This type of identity is amorphous, multifaceted, complex, encompassing numerous synthetic, syncretic and hybrid forms; the destination of its “carrier,” who follows the path of multiculturality, is unknown.

Identity is not something which is given, it is a creative process through which a particular image of the outside world is constructed in the mind of the individual, it is a way of adapting to reality through constant creation. According to anthropologists,

Identity is currently becoming an arduous challenge, a lifelong task for people-in-motion living in a world-in-motion. Although the world appears to be more unified, the comfortable feeling of detachment, of drifting on the open sea where the distance from the seabed, one’s roots, is equal to distance from the shore, one’s new possibilities, is rarely experienced by its inhabitants (Burszta/Kuligowski 2005: 15).

The identity of cultural transfer is neither superficial nor deep. It allows its “carrier” to explore the phenomena on the surface and in the depths of the substance in which it is submerged. It is a global, infinite space of popular, mass, universalised culture, available in any place and at any time to anyone who has access to the worldwide web or is a user of the channels of mass communication and exchange.

The identity of cultural transfer is “itinerant,” typical of men “of the road,” travelers, pilgrims, migrants, tourists, nomads who move from airport to airport, hackers and creators, intellectuals and visiting professors, students participating in international or intercollegiate exchange programmes or secondary school students learning foreign languages. The identity of cultural transfer is the identity of those who participate in intercultural exchanges. It is an attribute of those who move in a semantic rather than spatial sense, who travel in a world of meanings, symbols, values and their carriers. As stated by the cited anthropologists,

It is clear that we live in the times of the great migration of objects, they are sold and bought, thrown away by some and collected by others, exchanged and stolen, abandoned and found. The internet, the greatest exchange market in history, has joined the extensive network of bazaars, marketplaces, fairs, flomarkets and stock markets [...]. Objects now lead a nomadic life of their own, seldom retaining permanent cultural roots or a particular identity. Our eve-
“accessories” do not need to tell any simple story, they cross borders but are no longer marked with specific seals (Burszta/Kuligowski 2005: 14).

The identity of cultural transfer allows one to go beyond the borders of one’s own affiliation, to open up to different cultures and their “carriers.” However, this approach frequently leads “to nowhere,” imprisoning its “carrier” in a semantic trap, in a cultural reserve, in a space which does not belong to any community or group. Occasionally, if the existing social and cultural order is disrupted or “deconstructed” as a result of globalising changes, people torn away from tradition, a familiar cultural space, embark on a “journey” in search of a new identity, follow the path which leads to a new “project.” To some extent this journey is pointless, it leads “to nowhere” (Zubrzycki 1989: 8). People disinherited from their culture, who no longer identify with a homeland that has ceased to exist, accept old hierarchies of values as dominant or become “neophytes” of the new order. In extreme cases this ends in a constant state of remaining “in exile,” the lack of a crystallised identity with one’s new ideological homeland, a state of awareness typical of culturally disinherited and cosmopolitan people. In these cases spatial transfer, migration, journeying across the “wilderness” of contemporary culture, becomes a means of achieving freedom from the ideological, moral and customary requirements of a particular ethnic-national or citizen community. As a result, one’s identity can be freed from the narrow, regional/local borders of ideologies such as nationalism, socialism or patriotism, allowing individuals who are aware of their contestation to permanently abandon their position in the social system and move from place to place.

In such cases many kinds of identities emerge which are transitory, temporary, random, “for show.” On the one hand the pressure of the social system, the structural requirements of being an actor, artist, politician, intellectual, reporter, journalist, lawyer, doctor, but also a financial immigrant, alterglobalist, union activist or student, result in the imposition of various “masks” onto one’s indigenous identity. On the other hand there is the need to protect the original, authentic sphere of one’s personality, which is characteristic of contemporary culture. Identity is the key to the conflicting requirements of “postmodern contemporaneity.”

Identity is gradually becoming a type of “programming” or “software” that characterises individuals who participate in the processes of globalisation and are subject to the influence of cultural universalisation. Being part of the universal web of meanings, symbols and values involves the constant “reinstalling” and updating of one’s “cultural software,” which allows for communication with other web users. Thanks to the system which allows for the exchange of information, meaning, context and sense, we become “compatible” with other participants of mass, intercultural, universalised culture. Identity is based on the constant updating of information and adding of new mechanisms of adjustment to the changing requirements of social life. Man is like a computer hard disk drive with only the original, basic version of an operating system installed – the cultural identity of one’s native, usually homogenous, monocentric cultural group. Cultural and social environments are gradually becoming more heterogeneous, they are composed of a multitude of different elements in which – in accordance with the concept of the
“cultural supermarket” – the values, symbols and creations of many different groups are mixed together.

The identity of cultural transfer inevitably accompanies all those who go beyond the borders of their own culture, their own community, not only in a spatial but also in a symbolic sense. The identity of cultural transfer is a process of updating, sometimes reinstalling, one's cultural software. This kind of identity is accompanied by numerous phenomena and processes such as multiculturalism and pluralism, transgression and transculturality, hybridism and syncretism, assimilation, acculturation and cultural universalisation. It is the Castellsian category of “project identity,” the identity of becoming and exchanging, shaped in the process of globalisation through the constant collision of different axio-normative systems, both in the private and public spheres, in direct human contact and in the worldwide web, multimedia, indirect communication and transfer. The identity of cultural transfer is a “project identity,” created, recreated, updated, allowing individuals and groups plucked from their previous social and cultural position and placed in a new globalised, mixed, pluralised, “mashed up” space to adapt.

The third type of identity, “project identity,” emerges when social actors create a new identity, on the basis of available cultural materials, which redefines their position in society, and in doing so aims to transform the entire social structure (CASTELLS 2009: 23-24).

The phenomena and categories of “cultural identity,” “cultural difference,” heterogeneity, multiculturalism, dissimilarity and autotelism are key to modern studies on and conceptualizations of culture. On the other hand the aim of contemporary scholars of anthropology and cultural studies is the critical reinterpretation of not so much the ontological status of culture but the possibility of subjecting it to systematic studies based on existing methodology. The entirety of contemporary theoretical thought in the area of culture studies is made up of antinomies and oppositions, disputes on the importance of what is common and similar or what is singular and different, what is objective and what is subjective, local or global, homogenous or heterogeneous. Although it does not systematise or explain phenomena, the multicultural perspective is at the forefront of contemporary research. Instead, it compounds the problem of existing controversy concerning alternative ways of practising culture studies, signalling their impotence rather than the possibility of the emergence of a new, holistic paradigm. Subjectivity, individuality, fragmentation, fluidity, instability, temporality, dynamism, the changing nature of identity, minority issues, localism against the unification and standardisation of current global tendencies, these are the most important topics and motifs of contemporary cultural theory. Postmodern discourse on the subject of culture and society is shifting towards extreme, liberal assumptions, in which, according to Andrzej Szahaj (SZAHAJ 2010, 149)

Dissimilarity and difference are celebrated, actively sought out, intensified and multiplied. Any form of unity is seen as essentially oppressive and any form of multiplicity as liberating. No standards of superiority or inferiority are recognized, all evaluations which attempt to
create a hierarchy of worldviews, cultures or value systems are rejected. Only difference, otherness and plurality are considered to be of value.

Thus culture and its conceptualisations cease to be an ideological weapon of expansion for dominant groups, they do not differentiate between people on the basis of their nationality, race, religion, sex or for any other reason. Contemporary notions of culture are a kind of expiation in relation to the theory justifying the “superiority” of Western national cultures in recent centuries. Postmodernism, pressured by the representatives of previously dominated and conquered cultures, would like to erase the “stain” of imperialism, colonialism, cultural domination from the theoretical tradition of Western universities (see: Said 1991; Appadurai 2000). The multicultural, alterglobalist, critical, liberal tendency towards the institution of the nation state is exemplified by the postmodern standpoint on post-structural, transgressive and gender issues. In the words of Andrzej Szahaj (Szahaj 2010rok: 151), this viewpoint suffers from numerous problems, of which it is worth mentioning those of a theoretical and political nature. The first kind, difficult to justify in light of available data, presupposes the existence of a state of independence from any initial judgments concerning one’s own viewpoint, the possibility of freeing oneself from all contexts, whether they be of a cultural or axiological nature, and peacefully drifting, floating above all earthly affairs and from this height contemplating all the differences in the world. Or, in a different, equally unreliable version, attachment to one’s own viewpoint and the simultaneous aim of intensifying the world’s differences, the multiplication of difference for the sake of difference. This version is not credible because it assumes that it is possible to simultaneously want something that is in line with one’s own viewpoint and something that is totally against it.

In other words, postmodern discourse, attitudes, narratives are full of contradictions, alternative suggestions, antinomies and inconsistencies. They reflect the nature of reality through their individualist, subjective, relativist, ambiguous character. Amidst all the theoretical confusion, a common definition of reality which would reduce it to a construct of thought, a human creation which would conform to the needs of its creators, has not yet been devised. From this perspective culture becomes fiction on the one hand and primary reality on the other. However, a sceptical and pessimistic conclusion can be drawn from these contradictions: the golden age of cultural studies has ended, and a new stage of contemplating the nature and structure of scientific thought itself has begun. We are dealing with “thought on the subject of” thought on culture. There are as many perspectives on the subject as there are discourse participants.

The need for the constant comparing of one’s own culture with other cultures has, through the prism of his cultural behaviour, become the source of the canons of human thought. Hence there is still much debate on issues […] on cultural relativism, the rationality of societies, language disparity, the role of the symbol in culture, myth, religion, ritual, family and so on. It would appear that none of these problems have been fully resolved, that research on
this subject is successively revised, which becomes the basis of anthropology being the art of doubting, the glorification of the social diversity of the world of values combined with the act of distancing oneself from oneself and one’s own culture (Burszta 1998: 179).

Contemporary cultural sciences, including anthropology and cultural studies, attempt to find a solution to the theoretical and methodological dispute, perhaps even conflict, in which the modernist theories of nation-state and postmodern discourse on the subject of civil societies have found themselves. These disputes are not mere academic squabbles. They originate from the academic evaluation of the current political, social or cultural reality which is – like the structure of theory itself – ambiguous, multicontextual, fluid, changing, uncertain and unstable. What is more, reality itself – like our reflection on reality – is in a state of permanent crisis. The crisis of values, economic and political disasters, is accompanied by the feeling of social uncertainty. Postmodern thought attempts to free science and society from political involvement and fear while simultaneously intensifying that fear and strengthening the feeling of uncertainty. However, from critical, multicontextual and multifaceted postmodern thought stems the commonly articulated need for its organisation and newfound conceptualisation in the form of a new paradigm which would incorporate the achievements of modernist theory and post-structural discourse. However, it would seem that this task is as yet impossible. Difference rather than similarity is the basis of all contemporary discourse. Consequently, anthropological thought on the subject of transgression also becomes transgressive, going beyond existing theoretical and conceptual barriers and conventions, introducing new, controversial paradigms.

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SEARCHING FOR A NEW IDENTITY: MUSLIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

ABSTRACT This article is devoted to the issue of multi-ethnic relations in Western Europe, and in particular to the question of the search of Muslim nowadays identity. The so-called civilization clash, language and culture diversity, the ongoing debate about the Muslims both new comers and old settlers are the crucial issue. Muslims in Western Europe are in constant search for their new identity made out of various elements, such as influences of home tradition, new movements, including fundamentalism and modern western trends. What is more, since Europe is predominantly Christian country, a development of Muslim-Christian dialogue is essential because it will have a tremendous influence of shaping new Muslim identity.

Keywords: Muslims, Western Europe, newcomers, identity, family reunion, transition new data
One may say that people who decide to leave their native land and emigrate to another country are usually very determined because the very hard and often tragic conditions of their lives prompted them to take such a decision. However, in their new country they experience new challenges and the encounter with a different culture, language and customs usually contributes to the increasing feeling of alienation and uncertainty. Eventually, as a result, their situation, at least for some time, does not change for better. Having problems with communication, struggling with day-to-day problems, the immigrants put themselves in a situation which they cannot fully understand. They not only have to learn how to “survive” in this new environment but, at the same time, they have to remember who they are and where they came from. In other words, while adjusting to their “new” and very “different” world they have to preserve their identity and protect themselves from losing its essence and values.

The Second World War (1939-1945) caused a tremendous destruction in Europe. Some cities practically disappeared, in the others many living quarters, historical monuments and industrial sites were substantially destroyed. As a result the social, political, economic and cultural life in the continent was no longer the same. Europe needed total reconstruction and this could not be done without a large quantity of cheap labor force. Between 1950 and 1970 the first waves of immigrants came to Europe, especially to Great Britain and France and then, during the 1950s to Germany and other countries. These waves, followed by subsequent ones, were to form the bulk of the immigrant populations in Western countries.

Among these immigrants there were also Muslims, and between 1950 and 1970 a number of them significantly increased. It was no longer the issue of a few thousand workers that the host country had to deal with but rather of several hundred thousands of Muslim residents who were simply living in European countries, establishing families and the old intention of going back to their native lands was becoming a rather remote hope. Instead the Muslim immigrants were making plans for their future in Europe.1

It is now more than a generation since Western Europeans began to notice that there were Muslim communities settling in their cities. The days of the temporary migrant workers had been replaced by the establishment of families in a process which clearly going to be permanent. Furthermore, this fact has also reminded the Europeans that there were already well-established Muslim communities in the parts of South Eastern Europe. The wave of immigration of people from Muslim countries which started after the Second World War brought to Europe first Muslim men, then their wives and the whole families. Although reluctantly, the European governments attempted to respond to the needs of new settlers by designing some kind of social and educational programs that would foster assimilation/integration process. As a result, the early simplistic plans that with the passage of time, perhaps over one generation, and the new immigrant communities would have become assimilated and integrated, did not work. In addi-

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1 For complex discussions on related issues refer to: HADDAD 2002; CESARI/MCLoughlin 2005; PĘDZIWIATR 2007; PARZYMIES 2005.
tion, one should point out that the Europeans were and still are reluctant to accept people who were/are different, except when on their terms. This attitude has certainly contributed to Muslims’ assertion of their own distinctiveness in response (see: RAMADAN 2001: 269). Furthermore, the Muslims’ attachment to their tradition has forced local communities, politicians and academics in European countries to take their needs seriously and forget about naive assimilationist scenarios.

The new environment that the Muslim immigrants found in the European countries had also significant implications on them and new generations born in Europe. Therefore, they had to pay considerable attention to the impact of their new situation for their faith and its practice, and the ways in which the faith might continue to form an appropriate and functional foundation for their daily lives. In other words, while living in a modern Western environment and at the same time coping with their changing traditional background, not only they had to preserve their Muslim identity but also to “enrich” it with a European context. Aware of this new situation and pushed by the desire to protect their identity, some Muslim began to organize their communities, establishing more mosques and founding Islamic organizations in order to secure for an average person places to pray, gather, learn and to facilitate the participation in various activities of local Muslim community.

There are some important facts about Muslim presence in Europe today. Since the 1950’s, their number has significantly increased and there are about 15 millions of Muslims living in Western Europe (KLAUSEN 2005).

Muslim presence in Europe is quite visible, their religion accounts for the second one in some countries (for example in France) (see: HUNTER 2002). Many of Muslims have taken European nationality and engaged themselves in professional activity, have established businesses and participate in various professional associations and religious organizations. The number of Muslims in Europe has steadily increased due to high birth rate, family reunions and newcomers obtaining a refugee status. There are also numerous converts to Islam, who, along with the young generation of Muslims who have now became European, are at home in Europe. In addition, there is a substantial number of Muslims coming to Europe for temporary stay – to study and work.

One can notice that over the past two decades the reality of the Muslim presence in Europe has changed. There is a revival of Islamic spirituality and practice as well as a feeling of belonging to a religious community amongst a great many young Muslims either born or living in Europe. As a result the number of places of worship has multiplied. There is also a growing number of Islamic organizations, among them active cultural centers. In countries with large Muslim minorities such as France, Great Britain and Germany there are over a thousand official Islamic organizations.

With regard to the present situation of Muslims in Europe it is important to note that the overall assessment is quite positive and optimistic. One may agree with Tariq Ramadan that Muslims are generally allowed to practice their religion in peace, to build

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2 With the illegal immigrants the number of Muslims living in Western Europe is estimated at about few millions more.
mosques and to establish Islamic organizations due to the fact that the various European constitutions and laws respect Islam as a religion and Muslims as believers (Ramadan 2002: 121-122).

When it comes to the expression of Muslim identity, one should bear in mind that “being Muslim” may be manifested in three ways, namely ethnic, cultural and religious. In other words within Muslim communities around the world, including Europe, one may distinguish three different types of communities. First, there are groups of “ethnic” Muslims whose members are not practicing Islam but were born in Muslim families, have Muslim names and have knowledge of important elements of Muslim religion and culture but they are more attached to their ethnic tradition. Second, there are groups of so called “cultural” Muslims who are considered more aware with regard to the issue of the universal dimension of Islam. They are attached to Islamic culture rooted in religious symbols. The members of such groups may differ in political views but they are bound together by strong cultural ties. Finally, there are groups of so called “religious” Muslims who are characterized by strong feeling of belonging to their Muslim umma. They pray five times a day and fulfill other religious requirements and duties. Some of these Muslims follow more spiritual, mystical path and join sufi orders. Others, who believe their duty is to spread the message of Islam and search for new believers, engage themselves in missionary activities and become members of various Muslim organizations. There are also Muslims who believe that Islam is not only a universal religion but also a social and political system adequate for all the people. They are often involved in Muslim fundamentalist organizations. These groups are primarily responsible for the negative image of Islam in Europe.

While discussing the question of European-Muslim identity it is worth noting that nowadays the Western way of living does not only mean a specific attitude, namely distinctive features in peoples’ behavior. The issue is more complex because, as Ramadan pointed out:

Western civilization with its machinery of values is armed with such a powerful means that it makes it difficult for anyone living in Europe to define what he or she is or is not. The media, popular culture, music, the cinema and advertising serve as vehicle to diffuse the concepts of individual and society, freedom and morality, entertainment and duty. Without warning, these concepts take root in the hearts and minds of individual, if they do not subjugate him completely, and make it difficult to determine what is really from him, of his own volition, and what is due to external contributions or influences (Ramadan 2002: 2).

For Muslim immigrants the Western secular context often becomes confusing due to the fact that their culture is based on social values and duties while the environ-

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3 For a few reflections on Islam as ethnicity refer to: Sayyid 1997: 38.
4 For a thorough discussion on the distinctions between Islam and the politically based fundamentalist movement known as Islamism, including the issues, such as the Islamists’ reinvention of jihadism as terrorism, their confusion with the concepts of authenticity and cultural purity and the Islamism as a totalitarian ideology. See Tibi 2012.
ment they have chosen for their new home promotes freedom and autonomy. It is natural that some features of Western culture are quite attractive for Muslim immigrants. However, they should protect themselves from the “unwanted” acquisition of Western models of behavior and from the hasty admiration of Western values.

As for the first generation of immigrants, mainly unskilled workers with a poor knowledge of Islam, it was relatively easy to “protect” themselves and their families by means of a whole series of rules, interdictions or prohibitions. In this way they were “explaining” Islam within the framework of a specific relation of protection from an environment which was perceived by them as too permissive and even hostile. As a result, despite the fact that their “protective rules” sometimes were confusing, had little connection to Islam and were rather linked to their native tradition, the first generation of immigrants from Muslim countries remained strongly attached to their religion and had a feeling of their firm Muslim identity.

For those born and brought up in Europe the problem of their Muslim identity is more complex. Many of young Muslims living in European countries are often not fluent in the language of their parents and their knowledge of both the native tradition and the religion of Islam seem to be weak. How to help these young people to find and understand their roots? How to reconstruct the sense of preserving their Islamic tradition in the modern, secular context? And finally: How these new generations of Muslims born and brought up in Europe could find consciously and freely shape their own way and their own unique European-Muslim identity?

While discussing the issue of Muslim identity and means of protecting it in Western environment, one may agree with Ramadan that Islam “before being a means of protection” should be considered as an affirmative faith which “carries within itself a global understanding of creation, life, death, and humanity.” (Ramadan 2002: 3) Therefore, for today’s Muslims in order to search for their “new” Islamic identity it is necessary to grasp the essence of this global vision of what the Islamic faith is (see: Donohue 1983: 48-61). In other words, it is important that Muslim scholars undertake the task of explaining to people not only the essential principles of the faith, but first of all make them understandable in the light of new context within European society. What is the essence of Muslims identity? What does it mean to be a European Muslim?

Defining a Muslim identity of a person living in Europe is a complex issue and it requires taking into consideration a number of factors. As previously mentioned, a “being Muslim” can be manifested in three ways, namely ethnic, cultural and religious. However, the essence of the Muslim identity is the saying of the shahāda (profession of faith), a testimony that one believes in God and His last messenger Muhammad (Schimmel 1992: 34). The shahāda, the first pillar of Islam also initiates a specific way of life for both an individual and a society. A Muslim first belongs to God and this influences all spheres of his life. The individual recognition of the shahāda and the recognition of the family as the first environment of social life are the basis for entering other social relations. While practicing their religion, Muslims are called upon to face

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5 For some remarks on related issues see: Ramadan 2001: 267-268.
the community dimension of Islamic way of life.\textsuperscript{6} The other four pillars of Islam, namely, the salāt (prayer), the zakāt (almsgiving), the sawm (fasting) and the hajj (pilgrimage) confirm and reinforce the community feeling. Therefore, for a Muslim to practice religion also means to be a member of Muslim ‘umma (community). As Ramadan says:

This (social) dimension is inherent in the Islamic Faith and way of life which, in return, are both strengthened, shaped and directed by this community feeling: \textit{All Believers are but brethren} reads the Qur’an (49:10). Whenever Muslims live we witness the birth of a community first created and based on common Prayer and the prescribed acts of worship and then growing, as the Muslims start to think of and actually set social activities around the mosque or through the medium of other Islamic Institutions (Ramadan 2002: 157).

In conclusion, one may say that shahāda, which is the essence of the Muslim identity together with other four pillars of Islam, upholds community sentiments and determines the social dimension of the Islamic way of life.

What does it mean to be a European Muslim? In other words: How to preserve the essence of Muslim identity in Western context?

There is an agreement among the ‘ulamā’ (religious scholars) which stipulates that it is non-permitted for a Muslim to stay in non-Muslim environment in three cases:

a) without a determined need or a clear objective justifying the stay; b) when the settlement is based only on a selfish will (getting a good job or more money for example) or desire to follow a Western way of life while neglecting Islamic religious prescriptions; c) if the Muslim itself allies himself with non-Muslims for the purpose of fighting Islam or other Muslims (Ramadan 2002: 166).

It is evident that in all other cases, such as working, studying, trading, establishing businesses, cooperating with local entrepreneurs, securing better future for their families, fleeing from persecution, a Muslim is allowed to stay in non-Muslim environment. However, in order that such a stay will be in agreement with the principles of Islam, two essential conditions have to be fulfilled, namely that (1) a Muslim should be free to practice his/her religion and (2) his/her would make all his/her best to work for the benefit of the entire community and contribute to its development by his/her work, study and all kinds of other activities including social, political and cultural engagements.

To be Muslim anywhere in the non-Muslim country in the world means primarily to strive to be a better person and to experience and develop the feeling of belonging to ‘umma.’ Furthermore, according to the Qur’an, every Muslim is individually invested with the common responsibility to bear witness to the Message before all mankind:

Thus have We made you
An Ummah justly balanced,

\textsuperscript{6} For a discussion on the communal solidarity of Muslims see: Ramadan 2001: 247-248.
That ye might be witnesses

Thus duty of a Muslim is to spread this message to his children, to the members of his community and to the others. No matter where the Muslims are (in this case Europe) they are called upon to defend and spread justice, solidarity and values pertaining to honesty, generosity, brotherhood and love, that is, they are called upon to defend human dignity in every circumstance towards Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore, it would be contradictory to Islamic principles for a Muslim living in Europe to act against the existing laws and rules.

As already mentioned, the fact that the number of Muslims in European countries has increased in recent years, as did the sudden awareness of their presence caused by their social visibility, that there are now millions of the followers of Islam residing in Europe and that almost half of them are already citizens, has created various problems, and provoked contradictory reactions among the indigenous population.

It should be pointed out that Muslims coming to Europe after the Second World War experienced three basic diverse models of integration/assimilation process, namely the German, the French and the British.

The characteristic feature of the German model was the initial assumption of the majority of the society that the post-Second World War Muslim immigrants were only temporary settlers who would come to work and after a period of time would return, with substantial savings, to their native country (see: Germany 2005: 32-37). However, as usual, real scenarios proved to be different and the majority of Muslim immigrants decided to stay. The German government had to face an unplanned situation and invent some kind of a program in order to help Muslim immigrant to integrate with the German society, and make important changes in the legislation to enable them to obtain important legal rights and privileges.

The French assimilationist model is based on the concepts of liberty, equality, fraternity and individual freedom that were expressed in France during the Revolution in the late 18th century (1789-1799) (see: France 2005: 21-31). The French believe that the people who form their nation are not necessarily related by blood and that their unity should be based on the acknowledgement of the same universal values. The French secular ideal of life also guarantees freedom of belief and life philosophy. However, this freedom is limited to the private sphere and the manifestation of religious differences in public is not permitted. It should be pointed out that the French assimilationist model offers Muslim immigrants many advantages, including anti-discriminative law system and relatively liberal regulations of acquiring the French citizenship. However, the most important is the well-organized system of public education. The aim of this system is to instill the republican ideals and values in students, eliminating the emphasis on ethnic, religious and social differences. It is worth noting that free access to education at all levels is also provided for the children of illegal immigrants. Despite all these quite advantageous policies, the French assimilationist model does not protect immigrants from discrimination, alienation and anti-Muslim slogans and actions of radical nationalist groups.
As for the British model, it does not focus on full assimilation with the society but promotes the policy of multiculturalism which is based on reciprocal tolerance and enables the immigrants to retain their cultural identity, that is to express their ethnicity and religious beliefs (see: The United Kingdom 2005: 10-19). The idea of multiculturalism is linked with the historical process of forming the British nation from different other nations, such as English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish and a large wave of immigrants from all part of the world during the post-Second World War period.

In Great Britain immigrants are considered an ethnic minority and the integration policy, adopted by the government, focuses on the promotion of tolerance and attempts to eliminate discrimination. Liberal economy promotes individual initiatives and enables the immigrants to participate actively in job market. Furthermore, immigrants are relatively free concerning the observance of their tradition and religious practices. In contrast to the French model, the educational system in Great Britain is not centralized, and therefore the schools are not playing important role in promoting integration and universal values. Although relatively advantageous for the immigrants, British policy of multiculturalism is criticized because it contributes to the separation of ethnic minorities from the society.

Over the last two decades these three patterns evolved and a number of diverse programs were designed in order to facilitate the integration/assimilation process of Muslim minorities with indigenous European societies. Politicians and activists have attempted to address the problem by designing various strategies to help the integration processes while the sociologists reflected on old concepts related to the minority issues and proposed a typology of possible approaches. It seems that the three patterns, namely the three concepts of reference that exist today are similar the three basic models discussed previously. The present-day patterns are: (1) the assimilationist model which supposes a total amalgamation between the Muslim and the Western cultural way of living, (2) an isolationist model which is based on the preservation of identity through the creation of an organized religious and cultural community within the global society and (3) the middle way model, i.e., the integrationist model that should provide both a protection to Muslim identity and an individual status of citizenship (like indigenous people). There is still confusion concerning these concepts and there are debates on more efficient integration strategies that help Muslim minorities to cope with everyday life in European countries. However, one may say that the middle way pattern should be the best solution.

For the last four hundred years the predominantly Christian European societies have gone through a very deep process of secularization. One may say that as a result the issue of faith, religion and practice is limited to a private sphere and no longer plays such an important role in social life. In the recent years there is even a fear of progressive atheism because Europeans are no longer used to a public manifestation of religious beliefs in their everyday lives and in great majority, either not practicing their religion much or not practicing it at all (John Paul II 1995).

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7 For a thorough discussion see: Ramadan 2002: 179-195.
Since for Muslims Islam means not only faith, religion and practice but also embraces all the aspects of their lives, it seems quite natural that in secular European societies they would face two choices, that is between (1) adopting the dominant trend of indigenous people, i.e., to limit the issue of religion to personal intimate dimension and (2) isolating themselves, i.e., to live in Europe out of Europe. However, for Muslims none of these choices proved to be the appropriate ones.

It is true that for a great number of Muslims living in the Western countries and even in the Middle East and Asia, to be a part of today’s modern global society means to adapt themselves to the Western way of life. Since the days of Muhammad ‘Abduh, many Muslim thinkers argue that Islam is a universal message that needs to be “modernized.” In other words the prescriptions of Islam have to be rethought and actualized by giving expression to the modern progress in all spheres of life (see: Arkoun, Mohammed 1994). It seems as if for a modern Muslim living in Europe the choice should be obvious, and, that there is no alternative: to be progressive, open-minded and modern and to be “relatively” European means to “rethink Islam” in such a way that Muslim identity would fit the Western environment. However, as Ramadan underlines, the majority of European Muslims still seem to do not pay much attention to the issue of “modernization” of their minds and “neglect or even ignore both the internal dynamic of Islam and the nature of Muslim identity.” (Ramadan 2002: 185) One may say that although the process of acculturation “helping” Muslims to embrace the Western way of life seems to be irreversible, it is not natural and efficient as predicted. Despite the fact of relative integration and involvement in social, political and cultural life as indigenous population, Muslims of the second and third generation hardly forget their Islamic identity, even though they do not practice their religion.

Many Muslims try to avoid being absorbed into European societies by focusing on community life. Some groups, for example from India or Pakistan, gather in a chosen area in attempt to reproduce a social microcosm, a reminiscence of their native social environment, within which they live among themselves with few contacts with indigenous population or society as a whole. Their aim is to be in Europe but “at home.” It is quite often that within such communities one may find young people from second or third generations who cannot speak English or French properly despite the fact of being born in Great Britain or France. For example, these are the cases of young girls who are treated as if they still were in their native countries of their parents and who are frequently denied the opportunity to acquire good education (Ramadan 2002: 187). It is true that Western environment has important influence on the values, fashions and behavior; especially for Muslim youth and that there is need for new educational programs that would help them to cope with the clash of their native tradition and nowadays Western trends. Therefore, while considering all these dangerous influences, many

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8 For a thorough discussion see: Ramadan 2002: 182-187.
9 Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905), was one of the most famous reformers of Islam from Egypt. He called upon the Muslims to reconcile Western modernity with the tradition of Islam and undertook the task of reforming the teaching at Al-Azhar, the most famous Islamic university. For a recent study refer to: Haj 2009.
Muslims still believe that by isolating themselves from the Western society they would protect well both their ethnic and Muslim identities.

In the twenty first century with the process of globalization getting stronger not only in the sphere of economy but also in the sphere of culture, the issue of peoples’ identity has acquired even more importance. Therefore, both the assimilationist and isolationist are not the right patterns for Muslims to “adjust” to European environment because these patterns can not protect their identity. As mentioned previously, the middle way, namely the integrationist pattern seems to be the most appropriate. As Ramadan pointed out, for Muslims living in Europe nowadays it is important:

to understand who they are and what they stand for means that they are able to determine their identity per se, according to their Islamic references and no longer through the image other develop of them as if they were but objects of some alien elaboration. It is only by acting in this way that European Muslim will feel that they are subjects of their own history, accountable before God, responsible before mankind. To be subject of their own history also means that they will eventually go beyond this pernicious feeling of being foreigners, of being different, of being an obvious manifestation of an insoluble problem (RAMADAN 2002: 189).

It is natural that for the members of the minority groups, in this case Muslims, having a clear awareness of their identity would strengthen their confidence and enable them to establish sound relations with indigenous people. Furthermore, it would help them to get involved in socio-political and cultural life of the local Western community life.

As mentioned previously, in the last few decades Muslim thinkers have been calling to “rethink,” and “actualise” the prescriptions of their religion, so that Islam would give an equate expression to the modern progress in all spheres of life. There is no doubt that this “revitalization” of faith could facilitate the process of shaping a “revitalized” Muslim identity, the essence of which would be firmly grounded in Islamic sources, tradition and culture in the light of modern Western context. Such a “revitalized” identity would protect itself from negative influences of some aspects of the Western life style. All in all, Muslims living in Europe would feel more confident in presenting the right image of their new “European-Muslim” identity.

Ramadan mentions four elements or dimensions that form a modern Muslim identity, namely (1) faith, practice and spirituality, (2) an understanding of texts and context, (3) to educate and transmit, and (4) to act and participate (see: RAMADAN 2002: 189-195).

The most important element of Muslim identity is faith, confirmed and testified by shahāda. It naturally takes concrete form of practice, namely prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage to Mecca. As the consequence of faith and practice Muslims develop their spirituality which keeps their faith alive and strengthens it. It’s important to note that word “Islam” in itself means “submission” to God and spirituality is the memory, re-

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10 For a thorough discussion on related issues see: SAYYID 1997: 31-49.
11 About the importance of faith and practice for Muslims, and in particular these living in the West see: ESPOSITO/MOGAHED 2007: 5-17.
membrance and the intimate effort to fight against human tendency to forget God. One may say that the Muslim identity means primarily “a faith, a practice and spirituality.” Therefore, to respect such an identity is to allow Muslims to perform all the practices that shape their spiritual life. Faith and reference to God, the idea that the sacred does not uniquely lie in rituals, but rather in any act that preserves the remembrance of the Creator in one’s conscience – all these nourish the daily existence of Muslim women and men and give strength and meaning to their spirituality. In the entire Muslim world, one senses that there still remains a very strong imprint of the religious point of reference and conviction that “this life is not the only life.” (Ramadan 2001: 234) Spirituality means a lot to Muslims; it makes them feel closer to God, give them strength to face upcoming challenges and cope with everyday worries and problems. Many Muslims say that spirituality and, in particular prayer, simply “nourish” their souls:

How many times do people in our comfortable society eat? Dieticians recommend three meals and two snacks… Well, Islam views the human being is not only a physical being, but a spiritual being as well, and just as our physical dimension requires regular nourishment throughout the day, so does our spiritual dimension… [five prayers] five small meals for the soul (Esposito/Mogahed 2007: 13-14).

It is worth noting that there is no true faith without understanding. For a Muslim this means to understand both the sources of their faith, namely the Qur’an and the Sunna (Tradition) and the context within which they live. In other words, as Ramadan pointed out:

The responsibility of every Muslim is based on this twofold aspect of “understanding”: that is to develop, in concomitance, “an intelligence of the texts” and “an intelligence of the context” in order to find the way to remain faithful to Islamic teachings. This has been the fundamental teaching of Islamic legal practice since the time of the Prophet, unceasingly kept up by the great scholars over the centuries (Ramadan 2002: 191).

So, it seems obvious that the Muslim identity is based on a permanent dynamic and dialectic movement between the Islamic sources and the environment. In addition, it is in a constant process of “internal” development and growth. Therefore, it “is not closed, confined within rigid and fixed principles.” (Ramadan 2002)

According to Islamic sources it is a duty of a Muslim to learn (Ramadan 2002: 192). Therefore, they should work constantly on increasing their knowledge. This knowledge is the condition of understanding not only the meaning of Islamic sources but also the surrounding world. Furthermore, such a knowledge and understanding would bring Muslims closer to God12 and help to make right choices. All in all, the second element of Muslim identity is defined through an active and dynamic intelligence requiring knowledge, freedom and a sense of responsibility.

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The third element of Muslim identity is “to educate and transmit.” As mentioned previously, it is important for Muslims to remember that their first duty concerning their children is to pass to them the *amāna* (trust). Educating children in order to give them opportunity to receive the trust is the most important function of the parents. They should explain to the children who they are, and then the children, responsible before God, will choose their way. Subsequently, Muslims should also pass the trust to their relatives. Finally, their responsibility before God is to make the message of this trust known by explaining its contents as much as possible and to bear witness to it before mankind.

The fourth element of Islamic identity embraces Muslims’ action and participation. In other words, whenever a Muslim lives, their actions should be defined by “activity and “participation.” As RAMADAN (2002: 194) says:

This action, whatever the country or the environment, is based on four major aspects of human life: to develop and protect spiritual life within society, to spread religious as well as secular education among people, to act for more justice within each sphere of social, economic and political life, and finally, to promote solidarity with all types of needy people.

It should be pointed out that, as viewed in the modern European context, the elements discussed above are essential to both the development and the protection of Muslim identity in its double dimension, namely individual and social. Therefore, it appears that the definition of Muslim identity should be seen as open and dynamic, that its essence has to crystallize in constant interaction with the environment.

One may agree with Ramadan that in our modern world the most advantageous “position” for the Muslims living in Europe would be the “middle path.” While remaining fully aware of the four-fold dimension of their identity, European Muslims should always be ready to participate in the life of the local communities both as Muslims and as citizens.

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This paper considers the issue of human values in intercultural space through the writings of Professor Jerzy Smolicz. It begins by explicating Smolicz’s concept of core values, developed from research on Australian ethnic cultural groups over more than three decades. Core values, he argued, were those central to the survival of viable and identifiable cultural groups. Where these values were lost, individuals assimilated into the mainstream cultural group. Intercultural space can be understood as places where individuals of different cultural backgrounds communicate, interact and co-operate. Such spaces may be transient and targeted to a specific purpose; develop over generations of different cultural groups inhabiting the same geographical region; be fostered in school classrooms; or even occur when an individual experiences ‘the cultural other’ in imagination through a literary or visual text. In such contexts, it would seem most appropriate for human values, those cultural meanings shared by all people as human beings, to prevail. However, Smolicz’s multicultural model for Australian society was based on a balance between the core values of the various minority groups and the overarching values shared by Australians of all cultural backgrounds. It is argued that a similar balance between core values and human values is required, if any intercultural space is to achieve dialogue, communication and fruitful interaction.

Keywords: core values, human values, intercultural space
I wish to approach the topic of human values in intercultural space through the writings of Professor Jerzy Smolicz and the studies he and his research students carried out with participants from more than fifteen different ethnic cultural groups in Australia. In pursuing this line of argument, I am making an assumption, which I will return to later, that Australia over the last four decades can be regarded as an example of intercultural space at the societal level. This is in spite of the many ways it has fallen short of its multicultural ideal. Nevertheless, I consider that Professor Smolicz’s Australian studies can make a useful contribution to any consideration of human values in intercultural space. Let us begin with the concept which has been most associated with Professor Smolicz – core values.

BACKGROUND FACTORS

Professor Smolicz’s academic interest in the core values of cultural groups can be seen to have had its roots in his own personal biography. As a child in 1940, he was deported with his parents from their home in what was then eastern Poland. Over the rest of World War II he spent time in places as different as the collective farms of the Kazakhstan steppes, the ancient Persian capital of Tehran and the cosmopolitan sea coast of Lebanon, to eventually settle after the war in the remote highlands of Scotland. His higher education at the universities of Edinburgh and Oxford included contact with students from many countries. These experiences gave him a lively interest in different cultures and a delight in interacting with people from widely diverse backgrounds (Secombe 2006).

Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to suggest that Professor Smolicz’s positive attitude to cultural diversity had also been fostered by being born into a family which looked back to the centuries old Jagiellonian tradition of multicultural dialogue, interaction and creative co-existence (Zamoyski 1987; Davies 1981). Between the wars this tradition continued to be upheld in the eastern Polish borderlands around Wilno and Nieswież, as well as in the University of Krakow. In my judgment, his knowledge of this practical Polish experiment in multicultural community living had a considerable influence on the way Professor Smolicz thought about the possibilities of cultural maintenance and interchange in the Australian context.

When Professor Smolicz took up a position in the Department of Education at the University of Adelaide in 1965, he found that the local schools were just beginning to be aware of the learning situation of children who came from post-war immigrant families. Many of these children did not speak English at home and maintained patterns of living which were rather different from those families whose descendants had come from Great Britain. Such children found themselves confronted in the Australian school with curriculum and pedagogy which were geared to the English speaking majority group (Smolicz 1971). No matter what school they went to, private, Catholic or state, the children of the newcomers had no option but to learn English and the
Anglo-Celtic Australian culture which dominated the curriculum, the pedagogy, the organisational and relationship patterns of the school.

Within a few years of his arrival in Adelaide, Professor Smolicz (1970:,40) was pointing out that such an approach would result in an inestimable loss of cultural resources, for the individual students and immigrant families concerned, as well as for Australian society as a whole. An early article directly on this issue discussed the benefits of encouraging in Australia what he called cultural interaction, the positive and potentially creative interchange among people brought up in different cultural traditions (Smolicz 1971).

From 1970 he embarked on pioneering research in Australia, based on interviewing immigrant parents and their student children concerning their views of schooling in Australia and the sort of learning opportunities they would like to have access to. It was pioneering in the sense that no-one previously had thought of asking the new arrivals what they thought. These studies were intensified and extended after a period of study leave in Poland in 1972 had introduced Professor Smolicz to humanistic sociology and the memoir method of gathering and analyzing research data. This proved to be a particularly appropriate method for understanding, from their own perspective, the experiences, the aspirations and the feelings of participants of minority ethnic background (Smolicz 1974; 1979, 1999(a); 1999(b)).

CORE VALUES

Over the next thirty years Professor Smolicz and his research students used written or oral memoirs or personal statements to investigate respondents from many different ethnic cultural communities: Italian, Greek and Armenian; Polish, Croatian, Ukrainian and Latvian; Ethiopian and Arab; Chinese and Indian; Vietnamese, Cambodian, Uighur and Filipino, as well as Welsh and mainstream Anglo-Celtic Australian (Smolicz 1979, 1999(a); 1999(b)).

There was a consistent pattern of responses across all the immigrant communities, regardless of when they arrived over the period 1948 to 1998. Despite the overwhelming dominance of English in most contexts in Australian society, many – but not all – parents and their children continued to speak other languages at home and in community gatherings. They wished to maintain their home language and culture in Australia, alongside the learning of English, which they recognised as necessary for communication with others, as well as for participation in the wider society. Many expressed their fears of losing their homeland culture and not being able to share it with their family, as a result of their children learning only English at school and assimilating to the cultural patterns of the dominant Anglo-Celtic-Australian group.

To make sense of these findings, Professor Smolicz proposed that some cultural values (that is, meanings shared by group members) were more important than others for the solidarity and survival of a given cultural group. These he called “core values” in that they were central to the life of the group and had an integrating function for the
culture as a whole. Although his focus at the time was ethnic cultural groups, he recognised that the term could also be applied to other sorts of groups at various levels of social organization.

The solidarity and survival function of core values was most evident when forces, such as colonial conquest or assimilationist pressures, resulted in a particular cultural group losing its core values. All the younger generation could activate were cultural residues which were no longer linked to the central meanings which had held the group and its culture together. The end result was the loss of the culture concerned as a viable and creative way of life for the group. At best, the younger members of the group maintained some residual values, such as food and festivals, on the periphery of their activation of the dominant group’s cultural values, which by default, had replaced the values of their own heritage in their day to day living (Smolicz, 1979; 1999(a); 1999(b)).

In addition, Professor Smolicz considered that core values were those which over generations had come to be regarded by group members as their identifying values. The acknowledging and activating of these core values distinguished those who belonged to the group from those outside the group. Hence the loss of core values not only portended the disappearance of one more culturally different pattern of life, but had disorienting and alienating repercussions for those whose sense of personal identity was deeply rooted in these values.

Professor Smolicz argued that for most, but not all ethnic cultural groups, their own distinctive language was a core value. In other cases religious values were linked to the group’s core, as for example, Greek Orthodox religion for Greeks, Islamic religion for Arabs, Catholic values for Polish people. Strongly collectivist family values were also evident as core values for Greek, Italian, Arab and Vietnamese groups, in contrast to the individualism in family life and personal relations, which was taken for granted as a core value by those of Anglo heritage. His judgment on these core values was based on the fact that the responses of participants in the small scale Australian studies were consistent with the findings of wider research studies on these cultural groups in their ethnic homelands (Smolicz 1979; 1999(a); 1999(b)).

This is not to say that all people identify themselves in ethnic cultural terms. The range of responses in some of our Australian studies indicated that some participants preferred to identify with gender, socio-economic, rural or professional groupings. A few defined themselves in terms of their psychological characteristics. It may be worth recognising that the majority of those who claimed no ethnic identity would have been identified, on the basis of the concrete facts of their birthplace and parental ancestry, as members of the mainstream Australian group (Maniam 2011).

If we return to the issue of human beings communicating and co-operating in “intercultural space,” the key question is whether the concept of core values has any relevance in the modern context of a globalizing world where human values would appear to be most appropriate. The answer to this question depends largely on how the terms “intercultural space” and “human values” are understood.
INTERCULTURAL SPACE

I take the phrase “intercultural space” to refer to a social context or cultural domain where people from different cultural groups meet, communicate, and interact. This interpretation is focused more on actual intercultural outcomes, rather than just their possibility. It is not the physical, geographical location of such encounters which is important, although this may make them more or less possible. In the age of the internet, however, partners of different cultural backgrounds, who are separated by continents and oceans, may actively engage in interchange for a common project. Such “virtual” intellectual space can also be regarded as intercultural in terms of the people involved and what they achieve. At an even simpler level, intercultural space may be created within the mind of a single individual as he or she engages with a literary or scholarly work, or views a film or television program which presents common life experiences through the eyes of individuals of another culture.

An intercultural space may be deliberately contrived through bringing together a group of people from different cultural backgrounds in a given geographical spot for a specific purpose. The June symposium held at Krakow was one such example. Participants were carefully chosen and invited to be part of a “meeting of scholars of many different cultural traditions” from the first announcement of seminar.

On such occasions it is important to ensure that not a single cultural group dominates. For then the cultural values of the dominant group prevail in terms of the language of communication, the organizational patterns, the academic traditions, even the ways of greeting and relating to one another. This is a common experience for those attending conferences in the English-speaking world. Under these conditions, the meeting space cannot be considered intercultural, but rather monocultural, even when the participants come from diverse cultural backgrounds.

Professor Smolicz was acutely aware of this dilemma. In two key committees he chaired on the implementation of multicultural policies in South Australian education institutions, he adopted strategies to ensure that the committees concerned were genuinely intercultural spaces and not dominated by those from the mainstream Anglo-Celtic-Australian group. He arranged that those who came from various minority ethnic cultural backgrounds outnumbered on the committee those who came from the mainstream group. As a result, almost all members felt comfortable in contributing to discussions, while decisions were reached by finding a consensus, rather than passing formal motions, as in the British tradition.

Another possibility is that an intercultural space emerges as a more stable phenomenon under favourable social and cultural conditions. There are some societies and regions where different ethnic cultural communities have lived side by side in the same geographical region for generations, for example, parts of Central Europe, or the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, or international ports or key centres at the crossroads of trade and migration in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In such spaces each group maintains its own culture, while at the same time interact-
ing with the others in the ordinary business of daily living. In maintaining the region as intercultural space, the members of each group come to some understanding and appreciation of the others’ cultures so that the possibility of creative interchange is facilitated.

Such communities create possibilities for intercultural space at a more micro level through long term friendships, relationships or marriages which cross cultural borders. Such spaces can only be regarded as intercultural when both partners have brought their particular cultural values to the relationship. When one partner, by choice or by default, assimilates to the values of the other, the cultural space of their relationship is monocultural, not intercultural.

Perhaps it is here that we can return to our initial assumption that since the adoption of multicultural policies in the mid-1970s, Australia can be regarded as an intercultural space at the societal level. In practice, it is closer to actual reality to say that Australia’s multicultural policies have helped to encourage the emergence of spaces where those of different cultural backgrounds can interact not only on meaningful and inclusive terms but in ways that creatively use cultural variations. Ethnic communities such as Italians, Greeks, Germans, Vietnamese, Chinese and Indian, have established well- patronised annual festivals in which they aim to share their aspects of their culture – food, music, dance, art – with Australians of all backgrounds who are interested enough to attend. Although the interchange on such occasions is at a fairly superficial level, they are important as a public proclamation and acknowledgement that these minority cultural communities are an integral part of Australian societal space.

At the University of Adelaide, the Centre for Intercultural Studies and Multicultural Education (CISME), of which Professor Smolicz was Director for fifteen years, was specifically established as an intercultural space. It provided opportunities for members and others interested, to take part in an intercultural encounter. This experience came partly through the seminar presentations from a wide range of people of varying cultural backgrounds from overseas, other Australian states or remote parts of South Australia, and partly through the interaction among those of many different cultural backgrounds who attended. Other examples of such spaces have been created by some groups of musicians, artists and actors; by students and teachers in the classrooms of some schools; by some churches, some suburban neighbourhoods, and sporting teams in a game like soccer where the majority of team members often come from a range of different minority groups (Maniam 2011).

There are many other spaces, however, in suburbs, schools, churches, rural towns; many teams in sports like cricket and women’s netball, where those of Anglo-Celtic-Australian background predominate and maintain the cultural values of their heritage. The little contact which individuals in these contexts have with those of other cultural backgrounds is always in terms of the mainstream culture. Those of different cultural backgrounds who happen to find their way into this sort of space are expected to follow the patterns of life and ways of thinking of the majority. The space concerned is monocultural not intercultural; no cross cultural exchange, intercultural dialogue or communication is possible (Vlahakis 2012).
Australian schools and classrooms also demonstrate the way in which the creation of intercultural space can be a matter of interpretation and attitude. Given their proportion in the Australian population at large, according to the latest available figures (Department of Immigration & Citizenship 2011), individuals with links to minority cultural groups can be expected to constitute up to 30 to 40% of a university tutorial or seminar group, a class of school students, or a whole school, although in practice particular schools can vary between 10% or less to 70% or more. Where teachers acknowledge and understand the cultural diversity of their students and build its reality into their pedagogy, the teaching and learning space becomes intercultural for them all, a space where dialogue, communication and fruitful interaction take place across cultural groups.

One graduate, all of whose family members were of “Anglo-Saxon ethnic background” remembered her high school as having many students from a range of different European and Asian cultural backgrounds. She described the way:

the teachers made good use of this situation, particularly in the social studies and language classes I attended. We often had lessons where we discussed different cultures first hand, as it were, with the students from different cultures. I learnt a lot from the time I spent there, gaining a much better understanding of other cultural values. Certainly the teaching staff encouraged us to learn about each other’s different cultural backgrounds, pointing out the benefits of broadening our minds, trying to break down senseless prejudices, develop awareness of different languages and [their] function, and in turn learning about our own language in the process (Secombe 1997: 198).

However, this positive experience of an intercultural classroom was mentioned only four times among a group of 43 graduate participants (Secombe 1997).

With other teachers who do not make the effort to find out the background of the students, or who believe in treating all students the same (i.e. as if they were members of the majority group) the teaching/learning space reverts to the cultural monism of mainstream Australians. Even though the class of students and their range of cultural backgrounds is the same, the teaching/learning space ceases to be intercultural – unless the students themselves have reached the point of developing an intercultural momentum of their own in communication and dialogue (Secombe 1997).

A recent small-scale study in an Adelaide secondary college with a predominance of mainstream students and a monocultural school ethos has looked at how the school’s curriculum and pedagogy could influence students toward a personal understanding of the multicultural dimensions of Australian society. Over a four year period, a class of English students engaged in an in-depth study of a number of literary texts which were focused on the experiences and feelings of individuals and families from cultural backgrounds different from the students. A comparison of the students’ written comments about their thoughts and feelings toward those of Aboriginal and Italian cultural background students before and after their study of the literary texts demonstrated that the in-depth engagement with the relevant text created an experience of intercultural space
within the minds of some students which led to a marked change in their attitudes to the “cultural other” (Vlahakis 2012).

HUMAN VALUES

The other key concept which needs clarification is “human values.” In his humanistic sociological approach, Znaniecki (1968) insisted on relating cultural values or shared meanings directly to the group which created, maintained and modified them. If we adopt this approach, then human values would be taken to refer to those cultural meanings which we all share as human beings, as distinct from other animal, or possibly, even extra-terrestrial groups. Human values therefore could be expected to relate to the biological and psychological nature, the social and cultural tendencies which underpin all human life across the globe.

Znaniecki (1968) used the term “cultural universals” to refer to those cultural meanings which are found in all social/cultural groups. These relate to what we all have in common with one another as human beings. Over and above the cultural meanings we share with other members of the specific social and cultural groups to which we belong, cultural universals are expressions of what makes us all humans (Halas 2000).

Nevertheless, it must be recognised that we activate and express these shared human values in different ways, according to the particular cultural groups to which we belong. We may wish to express our sympathy or our sense of oneness with our fellow human beings, but to give voice to these feelings, we must use the words and the linguistic structures of a particular language. At best perhaps, we can follow Pope John Paul II’s example and use a number of different languages for greetings and key ideas, in order to stress the way a common human idea needs to find a diversity of expression among human beings.

The title of the June symposium in Kraków, Human Values in Intercultural Space, implied that in intercultural spaces we would expect to find human values prevailing. The varying participants, for example, could expect to identify one another not in ethnic cultural terms, not in gender terms as men or women, not even as academics and scholars in a particular discipline or interdisciplinary field, but more fundamentally as fellow human beings.

CORE VALUES AND HUMAN VALUES IN INTERCULTURAL SPACE

Let us return then to the basic dilemma in relation to our topic. Is there room for core values in intercultural space? Is the concept of core values appropriate or relevant, when we envisage intercultural space as the domain where participants activate human values? If the purpose of the intercultural space is to foster the Jagiellonian values of dialogue, interaction and creative co-existence or interchange, as it would seem from the
use of the term “intercultural,” then my answer is that the concept of core values is essential for this purpose to be achieved.

To justify this answer, I wish to return to the writings of Professor Smolicz. A glance at the totality of his writings makes it clear that his concern was never just core values per se and the need to preserve minority core values in culturally diverse societies like Australia. His ultimate ideal was the achievement of a multicultural society in which cultural interaction among peoples of different ethnic cultural traditions continued over generations – the ideal of what he called “a dynamic and resilient” multicultural society (SMOLICZ 1999(a); 1999(b)).

This ideal almost certainly had its origins in Professor Smolicz’s understanding of the tradition of fruitful co-existence which marked the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth and neighboring countries during the Jagiellonian period. It looks to the emergence of a society which does not simply tolerate (in the sense of allow to exist in private), but actively encourages diverse cultural traditions, languages and religions as an integral part of the nation. Individuals then have an opportunity for cultural interaction where they can enjoy and share in the cultural riches of the community beyond their own family heritage.

In the Australian context, Professor SMOLICZ (1979; 1999(a); 1999(b)) argued, the achievement of such a multicultural society depended on the core values of the various cultural groups (necessary for their survival as viable creative groups) being held in balance with certain key values which all members of Australian society shared. These he referred to as overarching values, reflecting the image of a societal umbrella under which different cultural groups were sheltered and protected. These included the democratic, legal and economic values which make up the framework of society for all Australians; English as the common language, as well as recognition of religious freedom, acknowledgement of cultural diversity as an integral part of society and the ideal of a ‘fair go’ for all.

The achievement of this point of balance which allows a multicultural nation (SMOLICZ 1999(a); 1999(b)) to flourish usually requires modifications or adjustments to both core and overarching values. In extreme cases, where the core values of a minority group are in direct conflict with a value which overarches society as a whole, there is little chance of achieving the point of balance at all. Consider, for example, the hypothetical situation of a group whose members regard totalitarian forms of government or a strictly hierarchical social structure as their core value. Such a group would not be accepted as a part of the Australian nation as long as democratic and egalitarian values remain so strongly supported as overarching values for the whole society. For this very reason, few members of such groups have ever wanted to come to Australia. Nor, in actual present reality, does the legal framework of Australia, in the area of family law, permit the arrival of individuals, let alone groups, who uphold the practice of polygamy as a core value.

However, in relation to the minority core values discussed earlier, there have been modifications to both core and overarching values. In the Australian context, the religious core values of some minority groups have been easily accommodated because Australian society had already accepted the individual’s right to freedom of religious
belief and practice. Strongly collectivist family values, which had caused some conflict with schools and welfare agencies, have been modified by subsequent generations who have been more willing to accommodate individual needs and interests. At the same time, family law under the Australian overarching framework has been modified to take account of collectivist values.

Linguistic core values have required more compromises. Minority groups were willing to accommodate by accepting English as the common language, alongside their own ethnic language. It has proved much more difficult for mainstream Australians to shift away from the ideal of a monolingual English only society toward accepting bilingualism among speakers of minority languages, and even more, recognising the possible benefits of bilingualism for themselves. Now Australian community languages other than English are accepted by the government in a number of ways in educational, social welfare and arts policies, although the amount of resources allocated varies from government to government.

The details of these modifications in core and overarching values to achieve the point of multicultural balance in Australian society are not important in themselves in this present paper. They have been mentioned rather as examples of the way groups inhabiting the same societal space have adjusted to one another in order to maintain and strengthen the intercultural character of their nation. For I wish to argue that Professor Smolicz’s model for an Australian multicultural society can provide a useful blueprint for the effective functioning of other intercultural spaces.

The Jagiellonian tradition, I would contend, can only become a reality in any intercultural space, when both core values and human values are recognized and acknowledged. Both need to be taken into account. At the most fundamental level, there can be no intercultural space without core values. A space can only be intercultural when it is inhabited by people from more than one cultural background. Core values mark out those cultural groups which are being actively maintained and modified. It is the maintenance of the various core values which ensures on-going diversity in intercultural space.

On the other hand, without human values, there is no way for individuals to cross cultural boundaries or to transcend the more limited and specific culture of their particular groups. The possibility of effective interaction and communication is greatly diminished, if not lost altogether. Those who inhabit an intercultural space, and wish to achieve the multicultural dialogue, interaction and creative co-existence of the Jagiellonian tradition, need to balance the two – the core values and the human values. Indeed, it is the tension of balancing the two which sparks the possibilities of creativity in intercultural space, as human beings learn new ways of doing things from one another.

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ABSTRACT

The colonial period in Burma marked the start of slow changes which would eventually turn a traditional society into a modern one. The changes in Burmese culture which took place in the colonial period were an important aspect of this transformation. In the period of British rule, Burmese culture found itself in an ambivalent situation, on the one hand opposing foreign models and ideas and, on the other, adopting numerous foreign cultural elements which, if treated as cultural tools, allowed for the protection of autotelic indigenous Burmese values.

Keywords: Burma, colonialism, culture, values
The country presently known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar may be considered an entity created primarily by the events that took place in the 19th century. This century of conquest, electricity and steam had a great impact on the political, economic, social and cultural situation in the country. The three Anglo-Burmese wars which took place during this period, the first in the years 1824-26, the last in 1885-1886, eventually resulted in the total annexation of Burma (Fink 2001: 17). Even before this turn of events, Burma’s political elite were well aware of the political and technological superiority of the invaders. Although attempts were made to modernise the country, the impending tragedy could not be stopped. The colonisation of Burma was partially a result of external factors such as the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 which revolutionised the economic relations between the East and the West. Burma became a profitable source of raw materials for the Western market. The colonisers attempted to transform Burma into a consumer of western goods and, through trade, incorporate the country into the sphere of world economy. The Burmese economy had to adapt to this new approach and many structural changes were introduced. Colonialism led to economic exploitation and military oppression but it was also a source of previously unknown inventions, ideas and currents of thought. These pertained to the economic changes mentioned above, the political sphere and even the legal system. As in other colonies, these changes posed a challenge for Burmese culture, the traditional Burmese way of life.

In the period of British rule, Burmese culture found itself in an ambivalent situation, on the one hand opposing foreign models and ideas and, on the other, adopting numerous foreign cultural elements which, if treated as cultural tools, allowed for the protection of autotelic indigenous Burmese values. This process of cultural mimicry also occurred in British Burma among other forms of reaction to colonialism. According to Partha Chaterjee, who may be considered the anthropologist of nationalism, this ideology, a “European import” that founds its way into the colonies, functioned in two parallel domains: the material and the spiritual. Chaterjee describes the first domain as external, encompassing the spheres of „the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed” (Chaterjee 2010: 26-27). It was this domain that was subject to the process of cultural mimicry in its attempts to resemble the West, it was here that “Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated” (Chaterjee 2010: 27). The exact opposite situation took place in respect to the spiritual domain, considered independent and “internal,” containing the essence of cultural identity (Chaterjee 2010). Any attempt to intervene in the spiritual domain, where the autotelic values of any given culture are located, is met with spontaneous and uncompromising resistance direct against the colonial power. That is why close examination of the changes which take place in the spiritual domain in times of colonial rule is of the utmost importance for studies on the development of local nationalism.

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1 For more on the subject of cultural mimicry see: Bhabha 2010: 79-88.
Since the colonisation was conducted by the British Raj, Burma was annexed to it as a subordinate province. This was the greatest mistake made by Great Britain in its relations with the newly acquired colony. As a result of the introduction of administrative models based on those introduced by the British in India, administrators who did not speak Burmese and had little or no knowledge of Burmese culture and customs, were unable to create a system which would relate to the local reality. In order to impose its rule, the British Empire, “on which the sun never sets,” relied on its technological superiority and the power of its state-of-the-art army, which were the primary factors that allowed for the spectacular conquest of Burma. Upon seizing power the borders of the new colony were established in an arbitrary manner by Victorian diplomats and cartographers at Fort Williams (Thant Myint-U 2001: 220), which upset the existing ethnic and religious ties. Apart from ethnically Burmese lands, the newly established area covered a part of the borderlands whose relation with the Kingdom of Ava was tributary or formally non-existent. However, in the 20th century, these borders, marking the areas of colonial influence, became a basis for the establishment of the geopolitical framework of the newly formed Burmese state. What is more, the British, employing the old Roman principle of divide et impera, would frequently favour the representatives of the ethnic minority, allowing them, for instance, to serve in the colonial army, which was inaccessible to those who were ethnically Burmese (Silverstein 1977: 16). By and large, representatives of the British Crown allowed the heads of the local ethnic communities to retain their internal autonomy. Consequently, local social structures were preserved in an unchanged state. Royal and subsequently colonial policy resulted in the creation of strong separatist tendencies within the ethnic minorities which still exist in present-day Burma and are particularly evident among the Shan and Karen people. These tendencies had a substantial impact on the relations between the dominant ethnic group and the minorities and resulted in the creation of a specific type of nationalism in Burma – ethnic nationalism.

THE CLASH OF CULTURES

During a visit to a newly constructed British estate in colonial Burma in 1901, the Viceroy of India, George Curzon, known as the Lord Curzon of Kedleston, assured his listeners that “British [...] do not [...] wish that people should lose the characteristics and traditions [...] of their own race” (Charney 2009: 7). In reality, however, the actions of the new British rulers brutally targeted Burmese culture and national pride. For instance, the Village Act of 1889, among other sanctions, obliged all Burmese nationals apart from Buddhist monks to show respect to British officers by use of the shikbo greeting, previously reserved for the most important elders, representatives of the Sangha – the Buddhist monastic order – and the Buddha (Charney 2009). In the aftermath of colonial conquest, Buddhist values and personal responsibilities to the royal throne were replaced with the indifferent, if not directly hostile, British administration which had little to no knowledge of Buddhist ideals.
The British colonialists of the time were adamant that

England [was] the most highly enlightened and civilized nation upon earth, enjoying the knowledge of the sublime truths of the Christian revelation in its purest form, freed from the errors and corruptions which human devices introduced [...] (Almond 1988: 40).

Moreover, this “exceptional” nation had a specific mission to carry out, best described by an article from an 1854 issue of the *London Quarterly Review*, in which the following words appear:

we have been raised up to civilize the savage, to colonize the uninhabited, but habitable, portions of the globe, and to diffuse the blessings of the Gospel amongst mankind (Almond 1988: 42).

The majority of the British shared the cold sentiment of superiority in relation to the peoples under the authority of the British Empire. This belief was best expressed by the famous British coloniser Cecil Rhodes, in whose honour the name Rhodesia was given to one of the colonies in Africa, who once said: “We happen to be the best people in the world, with the highest ideals of decency and justice, and liberty and peace, and the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for humanity” (Shah 2012: 45). A common belief in the Victorian era was that the so-called “oriental brain” was “less intelligent, more fanciful, childish and simple, prone to exaggeration, generally indolent, and lacking in originality” (Almond 1988: 41). The Burmese themselves were deemed “simple as children of Nature, kind towards man and beast and creeping things, easily pleased, courteous to the last degree contented and peaceful, and devoted to the faith of the Buddha” (Almond 1988: 48). Racism was not so much an incidental fact in the history of the British Empire, but rather the chief support behind the entire British colonial system (Darwin 2012). Because of this approach towards the colonised many among the British colonisers did not even attempt to understand the Burmese in the context of their own culture. The British and the Burmese, two neighbouring societies, were divided by pronounced cultural differences, as stated by a Burmese minister during his conversation with a British emissary in 1826: “Your and our customs are so completely opposite in so many points. You wrote on white, we on black paper. You stand up, we sit down, you cover your head, we our feet in toke of respect” (Shah 2012: 45). Apart from racism, the macho ethos cultivated by the colonisers, according to which they were “masculine imperialists conquering the feminine East” (Saha 2013), was also highly important in the history of the British Empire.

**CREATION OF COLONIAL HISTORY**

When writing about the colonial period in Burma it is worth noting that historians who study this period select certain facts which, according to them, are the most important and subsequently present them in a certain order while also suggesting a particular ex-
planation of these events (Hong 1996: 46). Analyses pertaining to the colonial period focus primarily on the history of the creation and development of local political elites, the study of political parties, their leaders and nationalist movements. As a result, changes that occurred in terms of culture and values remain in the background. Political elites are seen as the most dynamic forces which greatly influence national and political reality. However, it is worth noting that their representatives cannot operate in a cultural vacuum, their actions are always governed by their native culture and the values contained within it. The most important question is not how these new elements, ideas and institution were introduced into Burma, but rather how they were perceived by the Burmese population and how they were incorporated and subordinated to the pre-existing ideologies and value systems. According to Thongchai Winichakul, history requires that those who create it “reconsider the underlying concepts, assumed theories, and reigning paradigms, within which we are refining our craft” (Thongchai Winichakul 2003: 3). This is particularly important in the context of the history of colonial Burma, which was written practically in its entirety by the British, for the British and based on British sources. That is why the materials which serve as sources when writing about the colonial period present primarily the British point of view. Access to local sources is much more difficult due to the language barrier. During the colonial period representatives of the British administration studied “religion, culture and language […] to understand the ‘mentality’ of colonial subjects.” […] (Hong 1996: 49), conducting their research in the service of the colonial project. It is therefore highly important that the specific cultural context of the colonial period is recognised by the historian. As stated by Frantz Fanon: “the colonial world is a Manichean world” in which “[…] the dividing line is determined by the fact of belonging to a particular species, to a particular race” (Fanon 1985: 23). The colonial reality is therefore marked by a separation between the autochthons and the colonisers who exercise authority over them. The colonisation of Burma coincides with a rapid growth in the number of European sources describing it, written by missionaries, merchants, colonial officials and travellers. Gradually these materials become more detailed, comprehensive and thoughtful. A good example of the latter comes in the form of George Orwell’s Burmese Days. Through the words of the book’s main character, Flory, Orwell describes the actions of the British Empire in Burma: “[…] I don’t deny that we modernise this country in certain ways […] In fact, before we’ve finished we’ll have wrecked the whole Burmese national culture. But we’re not civilising them [the Burmese], we’re only rubbing our dirt on them” (Orwell 1962: 42).

THE FALL OF MONARCHY AND THE SAYA SAN REBELLION

Among the wounds inflicted on Burmese culture by the colonial administration the abolition of the institution of monarchy may be considered one of the most painful. It took one night to transform the kingdom into a province of the British Raj. The royal family was exiled and the last king of Burma, Thibaw, died in 1916 in the Indian city of Rattanagiri (Gravers 2007: 8). Attempts were made to weaken the connection be-
tween the royal family and Burma. Among other restrictions, the king, traditionally the patron of Burmese Buddhism, was denied the possibility of donating in the name of the Shwedagon Pagoda (Shah 2012: 92). As stated by one of queen Supayalat’s maids of honour: “[…] you may say she was not a good queen, he was not a good king, but they were our own. Do you think we can love foreign master as we loved our kings, who was, as it were, part of ourselves” (Shah 2012: 83) The majority of the population continued to long for the old times of royal rule during which Burma served as a local militant empire and social order was based on the local culture. Many anti-British partisan uprisings broke out in different parts of Burma as a direct result of the abolishing of monarchy. In the years 1910-1932 there were as many as five anti-British uprisings whose goal was the defence of “Buddhism and tradition” and the expulsion of the British invaders. At the helm of these uprisings stood the minlaungs or “future kings.” The appearance of the minlaung was a sign that foretold the restoration of the social and cosmic order which had been disturbed by the fall of the royal dynasty. In the period of British rule, according to western historiography, these uprisings were of a proto-nationalist nature. This theory has received harsh criticism in modern times. The controversy surrounding this issue brings to mind the Katipunan uprising in the Philippines, which was also of a religious and popular nature. The question asked by Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, a historian of the uprising: “do we really understand what the Katipunan uprising was all about?”, may also be referred to the Saya San uprising – although it has been the object of study of numerous analyses, in reality the created “[… the overall framework of interpretation has remained rather constant” (Ileto 1989: 3). The motives behind the rebellion during the British period are comparable to those which led to uprisings in the pre-colonial period (Prager 2003: 1-32). The uprising is currently treated as a form of social protest that is part of a long tradition of popular rebellion and may be explained only in the context of Burmese Buddhist culture (Prager 2003).

The Saya San Rebellion, considered the largest popular uprising in the times of British rule, broke out on December 22, 1930, at the auspicious (according to Burmese numerology) time of 11:33 PM (Thant Myint-U 2006: 209). The leader of the uprising, Saya San, was also the leader of the Wunthanu in the city of Yazenida, located in the Henzada district (Houtman 1999: 233). The Wunthanu Athin were a nationalist association established in rural villages and supported by the GCBA in their protests against the taxes imposed by the British (Houtman 1999). Their chief goal was the protection of their kind and the continuation of the Burmese tradition. The title of Saya may be translated as witch-doctor or shaman, a person proficient in Burmese astrology, alchemy and medicine, occupying an important position in the local community. It is worth noting that during the described period traditional Burmese medicine was considered quackery by the British authorities. San practised the Burmese art of medicine and highlighted its superiority in many of his publications. In his opinion it was cheaper and more trustworthy than western medicine (Charney 2009: 13).

In response to the deteriorating economic situation of Burmese peasants resulting from the Great Crisis, Saya San declared himself the new king of Burma, taking full
advantage of the vast range of royal symbols and using them to bolster his authority. A white parasol was carried above his head and ceremonies were conducted according to established rules. The colonial authorities, focusing on the royal proclamations and symbols, considered the Saya uprising a sign of Burmese traditionalism (Gravers 2007: 34). The rebellion was regarded as an outburst of superstition inspired by the Buddhist monastic order, a sign of exoticism and the need to civilise the Burmese people (Gravers 2007). Before the uprising broke out, Saya organised *galon athins* in Upper Burma – a secret society whose members were to become recruits in his army. In Burmese mythology *galon* was a mythical bird which killed *naga* snakes. San used the latter term to describe foreigners, most of all the British (Charney 2009: 15). The *galon-naga* opposition is a powerful supernatural force in Burmese folklore which may influence the political situation and facilitate the functioning of *samsara* (Houtman 1999: 235). Political conflict in Burma was traditionally depicted as the clash between *galon* and *naga* (Houtman 1999). An intriguing aspect of the uprising was the tattooing of all those who took part in it. An image of *galon* was tattooed on the chests of the members of Saya San’s insurgent army, who also took an oath upon joining the *galon athin* (Charney 2009: 15). It is worth noting that tattooing as a practice was in decline until the 1920s and was revived by the *Wuthanu*. The British “discovered that one of the first evidences of planned insurrection was marked by increased of tattooing activity” (Houtman 1999: 234). Many *weikza* (magicians) also took part in the rebellion. The tattoos and amulets worn by the insurgents were supposed to protect them from British bullets. On December 5, 1930, the foundation stone for the construction of a new royal capital for Saya San, named Buddha Raja, was laid (Charney 2009: 15). Despite the symbolic preparations, the insurgent army, equipped with canons, swords and spears forged by the local blacksmiths, was decimated by British machine-gun fire. As a result of this military defeat San left his capital disguised as a monk. In March 1931 he travelled to the area populated by the Shan people where he began to form a new insurgent army by recruiting local peasants (Charney 2009: 16). However, the uprising was a complete failure. In August San was apprehended by the colonial authorities. His trial, which ended in his sentencing to death, led to two very important changes. Firstly, the budding nationalist movement in Burma gained a martyr. Secondly, his defender, Dr. Ba Maw, garnered a great following among the people, which would later earn him the post of Prime Minister of Burma. Saya San was hanged in a colonial prison in Tharrawaddy on November 28, 1931 (Charney 2009). His attempt to defend Burmese values, symbolized by the royal throne and the person of the king, ended in failure. His efforts were directed not so much against an invading foreign power, but rather against the “[…] disintegration of their entire social and cultural order, as defined by Buddhist cosmology” (Gravers 2007: 11). In order to sum up this rebellion, reference should be made to the words of Parth Chatterjee who wrote “[…] peasants in their collective actions were also being political, except that they were political in a way different from that of the elite” (Chatterjee 2010: 39).
THE BURMESE FATE OF THE COLONIAL PRISON

The “Burmese fate” of the colonial prison is an interesting example of how western inventions were actually received in colonial Burma and how they influenced the local sphere of values. The modern prison was one of the many innovations, which also included the railway or western medicine among others, that were brought to Burma by the colonisers in the mid-19th century. The term modern prison refers to an institution whose chief goal is the punishment or resocialisation of prisoners. It is generally thought that the first modern prison was opened in 1842 in Pentonville, to the north of London (Wintin/Brown 2005). The Pentonville model spread rapidly throughout the different parts of the British Empire. The central prison in Rangoon and the prison in Insein were both built on this model. Commenting on the prison system created by the colonial authorities Orwell stated that: “They build a prison, and call it progress” (Orwell 1962: 42). Initially it appeared that the penalty regime introduced by the Burmese rulers would be abandoned along with the implementation of the colonial prison system. However, as soon as the concept of the modern prison found its way into the colony, it was promptly modified and adjusted to better suit local needs, as in the case of many other western inventions. In order to introduce these innovations, the existing local practices and traditional penalties for crimes would have to be taken into consideration. The cultural positioning of western inventions and ideas occurred in this manner. Upon closer analysis the contrast between the two prison models in Burma, the local system and the one introduced by the colonisers, is not that pronounced.

In reality the most important aspects of the prison system during the pre-colonial period were already present under British rule. A number of the “innovations” introduced by the British already existed at that time. The external contrast between prisons in the colonial and pre-colonial periods was noticeable mainly in their architecture. Pre-colonial Burmese prisons, with one main building in which the apprehended prisoners were kept, divided by bamboo fences, gave the impression of something temporary, impermanent. On the other hand, the prisons built by the British authorities were of a sturdy and lasting nature, closed off from the outside world by large, thick stone walls equipped with double gates. The wings, in which numerous buildings along with barriers separated different aspects of prison life and different categories of prisoners, spread out from the central point of these walls. During the Victorian period, the architectural purpose of public buildings constructed in the colonies was to convey the power of the British Empire. Similarly as in the case of present-day architecture, the external form of the building was a way for the colonial authorities to communicate their power to their subjects. During the reign of the Burmese royal dynasty convicted criminals were usually punished by flogging, execution or exile. Alternatively, they could also be tattooed, usually on the face, to denote the crime that they had committed or to wound their body (Thant Myint-U 2001: 88). Among the similarities between the two systems, it is worth noting that, like the British colo-
nial regime, the Burmese kings also used convicts as a cheap labour force outside of the prison walls, in the construction of irrigation canals, roads and the like. What is more, the true power in the prison, both during the colonial and pre-colonial periods, was in the hands of the Burmese convicted that were in charge of the other prisoners. Rather paradoxically, their position only strengthened during the colonial period. This was a result of the fact that, in comparison to the mostly British and Hindu senior employees, they were simply closer to the prisoners they were in charge of as a result of physical, cultural and linguistic similarities. The convicted-supervisors were the only workers who could easily communicate with the mass of prisoners. Prison as a form of punishment had already existed in pre-colonial Burma in respect to certain categories of convicts. For instance, monks disturbing the social order by claiming that they have supernatural powers, political opponents, dishonest officials and debtors were all kept in prison for extended periods of time. Highly detailed annual reports, which focused on, among other issues, the number of prisoners suffering from malaria or the number of prisoners flogged in a particular building, were conducted in Burma’s colonial prisons in order to highlight the omnipotence of the colonial administration, its extraordinary ability to control. However, it seems that everyday reality in the colonial prison may have drastically differed from this state of affairs. Existing continuities have: “[…]

Putrid remains of cast-away animal and vegetable stuff [...] the stale fumes from thousands of tobacco-pipes [...] the scattered ejections of the pulp and liquid from their everlasting betel, and other nameless abominations, still more disgusting [...] the exudation from the bodies of a crowd of never-washed convicts, encouraged by the thermometer at 100 degrees, in a den almost without ventilation – is it possible to say what it smelt like? (Gouger 1862: 148).

Gouger was accused of spying for the British Empire and served his sentence in the Let Ma prison, in the years 1824-26. Interestingly, Orwell provides a similar description to Gouger’s when describing a latter-day colonial prison. As admitted by the writer himself, while reminiscing upon the period of his life spent in Burma, he met face to face with “the dirty work of the Empire” (Orwell 2003). He writes about a prison in British Burma: “[...] the wretched prisoners huddling in stinking cages of the lock-ups, the grey, cowed faces of the long-term convicts, the scarred buttocks of the men who had been Bogged with bamboos – all these oppressed me with an intolerable sense of guilt.” (Orwell 2003) During the period of British rule, for the first time in Burmese history, the mass popularising of the vipassana meditative practice took place in colonial prisons. In British prisons this practice referred to an important figure in Theravada Buddhism – Angulimala, a ruthless assassin who planned to kill even the Buddha
himself. However, moved by his teachings, Angulimala repented and redeemed himself by becoming the Buddha’s student (Houtman 1999: 327). In this way even the colonial prison became a vehicle of religious values, one of the elements in the spiritual war against foreign oppression.

THE CREATION OF NATIONAL COSTUME

The issue of clothing, which assumed different shades in different contexts of colonial reality, is another interesting aspect of the changes in Burmese symbolic culture. Clothing in colonial Burma became a manifestation and a symbol of the values cherished by the wearer. However, before these changes were to take place, a radical change, allowing for the creation of a “we-Burmese” versus “they-colonisers” opposition expressed in clothing would have to occur. As a result of colonial conquest, traditional Burmese costume was abandoned and forgotten. Some of these outfits are currently part of an exhibit at the Victoria and Albert museum in London. In the 1920s the Burmese people increasingly expressed their nationalist ideals through their clothing, which was a product of the colonial era in Burma (Thant Myint-U, 2006: 182). Anti-colonial sentiment was manifested through a characteristic outfit composed of gaungbaungs (Charney 2009: 30) (a type of headgear), longyi (trousers), more commonly known under the Malay name sarong, and pinni (a white jacket) (Edwards 2008). It must be stressed that elements of this nationalist outfit were an artificial creation, as noted by the historian Thant Myint U: “No self-respecting man, at least in Upper Burma in the nineteenth century, would have been caught in public wearing a longyi” (Thant Myint-U 2006: 182). Despite this fact, they gained an entirely new meaning in colonial Burma. On November 22, 1921, a Burmese man, Maung Ba Bwa, was apprehended by the British police during his visit to the Shwedagon Pagoda – his pinni jacket and his longyi were treated as a direct “[...] demonstration of his nationalist sympathies” (Edwards 2008).

The creation of the Burmese national costume was a reaction to the dress code brought to Burma by the colonisers. It was composed of: trousers, a beret, a helmet, stockings and boots. In this particular context sturdy footwear was one of the manifestations of colonial stratification, according to which “The settler’s feet are never visible, except perhaps in the sea; but there you’re never close enough to see them” (Fanon 1985: 22). It is worth noting that in the relation between the local community and colonial authorities the so-called “footwear issue” remained a key contentious matter for quite some time. To quote the public announcement placed in front of the Shwe Sandaw Pagoda:: “None permitted to wear shoes in this Pagoda but English and Asiatic Europeans” (Charney 2009: 31). Upon his return from England in 1916, the lawyer U Thein Maung added the line “with no exceptions” to the announcement (Edwards 2008). He chose to ignore the order to remove the added line, issued by the Deputy Commissioner for Burma. Soon after, at the Universal Burmese Buddhist Conference in Rangoon, it was demanded, with the help of the nationalist organisa-
tion Youth Man Buddhist Association (YMBA), that the government ban entry into the pagoda in boots. The lack of consent on part of the colonial authorities resulted in an increase in violence in 1919, which is when a group of monks in the Eindway pagoda in Mandalay attacked a group of boot-wearing, European tourists (Charney 2009: 31). On the one hand, this event is evidence of the determination of the Burmese people in their task of defending Burmese values, on the other, it denotes the growing feeling of discontent among the Burmese resulting from the rejection of foreign authorities.

The issue of clothing was also closely connected to the protection of the local economy. In this case Burmese nationalists were strongly inspired by Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement. After his visit to Burma in 1929, awed by the artistry of the Burmese spinning wheel used for spinning wool, Gandhi decided to encourage the Hindus to boycott clothes produced in other countries. During his visit to Moulmein, Gandhi openly criticised Burmese women for wearing foreign silk, stating that they should: “revise [their] taste for foreign fineries” (Edwards 2008). In Prome he deplored the behaviour of villagers working with foreign yarn, motivated by profit rather than patriotism. Students began to treat the issue of clothing as a symbol of national identity and a way of supporting the Burmese economy. A year after Gandhi’s visit to Burma, as a result of low rice prices and the growing indebtedness of the Burmese villagers to Hindu money lenders, race riots broke out between the Burmese and the Hindus. This led to a marked deterioration in the relations between these two nations. In 1930 Dobama Asiayone, considered the first modern nationalist political group in Burma, was established. Although the group adopted a highly xenophobic approach, the strategies of the organization were borrowed from India. In that very year it was decided that foreign products, such as cigarettes, clothes etc., cannot be imported. The campaign promoting traditionally hand-sewn garments was supported, whilst the clothes produced in the West were boycotted. Even after the country regained its independence Prime Minister U Nu stressed that the national costume is one of the many symbols which “carries with it that distinctive mark of the culture of the race or nation which is its very backbone” (Edwards 2008). The prime minister himself was never seen in public without his longyi and gaungbang. In this period the longyi and thamein are officially named as the country’s national dress. Aung San Su Kyi also wears a longyi, suggesting through her outfit that her efforts are directed towards the democratisation of the country, the “second struggle for Independence” (Edwards 2008). The colonial period also resulted in changes in male hairstyles, “Men in the old days also kept their hair uncut and tied up in a knot on the top of their heads, [...]. By the turn of the century hair was cut short, in the English way, and many [...] sported mustaches in the European fashion and times” (Thant Myint-U 2006: 182) The royal edict of 1811 prohibited short hairstyles for men (Thant Myint-U 2001: 94). In 1962 General Ne Win carried out a coup and subsequently prohibited the wearing of long hair or Western trousers stating that it would be considered a sign of Western corruption (Fink 2001: 133).
PUPPET THEATRE IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD,
FROM THE FALL TO THE REVIVAL

As in the case of Indonesia, the local puppet theatre, in its numerous forms, played and still plays an important role in creating the foundations of Burmese national identity. It was once written that: “[...] no other people in the world enjoy theatrical performances more than Burmese” (Shah 2012: 27). References to puppet theatre are still noticeable in present-day Burma. For instance, in the Burmese language, the expression thi’ ta hmau, which originally denoted the puppeteer’s ability to take out any given puppet out of a box and begin manipulating it, is currently used to describe a trustworthy person (Bruns 2006: 74). This highlights the importance of puppet theatre in Burma. Puppet shows were educational and attempted to promote Buddhist faith among the people. They were also known to contain a more or less discrete political message. The performances focused on numerous aspects of court life, such as court dress, manners and language. Due to the amount of interest in theatrical performances, Burma, under King Bodawpaya, became the first country in the world to create a Ministry of Theatre (Thant Myint-U 2001: 93). Its primary purpose was the “[...] to stimulate the theatre, particularly the puppet theatre, along lines agreeable to the State and to keep it in political accord with the policies of the King” (Bowers 1956: 111). In pre-colonial Burma, as in other countries of Southeast Asia, puppetry-based performances were held in higher esteem than those enacted by actors (Foley 2001). They constituted an important part of Burmese cultural life and word of their popularity, spread by emissaries from Western countries, reached as far as Europe. Burmese puppet theatre, known as Yokthe Thay in the Burmese language, contains visible elements from neighbouring forms of puppet theatre from India, Thailand and Indonesia. Reaching back to its inception, there has always been a strong connection between puppet theatre and religion in all of these countries. Consequently, Burmese puppetry received great support from the ruling class (Alex R.H. Bruns, Burmese Puppetry, op. cit., p. 9). Those in power wanted to protect the cultural and traditional values kept alive through the institution of puppet theatre. In terms of form, puppet theatre has always been conservative. A basic set of puppets used in the 19th century was composed of twenty-eight dolls, which can be divided into three groups: animals, gods and mythical figures, and people (Foley 2001). The outfits worn by the puppets were faithful replicas of those worn at court. The attention to detail was also visible in the puppets’ hairstyles, which reflected those worn in specific dynasties (Bruns 2006: 112), and in their footwear – known as hin tha or karawei, typical of court dress under the Konbaung dynasty (Bruns 2006: 120). There were four puppet stages in place at the royal court during the reign of this dynasty. Rather than financial remuneration for their services, the troupes were given large swaths of land. Puppeteers who were particularly popular received numerous privileges from the king, including the privilege of presenting the royal insignia. Even after

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2 For more information on the subject see: Thanegi 1994.
the fall of the kingdom the former royal troupes continued to present the insignia with pride (BRUNS 2006: 10). During the peak of its development, in the period of the reign of the last Burmese dynasty, it was not uncommon to see up to forty puppeteers taking part in a single performance of puppet theatre (FOLEY 2001).

Due to the annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 and the resulting abolition of monarchy, puppet theatre lost its chief patron in the form of the king and his court. The British did not show any interest in this area of Burmese art. In consequence of the decline of court patronage, the enforcement of the strict requirements that had previously governed puppet theatre gradually slackened. The artists had no choice but to cater to the tastes of the common audience. Additionally, puppet theatre was no longer free as an entrance fee was introduced (BRUNS 2006: 80). The artists were forced to make numerous adjustments as a result of financial problems and the increasingly popular Western invention of cinema.

In the case of the thematic content of the performances, it is worth mentioning the adaptations of works by U Kyin U, which, along with the Jatakas3 and historical dramas, became part of the permanent repertoire of performances (BRUNS 2006: 12). A new character was added among the puppets – Bandula, named after a Burmese general who took part in the First Anglo-Burmese War, usually depicted in a general’s outfit from the Konbaung period (BRUNS 2006: 69). The hsai’kala stage was also added as a reaction to the introduction of horse-racing, brought to Burma by the British. The kala puppet – whose name is a derogatory Burmese remark used to describe Hindus – which appeared on this stage functioned as a stereotypical caricature of a representative of the Hindu community. The hsai’kala stage attempted to re-enact the conflict between the Burmese and the wage labourers from India (BRUNS 2006: 60). As in the other parts of the empire, the British encouraged the migration of a cheap labour force from India and China to Burma. The Chinese and the Hindus, along with Burmese ethnic minorities, played a key role in the political and economic development of the new colonial order (HOUTMAN 1990: 32). Migrant communities played an important part in trade, banking and colonial public service. In the years 1900-1930 immigration from India was equal to approximately 150 thousand people a year, a third of whom would remain in Burma permanently (HOUTMAN 1990). With the outbreak of the Great Crisis Burmese farmers lost land to the Hindu Chettyar, members of any Hindu caste that dealt with trade. The fact that the Burmese people now had to compete for employment with the Chinese and Hindus led to anti-Hindu (1930), anti-Chinese (1931) and anti-Muslim (1938) riots (HOUTMAN 1990: 33).

Other changes came as a result of the decline in audience size, due to which the performers abandoned puppet theatre in favour of the increasingly popular dance theatre. The expensive sai wang orchestra was replaced with a Western invention – the gramophone. For financial reasons, the puppeteers’ manual skills became increasingly important, one puppeteer now had to manipulate two puppets at the same time. „Numerous elements of the show with deep symbolic content were sacrificed“ (BRUNS 2006: 13).

Additionally, the fragments whose purpose was to delay the action of the play were radically shortened. Finally, at the beginning of the 20th century, the lack of both viewers and artists led to a revolutionary change – women were allowed to become performers. According to tradition, women could not go onto the stage either as performers or as spectators. Initially, productions by troupes from Upper Burma gained great popularity in Lower Burma. The puppet shows “[...] reflected the Burmese kingdom and royal power, which – regardless of the sad reality – was painted in glowing colours” – (BRUNS 2006: 81). At times these performances transformed into patriotic gatherings against British occupiers “[...] under whom the country’s old tradition were trampled on and subsequently declined” (BRUNS 2006: 81). However, with time, viewers gradually became less interested and so did the artists, who gradually joined the za’pwe, or dance theatre, which was highly popular in the colonial period. During the period of monarchy, theatre troupes travelled by boat, stopping along the way to give performances. With the development of new means of transport and communication lines, and especially the idée fixe of the British Empire – the railroad, the theatre troupes gained access to previously unreachable areas. From time to time they would give performances in cities on the railway line. After the colonial period came to end there were but a few puppet stages left in Burma and the most famous puppeteers had either died long ago or were too old to perform.

After 1962 and Ne Win’s seizure of power puppet theatre became a tool of political propaganda in the hands of the regime (BRUNS 2006: 15). Puppets began to represent ethnic minorities with the goal of supporting national unity, as was the case in Indonesia where a new type of puppet theatre was created after 1949 – wayang pancasila (BRUNS 2006: 16). During this period the dances of ethnic minorities were also added to the repertoire. As a result of tourism and Burmese nationalism, puppet theatre in present-day Burma is experiencing its renaissance. In the first decades after achieving independence, the Yokthe Thay theatre became a national symbol in the eyes of Burmese nationalists, a symbol which reminds the people of a native, pre-colonial past which is forever lost (FOLEY 2001). Existing theatre troupes did not have a sufficient number of members to stage performances in their entirety, and so the custom ceased to be practised. However, due to the efforts of educated social groups and the interest of Western tourists the tradition has been revitalised to an extent.

THE CLASH OF FOREIGN RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS, THE MISSIONARY CAMPAIGN AND BUDDHISM

The missionary campaign which intensified during the colonial period may be described as a clash of foreign cultures, but also of seemingly contradictory, but in reality complimentary value systems. It was believed at the time that Great Britain was to

to preach the Gospel among nations, to dispell [sic] the darkness that still pervades so large a portion of the globe, to spread abroad the light of Christian truth, and to teach to
millions of her grateful subjects the knowledge of that God who died for their salvation (Almond 1988: 40).

The missionaries considered Burma the embodiment of despotism, idolatry and tyranny, which hindered the development of civilisation and salvation. In 1885, the missionaries serving in the area of Upper Burma, armed by the British, stated that “God is with us, tyranny and the Buddhism are a dying monster” (Gravers 2007: 23). At that time the Burmese believed Christianity to be “[... intolerant, arrogant and absolutist” (Gravers 2007: 22) The missionary campaign intensified after the total submission of the kingdom of Burma. In the period of British rule the Burmese saw this as an attack directed against Buddhism and traditional culture. The missionaries demanded that their Burmese converts completely abandon Buddhism. Even before Burma’s complete submission King Bagyidaw asked missionary Judson whether Burmese Christians “[...] Are they real Burmans? Do they dress like other Burmans” (Gravers 2007: 21) The missionaries did achieve some success in terms of converting ethnic minorities professing animism, but the ethnic Burmese were considered “[...] satisfied with Buddha and their pagodas” (Shah 2012: 105).

The British, as in the other colonies, attempted to “whiten the blacks” by converting them to Christianity. Natives who had converted to Christianity were seen as black on the outside, but, since they were now considered Christians, “white” on the inside (Shah 2012: 214). The converts were recruited into the colonial army along with the Hindus, they could also find employment in the lower ranks of colonial administration. Missionary schools were characterised by a high level of education, but their main goal was to convert the natives to Christianity. “Proselytizing was high on the agenda of all European colonisers: “the plunder of goods [could be] justified by the gift of Christianity” (Shah 2012: 228). Among the missionaries working in Burma, a particularly important role was played by the American Baptist Adoniram Judson from Massachussets who came to Burma in 1812 (Thant Myint-U 2006: 210). During his service as a missionary in Burma he survived two wives and then married again, he also spent 18 months in a Burmese prison during the First Anglo-Burmese War. The crowning achievement of his evangelical efforts came in 1819 when the first convert was baptised (Thant Myint-U 2006). Adoniram Judson served primarily among the animistic Karen who gradually converted to Christianity, casting aside their old beliefs. Judson was also the author of the first Anglo-Burmese dictionary. Judson is thought to have introduced the word Buddhism into the Burmese language by adding the now common term *bok-da’ba-tha*, meaning “Buddhist language, culture,” to his dictionary (Houtman 1990: 55). Thus the missionary campaign also led to changes in Burmese Buddhism (Houtman 1990: 23).

In addition to conducting the missionary campaign, the Western world also attempted to gain more knowledge about Buddhism. As stated by Philip C. Almond (Almond 1988: 7), “Buddhism was ‘discovered’ in the West during the first half of the nineteenth century.” These 19th-century interpretations of non-Christian religions had a great impact on the formation of Victorian culture. The Victorian view of Bud-
dhism reflects the world in which such an image was created, it functions as a mirror in which one can view not only the Orient but also the Victorian world (Almond 1988: 6). At first Western scholars of Buddhism displayed complete ignorance when attempting to tackle the subject. At the beginning of the 19th century most were not even aware of the Buddha's origins. Robert Percival was one of the first to suggest that the Buddha came from Africa: “Buddou [sic!] is always represented [...] with thick, black frizzled hair like an African Negro” (Almond 1988: 20). The theory of Buddhism having non-Indian roots was debated for a long time, with researchers pointing to Africa, Persia or Mongolia as the Buddha's country of origin. Until the 1830s, literature written by Orientalist scholars stated that the Buddha most probably came from Ethiopia or North Asia (Almond 1988: 21). Finally, in 1850, the Western world stopped viewing Buddhism as a form of paganism, it became “the grandest and purest, after Christianity, of all Eastern religions” (Almond 1988: 35). The similarities between Buddhism and Christianity, highlighted during the Victorian period, were the result of the assimilation of Christian terms and phrases to describe Buddhism. For instance, the Christian concept of prayer was the only available analogy to describe the meditational practice of vipassana (Houtman 1990: 43). However, it would take many decades for this practice to receive its due respect. Sir James George Scott, more commonly known under his Burmese literary pseudonym Shway Yoe, writes as follows in his, still influential, 1882 book on Burmese culture: “Most of the older members of the kyaung do, however, what an Englishman would call nothing, all the afternoon. [...] [they] sink into the meditation and many of the weaker of them into sleep,” (Shway Yoe 1963: 35). In reality it would be better to define the “sleep” described by the author as a meditative trance, which is the highest manifestation of entry into the inner Self, characterised by a detachment from the real world which is dominated by delusion. Shway Yoe, though still considered a figure of authority in the area of Burmese culture, exemplifies the incompetence which was typical of early Western authors when describing Buddhist thought and meditation, concepts which are fundamental for Burmese culture. The fact that the English language did not evolve within a Buddhist community, as in the case of all other European languages, constituted an acute problem, in that it cannot accurately describe the subtle differences within Buddhist religious doctrine (Houtman 1990: 74). In the aftermath of colonial conquest, Buddhism also became more aware of foreigners. In 1885 a representative of Sangha described British conquest as follows:

If foreigners are to rule Burma, it will cause many terrestrial animals to be killed and destroyed. The reason is that western foreigners are the type of people who have appetite for enormous quantities of meat. If they arrive in Burma, they will set up killing factories of cows, of pigs, of goats, where so many such creatures will meet their death (Houtman 1990: 29).

As the saying goes, to be Burmese is to be Buddhist, Theravada Buddhism is currently followed by 85 percent of the population (Houtman 1990: 36). In Burma,
Buddhism has been a marker of identity for centuries. Until the 19th century, meditation was reserved only for those who had sufficient knowledge on Buddhist books and were of sufficient age. Currently, as a result of changes in Burmese Buddhism which were introduced during the colonial period, *vipassana* may even be practised by non-Buddhists. King Mindon, who reigned in the years 1853-1878, took an early interest in meditation. He compared life without meditation to “eating curry without salt by which one can never feel contented” (Houtman 1999: 267). His interest in meditation was a type of coping mechanism that allowed to him to deal with his grief after the British conquest of Lower Burma (Houtman 1990: 39). The king’s personal involvement in meditation led to a heightened interest in the *vipassana* practice among the royal family, the court, and even among monks and lay people in his kingdom (Houtman 1990: 41). *Vipassana* was particularly popular in the thirties during the colonial period, the practice brought solace in this time of the Great Crisis and the great corruption of the country’s nationalist leaders. After the country regained its independence and the newly formed government began to support Buddhism, there was an increased interest in meditation after 1962 (Houtman 1990: 22). Le-di Hsa-ya-daw was one of the first and most influential monks to teach *vipassana* in the colonial period. In the face of British conquest and in accordance with the tradition started by forest monks, Le-di Hsa-ya-daw led an ascetic life, only meditating in the woods in complete solitude. As foreigners gradually gained more knowledge of Buddhism, Buddhism slowly became more aware of them. The ancient bond between ruler and Buddhism was broken as a result of British conquest. This is particularly important since there is no concrete ritual in the Buddhist faith which binds the monastic order and lay people into one community. For more than a decade the British authorities did not appoint a new *Tha-tha-na-baing*, which was the head of the Buddhist church in Burma and an instrument of control over the Buddhist monastic order and monasteries. Although the previous *Tha-tha-na-baing* submitted to colonial authority, the Indian government could not support religious administration. This fact, along with the Hindu protests, resulted in a proclamation passed by Queen Victoria in 1858. The Queen made it illegal for the British authorities in India to interfere in the religious beliefs of all subjects subordinate to royal rule (Houtman 1990: 35). The immediate consequence of this change was the development of Buddhist sects. Monasteries and monks previously subordinate to monastic courts would have to answer to lay British law and courts during the colonial period (Houtman 1990: 35). *Sangha* was the only institution which, despite numerous wounds, survived foreign colonisation. As a result, it was Buddhism along with the monastic order devoted to its propagation that united the Burmese people in their fight against the lay colonial authorities, strengthening the position of the anti-British opposition. The practice of *vipassana* became, on the one hand, a type of reaction to the politics of the time and, on the other, a form of creating the new nation-state, a way of building a new nation through the transformation of its people.
THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN MEDICINE IN BURMA

The impact of the introduction of Western medicine into particular colonial estates in Asia in the colonial period was noticed, already in that time, by the British anthropologist John S. Furnivall, who wrote an entire chapter on the history of colonial medicine in Burma (Furnivall 1916). Missionaries-doctors – such as Felix Carey, doctor Adoniram Judson and his wife Anna, doctor Jonathan Price – were some of the first popularisers of Western medicine in Burma. At the 1853 Missionary Convention it was openly stated that medical work was to become one of the means of evangelisation (Naono 2006). In the 1920s the colonial government began a nationwide compulsory campaign against smallpox, which was met with strong resistance and reluctance on behalf of the indigenous population (Charney 2009: 9). Contemporary scholars of colonialism often equate the pacification of the people with vaccination campaigns (Edwards 2010). The main reason for the introduction of the campaign in Burma were the epidemics of smallpox which would periodically devastate the indigenous population, at the same time endangering the lives of the British soldiers stationed in Burma. Consequently, vaccination against smallpox was considered a priority by the British administration. Some early campaigns by missionaries were successful, such as the vaccination campaign started by Felix Carey in Rangoon in 1811, but these were later proven to be exceptions to the rule. The campaigns conducted by missionaries in remote mountainous areas among ethnic minorities who had converted to Christianity were also successful. In one of his reports to the chief commissioner, Keith Norman MacDonald, a civil surgeon in Prome, writes: “I fear it will take many years to impress the importance of vaccination upon the Burmese, because they are so much biased against all foreign innovations [...]” (Naono 2006). The proud colonial authorities were displeased with their failure to popularise free vaccination against smallpox, doctors gradually became frustrated and began looking down on the indigenous population. In reality, however, the greatest problem in terms of conducting medical work in this particular case was the language barrier that existed between the doctors and the natives. In March 1854 the Governor-General of India ordered that every doctor wishing to work in the prison hospital in Burma, which was the main place of employment for doctors in Burma, would have to pass an exam on local everyday language. The primary native language in India was Hindustani and it was this language that was most commonly spoken by the doctors-officers working in Burma. However, as stated by the Undersecretary of the Government of India Robert B. Chapman: “[...] knowledge of Hindoostani will not enable Medical men to converse with their Burmese patients” (Naono 2006). However, it soon became obvious that passing an exam in the Burmese language would be a troublesome affair due to the lack of linguistic competence in this area among the employed doctors. The first Burmese medical school was opened as late as 1931 (Edwards 2010). It is worth noting that the “linkage between Western medical training and nationalist activism was a common theme throughout the British empire and Asia [...]” (Edwards 2010).
Although it is difficult to find examples of doctors in Burma who measure up the likes of the Chinese Dr. Sun Yat Sen or the Indian Dr. Mahathir, there were those – for instance, San C. Po or Thein Maung – who played an important role in the development of the local nationalist movement.

**BURMESE CULTURE AND THE COLONIAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM**

The Western educational system introduced in the colonial period was yet another threat to the Burmese value system. According to Burmese tradition, scholarly work and teaching were a natural extension of religious vocation. Buddhist monasteries were bastions of civilisation and knowledge for centuries; they were also the traditional centres of education. However, just like Buddhism itself, they had to evolve in the new reality. Education plays an important role in shaping the concepts of culture, identity, national affiliation and religion, it is responsible for the socialization of the elites. The conflict that took place in this area after the British conquest of Burma was particularly important for the country’s future. Beginning in 1866, the British administration, embodied in the form of Chief Commissioner Arthur Phayre, attempted to introduce secular subjects into monastic schools with the support of monasteries (Schroeber 2007: 59). Monasteries which agreed to hire secular staff and include these Western school subjects in their curriculum were granted financial aid and their students were given scholarships. However, the reform was not received well by the British conservatives in the colonial government and was criticised by the Buddhist monastic order. Until 1871 only forty monastic schools agreed to employ secular teachers and teach Western subjects, two years later that number had increased to over eight hundred (Schroeber 2007: 59). However, in 1891, four years before his death, Thathanabaing Taungdaw Sayadaw forbade cooperation with the colonial authorities in the realisation of this reform, stating that the presence of secular teachers on monastery grounds was unacceptable (Schroeber 2007: 60). Although Taunggwin Sayadaw, who had been chosen as the new Thathanabaing by the British authorities, stated that he would remain neutral when it comes to the reform in 1901, he also highlighted that according to Theravada Buddhism monks cannot receive pay for their work and that subjects taught at monasteries “[...] should be [...] consistent with the tenets of Buddhism” (Schroeber 2007: 61). Due to the lack of cooperation on part of Sangha, seen as an attempt to undermine the colonial project by the British, Sir Arthur Phayre’s reform was abandoned by the Educational Committee in 1924 (Schroeber 2007: 60). The colonial government turned its attention to non-governmental missionary schools and to those belonging to private committees. Thanks to financial support of the colonial government, the new educational system allowed for the teaching of secular and Christian values to the Burmese people. Christian education was founded before the 14th century but did not play an important role until the First Anglo-Burmese War (Houtman 1990: 102). Its primary goal was to convert the people to Christianity, civilising and educating were secondary objectives (Gravers 2007: 29). Teaching was conducted in English and
the curriculum was based around popularising Western knowledge. Consequently, students were given new possibilities – they could learn a number of different skills and develop in new ways. In the colonial period, students of secular and missionary schools had better job and career prospects, whereas the students of monastic schools became beggars (Houtman 1990: 103). As a result, Western schools quickly became the primary destination for talented and ambitious Burmese students. This deepened the divide between civic areas and the still traditional Burmese countryside, dominated by monastic education, and may be considered a characteristic trait of the Burmese colonial experience. However, along with the creation of the YMBA (a Buddhist organization which was the product of colonial education and was founded by the Westernized Burmese civic elite) in 1906, it became clear that colonial authority was once again subjected to a universal, but now modern in its form, Buddhist cosmology.

THE COLONIAL CENTRE

A British historian once wrote: “The most serious challenges to the continuity of the precolonial social and cultural life would occur in the colonial capital at Rangoon [...]” (Charney 2009: 6). It was in Rangoon, the anglicised centre of the modernisation occurring in Burma, where the country’s internal contradictions were most noticeable. The city, which served as the main port in Burma, with its Victorian architecture, its pattern of streets intersecting at right angles, its public houses and its ethnically and nationally diverse population, was a typical colonial city, similar to its equivalents in British Malaya, China or neighbouring India. After the annexation of Upper Burma, Rangoon experienced a large influx of immigrants which was directly linked to the expansion of the colonial economy. Many public buildings were also erected at the time, including Dufferin Hospital (1887), the Town Hall (1886) or the Government House, built in the years 1892-1895 (Charney 2009: 20). In 1884 steam trams appear on the streets of colonial Rangoon. In 1900 electricity is partially introduced into the city, in the years 1906-1908 the trams are replaced with electric models and in 1907-1911 electric lighting is installed in the streets (Charney 2009). The appearance of the first private automobile in Burma dates back to 1905, ten years later the country would be home to eight buses, 139 motorbikes, 28 taxis and 426 private taxis and lorries (Charney 2009: 21). Three years before the outbreak of WW2 electric trams were gradually replaced by trolleybuses (Charney 2009). The modernisation efforts that took place in Rangoon transformed this initially small Burmese city into a modern metropolis. The contrast between Rangoon and the vast rural areas was pronounced, to quote Fanon (Fanon 1985: 22):

The zone where the natives live is not complementary to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The two zones are opposed, but not in the service of higher unity [...] The settler’s town is a strongly built town, all made of stone and steel. It is a brightly lit town; the streets are covered with asphalt, and the garbage cans swallow all the leavings, unseen, unknown and hardly thought about.
The Burmese language was of lesser importance in Rangoon, its position more akin to that of Hindu languages. At that time a basic knowledge of Hindustani and the other dialects from India was indispensable in everyday life (Zaw 2009). The continuous influx of immigrants from south-eastern India and south-eastern China resulted in the number of migrants surpassing the number of Burmese nationals. The immigrants also began to dominate in the fields of trade, industry and administration. As a result the Burmese living in Rangoon became “foreigners in their own country” (Ferro 1997: 249). This situation was further intensified by the segregation of the native population from the colonial masters, for instance, in the case of the glaring example of the best train compartments being labelled “Only for Europeans” (Charney 2009: 28). In reaction to the ever-present discrimination, Burmese nationalism developed rapidly in colonial Rangoon. Initially, through the YMBA, its primary goal was to protect the Buddhist religion. Soon, however, groups of a nationalist character began to protect the native people and the local economy by boycotting foreign products and inciting ethnic riots.

CONCLUSION

Although the reforms carried out by the colonial authorities in the legal, political, tax, and educational systems had a beneficial impact on the fate of the population, they were of a foreign origin and were not rooted in the local culture. The political system must harmonise with the existing political culture in order to survive. Only then can it be widely supported by the public. If the situation is reversed, the conflict between the political culture and the newly introduced political system will inevitably lead to such great internal tension within society that its release will eventually destroy the established political framework. The case of colonial Burma is an example of this pattern of events. In the pre-colonial period, the kingdom of Burma developed in response to organic, internal political currents, tensions and challenges. In contrast, the colonial authorities modelled their colony in line with the strategic, economic and, above all, commercial interests of the British Empire. British rule in this case was foreign, secular and often of a military nature, which led to the gradual rationalisation of the country in the years 1825-1942, examples of which include: the introduction of differentiation between the public and private spheres, centralization characterised by increased control over the population, increased use of money, increased social mobility, the introduction of Western concepts of law and justice. The colonial period in Burma marked the start of slow changes which would eventually turn a traditional society into a modern one, one type of integrated society into another. The changes in Burmese culture which took place in the colonial period were an important aspect of this transformation. As rightfully observed by Partha Chaterjee (Chaterjee 2010: 27):

[…] it is not as though this so-called spiritual domain is left unchanged. In fact, here nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western.
In the social sciences, local cultures in developing countries are often considered reservoirs of traditional beliefs and convictions which have frozen in place. Only their ongoing substitution with Western models can lead to progress. Consequently, the processes of modernisation taking place in the countries were often confused with changes that took place in the culture. It was wrongly assumed that the changes which were taking place encroached on the sphere of autotelic values, which appeared not to have been affected on closer examination. Ronald Rovencher, an anthropologist, states as follows: “Southeast Asian cultures are changing. However, details have changed much more rapidly than large patterns. Insuring a relationship of continuity between cultural history and modern events in Southeast Asia” (Provencher 1975: 3). Man, along with his culture, was the basic carrier of those ideas and values. That is why the continuity which characterised pre-colonial Burmese culture is also visible in the period after the British annexation of the country. The changes which took place in this distinctive period were a direct response to colonial oppression. However, their main objective was to protect the values encoded in the culture and embodied in monarchical symbolism, theatre, monastic education or the meditational practice of *vipassana*, whose popularity was growing at the time. Existing pre-colonial ideas and values concerning political power and its legitimisation were not replaced by Western models. If anything Western models were influenced by certain aspects of Burmese culture, as in the case of the colonial prison system and the pre-colonial Burmese concepts of power, which were later incorporated into the ideology of the first nationalist organisations in Burma. It is worth noting that the first purveyors of modern Burmese nationalism in the years 1910-1930 and their successors referred directly to the symbolism of monarchical Burma in their actions. Existing values became the basis for the legitimisation of power in post-war independent Burma.

The existing symbolic universe, expressed through clothing, hairstyles, performance arts and other activities, became the cornerstone for the national symbolic universe, in which the echoes of the monarchical past merged with the echoes of colonialism. In this light it seems obvious that any analysis of the development of nationalisms in colonial, or semi-colonial, countries requires, first of all, a more extensive study of the sphere of values and the sphere of symbolic culture, by means of which they are mediated. Attention must be paid to how particular elements which constitute symbolic culture respond to foreign power and oppression. When discussing the damage done to Burmese high culture by British colonialism, it seems apt to quote the still applicable remark of the great Polish sociologist Antonina Kłoskowska, who, referring to the harm inflicted on Czech culture by foreign rulers, writes that “if the intellectual life of the higher classes were to be destroyed, the survival of the elementary, ethnic bases of national culture would allow for its renewal [...]” (Kłoskowska 2012: 59). The above statement serves as a fitting conclusion to the above considerations on the relationship between the world of Burmese and the changes which took place in the Burmese culture during the colonial period.

Translated by Zuzanna Slawik
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